Republic of the
Supreme Court
|
ELPIDIO CALIPAY, Petitioner, - versus - NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
TRIANGLE ACE CORPORATION and JOSE LEE, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 166411 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: August 3, 2010 |
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PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for
review on certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the Decision[1] and
Resolution[2] of the
Court of Appeals (CA), dated
The pertinent
facts of the case are as follows:
On July
16, 1999, a Complaint[3] for
illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, underpayment of wages and 13th
month pay, non-payment of service incentive leave pay, overtime pay, premium
pay for holiday, rest day, night shift allowances and separation pay was filed
by herein petitioner Elpidio Calipay, together with Alfredo Mission and Ernesto Dimalanta against herein private respondents Triangle
Ace Corporation (Triangle) and Jose Lee.
Calipay and the other complainants
alleged in their Position Paper that in the course of their employment, they were
not given any specific work assignment; they performed various kinds of work imposed
upon them by Lee; in discharging their functions, they were required by Lee to
work for nine (9) hours a day, beginning from 7:00 a.m. and ending at 6:00 p.m.
with a break of one hour at 12:00 noon; they were also required to report from
Monday to Sunday; for work rendered from Mondays to Saturdays beyond the normal
eight (8) working hours in a day, they were paid a uniform daily wage in the
amount of P140.00 even during holidays; for work performed on Sundays,
they were not paid any wage due to the policy of Lee that his workers must
provide work without pay at least a day in the week under his so-called “bayanihan
system”; in receiving their wages, they were not given any duly
accomplished payslips; instead, they were forced to sign a blank form of their
daily time records and salary vouchers.
It was further alleged that in May
1998, Lee confronted Calipay and
In their Position Paper, private
respondents countered that the termination of Calipay and the other
complainants was for a valid or just cause and that due process was observed.
They claimed, among others, that Calipay was on absence without leave (AWOL) status
from November 2, 1998 up to November 17, 1998; a memorandum dated November 17,
1998, requiring him to explain why his services should not be terminated, was
sent by mail but he refused to receive the same; for failure to explain his
side, another memorandum dated December 11, 1998 was issued terminating
Calipay’s employment on the ground of abandonment of work; there is no unfair
labor practice because there is no union; there is full compliance with the law
regarding payment of wages and other benefits due to their employees;
non-payment of nightshift premium is true, because the company does not operate
at night.
On
Calipay and the other complainants
filed an appeal with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).[5]
On
February 1, 2002, the NLRC rendered judgment via a Resolution[6] based on
the findings that: (a) in dismissing the complainants from their employment,
respondents failed to faithfully observe the requirements of notice and hearing
rendering the said dismissals invalid and illegal; (b) the dismissals were not based on any of the
just causes provided in Article 282 of the Labor Code; (3) the complainants’
failure to report for work were justified by their sudden termination from
employment which nullified respondents’ contention that complainants were
guilty of abandonment of work. The dispositive
portion of the NLRC Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE,
the Decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED, ordering respondents Triangle
Ace Corporation Inc./Jose Lee to reinstate the complainants to their former
position without loss of seniority rights and benefits and to pay them full
backwages reckoned from the date of dismissals up to actual reinstatement which
as of even date amount to P149,017.57 for Alfredo Mission, P148,705.44
for Elpidio Calipay, and P165,961.77 for Ernesto Dimalanta, plus ten
(10%) percent of the total award as and for attorney’s fees totaling P46,368.47
computed as follows:
x x x x
Should reinstatement be not feasible, the payment of separation pay in lieu thereof is awarded.
The Decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Aggrieved, private respondents filed a Motion for
Reconsideration.
On
WHEREFORE, the instant motion being
meritorious is GIVEN DUE COURSE. Accordingly, Our Resolution promulgated on
SO ORDERED.[9]
As a consequence, Calipay and the other
complainants moved for the reconsideration of the above-quoted Resolution, but
the same was denied by the NLRC in a Resolution dated
Calipay and the other complainants then
filed a special civil action for certiorari, with the CA assailing the
On
Calipay filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated
Hence, the instant petition of Calipay
raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT ISSUED ITS DECISION DATED 24 AUGUST 2004 AND RESOLUTION DATED 10 DECEMBER 2004 DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND AFFIRMING THE RESOLUTIONS OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC DATED 30 JUNE 2003 AND 24 SEPTEMBER 2002, WHICH RESOLUTIONS DISMISSED PETITIONER’S COMPLAINT FOR ILLEGAL DISMISSAL BY REVERSING RESPONDENT NLRC’S PREVIOUS RESOLUTION DATED 01 FEBRUARY 2002.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE SUBJECT RESOLUTIONS OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC DISMISSING THE APPEAL FILED BY PETITIONER AND REINSTATED THE DECISION OF LABOR ARBITER PANGANIBAN ORDERING THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT FOR ILLEGAL TERMINATION NOTWITHSTANDING THE PREVIOUS RESOLUTION OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC DATED 01 FEBRUARY 2002 DECLARING THE ILLEGALITY OF PETITIONER’S DISMISSAL FROM EMPLOYMENT.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE WAS UNDULY COMPROMISED WHEN PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED NLRC’S DISMISSAL OF PETITIONER’S APPEAL DATED 06 SEPTEMBER 2000 AND RULED AGAINST PETITIONER’S COMPLAINT FOR ILLEGAL DISMISSAL BASED SOLELY ON TECHNICAL RULES OF PROCEDURE WHEN THE SAME SHOULD HAVE BEEN RELAXED TO GIVE WAY TO MERITORIOUS AND JUDICIOUS CASES SUCH AS THIS INVOLVING DISMISSAL FROM WORK OF AN EMPLOYEE.[10]
Petitioner’s
basic contention is that the CA erred in dismissing the petition filed with it
on the basis of strictly adhering to purely technical grounds. Petitioner argues that he cannot be solely
faulted for his failure to timely file his appeal with the NLRC, considering
that his former counsel suddenly and unexpectedly withdrew his services at the
time that said counsel should have been preparing his appeal, leaving
petitioner without anyone to help him prepare his appeal on time. Petitioner
avers that in a number of cases, this Court allowed the late filing of an
appeal where such appeal by a dismissed worker is, like in the present case,
impressed with merit in order that the ends of substantial justice would be
served.
The
petition lacks merit.
It bears to reiterate the settled rule that the timely perfection of an
appeal is a mandatory requirement, which cannot be trifled
with as a “mere technicality” to suit the interest of a party.[11] The rules on periods for filing appeals are
to be observed religiously, and parties who seek to avail themselves of the
privilege must comply with the rules.[12]
Procedural rules setting the period for
perfecting an appeal or filing a petition for review are generally inviolable.[13] It is doctrinally entrenched that appeal is
not a constitutional right, but a mere statutory privilege.[14] Hence, parties who seek to avail themselves
of it must comply with the statutes
or rules allowing it.[15] The requirements for perfecting an appeal
within the reglementary period specified in law must, as a rule, be strictly
followed.[16] Such requirements are considered
indispensable interdictions against needless delays and are necessary for the
orderly discharge of the judicial business.[17] Furthermore, the perfection of an appeal in
the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory, but
also jurisdictional.[18] Failure to perfect the appeal renders the
judgment of the court final and executory.[19] Just as a losing party has the privilege to
file an appeal within the prescribed period, so does the winner also have the
correlative right to enjoy the finality of the decision.[20]
It is true that procedural rules may be waived or
dispensed with in the interest of substantial justice.[21] This Court may deign
to veer away from the general rule if, on its face, the appeal appears to be
absolutely meritorious.[22] Indeed, in a number of instances, procedural rules are relaxed in order to serve substantial
justice. However, the Court sees no
reason to do so in this case as there is no reason to reverse the findings of
the CA, to wit:
It
must be considered that his [Calipay’s] former counsel had manifested in his
“Withdrawal of Appearance” (p. 80, Rollo) that he was withdrawing as counsel by
reason of his (Calipay) desire to engage the services of another counsel for
purposes of perfecting his appeal from the Labor Arbiter’s Decision and said “Withdrawal
of Appearance” was duly signed by his former counsel with the petitioner’s
conformity thereto and which therefore showed that the latter had assented to
such withdrawal by reason stated therein. Hence, petitioner Calipay could not
blame their former counsel for the non-perfection of their appeal. And even if
it were true, that there was untimely withdrawal of his counsel, the latter
should not be totally blamed as the
herein petitioner is duty bound to protect his interests and he should have
been more vigilant and circumspect of his right in pursuing his case by
observing the rule on perfection of appeal.[23]
Moreover, the Court notes private respondents’ contention that
petitioner again did not comply with procedural requirements when he failed to attach to the instant petition a
verification and certificate against forum shopping as required under Section,
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. On this
basis alone, the petition should be dismissed.
Even if the Court were to disregard petitioner’s violation
of the above-cited procedural rules, a careful review of his contentions, as
well as the records of the case, would show that on its merits, the present
petition should still fail.
A perusal of the assailed Decision of the CA would readily confirm
that the appellate court’s dismissal of the petition filed by herein petitioner
was not based solely on procedural or technical grounds. Thus, the CA held:
Be that as it may, even if We would set aside the technicalities
in the interest of substantial justice as proffered by petitioner Calipay that
the belated filing of his appeal should nevertheless be considered in order to
completely resolve the case on its merits, We opine that the instant case would
likewise fail.
We agree with the Labor Arbiter’s finding that petitioner
Calipay had abandoned his work. x x x
In the instant case, petitioner Calipay had failed to
report for work for unknown reasons x x x His continued absences without the
private respondents’ approval constituted gross and habitual neglect which is a
just cause for termination under Article 282 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines.[24]
Petitioner harps on the
fact that on
Furthermore, petitioner insists
that he is not guilty of abandoning his job and that his failure to report for
work was justified by his unceremonious dismissal from employment. However, the Labor Arbiter made the following
categorical findings:
Complainant Ernesto Dimalanta claimed that he was
dismissed on
Calipay and the other complainants failed to sufficiently
refute these findings of the Labor Arbiter in their appeal filed with the NLRC.
They simply insisted that they did not report for work, because they were
already terminated. However, they did not present any evidence to prove their
allegation. On the other hand, as held by the Labor Arbiter, private
respondents were able to present the DTRs and Salary Vouchers of Calipay and
the other complainants showing that they indeed reported for work even after
their alleged termination from employment.[26] Calipay and the other complainants also failed
to present evidence to prove their allegation that they were forced to sign
blank forms of their DTRs and Salary Vouchers.
Indeed, if
petitioner was dismissed, as he claims, on
On the basis
of the foregoing, the Court arrives at the conclusion that the filing of the
complaint for illegal dismissal appears only as a convenient afterthought on
the part of petitioner and the other complainants after they were dismissed in
accordance with law.
Jurisprudence
has held time and again that abandonment is totally inconsistent with the immediate
filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal, more so if the same is accompanied
by a prayer for reinstatement.[27] In the present case, however, petitioner
filed his complaint more than one year after his alleged termination from
employment. Moreover, petitioner and the
other complainants’ inconsistency in their stand is also shown by the fact that
in the complaint form which they personally filled up and filed with the NLRC,
they only asked for payment of separation pay and other monetary claims. They
did not ask for reinstatement. It is
only in their Position Paper later prepared by their counsel that they asked
for reinstatement. This is an indication
that petitioner and the other complainants never had the intention or desire to
return to their jobs. In fact, there is
no evidence to prove that petitioner and his former co-employees ever attempted
to return to work after they were dismissed from employment.
On the other hand, private respondents were able to present memoranda
or show-cause letters served on petitioner and the other complainants at their last
known address requiring them to explain their absence, with a warning that their
failure would be construed as abandonment of work. Also, private respondents served on petitioner
and the other complainants a notice of termination as required by law. Private respondents’ compliance with said
requirements, taken together with the other circumstances above-discussed, only
proves petitioner and the other complainants’ abandonment of their work.
Finally, it
bears to point out that the Decision of the Labor Arbiter was affirmed by the
NLRC and the CA. The settled rule is that the factual findings of the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC, especially when affirmed by the CA, are accorded not only
great respect but also finality, and are deemed binding upon this Court so long
as they are supported by substantial evidence.[28] In the present case, the Court finds no
cogent reason to depart from this rule.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals, dated
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Second
Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, with Associate Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria and Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente, concurring; rollo, pp. 32-42.
[2]
[3] Records, p. 1.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] Rollo, p. 13.
[11] Moneytrend Lending Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 165580, February 20, 2006, 482 SCRA 705, 714-715; Cuevas v. Bais Steel Corporation, 439 Phil. 793, 806 (2002).
[12]
[13] McBurnie v. Ganzon, G.R. Nos. 178034, 178117, 186984-85, September 18, 2009, 600 SCRA 658, 672; Land Bank of the Philippines v. Ascot Holdings and Equities, Inc., G.R. No. 175163, October 19, 2007, 537 SCRA 396, 406.
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20] Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. Raut, G.R. No. 174209, August 25, 2009, 597 SCRA 66, 72, citing Accessories Specialist, Inc. v. Alabanza, 559 SCRA 550, 562-563 (2008).
[21] Tiger Construction and Development Corporation v. Abay, G.R. No. 164141, February 26, 2010; Iligan Cement Corporation v. ILIASCOR Employees and Workers Union – Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (IEWU-SPFL), G.R. No. 158956, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 449, 461.
[22] Ruiz
v. Delos
[23] Rollo, pp. 39-40.
[24]
[25] Records, pp. 171-172.
[26]
[27] South Davao Development Company, Inc. v. Gamo, G.R. No. 171814, May 8, 2009, 587 SCRA 524, 535; RBC Cable Master System v. Baluyot, G.R. No. 172670, January 20, 2009, 576 SCRA 668, 679.
[28]
Diversifed Security, Inc.
v. Alicia V. Bautista, G.R. No 152234,