Republic
of the Philippines
Supreme
Court
Manila
|
PICOP RESOURCES, INCORPORATED (PRI), Petitioner,
-
versus – ANACLETO L. TAÑECA,
GEREMIAS S. TATO, JAIME N. CAMPOS, MARTINIANO A. MAGAYON, JOSEPH B. BALGOA,
MANUEL G. ABUCAY, MOISES M. ALBARAN, MARGARITO G. ALICANTE, JERRY ROMEO T.
AVILA, LORENZO D. CANON, RAUL P. DUERO, DANILO Y. ILAN, MANUEL M. MATURAN,
JR., LUISITO R. POPERA, CLEMENTINO C. QUIMAN, ROBERTO Q. SILOT, CHARLITO D.
SINDAY, REMBERT B. SUZON ALLAN J. TRIMIDAL, and NAMAPRI-SPFL,
Respondents. |
G.R. No. 160828 Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA
ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: August 9, 2010 |
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
This
is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision[1] dated
July 25, 2003 and Resolution[2]
dated October 23, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71760, setting
aside the Resolutions dated October 8, 2001[3] and
April 29, 2002[4]
of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC CA No. M-006309-2001 and
reinstating the Decision[5]
dated March 16, 2001 of the Labor Arbiter.
The
facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On February 13, 2001, respondents
Anacleto Tañeca, Loreto Uriarte, Joseph Balgoa, Jaime Campos, Geremias Tato,
Martiniano Magayon, Manuel Abucay and fourteen (14) others filed a Complaint
for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal and money claims against
petitioner PICOP Resources, Incorporated (PRI), Wilfredo Fuentes (in his
capacity as PRI's Vice President/Resident Manager), Atty. Romero Boniel (in
his capacity as PRI's Manager of Legal/Labor), Southern Philippines
Federation of Labor (SPFL), Atty. Wilbur T. Fuentes (in his capacity as
Secretary General of SPFL), Pascasio Trugillo (in his capacity as Local
President of Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa PICOP Resources, Inc.- SPFL
[NAMAPRI-SPFL]) and Atty. Proculo Fuentes, Jr.[6]
(in his capacity as National President of SPFL).
Respondents were regular rank-and-file employees of PRI and bona fide
members of Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa PRI Southern Philippines Federation
of Labor (NAMAPRI-SPFL), which is the collective bargaining agent for the rank-and-file
employees of petitioner PRI.
PRI has a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with NAMAPRI-SPFL for
a period of five (5) years from May 22, 1995 until May 22, 2000.
The CBA contained the following union security provisions:
Article II- Union
Security and Check-Off
Section 6. Maintenance of membership.
6.1 All
employees within the appropriate bargaining unit who are members of the UNION at
the time of the signing of this AGREEMENT shall, as a condition of continued
employment by the COMPANY, maintain their membership in the UNION in good
standing during the effectivity of this AGREEMENT.
6.2 Any
employee who may hereinafter be employed to occupy a position covered by the
bargaining unit shall be advised by the COMPANY that they are required to file
an application for membership with the UNION within thirty (30) days from the
date his appointment shall have been made regular.
6.3 The
COMPANY, upon the written request of the UNION
and after compliance with the requirements of the New Labor Code, shall
give notice of termination of services of any employee who shall fail to
fulfill the condition provided in Section 6.1 and 6.2 of this Article,
but it assumes no obligation to discharge any employee if it has reasonable
grounds to believe either that membership in the UNION was not available to the
employee on the same terms and conditions generally applicable to other
members, or that membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than
voluntary resignation or non-payment of regular union dues. Separation under
the Section is understood to be for cause, consequently, the dismissed employee
is not entitled to separation benefits provided under the New Labor Code and in
this AGREEMENT.”[7]
On May 16, 2000, Atty. Proculo P. Fuentes (Atty. Fuentes) sent a
letter to the management of PRI demanding the termination of employees who
allegedly campaigned for, supported and signed the Petition for Certification Election
of the Federation of Free Workers Union (FFW) during the effectivity of the
CBA. NAMAPRI-SPFL considered said act of
campaigning for and signing the petition for certification election of FFW as
an act of disloyalty and a valid basis for termination for a cause in
accordance with its Constitution and By-Laws, and the terms and conditions of
the CBA, specifically Article II, Sections 6.1 and 6.2 on Union Security
Clause.
In a letter dated May 23, 2000, Mr. Pascasio Trugillo requested the
management of PRI to investigate those union members who signed the Petition
for Certification Election of FFW during the existence of their CBA.
NAMAPRI-SPFL, likewise, furnished PRI with machine copy of the authorization
letters dated March 19, 20 and 21, 2000, which contained the names and
signatures of employees.
Acting on the May 16 and May 23, 2000 letters of the NAMAPRI-SPFL,
Atty. Romero A. Boniel issued a memorandum addressed to the concerned employees to explain in writing
within 72 hours why their employment should not be terminated due to acts of
disloyalty as alleged by their Union.
Within the period from May 26 to June 2, 2000, a number of employees
who were served “explanation memorandum” submitted their explanation, while
some did not.
In a letter dated June 2, 2000, Atty. Boniel endorsed the explanation
letters of the employees to Atty. Fuentes for evaluation and final disposition
in accordance with the CBA.
After evaluation, in a letter dated July 12, 2000, Atty. Fuentes
advised the management of PRI that the Union found the member's explanations to
be unsatisfactory. He reiterated the
demand for termination, but only of 46 member-employees, including respondents.
On October 16, 2000, PRI served notices of termination for causes to
the 31 out of the 46 employees whom NAMAPRIL-SPFL sought to be terminated on
the ground of “acts of disloyalty” committed against it when respondents
allegedly supported and signed the Petition for Certification Election of FFW
before the “freedom period” during the effectivity of the CBA. A Notice dated October 21, 2000 was also
served on the Department of Labor and Employment Office (DOLE), Caraga
Region.
Respondents then accused PRI of Unfair Labor Practice punishable under
Article 248 (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) of the Labor Code, while Atty. Fuentes
and Wilbur T. Fuentes and Pascasio Trujillo were accused of violating Article
248 (a) and (b) of the Labor Code.
Respondents alleged that none of them
ever withdrew their membership from NAMAPRI-SPFL or submitted to PRI any union
dues and check-off disauthorizations against NAMAPRI-SPFL. They claimed that
they continue to remain on record as bona fide members of NAMAPRI-SPFL.
They pointed out that a patent manifestation of one’s disloyalty would have
been the explicit resignation or withdrawal of membership from the Union accompanied by an advice to
management to discontinue union dues and check-off deductions. They insisted
that mere affixation of signature on such authorization to file a petition for
certification election was not per se an act of disloyalty. They claimed
that while it may be true that they signed the said authorization before the
start of the freedom period, the petition of FFW was only filed with the DOLE
on May 18, 2000, or 58 days after the start of the freedom period.
Respondents maintained that their acts
of signing the authorization signifying support to the filing of a Petition for
Certification Election of FFW was merely prompted by their desire to have a
certification election among the rank-and-file employees of PRI with hopes of a CBA negotiation in due
time; and not to cause the downfall of NAMAPRI-SPFL.
Furthermore, respondents contended
that there was lack of procedural due process. Both the letter dated May 16,
2000 of Atty. Fuentes and the follow-up letter dated May 23, 2000 of Trujillo
addressed to PRI did not mention their names. Respondents stressed that
NAMAPRI-SPFL merely requested PRI to investigate union members who supported
the Petition for Certification Election of FFW. Respondents claimed that they
should have been summoned individually, confronted with the accusation and
investigated accordingly and from where the Union may base its findings of
disloyalty and, thereafter, recommend to management the termination for causes.
Respondents, likewise, argued that at
the time NAMAPRI-SPFL demanded their termination, it was no longer the
bargaining representative of the rank-and-file workers of PRI, because the CBA
had already expired on May 22, 2000. Hence, there could be no justification in
PRI’s act of dismissing respondents due to acts of disloyalty.
Respondents asserted that the act of
PRI, Wilfredo Fuentes and Atty. Boniel in giving in to the wishes of the Union
in discharging them on the ground of disloyalty to the Union amounted to
interference with, restraint or coercion of respondents’ exercise of their
right to self-organization. The act indirectly required petitioners to support
and maintain their membership with NAMAPRI-SPFL as a condition for their
continued employment. The acts of NAMAPRI-SPFL, Atty. Fuentes and Trujillo
amounted to actual restraint and coercion of the petitioners in the exercise of
their rights to self-organization and constituted acts of unfair labor
practice.
In a Decision[8] dated
March 16, 2001, the Labor Arbiter declared the respondents’ dismissal to be
illegal and ordered PRI to reinstate respondents to their former or equivalent
positions without loss of seniority rights and to jointly and solidarily pay
their backwages. The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby entered:
1.
Declaring complainants’
dismissal illegal; and
2.
Ordering respondents
Picop Resources Inc. (PRI) and NAMAPRI-SPFL to reinstate complainants to their
former or equivalent positions without loss of seniority rights and to jointly
and solidarily pay their backwages in the total amount of P420,339.30 as
shown in the said Annex “A” plus damages in the amount of P10,000.00
each, or a total of P210,000.00 and attorney’s fees equivalent to 10% of
the total monetary award.
SO ORDERED.[9]
PRI and NAMAPRI-SPFL appealed to the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which reversed the decision of the
Labor Arbiter; thus, declaring the dismissal of respondents from employment as
legal.
Respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration, but it was denied on April 29, 2001 for lack of merit.
Unsatisfied, respondents filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals and
sought the nullification of the Resolution of the NLRC dated October 8, 2001
which reversed the Decision dated March 16. 2001 of Labor Arbiter and the Resolution
dated April 29, 2002, which denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration.
On July 25, 2003, the Court of Appeals
reversed and set aside the assailed Resolutions of the NLRC and reinstated the
Decision dated March 16, 2001 of the Labor Arbiter.
Thus, before this Court, PRI, as petitioner, raised the following
issues:
I
WHETHER AN EXISTING COLLECTIVELY (sic) BARGAINING
AGREEMENT (CBA) CAN BE GIVEN ITS FULL FORCE AND EFFECT IN ALL ITS TERMS AND
CONDITION INCLUDING ITS UNION SECURITY CLAUSE, EVEN BEYOND THE 5-YEAR PERIOD WHEN NO NEW CBA HAS YET BEEN ENTERED INTO.
II
WHETHER OR NOT AN HONEST ERROR IN THE INTERPRETATION
AND/OR CONCLUSION OF LAW FALL WITHIN THE AMBIT OF THE EXTRAORDINARY REMEDY OF
CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65, REVISED RULES OF COURT.[10]
We will first delve on the technical issue raised.
PRI perceived a patent
error in the mode of appeal elected by respondents for the purpose of assailing
the decision of the NLRC. It claimed that assuming that the NLRC erred in
its judgment on the legal issues, its error, if any, is not tantamount to abuse
of discretion falling within the ambit of Rule 65.
Petitioner
is mistaken.
The
power of the Court of Appeals to review NLRC decisions via Rule 65 or Petition
for Certiorari has been settled as early as in our decision in St.
Martin Funeral Home v. National Labor Relations Commission.[11] This Court held that the proper vehicle for such review was a Special Civil
Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and that this
action should be filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the
doctrine of the hierarchy of courts.[12] Moreover, it is already settled that under
Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No.
7902[10] (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, amending
for the purpose of Section Nine of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 as amended, known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980),
the Court of Appeals – pursuant to the exercise
of its original jurisdiction over Petitions for Certiorari – is
specifically given the power to pass upon the evidence, if and when necessary,
to resolve factual issues. [13]
We now come to the main issue of whether there was just cause to
terminate the employment of respondents.
PRI argued that the dismissal of the
respondents was valid and legal. It claimed to have acted in good faith at the
instance of the incumbent union pursuant to the Union Security Clause of the
CBA.
Citing Article 253 of the Labor Code,[14] PRI
contends that as parties to the CBA, they are enjoined to keep the status quo
and continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the
existing CBA during the 60-day period and/or until a new agreement is reached
by the parties.
Petitioner's argument is untenable.
“Union security" is a generic term, which is applied to and
comprehends "closed shop," “union shop," "maintenance of
membership," or any other form of agreement which imposes upon employees
the obligation to acquire or retain union membership as a condition affecting
employment. There is union shop when all new regular employees are required to
join the union within a certain period as a condition for their continued
employment. There is maintenance of membership shop when employees, who are
union members as of the effective date of the agreement, or who thereafter
become members, must maintain union membership as a condition for continued
employment until they are promoted or transferred out of the bargaining unit,
or the agreement is terminated. A closed shop, on the other hand, may be
defined as an enterprise in which, by agreement between the employer and his
employees or their representatives, no person may be employed in any or certain
agreed departments of the enterprise unless he or she is, becomes, and, for the
duration of the agreement, remains a member in good standing of a union
entirely comprised of or of which the employees in interest are a part.[15]
However, in terminating the employment of an employee by enforcing the
union security clause, the employer needs to determine and prove that: (1) the
union security clause is applicable; (2) the union is requesting for the
enforcement of the union security provision in the CBA; and (3) there is
sufficient evidence to support the decision of the union to expel the employee
from the union. These requisites constitute just cause for terminating an
employee based on the union security provision of the CBA.[16]
As to the
first requisite, there is no question that the CBA between PRI and respondents
included a union security clause, specifically, a maintenance of membership as
stipulated in Sections 6 of Article II, Union Security and Check-Off. Following the same provision, PRI, upon
written request from the Union, can indeed terminate the employment of the
employee who failed to maintain its good standing as a union member.
Secondly, it
is likewise undisputed that NAMAPRI-SPFL, in two (2) occasions demanded from
PRI, in their letters dated May 16 and 23, 2000, to terminate the employment of
respondents due to their acts of disloyalty to the Union.
However, as
to the third requisite, we find that there is no sufficient evidence to support
the decision of PRI to terminate the employment of the respondents.
PRI alleged that respondents were
terminated from employment based on the alleged acts of disloyalty they
committed when they signed an authorization for the Federation of Free Workers
(FFW) to file a Petition for Certification Election among all rank-and-file
employees of PRI. It contends that the acts
of respondents are a violation of the Union Security Clause, as provided in
their Collective Bargaining Agreement.
We are unconvinced.
We are in consonance with the Court of
Appeals when it held that the mere signing of the authorization in support of
the Petition for Certification Election of FFW on March 19, 20 and 21, or
before the “freedom period,” is not sufficient ground to terminate the
employment of respondents inasmuch as the petition itself was actually filed
during the freedom period. Nothing in
the records would show that respondents failed to maintain their membership in
good standing in the Union. Respondents did not resign or withdraw their
membership from the Union to which they belong. Respondents continued to pay
their union dues and never joined the FFW.
Significantly, petitioner's act of
dismissing respondents stemmed from the latter's act of signing an
authorization letter to file a petition for certification election as they
signed it outside the freedom period. However, we are constrained to believe
that an “authorization letter to file a petition for certification election” is
different from an actual “Petition for Certification Election.” Likewise, as per records, it was clear that
the actual Petition for Certification Election of FFW was filed only on May 18,
2000.[17] Thus, it
was within the ambit of the freedom period which commenced from March 21, 2000
until May 21, 2000. Strictly speaking, what is prohibited is the filing of a
petition for certification election outside the 60-day freedom period.[18] This is
not the situation in this case. If at all, the signing of the authorization to
file a certification election was merely preparatory to the filing of the
petition for certification election, or an exercise of respondents’ right to
self-organization.
Moreover,
PRI anchored their
decision to terminate respondents’ employment on Article 253 of the Labor Code
which states that “it shall be the duty of
both parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect
the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day period
and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties.” It claimed that
they are still bound by the Union Security Clause of the CBA even after the
expiration of the CBA; hence, the need to terminate the employment of
respondents.
Petitioner's reliance on Article 253 is misplaced.
The
provision of Article 256 of the Labor Code is particularly enlightening. It reads:
Article
256. Representation issue in organized establishments. - In organized
establishments, when a verified petition questioning the majority status of the
incumbent bargaining agent is filed before the Department of Labor and
Employment within the sixty-day period before the expiration of a collective
bargaining agreement, the Med-Arbiter shall automatically order an election by
secret ballot when the verified petition is supported by the written consent of
at least twenty-five percent (25%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit
to ascertain the will of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit. To
have a valid election, at least a majority of all eligible voters in the unit
must have cast their votes. The labor union receiving the majority of the valid
votes cast shall be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of all the
workers in the unit. When an election which provides for three or more choices
results in no choice receiving a majority of the valid votes cast, a run-off
election shall be conducted between the labor unions receiving the two highest
number of votes: Provided, That the total number of votes for all
contending unions is at least fifty per cent (50%) of the number of votes cast.
At the
expiration of the freedom period, the employer shall continue to recognize the
majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent where no petition for
certification election is filed.[19]
Applying the same provision, it can be said that while
it is incumbent for the
employer to continue to recognize the majority status of the incumbent
bargaining agent even after the expiration of the freedom period, they could
only do so when no petition for certification election was filed. The reason
is, with a pending petition for certification, any such agreement entered into
by management with a labor organization is fraught with the risk that such a
labor union may not be chosen thereafter as the collective bargaining
representative.[20]
The provision for status quo is conditioned on the fact that no
certification election was filed during the freedom period. Any other view would render nugatory the
clear statutory policy to favor certification election as the means of
ascertaining the true expression of the will of the workers as to which labor
organization would represent them.[21]
In
the instant case, four (4) petitions were filed as early as May 12, 2000. In
fact, a petition for certification election was already ordered by the
Med-Arbiter of DOLE Caraga Region on August 23, 2000.[22] Therefore, following Article 256, at the
expiration of the freedom period, PRI's obligation to recognize NAMAPRI-SPFL as
the incumbent bargaining agent does not hold true when petitions for
certification election were filed, as in this case.
Moreover,
the last sentence of Article 253 which provides for automatic renewal pertains
only to the economic provisions of the CBA, and does not include
representational aspect of the CBA. An existing CBA cannot constitute a bar to
a filing of a petition for certification election. When there is a
representational issue, the status quo provision in so far as the
need to await the creation of a new agreement will not apply. Otherwise, it
will create an absurd situation where the union members will be forced to
maintain membership by virtue of the union security clause existing under the
CBA and, thereafter, support another union when filing a petition for
certification election. If we apply it, there will always be an issue of
disloyalty whenever the employees exercise their right to self-organization.
The holding of a certification election is a statutory policy that should not
be circumvented,[23]
or compromised.
Time and again, we have
ruled that we adhere to the policy of enhancing the welfare of the workers.
Their freedom to choose who should be their bargaining representative is of
paramount importance. The fact that there already exists a bargaining
representative in the unit concerned is of no moment as long as the petition
for certification election was filed within the freedom period. What is
imperative is that by such a petition for certification election the employees
are given the opportunity to make known of who shall have the right to
represent them thereafter. Not only some, but all of them should have the right
to do so. What is equally important is that everyone be given a democratic
space in the bargaining unit concerned.[24]
We
will emphasize anew that the power to dismiss is a normal prerogative of the
employer. This, however, is not without limitations. The employer is bound to
exercise caution in terminating the services of his employees especially so
when it is made upon the request of a labor union pursuant to the Collective
Bargaining Agreement. Dismissals must not be arbitrary and capricious. Due
process must be observed in dismissing an employee, because it affects not only
his position but also his means of livelihood. Employers should, therefore,
respect and protect the rights of their employees, which include the right to
labor.[25]
An employee
who is illegally dismissed is entitled to the twin reliefs of full backwages
and reinstatement. If reinstatement is not viable, separation pay is awarded to
the employee. In awarding separation pay to an illegally dismissed employee, in
lieu of reinstatement, the amount to be awarded shall be equivalent to one
month salary for every year of service. Under Republic Act No. 6715, employees
who are illegally dismissed are entitled to full backwages, inclusive of
allowances and other benefits, or their monetary equivalent, computed from the
time their actual compensation was withheld from them up to the time of their
actual reinstatement. But if
reinstatement is no longer possible, the backwages shall be computed from the
time of their illegal termination up to the finality of the decision. Moreover, respondents, having been compelled
to litigate in order to seek redress for their illegal dismissal, are entitled
to the award of attorney’s fees equivalent to 10% of the total monetary award.[26]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 25, 2003 and the Resolution dated October
23, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71760, which set aside the
Resolutions dated October 8, 2001 and April 29, 2002 of the National Labor
Relations Commission in NLRC CA No. M-006309-2001, are AFFIRMED accordingly. Respondents
are hereby awarded full backwages and other allowances, without qualifications
and diminutions, computed from the time they were illegally dismissed up to the
time they are actually reinstated. Let this case be remanded to the Labor
Arbiter for proper computation of
the full backwages due respondents, in accordance with Article 279 of
the Labor Code, as expeditiously as
possible.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice |
|
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA Associate Justice |
|
ATTESTATION
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Second Division, Chairperson
Chief Justice
[1]
Penned by Associate
Justice Remedios Salazar-Fernando, with Associate Justices Delilah
Vidallon-Magtolis and Edgardo F. Sundiam, concurring; rollo, pp. 50-65.
[2]
Id. at 48.
[3]
Rollo, pp. 219-227.
[4] Id. at 233-234.
[5]
Id. at
166-178.
[6]
Now deceased.
[7] Emphasis
supplied.
[8] Rollo,
pp. 166-175.
[9] Id.
at 175.
[10] Id.
at 30.
[11] 356 Phil. 811 (1998).
[12] VMC Rural
Electric Service Cooperative, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 153144,
October 12, 2006, 504 SCRA 336, 348.
[13] Id.
[14] Art. 253. Duty to bargain collectively when there exists
a collective bargaining agreement. – When there is a collective bargaining
agreement, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that neither party
shall terminate nor modify such agreement during its lifetime. However, either
party can serve a written notice to terminate or modify the agreement at least
sixty (60) days prior to its expiration date.
It shall be the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and
to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing
agreement during the 60-day period and/or until a new agreement is reached by
the parties.
[15] Inguillo v. First
Philippine Scales, Inc., G.R. No. 165407, June 5, 2009, 588 SCRA 471,
485-486.
[16] Alabang Country Club, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. No. 170287, February 14, 2008, 545 SCRA 351, 362.
[17]
Rollo, p. 131.
[18]
Art. 253-A. Terms of a collective bargaining agreement.
– Any Collective Bargaining Agreement that the parties may enter into shall,
insofar as the representation aspect is concerned, be for a term of five (5)
years. No petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining
agent shall be entertained and no certification election shall be conducted by
the Department of Labor and Employment outside of the sixty-day period
immediately before the date of expiry of such five-year term of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement. All other provisions of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement shall be renegotiated not later than three (3) years after its
execution. Any agreement on such other provisions of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement entered into within six (6) months from the date of expiry of the
term of such other provisions as fixed in such Collective Bargaining Agreement,
shall retroact to the day immediately following such date. If any such
agreement is entered into beyond six months, the parties shall agree on the
duration of retroactivity thereof. In case of a deadlock in the renegotiation
of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the parties may exercise their rights under this
Code. (As amended by Section 21, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989).
[19] Emphasis
supplied.
[20] Vassar Industries Employees Union [VIEU] v.
Estrella, 172 Phil. 272, 278-279 (1978); Today’s
Knitting Free Workers Union v. Noriel, No. L-45057, February 28, 1977, 75
SCRA 450.
[21] Labor Code, Article 253-A.
[22]
Rollo, pp. 130-136.
[23]
Associated Labor Unions (ALU) v. Ferrer-Calleja,
G.R. No. 85085, November 6, 1989, 179 SCRA 127, 134
[24] Id.
[25] Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union v. Liberty
Cotton Mills, Inc., 179 Phil. 317, 321-322 (1979); Cariño v.
National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 91086, May 8, 1990, 185 SCRA
177, 189.
[26] See General Milling Corporation v. Ernesto
Casio, et al., G.R. No. 149552, March 10, 2010.