Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
EN BANC
|
WINSTON F.
GARCIA, in his capacity as President and General Manager of GSIS, Petitioner, - versus - MARIO I. MOLINA and ALBERT
M. VELASCO, Respondents. x--------------------------------------------------x WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his
capacity as President and General Manager of the Government Service Insurance
System, Petitioner, - versus - MARIO I. MOLINA and ALBERT
M. VELASCO, Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 157383
G.R. No.
174137 Present: CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, VELASCO, JR.,* NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: August 10,
2010
|
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court are two
consolidated petitions filed by Winston F. Garcia (petitioner) in his capacity
as President and General Manager of the Government Service Insurance System, or
GSIS, against respondents Mario I. Molina (Molina) and Albert M. Velasco
(Velasco). In G.R. No. 157383, petitioner assails the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision[1]
dated January 2, 2003 and Resolution[2]
dated March 5, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 73170. In G.R. No. 174137, petitioner
assails the CA Decision[3]
dated December 7, 2005 and Resolution[4]
dated August 10, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 75973.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as
follows:
Respondents Molina and Velasco, both Attorney V of the
GSIS, received two separate Memoranda[5]
dated May 23, 2002 from petitioner charging them with grave misconduct.
Specifically, Molina was charged for allegedly committing the following acts:
1) directly and continuously helping some alleged disgruntled employees to
conduct concerted protest actions and/or illegal assemblies against the
management and the GSIS President and General Manager; 2) leading the concerted
protest activities held in the morning of May 22, 2002 during office hours
within the GSIS compound; and 3) continuously performing said activities
despite warning from his immediate superiors. [6]
In addition to the charge for grave misconduct for performing the same acts as
Molina, Velasco was accused of performing acts in violation of the Rules on
Office Decorum for leaving his office without informing his supervisor of his
whereabouts; and gross insubordination for persistently disregarding petitioner’s
instructions that Velasco should report to the petitioner’s office.[7]
These acts, according to petitioner, were committed in open betrayal of the
confidential nature of their positions and in outright defiance of the Rules
and Regulations on Public Sector Unionism. In the same Memoranda, petitioner
required respondents to submit their verified answer within seventy two (72)
hours. Considering the gravity of the charges against them, petitioner ordered
the preventive suspension of respondents for ninety (90) days without pay,
effective immediately.[8] The
following day, a committee was constituted to investigate the charges against
respondents.
In their Answer[9]
dated May 27, 2002, respondents denied the charges against them. Instead, they
averred that petitioner was motivated by vindictiveness and bad faith in
charging them falsely. They likewise opposed their preventive suspension for lack
of factual and legal basis. They strongly expressed their opposition to
petitioner acting as complainant, prosecutor and judge.
On May 28, 2002, respondents filed with the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) an Urgent Petition to Lift Preventive Suspension Order.[10]
They contended that the acts they allegedly committed were arbitrarily characterized
as grave misconduct. Consistent with their stand that petitioner could not act
as the complainant, prosecutor and judge at the same time, respondents filed
with the CSC a Petition to Transfer Investigation to This Commission.[11]
Meanwhile, the GSIS hearing officer directed petitioners to
submit to the jurisdiction of the investigating committee and required them to
appear at the scheduled hearing.[12]
Despite their urgent motions, the CSC failed to resolve
respondents’ motions to lift preventive suspension order and to transfer the
case from the GSIS to the CSC.
On October 10, 2002, respondents filed with the CA a
special civil action for certiotari
and prohibition with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO).[13]
The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 73170. Respondents sought the annulment
and setting aside of petitioner’s order directing the former to submit to the
jurisdiction of the committee created to hear and investigate the administrative
case filed against them. They likewise prayed that petitioner (and the
committee) be prohibited from conducting the scheduled hearing and from taking
any action on the aforesaid administrative case against respondents.
On January 2, 2003, the CA rendered a decision[14]
in favor of respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Public respondents are hereby PERPETUALLY RESTRAINED from hearing and
investigating the administrative case against petitioners, without prejudice to
pursuing the same with the Civil Service Commission or any other agency of
government as may be allowed for (sic) by law.
SO ORDERED.[15]
The CA treated the
petition as one raising an issue of gnawing fear, and thus agreed with
respondents that the investigation be made not by the GSIS but by the CSC to
ensure that the hearing is conducted before an impartial and disinterested
tribunal.
Aggrieved, petitioner
comes before the Court in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising the
following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PETITIONERS ABUSED THEIR
AUTHORITY AND HAVE BEEN PARTIAL IN REGARD TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASES AGAINST
THE RESPONDENTS; AND IN PERPETUALLY RESTRAINING THE PETITIONERS FROM HEARING
AND INVESTIGATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASES FILED AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS –
SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF THE TOTALLY UNFOUNDED ALLEGATIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS
THAT THE PETITIONERS ARE PARTIAL AGAINST THEM.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE AND APPLY THE PRINCIPLE
OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES AND THE RULE ON NON FORUM SHOPPING IN
PERPETUALLY RESTRAINING THE PETITIONERS FROM HEARING AND INVESTIGATING THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CASES AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RENDERING A DECISION WHICH IS CONTRARY TO
AND COMPLETELY DISREGARDS APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE AND WHICH, IN VIOLATION OF
THE RULES OF COURT, DOES NOT CLEARLY STATE THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON WHICH IT IS
BASED.[16]
In the meantime, on February 27,
2003, the CSC resolved respondents’ Petition to Lift Order of Preventive
Suspension and Petition to Transfer Investigation to the Commission through
Resolution No. 03-0278,[17]
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE,
the Commission hereby rules
that:
1.
The
Urgent Petition to Lift the Order of Preventive Suspension is hereby DENIED for having become moot and
academic.
2.
The
Petition to Transfer Investigation to the Commission is likewise DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly,
GSIS President and General Manager Winston F. Garcia is directed to continue
the conduct of the formal investigation of the charges against
respondents-petitioners Albert Velasco and Mario I. Molina.[18]
As to the lifting of the order of
preventive suspension, the CSC considered the issue moot and academic
considering that the period had lapsed and respondents had been allowed to
resume their specific functions. This notwithstanding, the CSC opted to discuss
the matter by way of obiter dictum. Without
making a definitive conclusion as to the effect thereof in the case against
respondents, the CSC declared that a preliminary investigation is a
pre-requisite condition to the issuance of a formal charge.[19]
On the requested transfer of the
investigation from the GSIS to the CSC, the latter denied the same for lack of
merit. The Commission concluded that the fact that the GSIS acted as the
complainant and prosecutor and eventually the judge does not mean that
impartiality in the resolution of the case will no longer be served.[20]
Aggrieved, respondents appealed to
the CA through a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.[21] The
case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP NO. 75973.
On December 7, 2005, the CA rendered
a Decision[22] in
favor of respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:
PREMISES
CONSIDERED, the petition is
hereby GRANTED. The formal charges
filed by the President and General Manager of the GSIS against petitioners, and
necessarily, the order of preventive suspension emanating therefrom, are
declared NULL AND VOID. The GSIS is
hereby directed to pay petitioners’ back salaries pertaining to the period
during which they were unlawfully suspended. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO
ORDERED.[23]
The CA declared null and void
respondents’ formal charges for lack of the requisite preliminary
investigation. In view thereof, the CA disagreed with the CSC that the question
on the propriety of the preventive suspension order had become moot and
academic. Rather, it concluded that the same is likewise void having emanated
from the void formal charges. Consequently, the CA found that respondents were
entitled to back salaries during the time of their illegal preventive
suspension.
Hence, the present petition raising
the following issues:
I.
WHETHER THE RESPONDENTS WERE FULLY ACCORDED
THE REQUISITE
II.
WHETHER THE RESPONDENTS WAIVED THEIR RIGHT TO
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION.
III.
WHETHER PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS REQUIRED
IN INDICTMENTS IN FLAGRANTI, AS HERE.
IV.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LACKED
JURISDICTION, AS THE ALLEGED LACK OF PRELIMNARY INVESTIGATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN
RAISED BEFORE THE GSIS AND, THEREAFTER, BEFORE THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
UNDER THE PRINCIPLE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; THE GSIS HAVING
ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSONS OF THE RESPONDENTS, TO THE EXCLUSION OF
ALL OTHERS.
V.
WHETHER THE ALLEGED LACK OF PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION IS A NON-ISSUE.
VI.
WHETHER THE PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION ORDERS
ISSUED AGAINST RESPONDENTS MOLINA AND VELASCO ARE VALID, WELL-FOUNDED AND DULY
RECOGNIZED BY LAW.
VII.
WHETHER PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION IS A PENALTY
AND, THUS, MAY NOT BE IMPOSED WITHOUT BEING PRECEDED BY A HEARING.
VIII.
WHETHER THE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO
PAYMENT OF BACK SALARIES PERTAINING TO THE PERIOD OF THEIR PREVENTIVE
SUSPENSION.
IX.
WHETHER THE INSTITUTION OF THE RESPONDENTS’
PETITION BEFORE THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION WAS ENTIRELY PREMATURE.
X.
WHETHER THE MISAPPREHENSIONS OF THE
RESPONDENTS AS REGARDS THE PARTIALITY OF THE GSIS COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING THE
CHARGES AGAINST THEM IS BLATANTLY WITHOUT FACTUAL BASIS.
XI.
WHETHER RESPONDENTS’ OBVIOUS ACT OF FORUM
SHOPPING SHOULD BE COUNTENANCED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.[24]
The petitions are without merit.
The civil service
encompasses all branches and agencies of the Government, including government-owned
or controlled corporations (GOCCs) with original charters, like the GSIS, or
those created by special law. As such, the employees are part of the civil
service system and are subject to the law and to the circulars, rules and
regulations issued by the CSC on discipline, attendance and general terms and
conditions of employment.[25] The CSC has jurisdiction to hear and decide
disciplinary cases against erring employees. In addition, Section 37 (b) of
Presidential Decree No. 807 or the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines also
gives the heads of departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces,
cities and municipalities the authority to investigate and decide matters
involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction.
As for the GSIS, Section 45, Republic Act (R.A.) 8291 otherwise known as the
GSIS Act of 1997, specifies its disciplining authority, viz:
SECTION 45. Powers
and Duties of the President and General Manager. The President and General
Manager of the GSIS shall among others, execute and administer the policies and
resolutions approved by the Board and direct and supervise the administration
and operations of the GSIS. The President and General Manager, subject to the
approval of the Board, shall appoint the personnel of the GSIS, remove, suspend
or otherwise discipline them for cause, in accordance with existing Civil
Service rules and regulations, and prescribe their duties and qualifications to
the end that only competent persons may be employed.
By this legal provision,
petitioner, as President and General Manager of GSIS, is vested the authority
and responsibility to remove, suspend or otherwise discipline GSIS personnel
for cause.[26]
However, despite the authority conferred on him by law, such
power is not without limitations for it must be exercised in accordance with
Civil Service rules. The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service lays down the procedure to be observed in issuing a formal charge
against an erring employee, to wit:
First,
the complaint. A complaint against a civil service official or employee shall
not be given due course unless it is in writing and subscribed and sworn to by
the complainant. However, in cases initiated by the proper disciplining
authority, the complaint need not be under oath.[27]
Except when otherwise provided for by law, an administrative complaint may be
filed at anytime with the Commission, proper heads of departments, agencies,
provinces, cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities.[28]
Second,
the Counter-Affidavit/Comment. Upon receipt of a complaint which is sufficient
in form and substance, the disciplining authority shall require the person
complained of to submit Counter-Affidavit/Comment under oath within three days
from receipt.[29]
Third,
Preliminary Investigation. A Preliminary investigation involves the ex parte
examination of records and documents submitted by the complainant and the
person complained of, as well as documents readily available from other
government offices. During said investigation, the parties are given the
opportunity to submit affidavits and counter-affidavits. Failure of the person
complained of to submit his counter-affidavit shall be considered as a waiver
thereof.[30]
Fourth,
Investigation Report. Within five (5) days from the termination of the
preliminary investigation, the investigating officer shall submit the
investigation report and the complete records of the case to the disciplining
authority.[31]
Fifth,
Formal Charge. If a prima facie case is established during the investigation, a
formal charge shall be issued by the disciplining authority. A formal
investigation shall follow. In the absence of a prima facie case, the complaint
shall be dismissed.[32]
It is undisputed that the Memoranda separately issued to
respondents were the formal charges against them. These formal charges
contained brief statements of material or relevant facts, a directive to answer
the charges within seventy two (72) hours from receipt thereof, an advice that
they had the right to a formal investigation and a notice that they are
entitled to be assisted by a counsel of their choice.[33]
It is likewise undisputed that the formal charges were
issued without preliminary or fact-finding investigation. Petitioner explained
that no such investigation was conducted because the CSC rules did not
specifically provide that it is a pre-requisite to the issuance of a formal
charge. He likewise claimed that preliminary investigation was not required in
indictments in flagranti as in this case.
We disagree.
Indeed, the CSC Rules does not specifically provide that a
formal charge without the requisite preliminary investigation is null and void.
However, as clearly outlined above, upon receipt of a complaint which is
sufficient in form and substance, the disciplining authority shall require the
person complained of to submit a Counter-Affidavit/Comment under oath within
three days from receipt. The use of the word “shall” quite obviously indicates
that it is mandatory for the disciplining authority to conduct a preliminary investigation
or at least respondent should be given the opportunity to comment and explain
his side. As can be gleaned from the procedure set forth above, this is done
prior to the issuance of the formal charge and the comment required therein is
different from the answer that may later be filed by respondents. Contrary to
petitioner’s claim, no exception is provided for in the CSC Rules. Not even an
indictment in flagranti as claimed by
petitioner.
This is true even if the
complainant is the disciplining authority himself, as in the present case. To
comply with such requirement, he could have issued a memorandum requiring
respondents to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against them
instead of immediately issuing formal charges. With respondents’ comments,
petitioner would have properly evaluated both sides of the controversy before
making a conclusion that there was a prima facie case against respondents,
leading to the issuance of the questioned formal charges. It is noteworthy that
the very acts subject of the administrative cases stemmed from an event that
took place the day before the formal charges were issued. It appears, therefore,
that the formal charges were issued after the sole determination by the
petitioner as the disciplining authority that there was a prima facie case
against respondents.
To condone this would
give the disciplining authority an unrestricted power to judge by himself the
nature of the act complained of as well as the gravity of the charges. We,
therefore, conclude that respondents were denied due process of law. Not even
the fact that the charges against them are serious and evidence of their guilt
is – in the opinion of their superior – strong can compensate for the procedural
shortcut undertaken by petitioner which is evident in the record of this case.[34]
The filing by petitioner of formal charges against the respondents without
complying with the mandated preliminary investigation or at least give the
respondents the opportunity to comment violated the latter's right to due
process. Hence, the formal charges are void ab initio and may be
assailed directly or indirectly at anytime.[35]
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of
basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted from their jurisdiction. The
violation of a party's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional
issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of
the fundamental right to due process is apparent, a decision rendered in
disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction. This rule is equally
true in quasi-judicial and administrative proceedings, for the constitutional
guarantee that no man shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process is unqualified by the type of proceedings (whether judicial or
administrative) where he stands to lose the same.[36]
Although administrative procedural rules are less stringent
and often applied more liberally, administrative proceedings are not exempt
from basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as the right to due
process in investigations and hearings.[37]
In particular, due process in administrative proceedings has been recognized to
include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice to the
institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent's legal rights; (2) a
real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to
present witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights; (3) a
tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a
person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as
impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by
substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or
contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.[38]
Petitioner contends that respondents waived their right to
preliminary investigation as they failed to raise it before the GSIS.
Again, we do not agree.
It is well-settled that a
decision rendered without due process is void ab initio and may be
attacked at anytime directly or collaterally by means of a separate action, or
by resisting such decision in any action or proceeding where it is invoked.[39]
Moreover, while respondents failed to raise before the GSIS the lack of
preliminary investigation, records show that in their Urgent Motion to Resolve
(their Motion to Lift Preventive Suspension Order) filed with the CSC,
respondents questioned the validity of their preventive suspension and the
formal charges against them for lack of preliminary investigation.[40]
There is, thus, no waiver to speak of.
In the procedure adopted
by petitioner, respondents were preventively suspended in the same formal
charges issued by the former without the latter knowing that there were pending
administrative cases against them. It is true that prior notice and hearing are not
required in the issuance of a preventive suspension order.[41]
However, considering that respondents were preventively suspended in the same
formal charges that we now declare null and void, then their preventive
suspension is likewise null and void.
Lastly, the CA committed
no reversible error in ordering the payment of back salaries during the period
of respondents’ preventive suspension. As the administrative proceedings
involved in this case are void, no delinquency or misconduct may be imputed to
respondents and the preventive suspension meted them is baseless. Consequently,
respondents should be awarded their salaries during the period of their
unjustified suspension.[42]
In granting their back salaries, we are simply repairing the damage that was
unduly caused respondents, and unless we can turn back the hands of time, we
can do so only by restoring to them that which is physically feasible to do
under the circumstances.[43]
The principle of “no work, no pay” does not apply where the employee himself
was unlawfully forced out of job.[44]
In view of the foregoing
disquisition, we find no necessity to discuss the other issues raised by
petitioner.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition in G.R. No. 157383 is DENIED while the petition in G.R. No.
174137 is DISMISSED, for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO
Associate Justice
|
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
|
(On Official Leave) PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
|
TERESITA
J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
|
|
ARTURO D.
BRION
Associate Justice
|
DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
|
|
LUCAS P.
BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
MARIANO C.
Associate
Justice |
|
ROBERTO A.
ABAD
Associate Justice
|
MARTIN S.
VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
|
|
JOSE Associate Justice |
JOSE
CATRAL Associate Justice |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
* On Official Leave
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Eubolo G. Verzola, with Associate Justices Candido V. Rivera and Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring; rollo (G.R. No. 157383), pp. 37-40.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Eubolo G. Verzola, with Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring; id. at 41.
[3] Penned by Associate Justice Danilo B. Pine, with Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Vicente S.E. Veloso, concurring; rollo (G.R. No. 174137), pp. 69-78.
[4] Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon, with Associate Justices Renato C. Dacudao and Vicente S.E. Veloso, concurring; id. at 80-83.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] Embodied in two Orders dated July 30, 2002 and September 24, 2002; id. at 145 and 161.
[13]
[14] Supra note 1.
[15] Rollo (G.R. No. 157383), p. 40.
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21] Rollo (G.R. No. 174137) pp. 232-248.
[22] Supra Note 3.
[23] Rollo (G.R. No. 174137) pp. 77-78.
[24]
[25] Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) v. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS, G.R. No. 170132, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 622, 629-630.
[26]
[27] Section 8, Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
[28] Section 9, Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
[29] Section 11, Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
[30] Section 12, Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
[31] Section 14, Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
[32] Section 15, Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
[33] Section
16, Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
[34] Pat. Go v. NPC, 338 Phil 162, 171 (1997).
[35] Engr. Rubio, Jr. v. Hon. Paras, 495 Phil 629, 643 (2005).
[36] Montoya v. Varilla, G.R. No. 180146, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 831, 843.
[37]
[38] Montoya v. Varilla, supra ar 841-842; Fabella v. CA, 346 Phil 940, 952-953 (1997).
[39] Engr. Rubio, Jr. v. Hon. Paras, supra at 643.
[40] Rollo (G.R. No. 174137), p. 117.
[41] Carabeo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos.
178000 and 178003, December 4, 2009, 607 SCRA 394.
[42] Fabella v. CA, supra at 958.
[43] Neeland v. Villanueva, Jr., 416 Phil
580, 594.
[44]