EN BANC

 

 

A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J    ---      Assistant Special Prosecutor III Rohermia J. Jamsani-Rodriguez, Complainant, versus Justices Gregory S. Ong, Jose R. Hernandez and Rodolfo A. Ponferrada, Sandiganbayan, Respondents.

 

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DISSENTING OPINION

 

ABAD, J.:

 

 

I dissent from the majority decision ably written for the Court by Justice Lucas P. Bersamin.

 

In 1988 Assistant Special Prosecutor Rohermia Jamsani-Rodriguez from the Office of the Ombudsman charged Justices Gregory S. Ong, Jose R. Hernandez, and Rodolfo A. Ponferrada of the Sandiganbayan’s Fourth Division of (1) grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming a Justice, and conduct grossly prejudicial to the interest of the service; (2) falsification of public documents; (3) improprieties in the hearing of cases; and (4) manifest partiality and gross ignorance of the law.

 

Regarding the first and second charges, complainant Rodriguez assailed the procedure that respondent Justices adopted during the Fourth Division’s hearings in Davao City from April 24 to April 28, 2006.  Rodriquez alleged that, rather than sit as a collegial body, Justice Ong, as Chairman, heard cases by himself, while Justices Hernandez and Ponferrada together heard at a short distance the other cases, thus resulting in separate and simultaneous hearings.  Rodriguez said that she objected to the procedure but this was brushed aside.

 

Following an investigation, then Court Administrator Jose P. Perez, submitted a report dated October 6, 2009, recommending the dismissal of the charges for lack of merit.  But the majority in the Court found respondent Justices guilty of simple misconduct and respondent Justices Ong and Hernandez guilty of unbecoming conduct.  The Court dismissed all the other charges.

 

I disagree with the findings of guilt.

 

One.  The majority in the Court found respondent Justices guilty of simple misconduct for failure to hear the cases before them as a collegial body.  It ruled that P.D. 1606 and the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan required the actual presence of the three Justices composing the Division to constitute a quorum for conducting business and holding trial.  Thus, the exclusion or absence of any member of the Division negated the existence of a quorum and precluded collegiality.

 

But, while the procedure that respondent Justices adopted did not strictly follow the requirement to the letter, I submit that their acts cannot be characterized either as simple or grave misconduct.  Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.[1]  The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules. Otherwise, the misconduct is only simple.[2]

 

To be considered misconduct, the transgression must have been committed by unlawful behavior or gross negligence.  Here, respondent Justices conducted the separate and simultaneous hearings in the same venue and within hearing and communicating distance of each other.  They adopted this arrangement to maximize their presence in Davao City and render speedy justice to the parties that wait months before the Court could visit Mindanao again. 

 

The actions of the Justices also resulted in saving the litigants, the lawyers, the witnesses, and the Court considerable time, effort, and resources.[3]  None of the Justices was motivated by corruption or an illegal purpose; on the contrary, they did everything in good faith.  In fact, complainant Rodriguez herself recognized in her memorandum to her superior that it was commendable on the part of the Justices to have adopted the procedure which turned out to be advantageous to the prosecution.[4]

 

Clearly, there is nothing unlawful or grossly negligent in what respondent Justices did.  At most, it could only be regarded as irregular, which is not sufficient to make them liable for any misconduct.

 

Two.  In weighing respondent Justices’ individual liabilities, the majority in the Court made a distinction between the Chairman and the members of the Fourth Division.  It explained that as Chairman, Justice Ong possessed and wielded powers of supervision, direction, and control over the Division’s proceedings and eventually steered it into the path of procedural irregularity.  On the other hand, the majority mitigated the liabilities of Justices Hernandez and Ponferrada supposedly because they were mere Division members who had no direction and control of how the proceedings went.

 

I submit that the distinction is unwarranted and placed respondent Ong at an unfair disadvantage.

 

As the majority decision noted, the Sandiganbayan being a collegial court, each member has approximately equal power and authority.  The members act on the basis of consensus or majority rule.[5]  Thus, while the Chairman supervises and directs the proceedings of the Division, his authority is limited to that extent.  All Division members share any decision on what proceedings to adopt in the conduct of its business.  They act by consensus or majority rule.  In fact, respondent Justices pointed out in their respective comments that they adopted the challenged procedure in the best interest of the service.  This admission negates any impression that Chairman Ong imposed his will on Justices Hernandez and Ponferrada or that the latter two merely relied on their Chairman’s judgment.

 

It is not fair to conclude that since Justices Hernandez and Ponferrada were mere members, they had no voice in how their Division conducted its business and proceedings.  No less than the Code of Judicial Conduct requires them to be independent from judicial colleagues in respect of decisions which they are obliged to make independently.[6]

 

I submit that Justice Ong does not deserve the sanction, even if light, that the Court has chosen to impose on him.

 

 

 

         

                                                          ROBERTO A. ABAD

                                                     Associate Justice



[1]  Office of the Ombudsman v. Miedes, Sr., G.R. No. 176409, February 27, 2008, 547 SCRA 148, 156.

[2]  Rubio v. Munar, Jr., G.R. No. 155952, October 4, 2007, 534 SCRA 597, 602.

[3]  Decision, p. 9.

[4]  Id. at 3.

[5]  Id. at 14.

[6]  Section 2, Canon 1, Code of Judicial Conduct.