Republic
of the Philippines
Supreme
Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
ERLINDA REYES and ROSEMARIE MATIENZO, Petitioners, - versus - HON. JUDGE BELEN B. ORTIZ,
Presiding, Branch 49, Metropolitan Trial Court, Caloocan City; SPOUSES
BERNARD and FLORENCIA PERL, represented by Attorney-in-Fact BENJAMIN MUCIO;
HON. JUDGE VICTORIA ISABEL A. PAREDES, Presiding, Branch 124, Regional Trial
Court, Caloocan City and SEGUNDO BAUTISTA,
Respondents. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x SPS. ALBERTO EMBORES and LOURDES EMBORES, SPS. ROBERTO AND EVELYN
PALAD, DENNIS HENOSA and CORAZON LAURENTE,
Petitioners, - versus - HON. RAYMUNDO G. VALLEGA,
Presiding Judge, Branch 52, Metropolitan Trial Court, Caloocan City; HON.
ELEANOR R. KWONG, Presiding Judge, Branch 51, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Caloocan City; HON. JUDGE BELEN B. ORTIZ, Presiding Judge, Branch 49,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Caloocan City; VICTORIA C. SALIRE-ALBIS,
represented by her attorney-in-fact MR. MENELIO C. SALIRE; MA. FE R. ROCO,
ALFREDO TAN, MANUELITO ESTRELLA; and HON. JUDGE ANTONIO FINEZA, Presiding
Judge, Branch 131, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City,
Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 137794 G.R. No. 149664 Present: CORONA, C.J., Chairperson, LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, BERSAMIN,* DEL
CASTILLO, and PEREZ, JJ. Promulgated: August
11, 2010 |
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LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, J.:
The instant cases are consolidated Petitions[1]
for Declaratory Relief, Certiorari, and Prohibition. The petitioners in G.R. No. 137794 seek to
declare null and void the proceedings in Civil Case No. 23477, an ejectment
case, before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Caloocan City, Branch 49, and
Civil Case No. C-17725, a complaint for Recovery of Possession and Ownership,
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Caloocan City, Branch 124;[2]
while the petitioners in G.R. No. 149664 pray for the nullity of the following
ejectment proceedings before the different branches of the Caloocan City MeTC:
(1) Civil Case No. 99-25011, Branch 52; (2) Civil Case No. 22559 and Civil Case
No. 18575, Branch 49 and its appeal to the RTC, Branch 131; (3) Civil Case No.
00-25892, Branch 51; and (4) Civil Case No. 00-25889, Branch 51.[3] G.R. No. 149664 was considered closed and
terminated by the Court’s Resolution dated August 30, 2006.[4]
The parcels of land which are the subject matter of these
cases are part of the Tala Estate, situated between the boundaries of Caloocan
City and Quezon City and encompassing an area of 7,007.9515 hectares more or
less.[5]
In G.R. No. 137794, respondents Segundo Bautista and
spouses Bernard and Florencia Perl sought the ouster from the contested lots of
Erlinda Reyes, spouses Rene and Rosemarie Matienzo and Sergio Abejero, who are
occupants of separate home lots in Camarin, Caloocan City.
The first case was commenced on December 11, 1996, by
respondent Segundo Bautista, a registered owner of the parcel of land occupied
by spouses Rene and Rosemarie Matienzo. The case was a complaint for Recovery
of Possession and/or Ownership of Real Property (Recovery case) against the latter spouses with the RTC Caloocan
City, Branch 124.[6] This was docketed as Civil Case No. C-17725.[7]
Shortly thereafter, a separate but related action, was
initiated by the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of
Lands on December 27, 1996, before the Quezon City RTC, Branch 85 (re-raffled
to Branch 93).[8] This was a complaint for Annulment of
Title/Reversion (Annulment/Reversion
case) against Biyaya Corporation and the Register of Deeds of the Cities
of Pasig, Caloocan, and Quezon, the City of Manila, and the Administrator of
the Land Registration Authority involving the Tala Estate. The case, docketed as Civil Case No.
Q-96-29810, sought to declare null and void the transfer certificates of title
issued in the name of Biyaya Corporation, and all derivative titles emanating
therefrom, and to declare the land in suit to be reverted to it as part of the
patrimonial property of the State, and the same be awarded to the actual
occupants. One of the intervenors therein
is Samahan ng Maliliit na Magkakapitbahay (SAMAKABA) of which petitioners
Erlinda Reyes and Rosemarie Matienzo are members.[9]
On May 28, 1997, the Quezon City RTC in the
Annulment/Reversion case issued a Preliminary Injunction (Injunction) freezing all ejectment cases involving the Tala Estate
pending in the MeTCs of Quezon City and Caloocan City.[10]
Believing that the Injunction issued by the Quezon City RTC
can be beneficial to them in the Recovery case pending before the Caloocan City
RTC, on June 27, 1997, spouses Rene and Rosemarie Matienzo filed a motion to
suspend the proceedings of the Recovery case.[11] On December 8, 1997, the Caloocan City RTC,
Branch 124 denied said motion.[12] Spouses Matienzo moved for the
reconsideration of the motion, but the same was denied on May 14, 1998.[13] The spouses received the order denying their
motion for reconsideration on June 9, 1998.[14] Trial on the merits started on December 2,
1998.[15]
The second case, an ejectment complaint, was commenced by
spouses Bernard and Florencia Perl on June 25, 1997, against Erlinda Reyes
before the Caloocan City MeTC, Branch 49.[16] It was docketed as Civil Case No. 23477.
Shortly thereafter, on July 8, 1997, spouses Perl filed the third case, an
ejectment action against Sergio Abejero.
The case, which was raffled off to Branch 49 of the Caloocan City MeTC,
was docketed as Civil Case No. 23519.[17] Subsequently, these two ejectment cases were
consolidated (Ejectment cases).[18] In her Answer and during the preliminary
conference, Erlinda Reyes moved for the suspension of the proceedings and/or
for the dismissal of these cases citing the Injunction issued in Civil Case No.
Q-96-29810.[19] In its Order[20]
dated January 22, 1999, the MeTC did not entertain Reyes’s motion, instead, it
required her to submit a position paper.
Erlinda Reyes received the order on March 11, 1999.[21] On April 16, 1999, the trial court issued a
Decision ordering Erlinda to vacate the contested property.[22]
The Recovery case and the Ejectment cases converged when
petitioners Rosemarie Matienzo and Erlinda Reyes, joined on March 25, 1999 in
filing directly with this Court the instant petition denominated as
“Declaratory Relief, Certiorari, and Prohibition,” mainly assailing the
denial of their respective motions for suspension.[23] Petitioners Matienzo and Reyes asked that the
proceedings in the Ejectment cases and the Recovery case be declared null and
void for violating the Injunction order of the Quezon City RTC. This case is docketed as G.R. No. 137794.
During the pendency of G.R. No. 137794, certain events
supervened when the Ejectment cases ran their course and petitioner Reyes
appealed the MeTC decision to the RTC.
In the RTC, the Ejectment cases were docketed as Civil Cases Nos.
C-18904-05.[24]
Apparently, respondent-spouses Perl moved for the execution of the MeTC
decision pending appeal, which the RTC granted as the Writ of Execution was
thereafter issued on October 20, 2000.[25] Petitioner Erlinda Reyes and company, thus,
filed with this Court a motion to suspend the proceedings in the RTC. [26]
On October 25, 2000, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order
restraining the implementation of the said writ of execution.[27]
G.R. No. 149664, on the other hand, emanated from four
distinct ejectment complaints filed against petitioners Corazon Laurente, spouses
Alberto and Lourdes Embores, spouses Roberto and Evelyn Palad, and Dennis
Henosa.[28] The parcels of land from which petitioners
were sought to be evicted were located in Camarin, Caloocan City and within the
Tala Estate.[29] Petitioners were members of Alyansa Ng Mga
Naninirahan Sa Tala Friar Lands (ALNATFRAL), an intervenor in the Reversion
case.[30] These ejectment cases were all filed after
the Injunction order was issued on May 28, 1997 by the Quezon City RTC in the
Annulment/Reversion case. Thus, petitioners
separately invoked the said injunction in seeking the dismissal or suspension
of the four ejectment cases.
Petitioners’ motions for suspension were dismissed and the trial court
proceeded to render judgments on these cases. Petitioners resorted directly to
this Court in seeking the declaration of nullity of the proceedings of these
ejectment cases for violating the prevailing injunction issued by the Quezon
City RTC.
Meanwhile, on March 4, 2003, the petitioners in G.R. No.
149664 filed a motion for consolidation asking that the said case be
consolidated with G.R. No. 137794.
On April 28, 2003, this Court resolved to consolidate the
two cases.
On July 28, 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 149664 filed a
Motion to Withdraw and/or Dismiss Instant Petition[31]
stating that since a decision in the Annulment/Reversion case (Civil Case No.
Q-96-29810) was already issued (although they did not attach a copy thereof),
the petition is therefore rendered moot and academic as the injunction order
was effective only pending determination of the merits.
On August 30, 2006, the Court granted the motion to
withdraw petition in G.R. No. 149664 and considered the same closed and
terminated.[32] On October 11, 2006, G.R. No. 149664 became
final and executory.
What remains to be resolved, therefore, are the issues
raised in G.R. No. 137794.
In their bid to declare null and void the proceedings in
the Recovery case and the Ejectment cases, petitioners argued that the Caloocan
City MeTC, where the Ejectment cases were filed, and the Caloocan City RTC
where the Recovery case was pending, were divested of jurisdiction since the
Quezon City RTC acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter.[33] Petitioners specifically alleged that the
MeTC’s refusal to suspend the Ejectment cases despite the Injunction order is
tantamount or amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction. As to the Caloocan City RTC, its desistance
to heed the Injunction is unjustified and contrary to well-settled jurisprudence.[34] Petitioners were of the view that the
interference by the Quezon City RTC was justified since no third-party claim is
involved.[35]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) adopts the
position of petitioners in praying that the orders denying the motion to
suspend proceedings and the proceedings that transpired in the Ejectment cases
be set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.[36] Citing Honda Giken Kogyo-Kabushiki Kaisha v. San Diego,[37]
where it was held that a writ of injunction may be issued to a court by another
court superior in rank, the OSG maintains that the Injunction issued by the
Quezon City RTC in Civil Case No. Q-96-29810 covers all metropolitan trial
courts including the Ejectment cases in Caloocan City MeTC, Branch 49.[38] The OSG also maintains that the Injunction
was in accordance with the settled jurisprudence where the reversion case is
being filed by the State.
Respondent Segundo Bautista contends that petitioners
resorted to a wrong remedy. He argues
that the action for declaratory relief can only prosper if the statute, deed,
or contract has not been violated.[39] Hence, where the law or contract has already
been breached prior to the filing of the declaratory relief, courts can no
longer assume jurisdiction since this action is not geared towards the settling
of issues arising from breach or violation of the rights and obligations of the
parties under a statute, deed, and contract, but rather it is intended to
secure an authoritative statement for guidance in their enforcement or
compliance of the same.[40] Since the Injunction order of the Quezon City
RTC had already been violated as early as December 8, 1997 by the Caloocan City
RTC in the Recovery case, or before the filing of this instant petition, resort
to Rule 63 of the Rules of Court would not lie.
Respondent Bautista insists that the instant recourse of petitioner
Matienzo was resorted to as a ploy to substitute the filing of certiorari
under Rule 65, which she already lost since the 60-day period had already
expired.[41] Respondent points out that direct resort to
this Court violates the rule on the hierarchy of courts. Since it was the Caloocan City RTC which
denied petitioner Matienzo’s motion to suspend proceedings, the petition for
declaratory relief should have been filed with the Court of Appeals. Direct filing with this Court is not
justified as, other than making motherhood statements, petitioner Matienzo
failed to state clearly the exceptional and compelling circumstances to justify
the exercise of this Court’s primary jurisdiction.[42] He likewise contends that the Caloocan City
RTC did not err in not suspending the proceedings in the Recovery case,
notwithstanding the Injunction issued by the Quezon City RTC, since the said
injunction applied only to the MeTCs of Quezon City and Caloocan City so the
RTC was excluded from the injunction order.
He avers that it is the Caloocan City RTC which is vested with the
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case until its final conclusion since it
had acquired the same ahead of the Quezon City RTC. He states that being co-equal, the Quezon
City RTC had no authority to stop by injunction the Caloocan City RTC and even
though there are instances where another court may exercise coordinate
jurisdiction in cases where there are justifiable grounds, here, petitioner
Matienzo has not alleged any of those circumstances.
Petitioners
insist that this is mainly a petition for declaratory relief. Section 1, Rule 63 of the 1997 Rules of Court
provides:
SECTION
1. Who may file petition. — Any
person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or
whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation
thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine
any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his
rights or duties, thereunder.
An action
for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove
clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil
Code, may be brought under this Rule.
The foregoing section can be dissected into two parts. The first paragraph concerns declaratory
relief, which has been defined as a special civil action by any person
interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument or whose
rights are affected by a statute, ordinance, executive order or regulation to
determine any question of construction or validity arising under the
instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute and for a declaration of
his rights and duties thereunder. The
second paragraph pertains to (1) an action for the reformation of an
instrument; (2) an action to quiet title; and (3) an action to consolidate
ownership in a sale with a right to repurchase.[43]
The first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 63 enumerates the
subject matter to be inquired upon in a declaratory relief namely, deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, a statute, executive order or regulation,
or any government regulation. This
Court, in Lerum v. Cruz,[44]
declared that the subject matters to be tested in a petition for declaratory
relief are exclusive, viz:
Under
this rule, only a person who is interested “under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute or ordinance,
may bring an action to determine any question of construction or validity
arising under the instrument or statute and for a declaration of his rights or
duties thereunder.” This means that the subject matter must refer to a deed, will, contract
or other written instrument, or to a statute or ordinance, to warrant
declaratory relief. Any other matter not mentioned therein is deemed excluded.
This is under the principle of expressio unius est exclussio alterius. (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing holding was reiterated in Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[45]
wherein this Court stressed that court orders or decisions cannot be made the
subject matter of a declaratory relief, thus:
Judge
Querubin's query is not an action for declaratory relief. Section 1 of Rule 64
[now Rule 63] of the Rules of Court provides the requisites of an action for
declaratory relief. In interpreting these requisites, the Court has ruled that:
x x x x
The letter of Judge Querubin
pertained to final orders and decisions of the courts that are clearly not the
proper subjects of a petition for declaratory relief. Thus, the requisites prescribed
by the Rules of Court in an action for declaratory relief are not applicable to
the letter of Judge Querubin.[46]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Then again in a recent ruling of this Court, it was emphasized:
A
petition for declaratory relief cannot properly have a court decision as its
subject matter.
In Tanda v. Aldaya [98 Phil. 244 (1956)], we ruled that:
[A] court decision cannot be
interpreted as included within the purview of the words “other written
instrument,” as contended by appellant, for the simple reason that the Rules of
Court already provide for the ways by which an ambiguous or doubtful decision
may be corrected or clarified without need of resorting to the expedient
prescribed by Rule 66 [now Rule 64].[47]
(Emphasis supplied.)
In the instant case, petitioners Erlinda Reyes and
Rosemarie Matienzo assailed via
Declaratory Relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, the orders of the trial
courts denying their motions to suspend proceedings. This recourse by petitioners, unfortunately,
cannot be countenanced since a court order is not one of those subjects to be
examined under Rule 63.
The proper remedy that petitioner Erlinda Reyes could have
utilized from the denial of her motion to suspend proceedings in the Caloocan
City MeTC was to file a motion for reconsideration and, if it is denied, to
file a petition for certiorari before
the RTC pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, petitioner Matienzo should
have filed a special civil action on certiorari
also under Rule 65 with the Court
of Appeals from the denial of her motion by the Caloocan City RTC. The necessity of filing the petition to the
RTC in the case of Erlinda Reyes and to the Court of Appeals in the case of
Matienzo is dictated by the principle of the hierarchy of courts.[48] Both petitions must be filed within 60 days
from the receipt or notice of the denial of the motion to suspend proceedings
or from the denial of the motion for reconsideration. Section 4 of Rule 65 partly provides:
Sec. 4. When and where to file the petition. - The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days counted from the notice of the denial of said motion.
If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court x x x, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed with the Court of Appeals or with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the court’s appellate jurisdiction.
Despite this procedural remedy available to them,
petitioners, under the pretext that they were in a quandary as to their rights
under the Injunction order of the Quezon City RTC, directly filed the instant
case here. Petitioners did not bother to proffer a compelling reason for their
direct resort to this Court. This procedural
faux pas proves fatal. The Court’s exhortation against taking a
procedural shortcut cannot be overemphasized.
In Ortega v. The Quezon City
Government, [49] the Court accentuated:
At all
events, even if this petition delves on questions of law, there is no statutory
or jurisprudential basis for according to this Court original and exclusive
jurisdiction over declaratory relief which advances only questions of law.
Finally,
while a petition for declaratory relief may be treated as one for prohibition
if it has far reaching implications and raises questions that need to be
resolved, there is no allegation of facts by petitioner tending to show that
she is entitled to such a writ. The judicial policy must thus remain that
this Court will not entertain direct resort to it, except when the redress
sought cannot be obtained in the proper courts or when exceptional and
compelling circumstances warrant availment of a remedy within and calling for
the exercise of this Court's primary jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.)
To make matters worse, petitioner Matienzo obviously
availed of the instant declaratory relief to substitute for a petition for certiorari,
a remedy which she sadly lost by inaction.
It must be recalled that on December 8, 1997, the Caloocan City RTC,
Branch 124 denied Matienzo’s motion to suspend proceedings.[50] She moved for reconsideration, but the same
was denied on May 14, 1998.[51] She received the Order denying her motion for
reconsideration on June 9, 1998.[52] She had 60 days therefrom to question the
same before the Quezon City RTC. It was
only on March 25, 1999 that petitioner Matienzo assailed the order denying her
motion for reconsideration, albeit wrongly before this Court.[53] From this, it can be inferred that petitioner
Matienzo’s recourse is a belated attempt designed to salvage her lost
opportunity to assail the order denying her motion to suspend proceedings.
Also unavailing are the contentions of petitioners that the
Caloocan City RTC and MeTC committed grave abuse of discretion when they denied
petitioners’ motions to suspend proceedings.
The pertinent portion of the Injunction order of the Quezon City RTC
reads:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, this Court has to grant, as it hereby grants the
application for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. Let a writ
of preliminary Injunction be issued ordering defendant representing Biyaya
Corporation, its agents, assigns, and transferees, as well as all other persons
representing themselves as owners of certain portions of the land in question,
otherwise known as the Tala Estate, to immediately cease and desist from doing
or causing to do, further acts of disposition of the lots subject of the
present complaint, such as the filing of ejectment cases in the Municipal Trial Courts of Quezon City and Caloocan City and, the demolition and ejectment therefrom of the members of the herein Intervenors. Accordingly, the Metropolitan Trial Courts of
Quezon City and Caloocan City are specifically ordered to cease and
desist from further conducting trials and proceedings in the ejectment cases
filed and to be filed involving the lots of the present complaint, until
further orders from this Court.[54]
(Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing
order is not addressed to the Caloocan City RTC. Neither can it be inferred
from the language thereof that the Quezon City RTC intended to enjoin the
Caloocan City RTC from further proceeding with the Recovery case. The order merely mentions the Caloocan City
MeTCs. Nothing more. But more
importantly, the Quezon City RTC could not have validly enjoined the Caloocan
City RTC without violating the doctrine that no court has the power to
interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent
or coordinate jurisdiction.[55] Spouses
Ching v. Court of Appeals[56] justifies this rule in this manner:
Beginning
with the case of Orais v. Escaño, down to the subsequent cases of Nuñez
v. Low, Cabigao v. del Rosario, Hubahib v. Insular Drug Co., Inc., National
Power Corp. v. De Veyra, Luciano v.
Provincial Governor, De Leon v. Hon.
Judge Salvador, Cojuangco v. Villegas,
Darwin v. Tokonaga, we laid
down the long standing doctrine that no
court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of
a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. The various trial courts
of a province or city, having the same or equal authority, should not, cannot,
and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much less with
their orders or judgments. A contrary rule would obviously lead to confusion
and seriously hamper the administration of justice. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas v.
Court of Appeals,[57] two
civil cases with identical causes of action were filed in different RTCs, one
ahead of the other. The second RTC which
acquired jurisdiction over the case issued a preliminary injunction enjoining
the proceedings in the RTC which first acquired jurisdiction of the case. Ruling against the injunction issued by the
RTC, this Court stressed:
Hence,
nothing can be clearer than that Judge Rapatalo had indeed issued the
questioned writ of preliminary injunction with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction for the blatant disregard of the basic precept that no court has the power to
interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of a co-equal and
coordinate court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the
relief sought by injunction.
This
Court explained in Parco vs. Court of Appeals that:
x x x
Jurisdiction is vested in the court not in any particular branch or judge, and
as a corollary rule, the various branches of the Court of First Instance of a
judicial district are a coordinate and co-equal courts one branch stands on the
same level as the other. Undue interference by one on the proceedings and
processes of another is prohibited by law. In the language of this Court, the
various branches of the Court of First Instance of a province or city, having
as they have the same or equal authority and exercising as they do concurrent
and coordinate jurisdiction should not, cannot, and are not permitted to
interfere with their respective cases, much less with their orders or judgments
x x x.
Needless
to say, adherence to a different rule would sow confusion and wreak havoc on
the orderly administration of justice, and in the ensuing melee, hapless
litigants will be at a loss as to where to appear and plead their cause.[58]
(Emphasis supplied.)
While there are
recognized exceptions to the foregoing rule, other than citing said cases, [59]
petitioners did not explain the applicability of said exceptional cases to
their petition.
Bereft of merit too is petitioners’ argument that the
Caloocan City MeTC cannot disregard the injunction order of the Quezon City RTC
hearing the Annulment/Reversion case. The
established rule is that a pending civil action for ownership such as annulment
of title shall not ipso facto suspend
an ejectment proceeding.[60] The Court explained that the rationale for
this is that in an ejectment case, the issue is possession, while in an
annulment case the issue is ownership.[61] In fact, an ejectment case can be tried apart
from an annulment case.[62] Although there is an exception to this rule,
petitioners failed to justify that this case falls within said exception. The
words of the Court on this matter are instructive:
In the absence of a concrete
showing of compelling equitable reasons at least comparable and under circumstances
analogous to Amagan, we cannot override the established rule that a pending civil action for ownership shall
not ipso facto suspend an ejectment proceeding. Additionally, to
allow a suspension on the basis of the reasons the petitioners presented in
this case would create the dangerous precedent of allowing an ejectment suit to
be suspended by an action filed in another court by parties who are not
involved or affected by the ejectment suit.[63]
(Emphases supplied.)
Hence, petitioners’
posture that the Ejectment cases should be suspended due to the pendency of the
Annulment/Reversion case is not meritorious.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition
is hereby DISMISSED. The
Temporary Restraining Order dated October 25, 2000 issued by this Court is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice
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MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice |
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JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice |
Chief Justice
* Per Special Order No. 876 dated August 2, 2010.
[1] Petitioners in G.R. No. 137794 insist that their petition is mainly a Declaratory Relief. (See rollo, p. 366.)
[2] Rollo (G.R. No. 137794), pp. 3-15.
[3] Rollo (G.R. No. 149664), pp. 3-19.
[4] Id. at 398.
[5] Id. at 45.
[6] Rollo (G.R. No. 137794), p. 543.
[7] Id. at 6.
[8] Id. at 556.
[9] Id. at 299.
[10]
The motion for reconsideration of
the injunction order was denied on October 21, 1997. Apparently no further
actions were taken against the said order. (Rollo [G.R.
No. 137794], pp.
35-41.)
[11] Rollo (G.R. No. 137794), p. 546.
[12] Id. at 548.
[13] Id. at 551.
[14] Id. at 15.
[15] Id. at 552.
[16] Id. at 299.
[17] Id. at 299-300.
[18] Id. at 300.
[19] Id. at 112.
[20] Id. at 76.
[21] Id. at 15.
[22] Id. at 112.
[23] Id. at 3.
[24] Id. at 224.
[25] Id. at 284.
[26] Id. at 267-270.
[27] Id. at 283-284.
[28] Rollo (G.R. No. 149664), p. 8.
[29] Id. at 6.
[30] Id. at 40.
[31] Id. at 392.
[32] Id. at 398.
[33] Id. at 12.
[34] Id.
[35] Id. at 13.
[36] Rollo (G.R. No. 137794), p. 307.
[37] G.R. No. L-22756, March 18, 1966, 16 SCRA 406; rollo (G.R. No. 137794), p. 303.
[38] Rollo (G.R. No. 137794), p. 303.
[39] Id. at 558.
[40] Id.
[41] Id. at 354-355.
[42] Id. at 560-561.
[43]
Malana v. Tappa, G.R.
No. 181303, September 17, 2009, 600 SCRA 189, 199-200; Atlas Consolidated
Mining & Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 54305,
February 14, 1990, 182 SCRA 166, 177.
[44] 87 Phil 652, 657 (1950); Declaratory Relief was then under Rule 66 of the 1948 Rules of Court.
[45] 440 Phil. 1, 19 (2002).
[46] Declaratory Relief was then under Rule 64 of the 1994 Rules of Court.
[47] CJH Development Corporation v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 172457, December 24, 2008, 575 SCRA 467, 473.
[48] Tano v. Socrates, 343 Phil. 670, 700 (1997).
[49] 506 Phil. 373, 380-381 (2005).
[50] Rollo (G.R. No. 137794), p. 548.
[51] Id. at 551.
[52] Id. at 15.
[53] Id. at 3.
[54] Id. at 41.
[55] Suico Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 160, 172 (1999).
[56]
446 Phil. 121, 129 (2003).
[57] 422 Phil. 405 (2001).
[58] Id. at 420-421.
[59] Rollo, p. 341. The cases cited are Inter-Regional Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 160 Phil. 265, 269 (1975) and Abiera v. Court of Appeals, 150-A Phil. 666, 674-675 (1972), etc.
[60] Wilmon Auto Supply Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97637, April 10, 1992, 208 SCRA 108, 116.
[61] Antonio v. Court of Appeals, 237 Phil. 572, 581 (1987); Spouses Barnachea v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150025. July 23, 2008, 559 SCRA 363, 375.
[62] Antonio v. Court of Appeals, id.
[63] Spouses Barnachea v. Court of Appeals, supra note 61 at 377.