Republic of the
Supreme Court
FIRST DIVISION
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HEIRS OF FRANCISCA MEDRANO,
namely YOLANDA R. MEDRANO, ALFONSO R. MEDRANO, JR., EDITA M. ALFARO, MARITES
M. PALENTINOS, and GIOVANNI MEDRANO, represented by their legal
representative, Marites Medrano-Palentinos, |
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G.R. No. 165770 Present: LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BERSAMIN,* |
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Petitioners, |
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PEREZ, JJ. |
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- versus - |
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ESTANISLAO DE VERA, |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondent.
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August 9, 2010 |
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D E C I
S I O N
In cases where the subject property is
transferred by the defendant during the pendency of the litigation, the
interest of the transferee pendente lite
cannot be considered independent of the interest of his transferors. If the transferee files an answer while the
transferor is declared in default, the case should be tried on the basis of the
transferee’s answer and with the participation of the transferee.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] assails
the June 25, 2004 Decision[2]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 80053, which contained the
following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED and this Court orders that
the case be remanded to the court a quo
for further trial.
SO
ORDERED.[3]
Likewise assailed is the appellate
court’s October 6, 2004 Resolution[4]
denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.
Factual
Antecedents
This case concerns a 463-square
meter parcel of land[5]
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 41860 in the name of
Flaviana De Gracia (Flaviana). In 1980,
Flaviana died[6]
intestate, leaving her half-sisters Hilaria Martin-Paguyo (Hilaria) and Elena
Martin-Alvarado (Elena) as her compulsory heirs.
In September 1982, Hilaria and
Elena, by virtue of a private document denominated “Tapno Maamoan ti Sangalobongan,”[7] waived
all their hereditary rights to Flaviana’s land in favor of Francisca Medrano
(Medrano). It stated that the waiver was
done in favor of Medrano in consideration of the expenses that she incurred for
Flaviana’s medication, hospitalization, wake and burial. In the same year, Medrano built her concrete
bungalow on the land in question without any objection from Hilaria and Elena
or from their children.
When Hilaria and Elena died, some of
their children affirmed the contents of the private document executed by their
deceased mothers. To that end, they
executed separate Deeds of Confirmation of Private Document and Renunciation of
Rights in favor of Medrano.[8] They likewise affirmed in said documents that
Medrano had been occupying and possessing the subject property as owner since
September 1982.
Due to the refusal of the other children[9] to sign
a similar renunciation, Medrano filed a Complaint[10] on
April 27, 2001 for quieting of title, reconveyance, reformation of instrument,
and/or partition with damages against Pelagia M. Paguyo-Diaz (Pelagia),
Faustina Paguyo-Asumio (Faustina), Jesus Paguyo (Jesus), Veneranda
Paguyo-Abrenica, Emilio a.k.a. Antonio Alvarado, Francisca Alvarado-Diaz
(Francisca) and Estrellita Alvarado-Cordero (Estrellita). The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
U-7316 and raffled to Branch 48 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan. Medrano then caused the
annotation of a notice of lis pendens
on TCT No. 41860[11]
on May 3, 2001.
Summons upon the original complaint
was duly served upon Pelagia and Estrellita .[12]
On August 29, 2001, Medrano filed an
Amended Complaint[13]
impleading the widow and children of Antonio Alvarado, in view of the latter’s
death.[14] Summons upon the amended complaint was served
upon the other defendants,[15] but no
longer served upon Pelagia and Estrellita.
On April 2, 2002, respondent
Estanislao D. De Vera (De Vera) filed an Answer with Counterclaim.[16] De Vera presented himself as the real
party-in-interest on the ground that some of the named defendants (Faustina,
Pelagia, Francisca, Elena Kongco-Alvarado, Jesus, and Estrellita) had executed
a Deed of Renunciation of Rights[17] in his
favor on March 23, 2002. He maintained that the “Tapno Maamoan ti Sangalobongan” that was executed by the
defendants’ predecessors in favor of Medrano was null and void for want of
consideration. Thus, while some children
affirmed the renunciation of their deceased mothers’ rights in the lot in favor
of Medrano, the other children renounced their hereditary rights in favor of De
Vera.
Medrano filed a Motion to Expunge
Answer with Counterclaim of Estanislao D. De Vera and to Declare Defendants in
Default.[18] She argued that respondent De Vera had no
personality to answer the complaint since he was not authorized by the named
defendants to answer in their behalf.
In an Order,[19] dated
July 30, 2002, the trial court disagreed with Medrano’s argument and admitted
De Vera’s Answer with Counterclaim. The
trial court opined that De Vera did not need a special power of attorney from
the defendants because he did not answer the complaint in their behalf. De Vera made a voluntary appearance in the
case as the transferee of the defendants’ rights to the subject property. The trial court further explained that when
the presence of other parties is required for granting complete relief, the
court shall order them to be brought in as defendants. While it was unsure whether De Vera was an
indispensable party to the case, the trial court opined that at the very least he
was a necessary party for granting complete relief. It thus held that the admission of De Vera’s
Answer with Counterclaim is proper in order to avoid multiplicity of suits.[20] In the same Order, the court declared the
named defendants in default for not answering the complaint despite valid service
of summons. Thus, it appears that the
court a quo treated the named defendants and De Vera as distinct and
separate parties.
Medrano’s response to the aforesaid
order was two-fold. With regard to the
order declaring the named defendants in default, Medrano filed on February 13,
2003 a Motion to Set Reception of Evidence Before the Branch Clerk of Court.[21] She argued that she could present evidence ex parte against the defaulting
defendants on the ground that she presented alternative causes of action
against them in her complaint. Her cause
of action on the basis of acquisitive prescription can be raised solely against
the defaulting original defendants.[22] She thus prayed to be allowed to present
evidence ex parte with respect to her
claim of acquisitive prescription against the defaulting defendants. As for the order admitting De Vera’s Answer
with Counterclaim, Medrano filed on February 21, 2003 a Motion for
Reconsideration of Order dated July 30, 2002.[23] She asked the court to order De Vera to file
a pleading-in-intervention so that he could be properly named as a defendant in
the case.
In an Order[24] dated
March 6, 2003, the trial court resolved to grant Medrano’s Motion to Set
Reception of Evidence. It ordered the
conduct of ex parte presentation of
evidence on the same day and the continuation thereof to proceed on March 10,
2003. Thus, Medrano presented her
evidence ex parte on the set dates.
On March 10, 2003, the case was submitted for resolution.[25]
Given the court’s standing order
which admitted De Vera’s Answer with Counterclaim, De Vera filed a Motion to
Set the Case for Preliminary Conference on March 27, 2003.[26]
The trial court resolved petitioners’
and De Vera’s respective pending motions in its March 31, 2003 Order.[27] The trial court granted Medrano’s motion and
set aside its Order which admitted De Vera’s Answer with Counterclaim. Citing Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, the
court ordered De Vera to file a pleading-in-intervention so that he could be
recognized as a party-defendant. As a
necessary consequence to this ruling, the trial court denied De Vera’s motion
to set the case for preliminary conference for prematurity.
De Vera did not comply with the
court’s order despite service upon his lawyer, Atty. Simplicio M. Sevilleja, on
April 2, 2003.
Ruling
of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC rendered its Decision[28] on
April 21, 2003. It ruled that ownership
over the titled property has vested in petitioners by virtue of good faith
possession for more than 10 years; thus, it was no longer necessary to compel
the defendants - heirs of Hilaria and Elena - to execute an instrument to
confirm Medrano’s rightful ownership over the land.
The trial court likewise held that
the private document denominated as “Tapno
Maamoan Ti Sangalobongan” sufficiently conveyed to Medrano the subject
property. The court held that the
conveyance was done in consideration of the various expenses that Medrano
incurred for Flaviana’s benefit. While
the court conceded that the parcel of land was not adequately described in the
“Tapno Maamoan ti Sangalobongan,” its
location, metes and bounds were nonetheless confirmed by the defendants’
siblings in their respective deeds of confirmation.
The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads, in toto:
WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered:
(1)
Declaring
[Medrano], substituted by her heirs, as the rightful and lawful owner of the
land covered by T.C.T. No. 41860;[29]
(2)
Ordering the
Register of Deeds of Tayug, Pangasinan to cancel T.C.T. No. 41860 and to issue
another Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of [Medrano];
All
other claims are hereby denied for lack of merit.
SO
ORDERED.[30]
De Vera filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[31]
arguing that he was an indispensable party who was not given an opportunity to
present his evidence in the case. He
also maintained that Medrano was not the owner of the property, but a mere
administratrix of the land as evidenced by the records in SP Proc. No. 137577.[32]
De Vera’s motion was denied[33] for
lack of merit on July 22, 2003. The
court noted that De Vera had no legal personality to file a motion for
reconsideration because he did not file a pleading-in-intervention. The trial court explained it would have
allowed De Vera to present his evidence in the case had he complied with the
court’s order to file a pleading-in-intervention.
On September 10, 2003, De Vera filed
a Manifestation[34]
informing the trial court of his intention to file a petition for certiorari
and mandamus before the CA, pursuant to Rule 41, Section 1, second paragraph
and Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
On October 7, 2003, petitioners
filed a Motion for Entry of Judgment and Execution[35] before
the trial court. They also filed a
Counter-Manifestation[36] to De
Vera’s Manifestation. Petitioners insisted
that De Vera, as a transferee pendente
lite, was bound by the final judgment or decree rendered against his
transferors. Even assuming that De Vera
had a right to appeal, the period therefor had already lapsed on August 12,
2003.
In its Order[37] dated December
10, 2003, the court a quo maintained that De Vera was not a party to the
suit, hence his appeal would not stay the finality and execution of
judgment. Thus the trial court ordered
the entry of judgment in Civil Case No. U-7316.
The writ of execution was issued on December 12, 2003.
De Vera sought reconsideration[38] of the
above order but the same was denied[39] on the
basis that De Vera had no personality to assail any order, resolution, or
decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. U-7316.
The Register of Deeds of Tayug,
Pangasinan complied with the writ by canceling TCT No. 41860 in the name of
Flaviana De Gracia and issuing TCT No. 65635 in the names of petitioners[40] on
April 19, 2004.
Proceedings
before the Court of Appeals
De Vera argued in his Petition for Certiorari
and Mandamus[41]
before the CA that the trial court erred in declaring the defendants in default
and sought a writ compelling the trial court to try the case anew. He insisted that he stepped into the shoes of
the defendants with regard to the subject property by virtue of the quitclaim
that the defendants executed in his favor.
Thus, the trial court should have considered the defendants as properly
substituted by De Vera when he filed his Answer.
The standing order of the trial
court with regard to De Vera at the time that it allowed Medrano to present her
evidence was to admit De Vera’s Answer with Counterclaim. Thus, De Vera argued that it was improper for
the trial court to have allowed Medrano to present her evidence ex parte because it had yet to rule on
whether De Vera had personality to participate in the proceedings.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The appellate court agreed with De
Vera. The CA noted that the ex parte presentation of evidence took
place on March 6 and 10, 2003; while the Motion to Expunge Answer and Require
Filing of Pleading-in-Intervention was granted much later on March 31,
2003. The CA held that the trial court
gravely abused its discretion by allowing Medrano to present her evidence ex parte while De Vera’s personality to
participate in the case still remained unresolved. The premature ex parte presentation of evidence rendered a
pleading-in-intervention moot and academic.
The CA pointed out that the trial
court should have exercised its authority to order the substitution of the
original defendants instead of requiring De Vera to file a
pleading-in-intervention. This is
allowed under Rule 3, Section 19 of the Rules of Court. Since a transferee pendente lite is a proper party[42] to the case,
the court can order his outright substitution for the original defendants.
The CA further held that De Vera’s
failure to file the necessary pleading-in-intervention was a technical defect
that could have been easily cured. The
trial court could have settled the controversy completely on its merits had it
admitted De Vera’s Answer with Counterclaim.
Not affording De Vera his right to adduce evidence is not only a
manifest grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
but also runs counter to the avowed policy of avoiding multiplicity of
suits.
The appellate court then ordered the
case remanded to the trial court to afford De Vera an opportunity to present
his evidence.
Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,[43]
which motion was denied[44] for
lack of merit on October 6, 2004.
Issues
I
Whether De Vera could participate
in Civil Case No. U-7316
without filing a
motion to intervene
II
Whether De Vera
is bound by the judgment against his transferors
III
Whether it was proper for the CA
to take cognizance of
respondent’s
Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus
Our Ruling
We sustain the CA’s ruling that the
trial court gravely abused its discretion in refusing to allow De Vera to
participate in the case and requiring him to file a motion to intervene.
The trial court misjudged De Vera’s
interest in Civil Case No. U-7316. It
held that De Vera’s right to participate in the case was independent of the named defendants. Because of its ruling that De Vera had an “independent
interest,” the trial court considered his interest as separate from Medrano’s
claims against the named defendants, and allowed the latter to be tried
separately. Thus, it admitted De Vera’s
Answer with Counterclaim but declared the named defendants in default and
allowed the ex parte presentation of
evidence by Medrano against the named defendants.
The trial court’s approach is
seriously flawed because De Vera’s interest is not independent of or severable
from the interest of the named defendants.
De Vera is a transferee pendente
lite of the named defendants (by virtue of the Deed of Renunciation of
Rights that was executed in his favor during the pendency of Civil Case No.
U-7316). His rights were derived from
the named defendants and, as transferee pendente
lite, he would be bound by any judgment against his transferors under the
rules of res judicata.[45] Thus, De Vera’s interest cannot be considered
and tried separately from the interest of the named defendants.
It was therefore
wrong for the trial court to have tried Medrano’s case against the named
defendants (by allowing Medrano to present evidence ex parte against them) after it had already admitted De Vera’s
answer. What the trial court should have
done is to treat De Vera (as transferee pendente
lite) as having been joined as a party-defendant, and to try the case on
the basis of the answer De Vera had filed and with De Vera’s
participation. As transferee pendente lite, De Vera may be allowed to
join the original defendants under Rule 3, Section 19:
SEC.
19. Transfer
of interest. – In case of any transfer of interest, the action may be continued by
or against the original party, unless the
court upon motion directs the person to whom the interest is transferred to be
substituted in the action or joined with the original party. (Emphasis supplied)
The above
provision gives the trial court discretion to allow or disallow the
substitution or joinder by the transferee.
Discretion is permitted because, in general, the transferee’s interest
is deemed by law as adequately represented and protected by the participation
of his transferors in the case. There
may be no need for the transferee pendente
lite to be substituted or joined in the case because, in legal
contemplation, he is not really denied protection as his interest is one and
the same as his transferors, who are already parties to the case.[46]
While the rule allows for
discretion, the paramount consideration for the exercise thereof should be the
protection of the parties’ interests and their rights to due process. In the instant case, the circumstances
demanded that the trial court exercise its discretion in favor of allowing De
Vera to join in the action and participate in the trial. It will be remembered that the trial court
had already admitted De Vera’s answer when it declared the original defendants
in default. As there was a transferee pendente lite whose answer had already
been admitted, the trial court should have tried the case on the basis of that
answer, based on Rule 9, Section 3(c):
Effect of
partial default. – When a
pleading asserting a claim states a common cause of action against several
defending parties, some of whom answer and the others fail to do so, the court
shall try the case against all upon the answers thus filed and render judgment
upon the evidence presented.
Thus, the
default of the original defendants should not result in the ex parte presentation of evidence
because De Vera (a transferee pendente
lite who may thus be joined as defendant under Rule 3, Section 19) filed an
answer. The trial court should have
tried the case based on De Vera’s answer, which answer is deemed to have been
adopted by the non-answering defendants.[47]
To proceed with
the ex parte presentation of evidence
against the named defendants after De Vera’s answer had been admitted would not
only be a violation of Rule 9, Section 3(c), but would also be a gross
disregard of De Vera’s right to due process.
This is because the ex parte
presentation of evidence would result in a default judgment which would bind
not just the defaulting defendants, but also De Vera, precisely because he is a
transferee pendente lite.[48] This would result in an anomaly wherein De
Vera would be bound by a default judgment even if he had filed an answer and
expressed a desire to participate in the case.
We note that under Rule 3, Section
19, the substitution or joinder of the transferee is “upon motion”, and De Vera
did not file any motion for substitution or joinder. However, this technical flaw may be
disregarded for the fact remains that the court had already admitted his answer
and such answer was on record when the ex
parte presentation of evidence was allowed by the court. Because De Vera’s answer had already been
admitted, the court should not have allowed the ex parte presentation of evidence.
We are not
persuaded by petitioners’ insistence that De Vera could not have participated
in the case because he did not file a motion to intervene. The purpose of intervention is to enable a
stranger to an action to become a party in order for him to protect his
interest and for the court to settle all conflicting claims. Intervention is allowed to avoid multiplicity
of suits more than on due process considerations. The intervenor can choose not to participate
in the case and he will not be bound by the judgment.
In this case, De
Vera is not a stranger to the action
but a transferee pendente lite. As mentioned, a transferee pendente lite is deemed joined in the
pending action from the moment when the transfer of interest is perfected.[49] His participation in the case should have
been allowed by due process considerations.[50]
We likewise adopt with approval the
appellate court’s observation that De Vera’s failure to file a
pleading-in-intervention will not change the long foregone violation of his
right to due process. The ex parte presentation of evidence had
already been terminated when the trial court required De Vera to file his
pleading-in-intervention. Even if he complied with the order to file a
pleading-in-intervention, the damage had already been done. The precipitate course of action taken by the
trial court rendered compliance with its order moot.
Given the Court’s finding that the ex parte presentation of evidence
constituted a violation of due process rights, the trial court’s judgment by
default cannot bind De Vera. A void
judgment cannot attain finality and its execution has no basis in law. The case should be remanded to the trial
court for trial based on De Vera’s answer and with his participation.
Certiorari petition before the CA proper
Petitioners point out that De Vera
admitted receiving the trial court’s Order denying his motion for
reconsideration on July 28, 2003. Thus
he only had until August 12, 2003 to file an appeal of the decision. Having lost his right to appeal by allowing
the period therefor to lapse, respondent has also lost his right to file a
petition for certiorari before the CA.
A special civil action for certiorari is not a substitute for the
lost remedy of appeal.
Respondent argues that a Rule 65 certiorari
petition before the CA is proper because an ordinary appeal would not have been
speedy and adequate remedy to properly relieve him from the injurious effects
of the trial court’s orders.
We agree with respondent that
ordinary appeal was not an adequate remedy under the circumstances of the
case. An appeal seeks to correct errors
of judgment committed by a court, which has jurisdiction over the person and
the subject matter of the dispute. In
the instant case, the trial court maintained that it had no jurisdiction over
De Vera because it did not consider him a party to the case. Its stance is that De Vera, as a non-party to
the case, could not participate therein, much less assail any of the orders,
resolutions, or judgments of the trial court.
An appeal would have been an illusory remedy in this situation because
his notice of appeal would have certainly been denied on the ground that he is
not a party to the case.
On the other hand, certiorari
is an extraordinary remedy for the correction of errors of jurisdiction. It is proper if the court acted without or in
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there
is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in law. Given the circumstance that the final
decision in Civil Case No. U-7316 prejudices De Vera’s rights despite the fact
that he was not recognized as a party thereto and was not allowed to assail any
portion thereof, De Vera’s remedy was to annul the trial court proceedings on
the ground that it was conducted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. With such
annulment, the trial court should hear the case anew with De Vera fully
participating therein.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The June 25, 2004 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 80053 and its October 6, 2004 Resolution are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C.
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
|
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
JOSE
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions
in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* In lieu of Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., per Special Order No. 876 dated August 2, 2010.
[1] Rollo, pp. 14-56.
[2] CA rollo, pp. 152-160; penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S.
Labitoria and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Jose C.
Mendoza (now a Member of this Court).
[3] Id.
at 160.
[4]
[5] Located at
[6] Flaviana
De Gracia died on February 14, 1980 per Certificate of Death, records, p. 10.
[7] Exhibit
“C,” Folder of Exhibits.
[8] Two
of Hilaria’s children, Victorio and Miguel Paguyo, executed the Deed of
Confirmation on September 23, 1998, Exhibit “D,” Folder of Exhibits; while four
of Elena’s children, Elet, Francisco, Dolores, and Felipe, executed their own
Deed of Confirmation on January 26, 2000, Exhibit “E,” Folder of Exhibits.
[9] Pelagia
Diaz, Faustina Asumio, Jesus Paguyo, Veneranda Abrenica, Emilio a.ka. Antonio
Alvarado, Francisca Diaz, and Estrellita Cordero.
[10] Records, pp. 2-8 with Annexes.
[11] Entry
No. 196296, rollo, p. 103.
[12] Records,
p. 32.
[13] Id.
at 136-146.
[14] Ex-Parte
Notice of Death and Motion to Amend Complaint, id. at 134-135.
[15] Id.
at 170 and 197.
[16] Id.
at188-194.
[17] Id.
at 192-193.
[18] Id.
at 206-208. Dated July 1, 2002 and filed
on July 9, 2002.
[19]
[20] Id.
at 226.
[21] Id.
at 230-231.
[22] Id.
at 231.
[23] Id.
at 233-234.
[24]
[25] Id.
at 239. Meanwhile, Francisca Medrano died
and her daughter Edith M. Alfaro was entered as her legal representative (Id.
at 248).
[26] Id.
at 247.
[27]
[28] Id.
at 254-262.
[29] See
Order dated December 11, 2003, id. at 390.
[30] Id.
at 262.
[31] Id.
at 269-271.
[32] Id.
at 275-276.
[33]
[34] Id.
at 289.
[35] Id.
at 297-299.
[36]
[37]
[38] Id.
at 397-399.
[39] Order
dated May 13, 2004; id. at 415.
[40] Id.
at 428-429.
[41] Filed
on October 23, 2003. Entitled Pelagia M.
Paguyo-Diaz, Jesus M. Paguyo, Faustina M. Paguyo-Asumio, Franscisca M.
Alvarado-Diaz, Elena Kongco-Alvarado, and Estrellita M. Alvarado-Cordero,
substituted by Estanislao de Vera v. Regional Trial Court, First Judicial
Region, Branch 48, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, Heirs of Francisca R. Medrano,
namely: Alfonso Medrano, Jr., Editha M. Alfaro, Marites M. Palentinos, and
Giovani Medrano, represented by their legal representative, Editha M.
Alfaro. CA rollo, pp. 10-27.
[42] Heirs of Francisco Guballa, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-78223 and L-79403, December 19, 1988, 168 SCRA 518, 534.
[43] CA
rollo, pp. 165-184.
[44]
[45] Rules of Court, Rule 39, Section 47(b).
[46] Santiago Land Development
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 741, 748 (1997), and its Resolution in 342 Phil. 643, 649
(1997).
[47] See
Heirs of Mamerto Manguiat v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. Nos. 150768 and 160176, August 20, 2008, 562, SCRA 422,
432-433. See also Grageda v. Gomez, G.R. No. 169536, September 21, 2007, 533 SCRA
677, 692-693.
[48] Rules of Court, Rule 39, Section 47(b).
[49] Santiago Land Development
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, supra note 46 at 748.
[50] See
also Dela Cruz v. Joaquin, G.R. No.
162788, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 576, 584, which states: “The rule on the substitution of parties was
crafted to protect every party’s right to due process. x x x [N]o adjudication
can be made against the successor of the deceased if the fundamental right to a
day in court is denied. The Court has
nullified not only trial proceedings conducted without the appearance of the
legal representatives of the deceased, but also the resulting judgments.”