SECOND DIVISION
|
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner, - versus - FORT BONIFACIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Respondent. |
|
G.R. No. 167606 Present: CARPIO
J., Chairperson, PERALTA, ABAD,
PEREZ,* and MENDOZA,
JJ. Promulgated: August 11, 2010 |
x
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
At bar is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
filed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) against
Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation (FBDC),
challenging the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated: (1) January 27, 2003,[1]
denying the prayer of petitioner CIR and the Revenue District Officer,
Revenue District No. 44, Taguig and Pateros, Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), to admit the Amended Petition for Review;
and (2) March 18, 2005,[2]
denying their motion for the reconsideration thereof.
In its decision[3]
dated December 7, 2001, the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) granted the petition of FBDC and ordered the CIR and
the Revenue District Officer, Revenue District No. 44, Taguig and Pateros, BIR,
to refund or issue a Tax Credit Certificate in the total amount
of P15,036,891.26 in favor of FBDC for the fourth quarter of taxable
year 1997.
The
CIR sought to appeal the CTA decision to the CA. The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. UDK-4443. On
On
On
In its Manifestation[8]
dated
1.00. On February 1, 2002, the undersigned counsel
received a copy of the Resolution of this Honorable Court dated January 29,
2002, denying the “MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE PETITION FOR REVIEW”
(dated December 21, 2001) filed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (“Commissioner”)
as well as the Petition for Review.
1.01. The title of the above-entitled case is
wrong. The petitioner should be the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The
decision of the Court of Tax Appeals (“CTA”) in CTA Case No. 5962 subject of
the above-entitled case is favorable to FBDC and the latter is not appealing
said decision to this Court.
2.00. Earlier, on
2.01. It will be noted that in the aforesaid
second motion for extension, the Commissioner prayed for “an extension of
fifteen (15) days from
2.02. Moreover, the second motion for extension
does not show that there is a “most compelling reason” for the second extension
prayed for. Section 4 of Rule 9 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of
Appeals (“RIRCA”) provides that “No further extension shall be granted except
for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.” An identical provision is found in the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure (“RCP”) (Sec. 4, Rule 43).
3.00. On
3.01. It is not “accompanied by a clearly legible
duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order
or resolution appealed from, together with certified true copies of such
material portions of the record referred to therein and other supporting
papers” (Sec. 6[c], Rule 9, RIRCA; Sec. 6, Rule 43, RCP).
3.02. The Petition does not “[s]tate the specific
material dates showing that it was filed within the period fixed herein” (Sec.
6[e], Rule 9, RIRC; Sec. 6, Rule 43, RCP).
3.03. It is not accompanied by proof of service of
a copy of the Petition on the Court of Tax Appeals (Sec. 5, RCP).
On
FBDC then
filed a Counter-Manifestation[11]
insisting on the denial of the admission of petitioners’ amended petition on
the same grounds stated in its
In its
assailed
1) The dismissal of the petition for review and denial of the amended
petition are premised on: (a) the late filing of the original
petition for review earlier filed by the petitioner CIR et al.; (b) the
absence of a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated January 29,
2002;[14]
and (c) lack of authority of Atty. Alberto R. Bomediano, Jr.,
legal officer of the BIR Region 8, Makati City, to pursue the case on behalf of
the petitioner CIR.
2) It should be noted that the first extension to file petition
for review prayed for a period of fifteen (15) days from
3) The last day of filing of the petition for review was on
4) When petitioners received the Resolution dated
5) The proper officer that should have filed the case was the Solicitor
General, citing the case of CIR v. La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory,[15]
not an officer of the BIR.
Petitioners, this time through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion for Reconsideration (Re: Resolution
dated
Aggrieved, petitioner CIR seeks
relief from this Court via this petition for review anchored on the
following:
I
THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE AMENDED PETITION FOR REVIEW DATED
II
THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN HASTILY DISMISSING THE AMENDED PETITION FOR REVIEW CONSIDERING
THAT THE PETITIONER HAS MERITORIOUS GROUNDS SHOWING WANT OF BASIS OF
RESPONDENT’S CLAIM FOR REFUND IN THE AMOUNT OF P15,036,891.26, THEREBY
DEPRIVING THE GOVERNMENT OT ITS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.[18]
On
Petitioner and respondent filed their
respective memoranda.[20]
It appears that the only issue to be
resolved by this Court is whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly
dismissed the original Petition for Review, and denied admission of the Amended
Petition for Review.
We resolve the issue in the
affirmative.
The then applicable rule, Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court,[21]
provided:
SECTION 1. Scope.—This
Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of
Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or
authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board
of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the
President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil
Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer,
National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National
Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act
No. 6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation
Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine
Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission, and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law. (n)
x x x x x x x x x
SEC.
3. Where to appeal.—An appeal under this Rule may be taken to the
Court of Appeals within the period and in
the manner herein provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law,
or mixed questions of fact and law. (n)
SEC.
4. Period of appeal.—The
appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the award,
judgment, final order or resolution, or from the date of its last publication, if
publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of
petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in accordance
with the governing law of the court or agency a quo. Only one (1) motion
for reconsideration shall be allowed. Upon proper motion and the payment of the
full amount of the docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary period,
the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only
within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be
granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen
(15) days. (n)”
The right to appeal is not a natural right. It is also not part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to appeal.[22]
The failure to timely perfect an appeal cannot simply be dismissed as a mere technicality, for it is jurisdictional.[23] Thus:
Nor can petitioner invoke the doctrine
that rules of technicality must yield to the broader interest of substantial
justice. While every litigant must be given the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities, the failure to perfect an appeal within the reglementary period
is not a mere technicality. It raises a jurisdictional problem as it deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction
over the appeal. The failure to file the notice of appeal within the
reglementary period is akin to the failure to pay the appeal fee within the
prescribed period. In both cases, the appeal is not perfected in due time.[24]
[Emphases supplied]
As to the claim that the government would suffer
loss of substantial amount if not allowed to recover the tax refund in the
amount of more than P15M, the Court is of the view that said
problem has been caused by petitioner’s own doing or undoing. While
We understand its counsel’s predicament of being burdened with a heavy case load,
We cannot always rule in favor of the Government. In this case, petitioner even
failed to sufficiently explain its failure to observe the Rules.
Petitioner merely pointed out that due to plain oversight, the motions for extension of time and the petition for review that it filed were erroneously titled as “Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue” when it should have been “Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation;”[25] that “on the assumption that it was respondent which filed the motion, the Court of Appeals, in its Resolution dated January 29, 2002, denied the motion for extension of time to file petition for review on the ground of failure to pay docket and other legal fees;”[26] that respondent filed a manifestation stating that the case was incorrectly titled as it was not the one who appealed the CTA decision to the CA;[27] and that in order to rectify the error, petitioner filed an Amended Petition for Review.[28] To recognize the foregoing statements would render the mandatory rule on appeals meaningless and nugatory.
The point of reference of Our
discussion is not the CA’s Resolution dated
It bears emphasizing that the
dismissal of the petition for review and the denial of the amended petition were
premised rather on: (1) the late filing of the original petition
for review by the CIR; (2) the absence of a motion for
reconsideration of the January 29, 2002 Resolution; and (3) lack
of authority of Atty. Alberto R. Bomediano, Jr., legal officer of the BIR
Region 8, Makati City, to pursue the case on behalf of petitioner CIR.[29]
It has been ruled that perfection
of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law is not
only mandatory but also jurisdictional. The failure to perfect an appeal as required by the rules
has the effect of defeating the right to appeal of a party and precluding the
appellate court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case. At the risk of
being repetitious, We declare that the right to appeal is not a natural right
nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege, and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the
law.
Public policy and sound practice
demand that judgments of courts should become final and irrevocable at some
definite time fixed by law. Such rules are necessary incidents to the
proper, efficient and orderly discharge of judicial functions. Just as a
losing party has the privilege to file an appeal within the prescribed period,
so does the winner also have the correlative right to enjoy the fruits of his
victory. Failure to meet the requirements of an appeal deprives the
appellate court of jurisdiction to entertain any appeal.[30]
Undeniably, there are exceptions to this rule. Petitioner, however, did
not present any circumstances that would justify the relaxation of said rule.
It need not be
overemphasized that it is the responsibility of the counsel to check and keep
track of the period of time left to file an appeal. He cannot escape from
the inflexible observance of this rule which is jurisdictional. The rules,
particularly on the statutory requirement for perfecting an appeal within
the reglementary period provided, must be strictly followed. If an appeal is not
taken within the period prescribed therefor, the judgment becomes final and the
court loses all jurisdiction over the case.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
JOSE
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second
Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
*
Designated as additional member in lieu of Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura
per raffle dated
[1] Rollo, pp. 17-23. Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes with Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner and Associate Justice Danilo B. Pine, concurring.
[2]
[3]
[4] CA rollo, pp. 1-2.
[5] Rollo,
p. 18, cited in CA Resolution dated
[6] CA rollo, pp. 5-6.
[7] Rollo, p. 18.
[8] CA rollo, pp. 7-11.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] Rollo,
pp. 154-155; By mere oversight however,
the CA, in its
[15] Citing
G.R. No. 144942,
[16] CA rollo, pp. 138-147.
[17]
[18] Rollo, p. 39.
[19]
[20]
[21] Appeals from the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies to the Court of Appeals.
[22] Neypes v. Court of Appeals, 506 Phil. 613, 621 (2005).
[23] Nuñez
v. GSIS Family Bank, G.R. No. 163988,
[24] Supra note 22, citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, 379 Phil. 92, 100-101 (2000).
[25] Rollo, p. 35.
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30] In the matter of the Heirship (Intestate Estates) of the late Hermogenes Rodriquez v. Robles, G.R. No. 182645, December 4, 2009, 607 SCRA 770.