G.R.
No. 189793 SEN. BENIGNO AQUINO
III AND MAYOR JESSE ROBREDO, petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Promulgated:
April
7, 2010
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CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO MORALES, J.
I concur with the ponencia’s discussion on the procedural
issue.
“Transcendental importance” doctrine
aside, petitioners have the requisite locus standi. Petitioners are suing not only as lawmakers but
as taxpayers and citizens as well.
At the initiative of a taxpayer, a statute may be nullified, on the
supposition that expenditure of public funds for the purpose of administering
an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds.[1] Republic Act No. 9716 (R.A. 9716) mandates
the creation of another legislative district and indubitably involves the
expenditure of public funds.
I DISSENT, however, on the ponencia’s conclusion, on the substantive
issue, that a population of 250,000 is not an indispensable constitutional
requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province.
Contrary to
the ponencia’s assertion, petitioners
do not merely rely on Article VI, Section 5 (3) but also on Section 5 (1) of
the same Article. [2]
Both provisions must be read together in light of the constitutional
requirements of population and contiguity.
Section 5
(3) of Article VI disregards the 250,000 population requirement only with
respect to existing provinces whose population does not exceed 250,000 or to newly
created provinces under the Local Government Code (as long as the income and
territory requirements are met).
The
ponencia misinterprets Mariano v. Comelec.[3]
The actual population of the City of
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition
of another legislative district in
Nothing in Mariano reflects that the Court
disregarded the 250,000 population requirement as it merely stated that
The Local Government Code likewise is not in
point since Section 461 thereof tackles the creation of a province and not
the reapportioning of a legislative district based on increasing population. There is thus no point in asserting that
population is merely an alternative addition to the income requirement.
The ponencia likewise misinterprets Bagabuyo v. Comelec.[6] Notably, the ponencia spliced that portion of the decision in Bagabuyo which it cited to suit its
argument. Thus the ponencia
quotes:
x x x
Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of
the districts. The Constitution,
however, does not require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a
standard in gauging equality of representation. x x x To ensure quality
representation through commonality of interests and ease of access by the
representative to the constituents, all that the Constitution requires is that
every legislative district should comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact and adjacent territory.
(emphasis and underscoring in the original by the ponente)
It omitted
that portion which specified the respective total population of the two
districts as above 250,000. Thus
the full text of the pertinent portion of the decision reads:
The
petitioner, unfortunately, did not provide information about the actual
population of Cagayan de Oro City.
However, we take judicial notice of the August 2007 census of the
National Statistics
Office which shows that barangays comprising Cagayan de Oro’s first district have a total population of 254,644 while the second district has 299,322 residents. Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the districts. The Constitution, however, does not require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality of representation. x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The two
legislative districts of Cagayan de Oro subject of Bagabuyo met the minimum population requirement at the time of
reappportionment. The ponencia’s construal of the disparity in
population sizes of the districts involved in Bagabuyo clearly differs from the disparity of population in the
present case.
The
Record of the Constitutional Commission itself declares that the 250,000 benchmark
was used in apportioning the legislative districts in the country. The sponsorship speech of Commissioner Hilario
Davide, Jr.[7]
reflects so.
x x
x x. Each legislative district shall
comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent
territory. Each city or each province
with a population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one Representative.
This is Section 5 of the Article
on the Legislative. x x x x The ordinance fixes at 200 the number of legislative seats which are, in turn, apportioned
among the provinces and cities with a
population of at least 250,000 and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio. The population is based on the 1986
projection, with the 1980 official enumeration as the point of reckoning. This projection indicates that our population
is more or less 56 million. Taking
into account the mandate that each city with at least 250,000 inhabitants and
each province shall have at least one representative, we at first allotted one
seat for each of the 73 provinces; and one each for all cities with a
population of at least 250,000, which are the Cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay,
Caloocan, Cebu, Iloilo, Bacolod, Cagayan de Oro, Davao and Zamboanga. Thereafter, we
then proceeded to increase whenever appropriate the number of seats for the provinces and cities in accordance with number of their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. x x x x. (capitalization, emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
The framers
of the Constitution intended to apply the minimum population requirement of
250,000 to both cities and provinces in the initial
apportionment, in proportion to the country’s total population at that time (56
million).
Yet the ponencia asserts that the 250,000
benchmark was used only for the purpose of the 1986 initial apportionment of
the legislative districts, and now disregards the benchmark’s application in
the present petition. It is eerily silent,
however, on what the present population yardstick is. If the present estimated population of 90
million is to be the dividend,[8]
then there would roughly be one legislative district representative for every
450,000.
Following the
constitutional mandate, the population requirement cannot fall below
250,000. This is the average “uniform and progressive ratio” that
should prevail. Thus, using the present
population figure, the benchmark should be anywhere between 250,000-450,000 persons
per district. Using anything less than
250,000 is illogical, for it would operate to allow more than 360
representatives of legislative districts alone on some capricious basis other
than the variable of population.
A case in
point is the congressional reapportionment done in the provinces of Sultan
Kudarat and Zamboanga Sibugay effected through
Republic Act No. 9357[9]
and Republic Act No. 9360,[10]
respectively. At the time of the
congressional deliberations and effectivity of these laws, the population count
in these provinces more than met the basic standard. Sultan Kudarat already had a population of
522,187 during the 1995 census year,[11]
while Zamboanga Sibugay met the population threshold in 2001 with an estimated
503,700 headcount.[12]
The ponencia sweepingly declares that
“population was explicitly removed as a factor.”[13] Far from it. Population remains the controlling factor. From the discussions in the initial apportionment
and districting of Puerto Princesa,
The ponencia harps on petitioners’ admission
that Camarines Sur is actually entitled to SIX legislative districts, given its
population of 1,693,821, to justify its conclusion that there is nothing wrong
in the creation of another legislative district in the province. This is a wrong premise. It bears noting that petitioners raised the legislative
entitlement to underscore the GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION committed in the
enactment of R.A. 9716.
R.A. 9716
created one legislative district by reconfiguring the first and second
districts. It did not, however, touch
the third and fourth districts which, when properly reapportioned, can easily
form another district. No reasons were
offered except Senator Joker Arroyo’s during the Senate Plenary Debates on H.B.
No. 4264, viz: “When it comes to their district,
congressmen are kings. We cannot touch them. He [referring to Rep. Villafuerte]
does not also want it [referring to the district of Rep. Villafuerte] touched...
even if they have a pregnant populace or inhabitants, he does not want it
touched.”[14]
The resulting population distribution
in the present case violates the uniform
and progressive ratio prescribed in the Constitution.
Prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9716,
the tally of population percentage per district in Camarines Sur based on its
population of 1,693,821 was as follows:
District 1: 24.6%
District 2: 28.03%
District
3: 21.99%
District
4: 25.33%
Compare now the population percentage per
district after the passage of R.A.
9716:
District 1: 10.4%
District 2: 16.34%
District
3: 25.9%
District
4: 21.99% (former District 3)
District
5: 25.33% (former District 4)
Remarkably,
before R.A. No. 9716, the first district met the 250,000 minimum. After R.A. No. 9716, it suffered a very
significant drop in its population from 416,680 to 176,157.
The
extraneous factors[15]
cited by the ponencia do not suffice to justify the redistricting, particularly
the inclusion of the
The former
first district supposedly occupied 40% of the total land area of Camarines
The
The seminal
case of Reynolds v. Sims[16]
had already ruled that these factors cannot be permissively considered in
legislative reapportionment.
x x x Population is, of necessity, the starting point for consideration and the controlling criterion for judgment in legislative apportionment controversies. x x x [We] hold that, as a basic constitutional standard, [equal protection] requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis. Simply stated, an individual’s right to vote for state legislators is unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted when compared with votes of citizens living in other parts of the [State].
x x x x
[Equal protection] requires that a State make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as is practicable. We realize that it is a practical impossibility to arrange legislative districts so that each one has an identical number of residents, citizens, or voters. Mathematical exactness or precision is hardly a workable constitutional requirement. So long as the divergences from a strict population principle are constitutionally permissible, but neither history alone, nor economic or other sorts of group interests, are permissible factors in attempting to justify disparities from population-based representation. Citizens, not history or economic interests, cast votes. Considerations of area alone provide an insufficient justification for deviations from the equal-population principle. Again, people, not land or trees or pastures, vote. x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Undoubtedly,
Camarines Sur’s malapportionment largely partakes of gerrymandering.[17]
A final word. By pronouncing that “other factors,” aside
from population, should be considered in the composition of additional
districts, thereby adding other requisites despite the Constitution’s clear
limitation to population and contiguity, the ponencia effectively opens the floodgates to opportunistic
lawmakers to reconfigure their own principalia and bantam districts. Leaving open Section 5 of Article VI to
arbitrary factors, such as economic, political, socio-cultural, racial and even
religious ones, is an invitation to a free-for-all.
In light of
the foregoing, I vote to GRANT the petition and DECLARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Republic Act No. 9716.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
[1] Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331, 342-343 (1960).
[2] Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) x x x x
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
[3] 312 Phil. 259 (1995).
[4] Id. at 272 at footnote 13 which reads: As per the certificate issued by Administrator Tomas Africa of the National Census and Statistics Office, the population of Makati as of 1994 stood at 508, 174 x x x.
[5]
[6] 573 SCRA 290 (2008).
[7] Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. V, p. 949.
[8] As
of August 2007, the official population was 88,574,614 Filipinos. The population count was made official with
the signing by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of Proclamation No. 1498 on
April 16, 2008.
[9] Entitled “An Act Reapportioning the Province of Sultan Kudarat into Two Legislative Districts” and passed on October 10, 2006.
[10] Entitled “An Act Creating Another Congressional District In The
[12] http://www.census.gov.ph/data/census2007/index.html. Last visited March 30, 2010. Zamboanga Sibugay’s population during the 2000 Census was at 497,239 with an annual growth rate of 1.30%. Thus, the following year (2001), the province met the 500,000 minimum requirement.
[13] Decision, p. 20.
[14] TSN, Senate Plenary Debates, H.B. 4264, September 22, 2009..
[15] Decision, p. 23. These are dialects spoken, size of the
original groupings, natural division of the
[16] 377
[17] A name given to the process of dividing a state or other territory into the authorized civil or political divisions, but with such a geographical arrangement as to accomplish an ulterior or unlawful purpose, as, for instance, to secure a majority for a given political party in districts where the result would be otherwise if they were divided according to obvious natural lines. (Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., p. 618).