THIRD DIVISION
|
LUCIANO BRIONES and NELLY
BRIONES,
Petitioners, -
versus - JOSE
MACABAGDAL, FE D. MACABAGDAL and VERGON REALTY INVESTMENTS CORPORATION,
Respondents. |
G.R. No. 150666 Present: CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson, BRION, BERSAMIN, ABAD,* and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. Promulgated: August 3, 2010 |
x- - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - -x
DECISION
VILLARAMA,
JR., J.:
On appeal under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is the Decision[1]
dated December 11, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 48109
which affirmed the September 29, 1993 Decision[2]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 135, ordering petitioners
Luciano and Nelly Briones to remove the improvements they have made on the
disputed property or to pay respondent-spouses Jose and Fe Macabagdal the
prevailing price of the land as compensation.
The undisputed
factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
Respondent-spouses
purchased from Vergon Realty Investments Corporation (Vergon) Lot No. 2-R, a
325-square-meter land located in Vergonville Subdivision No. 10 at Las Piñas
City, Metro Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 62181 of
the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City. On the other hand, petitioners are the
owners of Lot No. 2-S, which is adjacent to Lot No. 2-R.
Sometime in
1984, after obtaining the necessary building permit and the approval of Vergon,
petitioners constructed a house on Lot No. 2-R which they thought was Lot No.
2-S. After being informed of the mix up by Vergon’s manager, respondent-spouses
immediately demanded petitioners to demolish the house and vacate the property. Petitioners, however, refused to heed their
demand. Thus, respondent-spouses filed
an action to recover ownership and possession of the said parcel of land with
the RTC of Makati City.[3]
Petitioners
insisted that the lot on which they constructed their house was the lot which
was consistently pointed to them as theirs by Vergon’s agents over the seven (7)-year
period they were paying for the lot.
They interposed the defense of being buyers in good faith and impleaded Vergon
as third-party defendant claiming that because of the warranty against eviction,
they were entitled to indemnity from Vergon in case the suit is decided against
them.[4]
The RTC ruled
in favor of respondent-spouses and found that petitioners’ house was undoubtedly
built on Lot No. 2-R. The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision
reads as follows:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, let judgment be rendered declaring, to wit:
1. That
plaintiffs are the owners of Lot No. 2-R of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-147392
at Vergonville Subdivision, No. 10, Las Piñas, Metro
2. Defendants,
jointly and severally, are ordered to demolish their house and vacate the premises and return the
possession of the portion of Lot No. 2-R as above-described to plaintiffs
within thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision, or in the alternative,
plaintiffs should be compensated by defendants, jointly and severally, by the
payment of the prevailing price of the lot involved as Lot No. 2-R with an area
of 325 square meters which should not be less than P1,500.00 per square
meter, in consideration of the fact that prices of real estate properties in
the area concerned have increased rapidly;
3. Defendants,
jointly and severally, pay to plaintiffs for moral damages with plaintiffs’
plans and dreams of building their own house on their own lot being severely
shattered and frustrated due to defendants’ incursion as interlopers of Lot No.
2-R in the sum of P50,000.00;
4. Defendants,
jointly and severally, to pay plaintiffs in the amount of P30,000.00 as
attorney’s fees; and,
5. to pay the costs of the proceedings.
Defendants’ counterclaim against plaintiffs is dismissed for lack of merit and with no cause of action.
Defendants’ third-party complaint against third-party defendant Vergonville Realty and Investments Corporation is likewise ordered dismissed for lack of cause of action and evidently without merit.
On the other hand,
defendants, jointly and severally, are liable for the litigation expenses
incurred by Vergonville Realty by way of counterclaim, which is also proven by
the latter with a mere preponderance of evidence, and are hereby ordered to pay
the sum of P20,000.00 as compensatory damage; and attorney’s fees in the
sum of P10,000.00
SO ORDERED.[5]
On appeal,
the CA affirmed the RTC’s finding that the lot upon which petitioners built
their house was not the one (1) which Vergon sold to them. Based on the
documentary evidence, such as the titles of the two (2) lots, the contracts to
sell, and the survey report made by the geodetic engineer, petitioners’ house
was built on the lot of the respondent-spouses.[6] There
was no basis to presume that the error was Vergon’s fault. Also the warranty against eviction under
Article 1548 of the Civil Code was not applicable as there was no
deprivation of property: the lot on
which petitioners built their house was not the lot sold to them by Vergon,
which remained vacant and ready for occupation.[7] The
CA further ruled that petitioners cannot use the defense of allegedly being a purchaser
in good faith for wrongful occupation of land.[8]
Aggrieved,
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the
appellate court.[9] Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioners raise the following assignment of errors:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS
DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE CONTRARY TO LAW AND APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE
SUPREME COURT IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ORDERING PETITIONERS
TO DEMOLISH THEIR ONLY HOUSE AND VACATE THE LOT AND TO PAY MORAL AND
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES AS WELL AS ATTORNEY’S FEE IN THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF PS[P]
110,000; AND
II.
THE COURT OF
APPEALS SANCTIONED THE DEPARTURE OF THE
In the
main, it is petitioners’ position that they must not bear the damage alone. Petitioners
insist that they relied with full faith and confidence in the reputation of
Vergon’s agents when they pointed the wrong property to them. Even the
President of Vergon, Felix Gonzales, consented to the construction of the house
when he signed the building permit.[11]
Also, petitioners are builders in good faith.[12]
The petition
is partly meritorious.
At the
outset, we note that petitioners raise factual issues, which are beyond the
scope of a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules. Well
settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to it
from the CA via a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 is
limited to the review of errors of law. The
Court is not bound to weigh all over again the evidence adduced by the parties,
particularly where the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court
coincide. The resolution of factual issues is a function of the trial
court whose findings on these matters are, as a general rule, binding on this
Court, more so where these have been affirmed by the CA.[13] We note that the CA and RTC did not
overlook or fail to appreciate any material circumstance which, when properly
considered, would have altered the result of the case. Indeed, it is beyond
cavil that petitioners mistakenly constructed their house on Lot No. 2-R
which they thought was Lot No. 2-S.
However, the
conclusiveness of the factual findings notwithstanding, we find that the trial
court nonetheless erred in outrightly ordering petitioners to vacate the subject
property or to pay respondent spouses the prevailing price of the land as
compensation. Article 527[14]
of the Civil Code presumes good faith, and since no proof exists to show
that the mistake was done by petitioners in bad faith, the latter should be presumed
to have built the house in good faith.
When a person builds in good faith on the land of another, Article 448 of the Civil Code governs. Said article provides,
ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof. (Emphasis ours.)
The
above-cited article covers cases in which the builders, sowers or planters
believe themselves to be owners of the land or, at least, to have a claim of
title thereto.[15]
The builder in good faith can compel the
landowner to make a choice between appropriating the building by paying the
proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of the land.
The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the
principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal
and not the other way around. However, even as the option lies with the landowner,
the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. He must choose one.[16]
He cannot, for instance, compel the owner of the building to remove the
building from the land without first exercising either option. It is only if the owner chooses to sell his
land, and the builder or planter fails to purchase it where its value is not
more than the value of the improvements, that the owner may remove the
improvements from the land. The owner is
entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the
other party fails to pay for the same.[17]
Moreover,
petitioners have the right to be indemnified for the necessary and useful expenses
they may have made on the subject property. Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil
Code provide,
ART. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof.
ART. 548. Expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure shall not be refunded to the possessor in good faith; but he may remove the ornaments with which he has embellished the principal thing if it suffers no injury thereby, and if his successor in the possession does not prefer to refund the amount expended.
Consequently,
the respondent-spouses have the option to appropriate the house on the subject
land after payment to petitioners of the appropriate indemnity or to oblige
petitioners to pay the price of the land, unless its value is considerably more
than the value of the structures, in which case petitioners shall pay
reasonable rent.
In accordance
with Depra v. Dumlao,[18]
this case must be remanded to the RTC which shall conduct the appropriate
proceedings to assess the respective values of the improvement and of the land,
as well as the amounts of reasonable rentals and indemnity, fix the terms of
the lease if the parties so agree, and to determine other matters necessary for
the proper application of Article 448, in relation to Articles 546 and 548, of
the Civil Code.
As to the liability of Vergon, petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to show negligence on Vergon’s part. Petitioners’ claim is obviously one (1) for tort, governed by Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (Emphasis ours.)
Under this
provision, it is the plaintiff who has to prove by a preponderance of evidence:
(1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the
defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the
connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages
incurred.[19]
This the petitioners failed to do. The
President of Vergon signed the building permit as a precondition for its approval
by the local government, but it did not guarantee that petitioners were
constructing the structure within the metes and bounds of petitioners’ lot. The
signature of the President of Vergon on the building permit merely proved that
petitioners were authorized to make constructions within the subdivision
project of Vergon. And while petitioners acted in good faith in building their
house on Lot No. 2-R, petitioners did not show by what authority the agents or
employees of Vergon were acting when they pointed to the lot where the
construction was made nor was petitioners’ claim on this matter corroborated by
sufficient evidence.
One (1) last
note on the award of damages.
Considering that petitioners acted in good faith in building their house
on the subject property of the respondent-spouses, there is no basis for the
award of moral damages to respondent-spouses. Likewise, the Court deletes the award to
Vergon of compensatory damages and attorney’s fees for the litigation expenses
Vergon had incurred as such amounts were not specifically prayed for in its
Answer to petitioners’ third-party complaint.
Under Article 2208[20]
of the Civil Code, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation are
recoverable only in the concept of actual damages, not as moral damages
nor judicial costs. Hence, such must be specifically prayed for—as was not
done in this case—and may not be deemed incorporated within a general prayer
for “such other relief and remedy as this court may deem just and equitable.”[21]
It must also be noted that aside from the following, the body of the
trial court’s decision was devoid of any statement regarding attorney’s fees.
In Scott Consultants & Resource Development Corporation, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals,[22]
we reiterated that attorney’s fees are not to be awarded every time a party
wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorney’s fees under Article 2208
of the Civil Code demands factual, legal, and equitable justification;
its basis cannot be left to speculation or conjecture. Where granted, the court
must explicitly state in the body of the decision, and not only in the
dispositive portion thereof, the legal reason for the award of attorney’s
fees.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated
1. The
trial court shall determine:
a. the present fair price of the
respondent-spouses’ lot;
b. the amount of the expenses spent by
petitioners for the building of their house;
c. the increase in value (“plus value”)
which the said lot may have acquired by reason thereof; and
d. whether the value of said land is
considerably more than that of the house built thereon.
2. After
said amounts shall have been determined by competent evidence, the Regional
Trial Court shall render judgment, as follows:
a. The trial court shall grant the
respondent-spouses a period of fifteen (15) days within which to exercise their
option under Article 448 of the Civil Code, whether to appropriate the
house as their own by paying to petitioners either the amount of the expenses
spent by petitioners for the building of the house, or the increase in value (“plus
value”) which the said lot may have acquired by reason thereof, or to oblige
petitioners to pay the price of said land. The amounts to be respectively paid
by the respondent-spouses and petitioners, in accordance with the option thus
exercised by written notice of the other party and to the Court, shall be paid
by the obligor within fifteen (15) days from such notice of the option by
tendering the amount to the Court in favor of the party entitled to receive it;
b. The trial court shall further order
that if the respondent-spouses exercises the option to oblige petitioners to
pay the price of the land but the latter rejects such purchase because, as
found by the trial court, the value of the land is considerably more than that
of the house, petitioners shall give written notice of such rejection to the
respondent-spouses and to the Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
respondent-spouses’ option to sell the land. In that event, the parties shall
be given a period of fifteen (15) days from such notice of rejection within
which to agree upon the terms of the lease, and give the Court formal written
notice of such agreement and its provisos. If no agreement is reached by the
parties, the trial court, within fifteen (15) days from and after the
termination of the said period fixed for negotiation, shall then fix the terms
of the lease, payable within the first five (5) days of each calendar month.
The period for the forced lease shall not be more than two (2) years, counted
from the finality of the judgment, considering the long period of time since
petitioners have occupied the subject area. The rental thus fixed shall be
increased by ten percent (10%) for the second year of the forced lease.
Petitioners shall not make any further constructions or improvements on the
house. Upon expiration of the two (2)-year period, or upon default by
petitioners in the payment of rentals for two (2) consecutive months, the
respondent-spouses shall be entitled to terminate the forced lease, to recover
their land, and to have the house removed by petitioners or at the latter’s
expense. The rentals herein provided shall be tendered by petitioners to the
Court for payment to the respondent-spouses, and such tender shall constitute
evidence of whether or not compliance was made within the period fixed by the
Court.
c. In any event, petitioners shall pay
the respondent-spouses reasonable compensation for the occupancy of the
respondent-spouses’ land for the period counted from the year petitioners
occupied the subject area, up to the commencement date of the forced lease
referred to in the preceding paragraph;
d. The periods to be fixed by the trial
court in its Decision shall be inextendible, and upon failure of the party
obliged to tender to the trial court the amount due to the obligee, the party
entitled to such payment shall be entitled to an order of execution for the
enforcement of payment of the amount due and for compliance with such other
acts as may be required by the prestation due the obligee.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice |
|
WE CONCUR: CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice Chairperson |
|
|
ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
|
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice |
|
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
|
|
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice Chairperson, Third Division |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
|
|
RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice |
*
Designated as additional member per
Special Order No. 843 dated
[1] Rollo, pp. 43-51. Penned by Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now a member of this Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. The dispositive portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] Bernarda
Ch. Osmeña v. Nicasio Ch. Osmeña, et al., G.R. No. 171911, January 26, 2010, p. 4.
[14] ART. 527. Good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests the burden of proof.
[15] Vide Philippine National Bank v. De Jesus, 458 Phil. 454, 458 (2003) and Pada-Kilario v. Court of Appeals, 379 Phil. 515, 529-530 (2000).
[16] Arangote
v. Maglunob, G.R. No. 178906,
[17] Sarmiento v.
[18] No. L-57348, May 16, 1985, 136 SCRA 475, 483, cited in National Housing Authority v. Grace Baptist Church, G.R. No. 156437, March 1, 2004, 424 SCRA 147, 154.
[19] Child Learning Center, Inc. v. Tagorio,
G.R. No. 150920,
[20] Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees
and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered,
except:
(1) When exemplary damages are
awarded;
(2) When the defendant’s act or
omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur
expenses to protect his interest;
(3) In criminal cases of
malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly
unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted
in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff’s plainly
valid, just and demandable claim;
(6) In actions for legal
support;
(7) In actions for the recovery
of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity
under workmen’s compensation and employer’s liability laws;
(9) In a separate civil action
to recover civil liability arising from a crime;
(10) When at least double
judicial costs are awarded;
(11) In any other case where
the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of
litigation should be recovered.
In all cases, the attorney’s fees and
expenses of litigation must be reasonable.
[21] Mirasol v. de la Cruz, No.
L-32552, 84 SCRA 337, 342-343.
[22] G.R. No. 112916,