Republic of the
Supreme Court
PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC.
(PGBI), represented by its Secretary-General GEORGE “FGBF GEORGE” DULDULAO,
Petitioner, -
versus
- COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent. |
G.R. No.
190529
Present: PUNO, C.J., CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: April 29, 2010 |
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R E S O L U T I O N
BRION, J.:
The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) seeks in this
petition for certiorari[1]
and in the motion for reconsideration it subsequently filed to nullify Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar as it
relates to PGBI, and the Resolution dated December 9, 2009 denying PGBI’s
motion for reconsideration in SPP No. 09-004 (MP). Via these
resolutions, the COMELEC delisted PGBI from the roster of registered national,
regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list
system.
BACKGROUND
Section 6(8) of Republic
Act No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise
known as the Party-List System Act, provides:
Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. –
The COMELEC may motu proprio or upon
verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice
and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
x x x x
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding
elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the
votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for
the constituency in which it has registered.[Emphasis supplied.]
The COMELEC replicated
this provision in COMELEC Resolution No. 2847 – the Rules and Regulations
Governing the Election of the Party-List Representatives through the Party-List
System – which it promulgated on June 25, 1996.
For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC en banc issued on October 13, 2009
Resolution No. 8679 deleting several party-list groups or organizations from
the list of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or
coalitions. Among the party-list organizations affected was PGBI; it was delisted because
it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate
in the 2007 elections. Nevertheless,
the COMELEC stated in this Resolution that any national, regional sectoral
party or organizations or coalitions adversely affected can personally or
through its authorized representative file a verified opposition on October 26,
2009.
PGBI filed its Opposition to Resolution No. 8679, but likewise
sought, through its pleading, the admission ad
cautelam of its petition for accreditation as a party-list organization
under the Party-List System Act. Among
other arguments, PGBI asserted that:
(1)
The assailed
resolution negates the right of movant and those similarly situated to invoke
Section 4 of R.A. No. 7941, which allows any party, organization and coalition
already registered with the Commission to no longer register anew; the party
though is required to file with the Commission, not later than ninety (90) days
before the election, a manifestation of its desire to participate in the
party-list system; since PGBI filed a Request/Manifestation seeking a deferment
of its participation in the 2007 elections within the required period prior to
the 2007 elections, it has the option to choose whether or not to participate
in the next succeeding election under the same conditions as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed;
(2)
The Supreme Court’s
ruling in G.R. No. 177548 – Philippine
Mines Safety Environment Association, also known as “MINERO” v. Commission on
Elections – cannot apply in the instant controversy for two reasons: (a)
the factual milieu of the cited case is removed from PGBI’s; (b) MINERO, prior to delisting, was afforded the
opportunity to be heard, while PGBI and the 25 others similarly affected by
Resolution No. 8679 were not.
Additionally, the requirement of Section 6(8) has been relaxed by the
Court’s ruling in G.R. No. 179271 (Banat
v. COMELEC) and the exclusion of PGBI and the 25 other party-list is a
denial of the equal protection of the laws;
(3)
The implementation of
the challenged resolution should be suspended and/or aborted to prevent a
miscarriage of justice in view of the failure to notify the parties in
accordance with the same Section 6(8) or R.A. No. 7941.[2]
The COMELEC denied PGBI’s
motion/opposition for lack of merit.
First, the COMELEC observed that PGBI clearly misunderstood the
import of Section 4 of R.A. 7941.[3] The provision simply means that without the
required manifestation or if a party or organization does not participate, the
exemption from registration does not arise and the party, organization or
coalition must go through the process again and apply for requalification; a
request for deferment would not exempt PGBI from registering anew.
Second, the MINERO ruling
is squarely in point, as MINERO failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and did not participate at all
in the 2004 elections.
Third, PGBI was given an opportunity to be heard or to seek the reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of – the essence of due process; this is
clear from Resolution No. 8679 which expressly gave the adversely affected
parties the opportunity to file their opposition.
As regards the alternative relief of application for
accreditation, the COMELEC found the motion to have been filed out of time, as
August 17, 2009 was the deadline for accreditation provided in Resolution 8646. The motion was obviously filed months after
the deadline.
PGBI came to us in its petition for certiorari, arguing the same positions it raised with the COMELEC
when it moved to reconsider its delisting.
We initially dismissed the petition in light of our ruling
in Philippine Mines Safety Environment
Association, also known as “MINERO” v. Commission on Elections (Minero);[4]
we said that no grave abuse of discretion exists in a ruling that correctly
applies the prevailing law and jurisprudence.
Applying Section 6(8) of RA 7941, the Court disqualified MINERO under the following reasoning:
Since petitioner by its own admission failed to get 2% of
the votes in 2001 and did not participate at all in the 2004 elections, it
necessarily failed to get at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast in the
two preceding elections. COMELEC,
therefore, is not duty bound to certify it.
PGBI subsequently moved
to reconsider the dismissal of its petition.
Among other arguments, PGBI claimed that the dismissal of the petition was
contrary to law, the evidence and existing jurisprudence. Essentially, PGBI asserts that Section 6(8)
of RA 7941 does not apply if one is to follow the tenor and import of the
deliberations inclusive of the interpellations in Senate Bill No. 1913 on
October 19, 1994. It cited the following
excerpts from the Records of the Senate:
Senator Gonzales: On the other hand, Mr. President, under ground no. (7),
Section 5 – there are actually two
grounds it states: “ Failure to participate in the last two (2)
preceding elections or its failure to obtain at least ten percent (10%) of the
votes case under the party-list system in either of the last two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered”
In short, the first ground is that, it failed to
participate in the last two (2) preceding elections. The second is, failure to obtain at least 10
percent of the votes cast under the party-list system in either of the last two
preceding elections, Mr. President,
Senator Tolentino: Actually, these
are two separate grounds.
Senator Gonzales: There are actually two grounds, Mr. President.
Senator Tolentino: Yes, Mr.
President.[5]
[Underscoring supplied.]
PGBI thus asserts that
Section 6(8) does not apply to its situation, as it is obvious that it failed
to participate in one (1) but not in the two (2)
preceding elections. Implied in this is
that it also failed to secure the required percentage in one (1) but not in the
two (2) preceding elections.
Considering PGBI’s arguments, we granted the motion and
reinstated the petition in the court’s docket.
THE ISSUES
We are called upon to resolve:
(a) whether there is legal basis for delisting PGBI; and (b) whether PGBI’s
right to due process was violated.
OUR RULING
We find the petition
partly impressed with merit.
a.
The Minero Ruling
Our Minero ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941;
hence, it cannot sustain PGBI’s delisting from the roster of registered
national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the
party-list system.
First, the law is clear
– the COMELEC may motu proprio or
upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due
notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral
party, organization or coalition if it: (a) fails
to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections; or
(b) fails to obtain at least two per
centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2)
preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.[6] The word “or” is a disjunctive term
signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things
enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it
ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive
word.[7] Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable
language of the law provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting.
Second, Minero is
diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as
PGBI’s cited congressional deliberations clearly show.
Minero therefore simply cannot stand. Its basic defect lies in its characterization
of the non-participation of a party-list organization in an election as similar to a failure to garner the 2%
threshold party-list vote. What Minero effectively holds is that a party
list organization that does not participate in an election necessarily gets, by
default, less than 2% of the party-list votes. To be sure, this is a confused interpretation
of the law, given the law’s clear and categorical language and the legislative
intent to treat the two scenarios differently.
A delisting based on a mixture or fusion of these two different and
separate grounds for delisting is therefore a strained application of the law –
in jurisdictional terms, it is an interpretation not within the contemplation of
the framers of the law and hence is a gravely abusive interpretation of the
law.[8]
What we say here should
of course take into account our ruling in Barangay
Association for Advancement and National Transparency v. COMELEC[9]
(
We
rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the
continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the
additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A.
No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two
percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum
number of available party list seats when the number of available party list
seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in
the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the
permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives
shall consist of party-list representatives.
The disqualification for
failure to get 2% party-list votes in two (2) preceding elections should
therefore be understood in light of the
We need not extensively discuss
To reiterate, (a) Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two
separate grounds for delisting; these grounds cannot be mixed or combined to
support delisting; and (b) the disqualification for failure to garner 2%
party-list votes in two preceding elections should now be understood, in light
of the Banat ruling, to mean failure to qualify for a party-list seat in
two preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. This, we declare, is how Section 6(8)
of RA 7941 should be understood and applied.
We do so under our authority to state what the law is,[10]
and as an exception to the application of the principle of stare decisis.
The doctrine of stare
decisis et
non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle
things which are established) is embodied in Article 8 of
the Civil Code of the
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial
precedents. It requires courts in a
country to follow the rule established in a decision of its Supreme Court. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to
be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once
a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled
and closed to further argument.[11] The doctrine is grounded on the necessity for
securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions, thus:
Time and again, the court has held that it is a very
desirable and necessary judicial practice that when a court has laid
down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will
adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts
are substantially the same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere.
Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply means that for
the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to
those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the
parties may be different. It proceeds
from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing
considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to
the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a
previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar
to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.[12]
The
doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that circumstances
attendant in a particular case override the great benefits derived by our judicial
system from the doctrine of stare decisis,
the Court is justified in setting it aside.[13]
As our discussion above shows, the most compelling reason to
abandon Minero exists; it
was clearly an erroneous application of the law – an application that the
principle of stability or predictability of decisions alone cannot
sustain. Minero did unnecessary violence to the language of the law, the intent
of the legislature, and to the rule of law in general. Clearly, we cannot allow PGBI to be
prejudiced by the continuing validity of an erroneous ruling. Thus, we now abandon Minero and strike it out from our ruling case law.
We are aware that PGBI’s situation – a party list group or
organization that failed to garner 2% in a prior election and immediately
thereafter did not participate in the preceding election – is something that is
not covered by Section 6(8) of RA 7941.
From this perspective, it may be an unintended gap in the law and as
such is a matter for Congress to address.
We cannot and do not address matters over which full discretionary
authority is given by the Constitution to the legislature; to do so will offend
the principle of separation of powers.
If a gap indeed exists, then the present case should bring this concern
to the legislature’s notice.
b.
The Issue of Due Process
On the due process issue, we agree with the COMELEC that PGBI’s
right to due process was not violated for PGBI was given an opportunity to
seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of Resolution No. 8679. The essence of due process,
we have consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard;
as applied to administrative proceedings, due process is the opportunity to
explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of. A formal or
trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The
requirement is satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned
upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing x x x.[14] We find it obvious under the attendant
circumstances that PGBI was not denied due process. In any case, given the result of this
Resolution, PGBI has no longer any cause for complaint on due process grounds.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, we GRANT the
petition and accordingly ANNUL COMELEC
Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar as the petitioner PGBI is
concerned, and the Resolution dated December 9, 2009 which denied PGBI’s motion
for reconsideration in SPP No. 09-004 (MP).
PGBI is qualified to be voted upon as a party-list group or organization
in the coming May 2010 elections.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO
D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
|
REYNATO
S. PUNO Chief Justice |
|
|
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO Associate Justice CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice TERESITA J.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice JOSE
|
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Filed under Rule 65 of the RULES OF COURT.
[2] Rollo, pp. 42-48.
[3] Sec. 4. Manifestation to Participate in the Party-List System. – Any party, organization or coalition already registered with the Commission need not register anew. However, such party, organization or coalition shall file with the Commission, not later than ninety (90) days before the election, a manifestation of its desire to participate in the party-list system.
[4] G.R. No. 177548, May 10, 2007; see rollo of G.R. No. 177548, pp. 46-48.
[5] Rollo, pp. 74-75.
[6] Numbering supplied.
[7] Agpalo, Statutory Construction, p. 204
(2003); see also The Heirs of George Poe
v. Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. G.R. No.
156302, April 7, 2009.
[8] See Varias v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189078, February 11, 2010 where we held that the use of wrong considerations is an act not in contemplation of law – a jurisdictional error for this is one way of gravely abusing one’s discretion.
[9] G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009.
[10] Marbury v.
[11] See Lazatin v. Desierto, G.R. No. 147097, June 5, 2009, citing Fermin v. People, G.R. No. 157643, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 132.
[12] Id., citing Chinese Young Men's Christian Association of the Philippine Islands v. Remington Steel Corporation, G.R. No. 159422, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 180.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Bautista v. Comelec, 460 Phil, 459, 478 (2003).