Republic of the
Supreme Court
|
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented
by Chief State Prosecutor JOVENCITO ZUÑO, State Prosecutor GERONIMO SY and
Prosecution Attorney
IRWIN MARAYA, Petitioners, -
versus - HON. BASILIO R. GABO, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch II and WILSON
CUA TING, EDWARD NGO YAO, WILLY SO TAN and CAROL FERNAN ORTEGA, Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 161083 Present:
CARPIO,
J., Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA, ABAD,
and
MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: August 3, 2010 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari[1] under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the July 24, 2003 Decision[2] and October 3, 2003 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 71985.
The facts of the case, as culled from the petition, are as follows:
On May 14, 2001,
around 12:15 a.m., a fire broke out inside the plant of Sanyoware Plastic
Products Manufacturing Corporation (Sanyoware) located at Km. 8,
Sanyoware 2, Warehouse 2, the building that was razed by fire, was located at the right innermost portion of the plant facing north. Sanyoware occupied the right, western portion of the said building, while New Unitedware Marketing Corporation (Unitedware) rented the other half, located at the left, eastern portion. The building was divided at the center by a tall concrete firewall with a steel gate.
Investigations were conducted by the Philippine 3rd Regional Criminal Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG) and the Inter Agency Anti-Arson Task Force (IATF) of the Department of the Interior and Local Government. Pursuant to the August 1, 2001 letter[4] of CIDG Regional Officer P/Supt. Christopher A. Laxa to the Secretary of the Justice; the IATF’s October 25, 2001 Indorsement;[5] and the October 8, 2001 letter[6] of Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) Chief Sr. Supt. Victoriano C. Remedio to the Prosecutor of the DOJ, the following were accused of destructive arson before the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor, namely: Samson Cua Ting, alias Ding Jian Zhi, External Vice-President; Wilson Cua Ting, Plant Manager; Edward Ngo Yao (Yao), President of New Marketing Corporation; Willy So Tan, alias Chen Yi Ming, Vice-President for Operations; Carol Fernan Ortega, Assistant to the External Vice-President; and John Doe and Peter Doe.
In support of the accusation, petitioner submitted the Sworn Statements of Richard Madrideo, Jaime Kalaw, Raymund Dy, Chit Chua, Jennifer Chua Reyes, Shanda Amistad, SPO1 Valeriano Dizon and Inspector Allan N. Barredo.
In his sworn statement,[7]
Richard Madrideo, a supervisor at Sanyoware said that there were two separate
sets of fire in the Sanyoware Warehouse and that it was different from, but
occurred simultaneously, with the fire at the Unitedware Warehouse. Madrideo
claimed that respondents Wilson Ting and
Jaime Kalaw, a former
head of the Maintenance Department of Sanyoware, alleged in his sworn statement[8]
that the cause of the fire could not have been faulty electrical wiring,
because the warehouse was relatively new and that, on the day of the fire, the
plant was not in operation so there was no heavy load of electricity and all
the circuit breakers were shut down. Kalaw noted that a week before the fire
occurred, almost 300 unserviceable molds were transferred to the burned
Sanyoware warehouse. A day before the fire, expensive finish products were
loaded in delivery trucks. In addition, Kalaw alleged that he saw respondent
Raymond Dy, a
warehouse supervisor at Sanyoware stated in his sworn statement[9]
that a week before the fire occurred, he observed that saleable products from
the burned warehouse were transferred to the Sanyo City Warehouse, while
unusable components from the
Chit Chua, an
employee at the Accounting Department of Sanyoware, claimed in her sworn
statement[10]
that Sanyoware was indebted to a number of banks and corporations and that
Sanyoware’s outstanding obligations amounted to P95,000,000.00 to P96,000,000.00.
Jennifer Chua Reyes, a secretary at Sanyoware, alleged in her sworn statement[11]
that Sanyoware has an outstanding loan of P180,000,000.00 to various
individuals.
Shanda Amistad,
a former stay-in worker at Sanyoware, alleged in her affidavit[12]
that, around 8:00 a.m. of May 13, 2001, she saw respondent
SPO1 Valeriano Dizon (SPO1 Dizon), a fireman assigned at the Meycauayan Fire Station, Bulacan, stated in his sworn statement[13] that he conducted the examination of the fire that occurred on May 14, 2001. He alleged that he took the statement of the witnesses, but Sr. Supt. Enrique Linsangan of the BFP Regional Office, Region III, took the witnesses’ statements from him before he could prepare the Final Investigation Report (FIR). Thereafter, Sr. Supt. Linsangan summoned him, Inspector Allan Barredo and BFP C/Ins. Absalon Zipagan, Municipal Fire Marshall of Bocaue, Bulacan, and showed them the copy of the FIR and made them sign it. Inspector Barredo, in his affidavit,[14] corroborated SPO1 Dizon’s allegation as to how Sr. Supt. Lansangan summoned and ordered them to sign the FIR.
In their defense, respondents submitted a Counter-Affidavit[15] to refute the allegations made against them, the significant portions of which read:
7. Principally on the basis of the “Salaysay”
of Richard Madrideo attached Annex “A” to the Affidavit of Carol Ortega Fernan
dated September 22, 2001, and on the basis of the “Sinumpaang Salaysay” of Ricky A. Hista and of the “Karagdagang
Salaysay” of Bobby Bacang and on the basis of our inquiry from others, we have
good reason to believe that one claiming to be a representative of CRM
Adjustment Corporation had indeed offered money and jobs to persons to give
perjured statements to make it appear that there was arson and that we
committed it. (The Affidavit of Carol Ortega Fernan, together with the
“Salaysay” of Richard Madrideo as Annex “A” thereto, the “Sinumpaang Salaysay”
of Ricky A. Hista and the “Karagdagang Salaysay” of Bobby Bacang were all
submitted last September 22, 2001 to the Inter Agency Anti-Arson Task Force,
Office of the Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local Government.
8.
We would like to stress the fact that
during the supposed investigation of this arson case by complainant 3rd
Regional Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, not one of us was invited
by complainant to answer the allegations of witnesses against us. As far as we know, complainant did not even
make an ocular inspection of the place where fire occurred.
9. Although the CIDG investigators were
allegedly informed by Mrs. June Go, a clerk of Sanyoware, that nobody could
assist the team in the ocular inspection, said investigators did not proceed to
conduct an ocular inspection when they actually did not need any assistance and
when nobody was preventing them from conducting the inspection.
10. Although Senior Police Officer Regino Raquipiso
claims that when he and SPO1 John Tabago returned to the factory, the ocular
inspection was not pushed through for alleged lack of clearance from the
company owners, there is no showing that said police officers insisted or
demanded to conduct then and there an ocular inspection.
11. Apparently, complainant solely relied on the
statements of Jaime Kalaw, Raymond Dy and Richard Madrideo in deciding to file
the case at bar against us.
12. Richard
Madrideo executed a “Sinumpaang Salaysay” before SPO4 Regino D. Raquipiso, Jr.
last June 29, 2001 wherein he claims, among others, that there was a
simultaneous fire that occurred in two places in Sanyoware warehouse and in a
place in Unitedware. However, said claim
is a blatant lie and perjured statement.
13. In his
“Salaysay” (Annex “A” to the Affidavit of Carol Ortega Fernan submitted last September
22, 2001 to the Inter Agency Anti-Arson Task Force), Richard Madrideo admitted
to the fact that he received the sum of P1,000.00 from Atty. Lugtu and
that he subsequently received another sum of P15,000.00 from Atty.
Lugtu. Richard Madrideo was also given a
cellphone and was promised a job.
According to said “Salaysay,” Atty. Lugtu instructed Madrideo to state,
among others, in his “Salaysay” that Madrideo saw a simultaneous fire that
occurred in two sides of the plant of Sanyoware.
14.
In the “Karagdagang Salaysay” of
Richard Madrideo, he repudiated his “Salaysay” by claiming that he was
threatened and coerced by Respondents into executing said “Salaysay.” Said claim is a blatant lie. In essence, the story contained in the
“Karagdagang Salaysay” regarding alleged threats and coercion is nothing but a
fabricated lie for the truth of the matter being that his “Salaysay” was
executed by him freely and voluntarily last July 30, 2001 at the conference
room of Sanyoware. He was not threatened
by anyone. He was neither paid nor
promised any consideration for executing said “Salaysay.”
15. At any
rate, I, Wilson Ting, and the security guards on duty can attest to the fact
that fire started at the warehouse of Unitedware and that it did not occur
simultaneously in different places.
16.
In the Sworn Statement of Raymond Dy,
he claims that Richard Madrideo had told him that while the fire was on going
at the Unitedware warehouse, Madrideo saw the fire on top of the stock piles
inside the Sanyoware warehouse aside from that fire at the Unitedware. However, Jaime Kalaw, who was allegedly
informed about the fire by Raymond Dy, did not mention in his Sworn Statement
about any simultaneous occurrence of the fire in different places. Jaime Kalaw even further stated in his Sworn
Statement that upon his inquiry from the employees, he was allegedly told that
the fire originated from Unitedware warehouse that spread to Sanyoware
warehouse.
17. The
allegation of Jaime Kalaw in his Sworn Statement that all circuit breakers were
“off” position so that there was no flow of electric current that may cause
fire on the warehouses and the allegation of Raymond Dy that during his roving
before the fire, all the lights were “off” are not true for the truth being
that management had required that some lights be put on every night in all the
warehouses so that they can be well guarded.
Besides, I, Wilson Ting, and the guards on duty can attest to the fact
that there were lights in all the warehouses during the subject incident.
18. Raymond Dy claims that the keys were usually
kept by the guard on duty, but that on this occasion, he learned from Shandra Amistad,
a stay-in helper, that the keys were then kept by Wilson Ting. Obviously, said claim is based on hearsay and
thus, should not be given any credence and besides, I, Wilson Ting, deny said
claim for the truth of the matter being that the keys of Sanyoware are kept
inside its main office and are not kept by the guard on duty.
19. Raymond Dy also claims that the lights were 3
to 4 meters away from the stocks, so that it could be impossible that stocks
will be caught by fire if and when the lights or electrical system leak
down. However, said claim is not true
for the fact of the matter is that in the Unitedware warehouse and in Sanyoware
warehouse, there were so much pile[s] of stocks that some pile[s] almost
reached the lights.
20. There
is also no truth to the allegation of Raymond Dy that a week before the fire,
saleable finished products from Sanyoware and Unitedware were removed and
transferred to
21. Long
before the subject incident, I, Wilson Ting, had ordered to have the stock
piles that were in between the steel gate dividing Unitedware and Sanyoware
warehouses moved, not to have a pathway, but for the purpose of closing the
said steel gate. After said stock piles
were moved, the steel gate was padlocked.
22.
There was nothing extraordinary or irregular for several delivery trucks filled
with stocks to stay at the parking area for the night and to leave very early
in the morning to avoid traffic.
Considering the huge volume of deliveries being made regularly by
Sanyoware and Unitedware, delivery trucks with finished products were often
times parked in the evening and during Sundays and holidays at the compound of
Sanyoware and they usually moved out very early in the morning from Monday to
Saturday. Thus, there was nothing
extraordinary or irregular for some delivery trucks with stocks at the parking
area on the night of May 13, 2001, considering especially that it was a Sunday.
23. Being the operations manager of Sanyoware, I
have no fixed time and schedule of work.
Even on a Sunday or holiday, I, Wilson Ting[,] sometimes visit the
plant. Thus, there was nothing unusual
that I, Wilson Ting, went to Sanyoware last May 13, 2001. Due to several incidents of thefts that took
place inside the compound of Sanyoware and because of reports that the delivery
trucks at the parking lot might contain some items that were not included in
the inventory for delivery, I, Wilson Ting, as operations manager, decided to
be at Sanyoware on that Sunday (May 13, 2001) principally to check the goods
inside the delivery trucks. With the
help of security guards Bobby Bacang and Ricky Hista, I, Wilson Ting, checked
the goods in all the delivery trucks.
24. Being the President and practically the
owner of Unitedware, a marketing area of Sanyoware and the lessee of
Sanyoware’s warehouse, I, (Edward Yao), visit Sanyoware and Unitedware from
time to time.
25. As my (Edward Yao’s) mother-in-law asked
from me (Edward Yao) some chairs and drawers, I (Edward Yao) drove my Pajero
and went to Sanyoware. I (Edward Yao)
called up Wilson Ting and informed him that I’ll be getting some chairs and
drawers from Sanyoware for my mother-in-law.
From the plant of Sanyoware, I (Edward Yao) got some chairs and
drawers. When said chairs and drawers
could not fit in my (Edward Yao) [P]ajero, I (Edward Yao) left to get a
van. I (Edward Yao) came back later
driving a van where the said chairs and drawers were placed. I (Edward Yao) brought said chairs and
drawers to my mother-in-law who selected and got only some items and so, I
(Edward Yao) returned to Sanyoware the remaining items. Before I (Edward Yao) left again, Wilson Ting
asked me to come back for some chat and so, I (Edward Yao) returned in my [P]ajero. However, after chatting with Wilson Ting, I
(Edward Yao) left at around 9:00 o’clock in the evening of May 13, 2001. Thus, just before the incident when the fire
occurred, I (Edward Yao) was not in the compound of Sanyoware.
26. There is no truth, however, to the claim
that I (Edward Yao) had entered the warehouse of Unitedware and that I (Edward
Yao) got a rectangular shape black object from my vehicle while inside the
warehouse for the truth of the matter being that I (Edward Yao) did not enter
said warehouse and I (Edward Yao) did not get any object from my vehicle. I (Edward Yao) got the said chairs and
drawers from the plant of Sanyoware.
27. There is no truth that the company is
suffering losses even before the fire occurred.
The loan of Sanyoware with Metrobank is fully secured by a real estate
mortgage wherein the value of the real estate, together with the improvements
thereon that was mortgaged is more or less double the amount of the said loan
and, thus, said real estate value is more than sufficient to cover said loan of
Sanyoware. On the other hand, the loan
with Equitable Bank is also fully secured by a real estate mortgage.
28. Before the subject incident, Sanyoware was
making profits. There was no year that
Sanyoware incurred losses. Its business
was going every year. Prior to the subject
incident, the record of Sanyoware with the banks was quite good.
29. Likewise, prior to the fire, Unitedware was
steadily growing. Every year, its profit
continued to go up. Last year,
Unitedware made a huge profit from its operation and it is expected that, despite
the fire that burned the warehouses, Unitedware will still make a good profit
this year.
30. Complainant did not conduct any
investigation, except to get the statements of its witnesses: Madrideo, Kalaw and Dy. Likewise, the Inter Agency Anti-Arson Task
Force did not also conduct any investigation, except in essence to ask the
witnesses of complainant to identify under oath their sworn statements
executed before the complainant and to
ask respondents to submit their sworn statements and later to identify the same
under oath.
31. On the other hand, the elements of Bocaue
Fire Station and OPFM Bulacan BFP Region 3 Intel and Inves Section conducted a
thorough investigation of the origin of the fire. Statements of security guards Bobby A. Bacang
and Mark Anthony Gabay were taken.
Statement of the operations manager Wilson Ting was also taken. The subject place was inspected. Pictures were taken. Specimens were obtained from the place where
fire occurred and submitted to the laboratory for examination. Said elements undertook other activities in
line with proper investigation.[16]
After preliminary investigation, then State Prosecutor Carlos C. Pormento issued a Resolution,[17] the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully
recommended that an information for Destructive Arson be filed against Wilson Ting,
Edward Yao, Willy So Tan and Carol Ortega. That the case against Samson Ting be
dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence to indict him under the charge.
As to the charge of Accessories against herein three
(3) Fire Officers, let that case be remanded to TF-IATF for further
investigation.[18]
Pursuant to the foregoing Resolution, an Information[19] for Arson was filed against Wilson Cua Ting, Edward Ngo Yao, Willy So Tan, Carol F. Ortega, John Doe and Peter Doe, of the crime of arson, to wit:
That on or about May 14, 2001, in the Municipality of
Bocaue, Province of Bulacan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating and mutually
helping one another, acting in common accord, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously, destroy the warehouses known as Sanyoware Plastic
Products Manufacturing Plant and New Unitedware Marketing Corporation,
including the stocks of raw materials and finish products, machineries and
various equipments by maliciously burning the same for the purpose of
concealing or destroying evidence of another violation of law, and to conceal
bankruptcy to defraud creditors and to collect from insurance.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[20]
The Information was raffled to Branch XI, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos Bulacan, 3rd Judicial Region. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 300-47M 2002.
Prior to the arraignment of respondents and before warrants of arrest could be issued, respondents filed a Motion to Conduct Hearing to Determine Probable Cause and to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest Pending Determination of Probable Cause.[21]
On February 27, 2002, the RTC issued an Order[22] dismissing the case, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Accordingly, for lack of probable cause, the instant
case is DISMISSED as ordained under Sec. 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
SO ORDERED.[23]
The RTC applied the equipoise rule in dismissing the case, because of its observation that the sworn statements submitted by petitioner and respondents contained contradictory positions.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[24] which was, however, denied by the RTC in an Order[25] dated March 25, 2002.
On August 8, 2002, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 71985. On July 24, 2003, the CA issued a Decision denying the petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no grave
abuse of discretion committed by the public respondent, the assailed Orders
dated February 27, 2002 and March 25, 2002 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto and the present petition is
hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and is, accordingly, DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[26]
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied by the CA in a Resolution[27] dated October 3, 2003.
Hence, this instant petition, with petitioner raising the following ground for this Court’s consideration, to wit:
THE
COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY AND GROSSLY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ADOPTING THE EQUIPOISE RULE IN THE CASE AT BAR.[28]
Before anything else, this Court shall address a procedural issue raised by respondents that certiorari does not lie considering that such special civil action is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, or more importantly, a lapsed appeal.[29]
Respondents’ position is well taken.
It is well settled that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court lies only when, “there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,” and certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy, certiorari not being a substitute for a lost appeal.[30]
A perusal of the records will show that petitioner received the assailed CA Resolution on October 10, 2003. From that time on, petitioner had 15 days, or until October 25, 2003, to file an appeal by way of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, instead of filing the appeal on the last day of reglementary period, petitioner simply allowed it to lapse. Clearly, petitioner had an appeal, which under the circumstances was the adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. On this point alone, petitioner’s petition must be dismissed, as herein petition is without a doubt a substitute for a lost appeal. In any case, even if this Court were to set aside the procedural infirmity of the petition, the same still fails on the merits.
In a petition for certiorari, the court must confine itself to the issue of whether or not respondent court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction or committed grave abuse of discretion.[31]
It
is well to remember that there is a distinction between the preliminary
inquiry, which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest, and the preliminary investigation proper, which ascertains whether the
offender should be held for trial or be released. The determination of probable
cause for purposes of issuing a warrant of arrest is made by the judge. The
preliminary investigation proper – whether or not there is reasonable ground to
believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged – is the function of
the investigating prosecutor.[32]
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
SEC 6. When
warrant of arrest may issue. –
x x x x
(a) By the
Regional Trial Court. – Within (10) days from the filing of the complaint
or information, the judge shall
personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting
evidence. He may immediately
dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable
cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest,
or a commitment order of the accused had already been arrested, pursuant to a
warrant issued by the judge who conducted preliminary investigation or when the
complaint or information was filed pursuant to Section 7 of this Rule. In case
of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor
to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue
must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the
complaint or information.[33]
As
enunciated in Baltazar v. People,[34]
the task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with the court is
first and foremost to determine the existence or non-existence of probable
cause for the arrest of the accused. Probable
cause is such set of facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the Information,
or any offense included therein, has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs the facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of
which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. A finding of
probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than
not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused.
Probable cause demands more than suspicion; it requires less than evidence that
would justify conviction.[35]
The purpose of the mandate of the judge to first determine probable cause for
the arrest of the accused is to insulate from the very start those falsely
charged with crimes from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public
trial.[36]
Based
on the foregoing, the RTC acted within its jurisdiction when it dismissed the case
on lack of probable cause as the same is sanctioned under Section 6, Rule 112
of the Rules of Court. The penultimate
question to be resolved then is was such exercise of jurisdiction attended by
grave abuse of discretion?
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or in other words where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.[37]
Petitioner’s main argument hinges on the propriety of the RTC’s use of the equipoise rule in dismissing the case which was affirmed by the CA. Specifically, petitioner contends that the equipoise rule cannot be used by the RTC merely after the filing of the information, thus:
Since there must be a proper determination of the
presence or absence of evidence sufficient to support a conviction, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt, the equipoise rule shall properly come into
play when the parties have already concluded the presentation of their
respective evidence. It is only at this stage, not at any prior time and
certainly not merely after the filing of the information, can the trial court
assess and weigh the evidence of the parties and thereafter determine which
party has the preponderance of evidence. If both parties fail to adduce
evidence in support of their respective cases, an adverse decision would be
rendered against the party which has the burden of proof.[38]
Under the equipoise rule, where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise, or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses. The equipoise rule finds application if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence does not suffice to produce a conviction.[39]
To
this Court’s mind, the reliance of the RTC in the equipoise rule is misplaced
as a review of previous Court decisions would show that the position of
petitioner is in fact correct. The equipoise rule has been generally applied
when the parties have already concluded the presentation of their respective
evidence as shown in a plethora of cases such as Abarquez v. People,[40]
Tin v. People[41] and People
v. Leano.[42]
While the use of the equipoise rule was not proper under the circumstances of the case at bar, the same, however, does not equate to an abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC, but at most, merely an error of judgment. More importantly, this Court finds that the RTC had in fact complied with the requirement under the rules of personally evaluating the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence and that the assailed Order was arrived at after due consideration of the merits thereto, thus:
By this statement of Madrideo, it would appear fire
broke out in two (2) places, which, presupposes or implies that some sort of
incendiary or flammable substances were ignited to start the fire. The
investigation conducted by the Bocaue Fire Station, however, appears to have ruled
out the use of incendiary or inflammable substances. Annex “E” of the
Complaint, Chemistry Report No. C-054-2001 of the Bulacan Provincial Crime
Laboratory Office indicated that the specimen submitted by the Bocaue Fire
Station in connection with the fire in question was found negative of any flammable
substance. This finding was never debunked or repudiated, which makes the
misgivings of the police investigators about its veracity unfounded. Thus,
pitted against the allegation of Madrideo, this physical evidence puts the
truth of the latter in grave doubt. Physical evidence is evidence of the
highest order. It speaks more eloquently than a hundred witnesses (People vs.
Sacabin, 57 SCRA 707). Physical evidence are mute but eloquent manifestations
of truth and they rate high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence (People
vs. Uycoque, 124 SCRA 769).
At this stage, it must be stressed that the Fire
Investigation Report prepared by the Bocaue Fire Station (Annex “D”) and the
Certification made by the Provincial Fire Marshall, Absalon Zipagan, point to
the faulty wiring as the cause or origin (sic) of the conflagration at bar. The
Office the Regional Fire Marshall also came out with the same findings.
(Annexes “B” and “C”) All the above reports and investigation stand as the
official report of the fire in question. Contrary to the Resolution, we find
nothing in the respective sworn statements of Supt. Absalon Zipagan, Sr. Supt.
Enrique Linsangan and Insp. Allan Barredo that deviated much less repudiated
the aforesaid reports and findings. Far from impugning their own investigation,
the three (3) fire officials simply narrated the steps that were taken at the
provincial and regional levels in the investigation of the Sanyo fire. Needless
to state, the investigation reports and findings carry the presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed. A mere affidavit cannot overcome
this presumption. (Transport Corporation vs. CA, 241 SCRA 77) Government
officials are presumed to perform their functions with regularity and strong
evidence is necessary to rebut this presumption. (Tata vs. Garcia, Jr., 243
SCRA 235)
The significance of the above reports and findings
cannot be overlooked. Note that F/CINSP. Absalon Zipagan, F/Insp. Allan Barredo
and SPO1 Valeriano Dizon, Jr. were included as accessories in the complaint by
the DILG, Inter Agency Anti-Arson Task Force but the State Prosecutor did not
rule on their liability, which thus enhances all the more the probative value
of the said reports and findings.
This Court, likewise, noted that although the Inter Agency
Anti Arson Task Force was quick to rule out faulty electrical wiring, it did
note arrive at a definite theory how the fire started, leaving everything
hanging in mid-air.
This Court is also hard put to make out a case from
the actuations of some of the accused before, during and after the fire. For
one, the presence of Wilson Ting and Edward Yao in the Sanyo premises before
the fire is not criminal per se. Both apparently have their own explanations,
and following the equipoise rule as elucidated above, no adverse implications
can be inferred therefrom. So are with the alleged utterances made by the
accused during and after the fire, having been said in the midst of tenseful
happening these can be attributed to their desperation over the loss of some of
their properties. And, consistent with the equipoise rule, if ever said
statements were uttered at all, they cannot serve as evidence against the
accused for the offense charged.[43]
The conclusions of the RTC which led to the dismissal of the information against respondents cannot, in any sense, be characterized as outrageously wrong or manifestly mistaken, or whimsically or capriciously arrived at. The worst that may perhaps be said of it is that it is fairly debatable, and may even be possibly erroneous. But they cannot be declared to have been made with grave abuse of discretion.[44]
Based
on Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the RTC judge, upon the filing of
an Information, has the following options: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence
on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) if he or she finds
probable cause, issue a warrant of arrest; and (3) in case of doubt as to the
existence of probable cause, order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence within five days from notice, the issue to be resolved by the court
within thirty days from the filing of the information.[45]
The judge is required
to personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting
evidence. He may immediately dismiss the
case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause.[46]
To this Court’s mind, the RTC had complied with its duty of personally
evaluating the supporting evidence of the prosecution before arriving at its decision
of dismissing the case against respondents.
While
petitioner mainly argues against the use of the equipoise rule, it cannot
escape this Court’s attention that ultimately petitioner is asking this Court
to resolve the propriety of the dismissal of the case by the RTC, on the basis
of the Information and the attached documents it had filed. This Court however,
will defer to the findings of fact of the RTC, which are accorded great weight
and respect, more so because the same were affirmed by the CA. In addition, it
bears to stress that the instant case is a petition for certiorari where
questions of fact are not entertained.[47]
The sole office of writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and does not include correction of public respondent’s evaluation of the evidence and factual findings based thereon.[48] An error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctible through the original special civil action of certiorari.[49]
In any case, the dismissal of herein petition does not preclude petitioner from availing of any other action it deems appropriate under the premises. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has not been arraigned and it was upon his express motion that the case was dismissed.[50] Moreover, while the absence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is a ground for the dismissal of the case, the same does not result in the acquittal of the said accused.[51]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The July 24, 2003 Decision and October 3, 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 71985, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Second Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of
the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 8-37.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice B.A. Adefuin-de la Cruz, with Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Hakim S. Abdulwahid, concurring; id. at 40-50.
[3]
[4] Rollo, pp. 117- 119.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22] CA rollo, pp. 43-47.
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30] Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106153, July 14, 1997, 275 SCRA 413, 426. (Underscoring supplied.)
[31] San Pedro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114300, August 4, 1994, 235 SCRA 145, 150.
[32]
AAA v. Carbonell, G.R. No. 171465,
June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 496, 509, citing People
v. Inting, 187 SCRA 788, 792-793 (1990).
[33] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
[34] G.R. No. 174016, July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 278, 293-294.
[35]
[36]
[37] Revised Rules
of Civil Procedure, Rule 65, Sec. 1. See
also Angara v. Fedman Development Corporation, 483 Phil. 495, 505
(2004).
[38] Rollo, pp. 30-31. (Italics in the Original).
[39] Tin v. People, 415 Phil. 1, 11 (2001).
[40] G.R. No. 150762, January 20, 2006, 479 SCRA 225.
[41] Supra note 39.
[42] 419 Phil. 241 (2001).
[43] Rollo, pp. 55-56.
[44] Busmente v. NLRC, G.R. No. 73647, April 8, 1991, 195 SCRA 710, 714.
[45]
In
Re:
[46] Concerned Citizen of Maddela v. Dela Torre-Yadao, 441 Phil. 480, 489 (2002).
[47] Premiere Development Bank v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 114695, July 23, 1998, 293 SCRA 49, 60.
[48] Building Care Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 335 Phil. 1131, 1139 (1997).
[49] Jamer v. National Labor Relations Commission, 344 Phil. 181, 197 (1997).
[50] People v. Monteiro, G.R. No. 49454, December 21, 1990, 192 SCRA 548, 553.
[51] See People v. Sandiganbayan, 482 Phil. 613, 632 (2004).