Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
|
LA CAMPANA DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioner,
- versus – ARTURO
LEDESMA, HON. JUDGE ESTRELLA T. ESTRADA, in her capacity as PRESIDING JUDGE,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Quezon City, and the HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 154152 Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: August 25, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
This resolves
the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, praying
that the Resolution[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA), dated February 13, 2002, ordering the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction, and its Resolution[2]
dated June 28, 2002 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, be
declared null and void ab initio.
The antecedent
facts are as follows.
Petitioner
filed an ejectment case with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) against
private respondent Ledesma, alleging that despite expiration of the contract of
lease executed between them and demands to vacate subject premises and pay
rentals therefor, the latter failed to comply with such demands. Private respondent countered in his Answer
that he had paid the rentals over subject premises and petitioner no longer had
the right to possess the property as it had been foreclosed by the Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP). Private
respondent further pointed out that subject premises had in fact been in the
possession of the DBP since March or April of 1997, so since that time, it was
with the DBP that he made arrangements for his continued occupation of the
subject premises.
The MeTC then
rendered judgment in favor of petitioner, ordering private respondent to
surrender possession of subject premises to petitioner. Private respondent appealed to the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), and to stay execution of said judgment, private respondent
filed a supersedeas bond with the MeTC.
The RTC
affirmed the MeTC judgment. Petitioner
then moved for the immediate execution of the RTC Decision, which motion was
granted by the RTC. Meanwhile, private respondent elevated the case to the CA via
a petition for review on certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction. A temporary restraining order was issued by
the CA, effectively staying implementation of the writ of execution issued by
the RTC. Eventually, the CA also issued
a writ of preliminary injunction per Resolution dated February 13, 2002. In justification of the issuance of said
writ, the CA stated in said Resolution that:
Based
on the evidence before Us, We are convinced that the execution of the assailed
decision of the RTC at this stage will probably cause injustice to the
petitioner [herein private respondent].
We cannot ignore Our ruling in CA-GR CV No. 34856 which had already
attained finality. The facts on hand
show that the DBP is the present owner of the leased premises. The only person who can lawfully eject an
unwelcome tenant from the leased premises is the owner thereof or persons
deriving rights from said owner, of which private respondent [herein
petitioner], in its Opposition to the present motion, does not pretend to
be. Contrary to the stand of the
respondent, the petitioner is not estopped from questioning the title of respondent
over the leased premises as the rule on estoppel against tenants is subject to
a qualification. It does not apply if
the landlord's title has expired, or has been conveyed to another, or has been
defeated by a title paramount, subsequent to the commencement of lessor-lessee
relationship. In other words, if there
was a change in the nature of the title of the landlord during the subsistence
of the lease, then the presumption does not apply.
Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of said Resolution was denied on June 28, 2002.
Thus,
petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari seeking the annulment
of the aforementioned CA Resolutions.
The
issues boil down to whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ordered the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction to stay the immediate execution of the RTC
judgment and whether mandamus lies to compel respondent RTC Judge to issue a
writ of execution.
The Court
finds the petition unmeritorious.
For the Court
to issue a writ of certiorari against the CA, it is incumbent upon
petitioner to show that said lower court committed grave abuse of
discretion. In Quasha Ancheta Peña & Nolasco Law Office v.
Special Sixth Division, Court of Appeals,[3] the
Court stated that:
Grave abuse of discretion means a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough;
it must be so grave as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation or law.[4]
A showing of such grave
abuse of discretion is sorely wanting in this case.
It is true that Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court
provides that “[t]he judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the defendant
shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may
be taken therefrom.” However, the Court
ruled in Benedicto v. Court of Appeals[5]
that “on appeal the appellate court may stay the said writ should circumstances
so require. x x x even if RTC judgments in unlawful detainer
cases are immediately executory, preliminary injunction may still be
granted.” Citing Amagan v. Marayag[6]
and Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendaño,[7]
the Court explained in Benedicto that:
Where the action,
therefore, is one of illegal detainer, as distinguished from one of forcible
entry, and the right of the plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously
placed in issue in a proper judicial proceeding, it is more equitable and just
and less productive of confusion and disturbance of physical possession, with
all its concomitant inconvenience and expenses. For the Court in which the
issue of legal possession, whether involving ownership or not, is brought to
restrain, should a petition for preliminary injunction be filed with it, the
effects of any order or decision in the unlawful detainer case in order to
await the final judgment in the more substantive case involving legal
possession or ownership. x x x[8]
Moreover, the Court also stressed in City of Naga v.
Asuncion[9]
that:
As a
rule, the issuance of a preliminary injunction rests entirely within the
discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case and will not be
interfered with, except in cases of manifest abuse. x x x
x x x x
x x x Be it noted that for a writ of preliminary
injunction to be issued, the Rules of Court do not require that the act
complained of be in clear violation of the rights of the applicant. Indeed,
what the Rules require is that the act complained of be probably in violation of the rights of the applicant. Under the Rules,
probability is enough basis for injunction to issue as a provisional remedy. x x
x[10]
In the afore-quoted case,
the Court reiterated that when exigencies in the case warrant it, the appellate
court may stay the writ of execution issued by the RTC in an action for
ejectment if there are circumstances necessitating such action. An example of such exceptional circumstance
can be seen in Laurel v. Abalos.[11] Therein, a defendant was ordered by the
trial court to vacate the premises of the disputed property and return
possession thereof to the plaintiffs, but while the ejectment case was on
appeal, a judgment was promulgated in a separate case where the sale of the property
to said plaintiffs was declared null and void, making the plaintiffs' right to
possess the disputed property inconclusive.
The Court ruled in said case that:
Where
supervening events (occurring subsequent to the judgment) bring about a
material change in the situation of the parties which makes the execution
inequitable, or where there is no compelling urgency for the execution
because it is not justified by the prevailing circumstances, the court may stay
immediate execution of the judgment.[12]
Based on the foregoing earlier ruling in Laurel,[13]
the Court also considered it just and equitable to stay the execution of the
RTC judgment in an ejectment case against the City of Naga, stating that:
Needless to reiterate, grave and irreparable injury will be inflicted on the City of Naga by the immediate execution of the June 20, 2005 RTC Decision. x x x the people of Naga would be deprived of access to basic social services. It should not be forgotten that the land subject of the ejectment case houses government offices which perform important functions vital to the orderly operation of the local government. x x x[14]
In the present case, there also exists a material change in
the situation of the parties. The CA
properly took into serious consideration the fact that in its Decision in
CA-G.R. CV No. 34856 entitled La Campana Food Products, Inc. v. Development
Bank of the Philippines, which has become final and executory, it
ordered herein petitioner, formerly known as La Campana Food Products, Inc., to
surrender possession of subject properties to the Development Bank of the
Philippines. Evidently, a serious
cloud of doubt has been cast on petitioner’s right of possession, making it
questionable whether the RTC Decision, ordering private respondent to surrender
possession of subject premises to petitioner, should be immediately implemented. Therefore, the CA did not gravely abuse its
discretion in this case; rather, it acted prudently when it stayed execution of
the RTC Decision until such time that a final resolution of the main case is
reached.
Petitioner's contention, that it was improper for the CA to
have granted private respondent's motion to consider the supersedeas
bond it posted with the Metropolitan Trial Court as sufficient to cover the
bond required for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, is
likewise incorrect. Petitioner argues
that, “said supersedeas bond is posted solely and primarily to answer for a
specific purpose which is for the payment of unpaid rentals accruing up to the
final judgment. This cannot be held
answerable for damages to petitioner should it later be found out that the
private respondent is not entitled to the issuance [of a writ of preliminary
injunction].”[15]
Note
that Section 4(b), Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides that:
(b) Unless exempted by the court, the applicant
files with the court where the action or proceeding is pending, a bond executed
to the party or person enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the court, to the
effect that the applicant will pay to such party or person all damages which he
may sustain by reason of the injunction or temporary restraining order if the
court should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto. Upon approval of the requisite bond, a writ
of preliminary injunction shall be issued;
However, in Hualam
Construction and Dev't. Corp. v. Court of Appeals,[16]
the Court expounded on what damages may be recovered in actions for forcible
entry or unlawful detainer, to wit:
As
to damages, We have on several occasions ruled that since the only issue raised
in forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases is that of rightful physical
possession, the “damages” recoverable in these cases are those which the
plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, i.e., those caused
by the loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not the damages
which he may have suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of
material possession. x x x Simply put, “damages” in the context of
Section 8 of Rule 70 [now Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court] is limited
to “rent” or “fair rental value” for the use and occupation of the property.[17]
Since the only damages that petitioner may be entitled to in
an action for unlawful detainer are those arising from its loss of the use or
occupation of subject premises, the only damages petitioner can claim by reason
of the stay of execution of the RTC judgment is also only for the “rent” or
“fair rental value” for the property in question. Therefore, the CA did not err in considering
the supersedeas bond filed with the MTC, which answers for unpaid
rentals, as sufficient bond for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.
In light of
the foregoing, it is quite clear that there is no reason to compel the RTC to
immediately implement the writ of execution in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, dated February 13, 2002 and June 28, 2002,
respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 66668, are AFFIRMED.
SO
ORDERED.
DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
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ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice |
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JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA Associate Justice |
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ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Second
Division, Chairperson
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Cancio C. Garcia, with Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Alicia L. Santos, concurring; rollo, pp. 104-113.
[2] Rollo, pp. 128-130.
[3] G.R. No. 182013, December 4, 2009, 607 SCRA 712.
[4] Id. at 721-722. (Emphasis supplied.)
[5] G.R. No. 157604, October 19, 2005, 473 SCRA 363.
[6] 383 Phil. 486 (2000).
[7] 169 Phil. 138 (1977).
[8] Benedicto
v. Court of Appeals, supra note 5, at 370-371.
[9] G.R. No. 174042, July 9, 2008, 557 SCRA 528.
[10] Id. at 545.
[11] 140 Phil. 532 (1969).
[12] Id. at 544. (Emphasis supplied.)
[13] Id.
[14] City of Naga v. Asuncion, supra note 9, at 546.
[15] Petitioner's Memorandum, rollo, p. 312.
[16] G.R. No. 85466, October 16, 1992, 214 SCRA 612.
[17] Id. at 624-625.