EN BANC
|
ASSISTANT
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR III ROHERMIA J.
JAMSANI-RODRIGUEZ,
Complainant, -versus - JUSTICES GREGORY S. ONG, JOSE R.
HERNANDEZ, and RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA, SANDIGANBAYAN.
Respondents. |
A.M.
No. 08-19-SB-J Present: CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, SERENO, JJ. Promulgated: August 24,
2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
BERSAMIN, J.:
Rohermia J. Jamsani-Rodriguez, an Assistant
Special Prosecutor III in the Office of the Special Prosecutor, Office of the
Ombudsman initiated this administrative matter by filing an affidavit-complaint dated October 23,
2008 to charge Sandiganbayan Justices Gregory S. Ong (Justice Ong); Jose R.
Hernandez (Justice Hernandez); and Rodolfo A. Ponferrada (Justice Ponferrada),
who composed the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), with
Justice Ong as Chairman, at the time material to the complaint, with (1) grave
misconduct, conduct unbecoming a Justice, and conduct grossly prejudicial to
the interest of the service; (2) falsification of public documents; (3) improprieties
in the hearing of cases; and (4) manifest partiality and gross ignorance of the
law.[1]
Before anything more, the Court
clarifies that this decision is limited to the determination of the
administrative culpability of the respondent Justices, and does not extend to
the ascertainment of whatever might be
the effects of any irregularity they committed as members of the Fourth
Division on the trial proceedings. This clarification stresses that the
proceedings, if procedurally infirm, resulted from the acts of the
Sandiganbayan as a collegial body, not from their acts as individual Justices.
The remedy against any procedural infirmity is not administrative but judicial.
Details of the Charges
A.
Grave Misconduct, Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Interest
of the Service, and Falsification of Public Documents
Under Section 1, Rule IV of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan,
cases originating from
the contrary.[2] Thus, for the period
from April 24 to
Fourth Division scheduled sessions
for the trial of several cases in the Hall of Justice in
Prior
to the scheduled sessions, or on
The
Prosecution Bureau IV is due to leave for
We find this procedure to be advantageous to the Prosecution and also commendable on the part of the Justices. While there are no objections manifested by the defense lawyers, we are apprehensive of the consequences, considering that this constitutes procedural lapses. In a case decided by the Supreme Court, the conviction of the accused by the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) was invalidated by the court when it was shown that the members of the court who heard his case were constantly changing. The Petitioner assailed the decision of the Sandiganbayan in its capacity as a trial court.
In one of her hearings, the undersigned has
already called the attention of the Hon. Chairman and expresses (sic)
her concern on the matter, and even opined that they might be charged of
falsification, by issuing orders that they heard the cases as a collegial body,
when in fact only the Chairman was present during the trial and the other
members are hearing cases in the other chamber.
The Chairman, however, welcomes any question on the procedure they are presently adopting.
We do not want to take chances. In cases where conviction are issued, the
accused would surely assail this procedure.
For your information and appropriate action.[4]
The
complainant stated in her affidavit-complaint
that Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio responded to her memorandum by instructing her and the
other Prosecutors to object to the arrangement and to place their objections on
record.
During
the hearing in
The
complainant averred that her recording of her continuing objections incurred
for her the ire of the Justices; and that faced with such predicament and out
of her desire to avoid any procedural defects, she decided to forego the
presentation of NBI Investigator Atty. Roel Plando as her witness in Criminal
Cases Nos. 28103 to 28104 entitled People of the Philippines v. Payakan
Tilendo in the last hearing date of April 27, 2006. Instead, she requested another Prosecutor to
inform the Fourth Division that she was then suffering from migraine, and to
request the cancellation of the hearing.
The complainant was surprised to
learn later on that the Fourth Division had issued a warrant for the arrest of
Atty. Plando for his non-appearance at the hearing.
On
May 8, 2006, Atty. Plando filed a motion to lift bench warrant,[6] in which he explained that he had arrived in
Davao City in the morning of April 27, 2006 in order to appear in court, and
had called up the complainant, who had told him that she would not be presenting
him as a witness due to lack of time for the necessary conference; and that she
had also told him about her having migraine on that morning.
On
Although
lifting the warrant of arrest issued against Atty. Plando through the order dated
For
the
Complying with the directive to show
cause, Pineda submitted an explanation/compliance,[10]
explaining that Director Chua had asked her to attend the hearing on
Director
Chua confirmed Pineda’s explanation
in her own manifestation and explanation,[11] stating that the complainant had requested that
a stenographer from the Office of the Special Prosecutor be tasked to take
notes at the hearing; and that “on 27
April 2006 when Prosecutor Rohermia Rodriguez was supposed to present her NBI
Agent witness in Davao City, she left Davao at 4:30 in the morning of the said
date so that it would be physically impossible for her to be in court at 8:30
in the morning.”
The Fourth Division issued an order on
The
complainant contended that by not acting as a collegial body, respondent
Justices not only contravened Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1606, but also committed
acts of falsification by signing their orders,
thereby making it appear that they had all been present during the hearing when
in truth and in fact they were not.
B.
Improprieties During Hearings Amounting to Gross Abuse of Judicial Authority
and Grave Misconduct
Allegedly,
Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez made the following intemperate and
discriminatory utterances during hearings.
Firstly, the complainant alleged that
Justice Ong uttered towards the complainant during the hearing held in
We
are playing Gods here, we will do what we want to do, your contempt is already
out, we fined you eighteen thousand pesos, even if you will appeal, by that
time I will be there, Justice of the Supreme Court.
Secondly, Justice Ong often asked
lawyers from which law schools they had graduated, and frequently inquired whether
the law school in which Justice Hernandez had studied and from which he had graduated
was better than his (Justice Ong’s) own alma mater. The complainant opined that the
query was manifestly intended to emphasize that the San Beda College of Law, the
alma mater of Justice Ong, and the UP
College of Law, that of Justice Hernandez, were the best law schools.
Thirdly,
on another occasion in that hearing in
Finally, Justice Hernandez berated
Atty. Pangalangan, the father of former UP Law Dean Raul Pangalangan, thus:
Just because your son is always nominated by the JBC to Malacañang, you are acting like that! Do not forget that the brain of the child follows that of their (sic) mother.
C.
Justices Ong, Hernandez, and
Ponferrada’s Gross Ignorance of the Law Amounting to Manifest Partiality for
Dismissing Criminal Case No. 25801,
Entitled People v. Puno,
upon a Demurrer to Evidence
In imputing manifest
partiality to respondent Justices, the complainant cited the Fourth Division’s resolution granting accused Ronaldo
V. Puno’s demurrer to evidence in Criminal Case No. 25801, and dismissing the
case upon a finding that the assailed contracts had never been perfected,[14] which finding was contrary to the evidence of the Prosecution.
The complainant insisted that the
conclusion that the assailed contracts had never been perfected was based on a National
Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) resolution, which the Fourth Division appreciated
in the guise of taking judicial notice. She
contended that taking judicial notice of the NAPOLCOM resolution upon a
demurrer to evidence was highly erroneous, and constituted gross ignorance of
the law.
Comments
of Respondents
Maintaining
their innocence of the charges, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez filed their joint
comment.[15] Although admitting having tried cases
in the provinces by apportioning or assigning the cases scheduled for hearing among
themselves, they emphasized that they had nonetheless ensured at the outset
that: first, there was a quorum, i.e., all the three members of
the Division were present in the same courtroom or venue, thereby preserving
the collegial nature of the Division as required by law, specifically Section 3
of PD 1606; second, the members of the Division were within hearing or
communicating distance of one another, such that they could readily confer with
each other in order to address or resolve any issue that arose in the cases separately
being heard by them; and, third, the parties did not object to the
arrangement, and thus could not later on assail the proceedings to which they had
given their full assent, based on the equitable principle of estoppel.
Justice
Ong and Justice Hernandez averred that their arrangement had been adopted in
the best interest of the service, because they had thereby expedited the
disposition of their cases, resulting in considerable savings in time, effort,
and financial resources of the litigants, lawyers, witnesses, and the court
itself; but that they had meanwhile discontinued the arrangement after it had
piled up so much work at a much faster pace than the Fourth Division could cope
with. They argued that even assuming, arguendo, that the arrangement had
been irregular, it could only be the subject
of a petition for certiorari on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, not an administrative complaint, due to its amounting only to a
mere procedural lapse.
Justice
Ong and Justice Hernandez refuted the complainant’s allegation on their use of
intemperate and discriminatory language by attaching the transcript of
stenographic notes to prove that there was no record of the intemperate and
discriminatory utterances on the date specified by the complainant.[16]
Justice Ong dared the complainant to produce a copy of the order that contained
his following alleged utterance:
We are playing Gods here, we will do what we want to do, your contempt is already out, we fined you eighteen thousand pesos, even if you will appeal, by that time I will be there, Justice of the Supreme Court.
Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez
admitted having asked the lawyers appearing before them about the law schools
they had graduated from, but explained that they had done so casually and
conversationally, with the scenario playing out between two Justices teasing
each other from time to time. They claimed that their queries were usually made
in jest, and were intended to break the monotony and seriousness of the
courtroom setting.
Justice
Hernandez denied having shouted at Prosecutor Tujan-Militante, but conceded the
possibility of having observed that her presence in
On
the charge of gross ignorance of the law amounting to manifest partiality (relating
to the grant of the demurrer to evidence in Criminal Case No. 25801), Justice
Ong and Justice Hernandez pointed out that the Supreme Court had already sustained
their action by dismissing the petition for review of the Special Prosecutor through
the resolution issued in G.R.
No. 171116 on June 5, 2006.[17]
Justice Ponferrada’s separate comment[18] echoed his co-respondents’ assertions in their joint comment.
Report of the Court Administrator
In
our resolution dated
In
his report dated
Viewed in the foregoing light, the charge of grave misconduct cannot stand. It is understood that grave misconduct is such which affects a public officer’s performance of his duties as such officer and not only that which affects his character as a private individual and requires reliable evidence showing that the judicial act complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law. Our perusal of the record shows that respondent’s adoption of the assailed practice was not motivated by corruption and/or an illegal purpose. Indeed, the best interest of the service was clearly aimed at. To justify the taking of drastic disciplinary action, the law requires that the error or mistake if there be such must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or in bad faith.
For the very same reasons, respondents cannot likewise be held liable for falsification of public documents arising out of the alleged falsity of the collegiality reflected in the minutes and/or stenographic notes taken during the proceedings in which the assailed practice was adopted. For liability to be assessed for the offense of falsification of official documents thru untruthful narration of the facts, the rule is settled that the following elements should concur, viz: (a) the offender makes in a document an untruthful statement in a narration of facts; (b) the offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated; (c) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and (d) the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with wrongful intent to injure a third person. The absence of the enumerated elements clearly discounts respondents’ liability for said offense.
Inasmuch as mere allegation is not evidence, it is a fundamental evidentiary rule that the party who alleges a fact must prove the same. For all of complainant’s imputations against respondents, the record is bereft of any showing that the latter are guilty of oppressive conduct and/or grave misconduct, particularly with reference to the comment the former was required to file regarding the motion to lift bench warrant filed by the witness Roel Plando in Criminal Case Nos. 28103-104. Given the variance between the allegations in said motion and the reasons complainant initially advanced for the non-presentation of said witness at the April 27, 2006 hearing in said cases, respondents were clearly acting within their prerogative when they decided to clarify the matter from the former and her colleague, Prosecutor Almira Abella-Orfanel. Although subsequently required to explain why she should not be cited for contempt in the June 20, 2006 order issued in the case, the record is, more importantly, bereft of any showing that complainant was, in fact, declared in contempt of court or actually fined in the sum of P18,000.00 as purportedly threatened by respondents.
Squarely refuted in the affidavits executed by her colleagues, namely, Prosecutors Cornelio Somido, Almira Abella-Orfanel, Elvira Chua and Rabenranath Uy, complainant’s bare allegations clearly deserve scant consideration insofar as they impute such further irregularities against respondents as threatening or humiliating her during the hearing/s conducted in the aforesaid cases and/or causing disrespect to Special Prosecutor Dennis Villa-Ignacio or otherwise allowing interference in the latter’s handling of a case. Because administrative proceedings like the one at bench are governed by the substantial evidence rule, the same may be said of the disparaging comments respondents are supposed to have made regarding the barong and/or intelligence of practitioners appearing before them which are, on the whole, devoid of any bases in the record outside of complainant’s averments and the affidavit belatedly executed by Assistant Special Prosecutor Ma. Hazelina Tujan-Militante. By substantial evidence is meant such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to support a conclusion and does not mean just any evidence in the record of the case for, otherwise, no finding of fact would be wanting in basis. The test is whether a reasonable mind, after considering all the relevant evidence in the record of a case, would accept the findings of fact as adequate.
As regards the charge of improprieties, it appears that the complainant has not discharged the onus of proof by substantial evidence. The intemperate and immoderate statements attributed to respondents are, to repeat, without sufficient substantiation. What comes near to but is not equivalent to impropriety is the jocular banter admitted by respondents about their respective alma maters, the intention being to break the usual monotony and seriousness of the courtroom setting or to put practitioners appearing before them at ease. It cannot be said that public confidence in the Judiciary was eroded by the conduct. No discourtesy was shown towards either the parties or to each other.
As for the charge of manifest partiality insofar as the grant of the demurrer in Criminal Case No. 25801 is concerned, suffice it to say that members of the bench like respondents are presumed to have acted regularly and in the manner that preserves the ideal of the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Because notatu dignum is the presumption of regularity in the performance of a judge’s function, the rule is settled that bias, prejudice and undue interest cannot be presumed lightly. Mere suspicion that the judge is partial to a party is, consequently, not enough; there should be adequate evidence to prove the charge. As a matter of policy, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action- he cannot be subject to civil, criminal or administrative liability for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. These principles find resonance in the case at bench where, in addition to the total dearth of evidence to prove the charge of manifest partiality, it appears that respondents’ grant of the demurrer in Criminal Case No. 25801 was affirmed in the following wise in the June 5, 2006 resolution issued by the Second Division of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 171116, to wit:
“G.R.
No. 171116 (PEOPLE OF THE
“In
any event, the petition is an improper remedy and failed to sufficiently
show that the Sandiganbayan had committed any reversible error in the
questioned judgment to warrant the exercise by this Court of its
discretionary appellate jurisdiction in this case x x x.” (emphasis supplied)
Ruling of
the Court
The
Court partly adopts the findings and recommendations of the Court Administrator.
A.
Respondents’ Violation of
the provisions of PD 1606
and Revised Internal
Rules of the Sandiganbayan
Respondent
Justices contend that they preserved the collegiality of the Fourth Division
despite their having separately conducted hearings, considering that the three
of them were in the same venue and were acting within hearing and communicating
distance of one another.
The
contention is not well-taken.
Section 3 of PD 1606,[21] the law
establishing the Sandiganbayan, provides:
Section 3. Division of the Courts; Quorum. - The Sandiganbayan shall sit in three
divisions of three Justices each. The three divisions may sit at the same time.
Three Justices shall constitute a quorum for sessions in division; Provided, that when the required quorum for the particular division cannot be had due to the legal disqualification or temporary disability of a Justice or of a vacancy occurring therein, the Presiding Justice may designate an Associate Justice of the Court, to be determined by strict rotation on the basis of the reverse order of precedence, to sit as a special member of said division with all the rights and prerogatives of a regular member of said division in the trial and determination of a case or cases assigned thereto, unless the operation of the court will be prejudiced thereby, in which case the President shall, upon the recommendation of the Presiding Justice, designate any Justice or Justices of the Court of Appeals to sit temporarily therein.
An
implementing rule is Section 3, Rule II of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, viz:
Section 3. Constitution of the Divisions. - The Sandiganbayan shall sit in five (5) Divisions of three (3) Justices each, including the Presiding Justice. The five (5) Divisions may sit separately at the same time. Each of the five (5) most senior Associate Justices including the Presiding Justice, shall be the Chairman of a Division; each of the five (5) Associate Justices next in rank shall be the Senior Member of a Division; and each of the last five (5) Associate Justices shall be the Junior Member of a Division.
Under
the foregoing provisions, the Sandiganbayan is a collegial court. Collegial
is defined as relating to a collegium or group of colleagues. In turn, a collegium
is “an executive body with each member having approximately equal power and
authority.”[22] In a collegial court, therefore, the
members act on the basis of consensus or majority rule. Thus, PD 1606, as
amended, and the Revised Internal Rules
of the Sandiganbayan, supra, call
for the actual presence of the three
Justices composing the Division to constitute a quorum to conduct business and to
hold trial proceedings. Necessarily, the exclusion or absence of any member of
a Division from the conduct of its business and from the trial proceedings negates
the existence of a quorum and precludes collegiality.
As
if underscoring the need for all three members to be actually present and in
attendance during sessions, Section 3 of PD 1606, as amended, further requires that:-
xxx when the required quorum for the particular
division cannot be had due to the legal disqualification or temporary
disability of a Justice or of a vacancy occurring therein, the Presiding
Justice may designate an Associate Justice of the Court, to be determined by
strict rotation on the basis of the reverse order of precedence, to sit as a
special member of said division with all the rights and prerogatives of a
regular member of said division in the trial and determination of a case or
cases assigned thereto, unless the operation of the court will be
prejudiced thereby, in which case the
President shall, upon the recommendation
of the Presiding Justice, designate any Justice or Justices of the Court
of Appeals to sit temporarily therein.
Respondent Justices cannot lightly regard the legal
requirement for all of them to sit together as members of the Fourth Division “in the trial and determination
of a case or cases assigned thereto.” The information and evidence upon
which the Fourth Division would base any decisions or other judicial actions in
the cases tried before it must be
made directly available to each and
every one of its members during the proceedings. This necessitates the equal and full participation of each
member in the trial and adjudication of their cases. It is simply
not enough, therefore, that the three members of the Fourth Division were within
hearing and communicating distance of one another at the hearings in question,
as they explained in hindsight, because even in those circumstances not all of them sat together in session.
Indeed, the ability of the Fourth Division to function as a collegial body became impossible
when not all of the members sat together during the trial proceedings. The
internal rules of the Sandiganbayan spotlight an instance of such impossibility.
Section 2, Rule VII of
the Revised Internal Rules of the
Sandiganbayan expressly requires that rulings on oral motions made or objections raised in the course of the trial proceedings or
hearings are be made by the Chairman of the Division. Obviously, the rule cannot be complied
with because Justice
Ong, the Chairman, did not sit in the hearing of the cases heard by the other
respondents. Neither could the
other respondents properly and promptly contribute to the rulings of Justice
Ong in the hearings before him.
Moreover, the respondents’ non-observance of collegiality contravened the
very purpose of trying criminal cases cognizable by Sandiganbayan before a
Division of all three Justices.
Although there are criminal cases involving public officials and employees
triable before single-judge courts, PD 1606, as amended, has
always required a Division of three Justices
(not one or two) to try the criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, in
view of the accused in such cases holding higher rank or office than those
charged in the former cases. The three Justices of a Division, rather than a
single judge, are naturally expected to exert keener judiciousness and to apply
broader circumspection in trying and deciding such cases. The tighter standard is
due in part to the fact that the review of convictions is elevated to the
Supreme Court generally via the
discretionary mode of petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, Rules
of Court, which eliminates issues of fact, instead of via ordinary appeal set for the former kind of cases (whereby the
convictions still undergo intermediate review before ultimately reaching the
Supreme Court, if at all).
In GMCR, Inc. v. Bell
Telecommunication Philippines, Inc.,[23] the Court delved on the nature of a
collegial body, and how the act of a single member, though he may be its head, done
without the participation of the others, cannot be considered the act of the collegial
body itself. There, the question
presented was whether Commissioner Simeon Kintanar, as chairman of the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC), could alone act in behalf of and bind the
NTC, given that the NTC had two other commissioners as members. The Court ruled:
First.
We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body requiring a majority vote
out of the three members of the commission in order to validly decide a case or
any incident therein. Corollarily, the
vote alone of the chairman of the commission, as in this case, the vote of
Commissioner Kintanar, absent the required concurring vote coming from the rest
of the membership of the commission to at least arrive at a majority decision,
is not sufficient to legally render an NTC order, resolution or decision.
Simply put, Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications Commission. He alone does not speak for and in behalf of the NTC. The NTC acts through a three-man body, and the three members of the commission each has one vote to cast in every deliberation concerning a case or any incident therein that is subject to the jurisdiction of the NTC. When we consider the historical milieu in which the NTC evolved into the quasi-judicial agency it is now under Executive Order No. 146 which organized the NTC as a three-man commission and expose the illegality of all memorandum circulars negating the collegial nature of the NTC under Executive Order No. 146, we are left with only one logical conclusion: the NTC is a collegial body and was a collegial body even during the time when it was acting as a one-man regime.
The foregoing observations made in GMCR, Inc. apply to
the situation of respondent Justices as members of the Fourth Division. It is of no
consequence, then, that no malice or corrupt motive impelled respondent
Justices into adopting the flawed procedure. As responsible judicial officers,
they ought to have been well aware of the indispensability of collegiality to the
valid conduct of their trial proceedings.
We find
that the procedure adopted
by respondent Justices for their provincial hearings was in blatant disregard
of PD 1606, as amended, the Rules of
Court, and the Revised Internal Rules
of the Sandiganbayan. Even worse, their adoption of the procedure
arbitrarily denied the benefit of a hearing before a duly constituted Division of
the Sandiganbayan to all the affected litigants, including the State, thereby rendering
the integrity and efficacy of their proceedings open to serious challenge on
the ground that a hearing before a duly constituted
Division of the Sandiganbayan was of the
very essence of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process of law.
Judges are not common individuals whose
gross errors men forgive and time forgets.[24]
They are expected to have more than
just a modicum acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules.[25] For this reason alone, respondent
Justices’ adoption of the irregular procedure cannot be dismissed as a mere
deficiency in prudence or as a lapse in judgment on their part, but should be
treated as simple misconduct, which is to be distinguished from either gross
misconduct or gross ignorance of the law. The respondent Justices were not liable
for gross misconduct – defined as the transgression of some established or
definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence,[26] or the corrupt or persistent violation of the law or disregard of well-known
legal rules[27] – considering that the explanations they
have offered herein, which the complainant did not refute, revealed that they
strove to maintain their collegiality by holding their separate hearings within
sight and hearing distance of one another. Neither were they liable for
gross ignorance of the law, which must be based on reliable evidence to show
that the act complained of was ill-motivated,
corrupt, or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or in persistent disregard of well-known legal
rules;[28] on
the contrary, none of these circumstances was attendant herein, for the
respondent Justices have convincingly shown that they had not been ill-motivated
or inspired by an intention to violate any law or legal rule in adopting the
erroneous procedure, but had been seeking, instead, to thereby expedite their
disposition of cases in the provinces.
Nonetheless, it remains that the
respondent Justices did not ensure that their proceedings accorded with the
provisions of the law and procedure. Their insistence that they adopted the
procedure in order to expedite the hearing of provincial cases is not a
sufficient reason to entirely exonerate them, even if no malice or corruption
motivated their adoption of the procedure. They could have seen that their procedure
was flawed, and that the flaw would prevent, not promote, the expeditious
disposition of the cases by precluding their valid adjudication due to the nullifying
taint of the irregularity. They knew as well that the need to expedite their
cases, albeit recommended, was not the chief objective of judicial trials. As the
Court has reminded judges in State Prosecutors v. Muro,[29] viz:
Although
a speedy determination of an action or proceeding implies a speedy trial, it
should be borne in mind that speed is not the chief objective of a trial. Careful
and deliberate consideration for the administration of justice is more
important than a race to end the trial.
A genuine respect for the rights of all parties, thoughtful
consideration before ruling on important questions, and a zealous regard for
the just administration of law are some of the qualities of a good trial judge,
which are more important than a reputation for hasty disposal of cases.
xxx xxx xxx
What is required on the part of judges is objectivity. An independent judiciary does not mean that judges can resolve specific disputes entirely as they please. There are both implicit and explicit limits on the way judges perform their role. Implicit limits include accepted legal values and the explicit limits are substantive and procedural rules of law.
The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinate to the “primordial necessity of order in the social life.”
Relevantly, we do not consider the respondent Justices’ signing
of the orders issued during the flawed proceedings as a form of falsification or
dishonesty, in that they thereby made it appear that they had all been physically
present when the truth was different. Such act merely ensued from the flawed
proceedings and cannot be treated as a separate offense.
B.
Unbecoming Conduct of Justice
Ong and Justice Hernandez
The Court
approves the Court Administrator’s finding and recommendation that no evidence
supported the complainant’s charge that Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez had
uttered the improper and intemperate statements attributed to them.
A review of
the transcripts of the stenographic notes for the hearings in which the
offensive statements were supposedly uttered by them has failed to substantiate
the complainant’s charge. In the absence of a clear showing to the contrary, the
Court must accept such transcripts as the faithful and true record of the
proceedings, because they bear the certification of correctness executed by the
stenographers who had prepared them.
Even so, Justice Ong and
Justice Hernandez admitted randomly asking the counsels appearing before them
from which law schools they had graduated, and their engaging during the hearings
in casual conversation about their respective law schools. They thereby publicized
their professional qualifications and manifested a lack of the requisite
humility demanded of public magistrates. Their doing so reflected a vice of self-conceit.
We view their acts as bespeaking their lack of judicial temperament and
decorum, which no judge worthy of the judicial robes should avoid especially
during their performance of judicial functions. They should not exchange banter
or engage in playful teasing of each other during trial proceedings (no matter
how good-natured or even if meant to ease tension, as they want us to believe).
Judicial decorum demands that they behave with dignity and act with courtesy towards
all who appear before their court.
Indeed, Section 6, Canon 6
of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
for the Philippine Judiciary clearly enjoins that:
Section 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence, direction or control.
We point out that publicizing professional qualifications or boasting
of having studied in and graduated from certain law schools, no matter how
prestigious, might have even revealed, on the part of Justice Ong and Justice
Hernandez, their bias for or against some lawyers. Their conduct was
impermissible, consequently, for Section 3, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, demands
that judges avoid situations that may reasonably give rise to the suspicion or
appearance of favoritism or partiality in their personal relations with
individual members of the legal profession who practice regularly in their
courts.
Judges should be dignified in demeanor, and refined in
speech. In performing their judicial duties, they should not manifest bias or
prejudice by word or conduct towards any person or group on irrelevant grounds.[30] It is
very essential that they should live up to the high standards their noble
position on the Bench demands. Their language must be guarded and measured,
lest the best of intentions be misconstrued. In this regard, Section 3, Canon 5
of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary, mandates judges to carry out judicial duties with
appropriate consideration for all
persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff, and judicial
colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the
proper performance of such duties.
In view of the foregoing, Justice
Ong and Justice Hernandez were guilty of unbecoming conduct, which is defined
as improper performance. Unbecoming conduct “applies to a broader range of transgressions of rules not only of
social behavior but of ethical practice or logical procedure or prescribed
method.”[31]
C.
Respondent Justices Not Guilty of Manifest Partiality
The charge of manifest partiality
for issuing the resolution
granting the demurrer to evidence of the accused in Criminal Case No. 25801 is
dismissed. As already mentioned, this
Court upheld the assailed resolution
on June 5, 2006 in G. R. No. 171116 by declaring the petition of the Office of
the Special Prosecutor assailing such dismissal to have “failed to sufficiently show that the
Sandiganbayan had committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment to
warrant the exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction.”
At any rate, it is worth stressing
that a judge will be held administratively liable for rendering an unjust
judgment only if he acts with bad faith, malice, revenge, or some other similar
motive.[32]
D.
Penalties
Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.
Section 9. Less Serious Charges. – Less serious charges include:
xxx xxx xxx
7. Simple Misconduct.
Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court alternatively prescribes
the sanctions on judges and justices guilty of a less serious charge, as
follows:
Section 11. Sanctions. – xxx
xxx xxx xxx
B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions shall be imposed:
1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or
2. A fine of
more than
P10,000.00 but not exceeding P 20,000.00.
xxx xxx xxx
On the
other hand, unbecoming conduct is a light charge under Section 10, Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court, thus:
Section 10. Light Charges. – Light charges include:
1. Vulgar and unbecoming conduct;
xxx xxx xxx
and is
punishable under Section 11(C), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court by a fine of not less than P1,000.00, but not exceeding P10,000.00;
and/or censure, reprimand, or admonition with warning.
Analogizing from Section 55 of the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, in an instance where
the respondent is guilty of two or more charges, the penalty is that corresponding
to the most serious charge, and the rest of the charges are considered as
aggravating circumstances.
That respondent Justices’ responsibilities
as members of a Division were different compels us to differentiate their
individual liabilities.
1.
Justice Ong
Without
doubt, the Chairman, as head of the Division under the internal rules of the
Sandiganbayan, is primus inter pares.[33] He possesses and wields powers of
supervision, direction, and control over the conduct of the proceedings coming
before the Division.
In exercising his powers as Chairman
of the Fourth Division, Justice Ong exuded an unexpectedly dismissive attitude
towards the valid objections of the complainant, and steered his Division into
the path of procedural irregularity. He thereby wittingly failed to guarantee
that his Division’s proceedings came within
the bounds of substantive and procedural rules. We cannot, of course, presume that
he was unaware of or unfamiliar with the pertinent law and correct procedure, considering
his already long tenure and experience as of then as a Justice of the
Sandiganbayan, having risen from Associate Justice to Chairman of his Division.
We hold that the condign and
commensurate penalty to impose on Justice Ong is a fine of P15,000.00, after
taking into consideration the mitigating circumstance that this administrative offense
was his first and the aggravating circumstance of the light
charge of unbecoming conduct. The penalty goes with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar of such
offenses shall be dealt with more severely.
2.
Justice Hernandez
and Justice Ponferrada
As
mere members of the Fourth Division, Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada had
no direction and control of how the
proceedings of the Division were conducted. Direction and control was vested in
Justice Ong, as the Chairman. Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada simply relied
without malice on the soundness and wisdom of Justice Ong’s discretion as their
Chairman, which reliance without malice lulled them into traveling the
path of reluctance to halt Justice Ong from his irregular leadership. We hold
that their liabilities ought to be much diminished by their lack of malice.
In addition, the fact that this is
the first case for Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada is a mitigating
circumstance in their favor.
Although Justice Hernandez is liable
for the less serious charge of simple misconduct, aggravated by a light charge
but appreciating his reliance without malice and the mitigating circumstance of
this offense being his first, the Court admonishes him with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar offenses shall be dealt with more severely.
The liability of Justice Ponferrada
for the less serious charge of simple misconduct, without any aggravating
circumstance, is obliterated by his reliance without malice and the mitigating
circumstance of its being a first offense. However, he is warned to be more cautious about the proper
procedure to be taken in proceedings before his court.
Final Note
It becomes timely to reiterate that an
honorable, competent and independent Judiciary exists to administer justice in
order to promote the stability of government and the well-being of the people.[34] We warn,
therefore, that no conduct, act, or omission on the part of anyone involved in
the administration of justice that violates the norm of public accountability
and diminishes the faith of the people in the Judiciary shall be countenanced.[35] Public
confidence in the judicial system and in the moral authority and integrity of
the Judiciary is of utmost importance in a modern democratic society; hence, it
is essential for all judges, individually and collectively, to respect and
honor the judicial office as a public trust and to strive to enhance and
maintain confidence in the judicial system.[36]
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES as follows:
1. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG is ordered to
pay a fine of P15,000.00, with
a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar offenses shall be
dealt with more severely;
2. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JOSE R. HERNANDEZ is admonished
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offenses shall be dealt
with more severely; and
3. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA is warned
to be more cautious about the proper procedure to be taken in proceedings
before his court.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA MARIANO C.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
JOSE
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
MARIA
Associate Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 4-19.
[2] Section 1, Rule IV, reads:
Section 1. Official Station; Place of Holding Sessions. — The Sandiganbayan shall have its principal office in the Metro Manila area and shall hold sessions thereat for the trial and resolution of cases filed with it: Provided, however, that cases originating from Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao, shall be heard in the region of origin, except only when the greater convenience of the parties and of the witnesses or other compelling considerations require the contrary, in which instance a case originating from one region may be heard in another region: Provided, further, that for this purpose the Presiding Justice shall authorize any Division or Divisions of the Sandiganbayan to hold sessions at any time and place outside Metro Manila, and, where the greater interest of justice so requires, outside the Philippines.
[3] Rollo, pp. 20-21.
[4]
[5] See Transcript of Stenographic Notes
(TSN),
[6] Rollo, pp. 25-27.
[7]
[8]
[9] TSN,
[10] Rollo, pp. 39-40.
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] See TSN of the proceedings taken on
[17] Rollo, p. 513.
[18]
[19]
[20] See
Report dated
[21] As amended by Republic Act No. 8249.
[22] Webster's Third
[23] G.R. No. 126496 and 126526,
[24] Requierme
Jr. v. Yuipco, A.M. No.
RTJ-98-1427,
[25] Community Rural Bank of Guimba v. Talavera, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1909, April 6, 2005, 455 SCRA 34; Domondon v. Lopez, 383 SCRA 376, June 20, 2002; De Vera v. Judge Dames II, 369 Phil. 470, July 13, 1999.
[26] Almojuela,
Jr. v. Judge Ringor, Adm. Matter No. MTJ-04-1521,
[27] Ajeno v. Judge Inserto, supra, note 26.
[28] Ajeno v. Judge Inserto, Adm. Matter No. 1098-CFI, May 31, 1976, 71 SCRA 166, 171-172; citing In re Horilleno, 43 Phil. 212.
[29] A.M. No. RTJ-92-876,
[30] Section 2, Canon 5, New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
[31] Zacarias v. National Police Commission,
G.R. No. 119847,
[32] Almendra
v. Asis, A.M. RTJ-00-1550,
[33] Literally, first among equals.
[34] Preamble, Code of Judicial Conduct.
[35] Alejandro
v. Martin, A.M. No. P-07-2349,
[36] 3rd “Whereas” Clause, New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.