Republic of the
Supreme Court
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HADJA SOHURAH DIPATUAN, Complainant, - versus - JUDGE MAMINDIARA P.
MANGOTARA, Respondent. |
A.M.
No. RTJ-09-2190 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 08-2909-RTJ) Present:
VELASCO, JR., NACHURA,
PERALTA, and
MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: April 23, 2010 |
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PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is an Affidavit-Complaint[1] dated
The antecedent facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as
follows:
On
Before Judge Macarambon could render a decision on the case, he was
appointed as COMELEC Commissioner. By
virtue of Administrative Order No. 201-2007[2]
dated
On P75,000.00 to P200,000.00.
On
Thus, on
On
In his Comment[8]
dated
Subsequently, in its Memorandum[9]
dated
However, in its Resolution[10] dated
July 22, 2009, the Court resolved to re-docket the instant complaint as a
regular administrative matter and refer the complaint to Court of Appeals Associate
Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos for investigation, report and recommendation.
We adopt the recommendation of the Investigating
Justice.
On the charge of bias and partiality
resulting to grave abuse of authority
We rule in the negative. As correctly observed by the Investigating Justice,
complainant indeed failed to specify the degree of relationship of respondent Judge
to a party in the subject case. She
failed to present any clear and convincing proof that respondent Judge was
related within the prohibited degree with the victim. Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of
Court states:
Sec. 1. Disqualification
of Judges. - No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in
which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee,
creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the
sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth
degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has
been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has
presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of
review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them
and entered upon the record.
A judge may,
in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a
case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
This being the case, the inhibition was indeed
discretionary or voluntary as the same was primarily a matter of conscience and
sound discretion on the part of the respondent Judge. When Mangotara chose not to inhibit and
proceed with the promulgation of the disputed decision, he cannot be faulted by
doing so. Significantly, complainant
while asserting that Mangotara should have inhibited in the said case, she
nonetheless failed to institute any motion for inhibition.
Moreover, complainant failed to cite any specific
act that would indicate bias, prejudice or vengeance warranting respondent’s
voluntary inhibition from the case. Complainant merely pointed on the alleged adverse and
erroneous rulings of respondent Judge to their prejudice. By themselves, however, they do not
sufficiently prove bias and prejudice.
To be disqualifying, the bias and prejudice
must be shown to have stemmed from an extrajudicial source and result in an
opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his
participation in the case. Opinions formed in the course of judicial
proceedings, although erroneous, as long as they are based on the evidence
presented and conduct observed by the judge, do not prove personal bias or
prejudice on the part of the judge. As a general rule, repeated rulings against
a litigant, no matter how erroneous and vigorously and consistently expressed,
are not a basis for disqualification of a judge on grounds of bias and
prejudice. Extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice
or corrupt purpose, in addition to the palpable error which may be inferred
from the decision or order itself. Although
the decision may seem so erroneous as to raise doubts concerning a judge's
integrity, absent extrinsic evidence, the decision itself would be insufficient
to establish a case against the judge.[11]
Mere suspicion of partiality is not enough. There
must be sufficient evidence to prove the same, as well as a manifest showing of
bias and partiality stemming from an extrajudicial source or some other basis.
A judge's conduct must be clearly indicative of arbitrariness and prejudice
before it can be stigmatized as biased and partial. As there was no substantial
evidence to hold Mangotara liable on this point, the Investigating Justice
correctly recommended the dismissal of this charge against him.
Moreover, we likewise found no basis to hold respondent Judge administratively
liable anent his issuance of the Decision dated
As to the charge of gross
ignorance of the law
As to the
charge of gross ignorance of the law in
so far as his act of increasing the bail bond of the accused instead of cancelling
it, Mangotara did not deny his issuance of said Order. However, he claims that the issuance thereof
was merely an error of judgment.
Indeed, as a
matter of public policy, not every error or mistake of a judge in the
performance of his official duties renders him liable. In the absence of fraud,
dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his official capacity do not
always constitute misconduct although the same acts may be erroneous. True, a
judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment absent proof that such error
was made with a conscious and deliberate intent to cause an injustice. This
does not mean, however, that a judge need not observe propriety, discreetness
and due care in the performance of his official functions.
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is clear on the issue. It provides:
SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary. – Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
xxx xxx xxx
The rule is
very explicit as to when admission to bail is discretionary on the part of the
respondent Judge. It is imperative that judges be conversant with basic legal
principles and possessed sufficient proficiency in the law. In offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua or death, the accused has no right to
bail when the evidence of guilt is strong.[12] Thus, as the accused in Criminal Case No.
3620-01 had been sentenced to reclusion perpetua, the bail should have
been cancelled, instead of increasing it as respondent Judge did.
While a judge
may not be held liable for gross ignorance of the law for every erroneous order
that he renders, it is also axiomatic that when the legal principle involved is
sufficiently basic, lack of conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance of
the law. Indeed, even though a judge may
not always be subjected to disciplinary action for every erroneous order or
decision he renders, that relative immunity is not a license to be negligent or
abusive and arbitrary in performing his adjudicatory prerogatives. It does not mean that a judge need not observe
propriety, discreetness and due care in the performance of his official
functions. This is because if judges wantonly misuse the powers vested on them
by the law, there will not only be confusion
in the administration of justice but also oppressive disregard of the basic
requirements of due process.[13]
Clearly, in
the instant case, the act of Mangotara in increasing the bail bond of the
accused instead of cancelling it is not a mere deficiency in prudence,
discretion and judgment on the part of respondent Judge, but a patent disregard
of well-known rules. When an error is so gross and patent, such error produces
an inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for gross ignorance of the
law.[14] It is a pressing responsibility of judges to
keep abreast with the law and changes therein, as well as with the latest
decisions of the Supreme Court. One cannot seek refuge in a mere cursory
acquaintance with the statute and procedural rules. Ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound
to know, excuses no one – not even judges. IGNORANTIA JURIS QUOD QUISQUE
SCIRE TENETUR NON EXCUSAT.[15]
We come to the imposable penalty.
Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance of the law or procedure is
classified as a serious charge. Under Section 11(A) of the same Rule, as
amended, if the respondent is found guilty of a serious charge, any of the
following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal
from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public
office, including government-owned or controlled corporations; Provided,
however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave
credits;
2. Suspension
from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of
more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
In this case, a fine of P20,000.00, as recommended by
the Investigating Justice, would thus appear to be an appropriate sanction to
impose on respondent Judge, considering that this is his first infraction in
his 13 years of service; his admission of his mistake; and his prompt correction
of such mistake.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds JUDGE MAMINDIARA
P. MANGOTARA, retired Presiding Judge of the P20,000,00), to be deducted
from his retirement benefits.
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SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate
Justice |
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WE
CONCUR: RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice Chairperson |
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PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR. Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
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JOSE CATRAL Associate Justice |
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[1] Rollo, pp. 1-5.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] Webb v. People,
[12] Managuelod
v. Paclibon, Jr., A.M. No.
RTJ-02-1726,
[13] Reyes
v. Paderanga, A.M. No.
RTJ-06-1973,
[14]
[15] Rivera
v. Mirasol, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1885,