EN BANC
SENATOR
BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR
JESSE ROBREDO, Petitioners, -versus- COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS represented by its Chairman JOSE
A.R. MELO and its Commissioners, RENE
V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO VELASCO, ELIAS
R. YUSOPH AND GREGORIO LARRAZABAL,
Respondents. |
G.R. No. 189793 Present: PUNO, C.J., CARPIO, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA,
BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, ABAD,* VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: April 7, 2010 |
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
D E C I S I O
N
PEREZ, J.:
This case comes before this Court by
way of a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In this original action, petitioners Senator
Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo, as public officers,
taxpayers and citizens, seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic
Act No. 9716, entitled “An Act
Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd)
Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a
New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment.”
Petitioners consequently pray that the respondent Commission on
Elections be restrained from making any issuances and from taking any steps
relative to the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716.
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No.
4264, and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12
October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009, or fifteen (15)
days following its publication in the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general
circulation.[1] In substance, the said law created an
additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by
reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the
province.
Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines
Sur was estimated to have a population of 1,693,821,[2]
distributed among four (4) legislative districts in this wise:
District |
Municipalities/Cities |
Population |
|
1st District |
Del Gallego Ragay Lupi Sipocot Cabusao |
Libmanan Minalabac Pamplona Pasacao San Fernando |
417,304 |
2nd District |
Gainza Milaor Naga Pili Ocampo |
Canaman Camaligan Magarao Bombon Calabanga |
474,899 |
3rd District |
Caramoan Garchitorena Goa Lagonoy Presentacion |
Sangay San Jose Tigaon Tinamba Siruma |
372,548 |
4th District |
Iriga Baao Balatan Bato |
Buhi Bula Nabua |
429,070 |
Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the
first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to
create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of
Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the
second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second
legislative district. The following
table[3]
illustrates the reapportionment made by Republic Act No. 9716:
District |
Municipalities/Cities |
Population |
|
1st District |
Del Gallego Ragay Lupi Sipocot Cabusao |
|
176,383 |
2nd District |
Libmanan Minalabac Pamplona Pasacao |
San Fernando Gainza Milaor |
276,777 |
3rd District (formerly 2nd District) |
Naga Pili Ocampo Canaman |
Camaligan Magarao Bombon Calabanga |
439,043 |
4th District (formerly 3rd District) |
Caramoan Garchitorena Goa Lagonoy Presentacion |
Sangay San Jose Tigaon Tinamba Siruma |
372,548 |
5th District (formerly 4th District) |
Iriga Baao Balatan Bato |
Buhi Bula Nabua |
429,070 |
Republic
Act No. 9716 is a well-milled legislation.
The factual recitals by both parties of the origins of the bill that
became the law show that, from the filing of House Bill No. 4264 until its
approval by the Senate on a vote of thirteen (13) in favor and two (2) against,
the process progressed step by step, marked by public hearings on the
sentiments and position of the local officials of Camarines Sur on the creation
of a new congressional district, as well as argumentation and debate on the
issue, now before us, concerning the stand of the oppositors of the bill that a
population of at least 250,000 is required by the Constitution for such new
district.[4]
Petitioner Aquino III was one of two senators who voted
against the approval of the Bill by the Senate.
His co-petitioner, Robredo, is the Mayor of Naga City, which was a part
of the former second district from which the municipalities of Gainza and
Milaor were taken for inclusion in the new second district. No other local executive joined the two;
neither did the representatives of the former third and fourth districts of the
province.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by
Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit
constitutional standard that requires
a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation
of a legislative district.[5] The petitioners claim that the
reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of
Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end
up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum population standard.[6] The provision reads:
Article VI
Section 5. (1) x x x x
(2) x x x x
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) x x x x (Emphasis supplied).
The petitioners posit that the 250,000 figure appearing in
the above-cited provision is the minimum population requirement for the
creation of a legislative district.[7] The petitioners theorize that, save in the
case of a newly created province, each legislative district created by Congress
must be supported by a minimum population of at least 250,000 in order to be
valid.[8] Under this view, existing legislative
districts may be reapportioned and severed to form new districts, provided each
resulting district will represent a population of at least 250,000. On the other hand, if the reapportionment
would result in the creation of a legislative seat representing a populace of
less than 250,000 inhabitants, the reapportionment must be stricken down as
invalid for non-compliance with the minimum population requirement.
In support of their theory, the petitioners point to what
they claim is the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to adopt a
population minimum of 250,000 in the creation of additional legislative seats.[9] The petitioners argue that when the
Constitutional Commission fixed the original number of district seats in the
House of Representatives to two hundred (200), they took into account the
projected national population of fifty five million (55,000,000) for the year
1986.[10] According to the petitioners, 55 million
people represented by 200 district representatives translates to roughly 250,000 people for every one (1)
representative.[11] Thus, the 250,000 population requirement
found in Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is actually based on
the population constant used by the Constitutional Commission in distributing
the initial 200 legislative seats.
Thus did
the petitioners claim that in reapportioning legislative districts
independently from the creation of a province, Congress is bound to observe a
250,000 population threshold, in the same manner that the Constitutional
Commission did in the original apportionment.
Verbatim,
the submission is that:
1. Republic Act 9716 is unconstitutional because the newly apportioned first district of Camarines Sur failed to meet the population requirement for the creation of the legislative district as explicitly provided in Article VI, Section 5, Paragraphs (1) and (3) of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended thereto; and
2. Republic Act 9716 violates the principle of proportional representation as provided in Article VI, Section 5 paragraphs (1), (3) and (4) of the Constitution.[12]
The provision subject of this case states:
Article VI
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) x x x x
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.
On the other hand, the respondents, through the Office of
the Solicitor General, seek the dismissal of the present petition based on
procedural and substantive grounds.
On procedural matters, the respondents argue that the
petitioners are guilty of two (2) fatal technical defects: first, petitioners committed an error in
choosing to assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716 via the remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and
second, the petitioners have no locus
standi to question the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716.
On
substantive matters, the respondents call attention to an apparent distinction between
cities and provinces drawn by Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. The respondents concede
the existence of a 250,000 population condition, but argue that a plain and
simple reading of the questioned provision will show that the same has no
application with respect to the creation of legislative districts in provinces.[13] Rather, the 250,000 minimum population is
only a requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city.
In sum,
the respondents deny the existence of a fixed population requirement for the
reapportionment of districts in provinces.
Therefore, Republic Act No. 9716, which only creates an additional
legislative district within the province of Camarines Sur, should be sustained
as a perfectly valid reapportionment law.
We first pass
upon the threshold issues.
The respondents assert that by choosing to avail themselves of
the remedies of Certiorari and
Prohibition, the petitioners have committed a fatal procedural lapse. The respondents cite the following reasons:
1. The instant
petition is bereft of any allegation that the respondents had acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.
2. The remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition must be directed against a tribunal,
board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or
ministerial functions. Respondents
maintain that in implementing Republic Act No. 9716, they were not acting as a
judicial or quasi-judicial body, nor were they engaging in the performance of a
ministerial act.
3. The
petitioners could have availed themselves of another plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Considering that the main thrust of the instant petition is the
declaration of unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716, the same could
have been ventilated through a petition
for declaratory relief, over which the Supreme Court has only appellate,
not original jurisdiction.
The respondents likewise allege that the petitioners had
failed to show that they had sustained, or is in danger of sustaining any
substantial injury as a result of the implementation of Republic Act No.
9716. The respondents, therefore,
conclude that the petitioners lack the required legal standing to question the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716.
This Court has paved the way away from procedural debates
when confronted with issues that, by reason of constitutional importance, need a
direct focus of the arguments on their content and substance.
The
Supreme Court has, on more than one occasion, tempered the application of
procedural rules,[14]
as well as relaxed the requirement of locus
standi whenever confronted with an important issue of overreaching
significance to society.[15]
Hence, in
Del
Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)[16] and
Jaworski
v. PAGCOR,[17]
this Court sanctioned momentary deviation from the principle of the hierarchy
of courts, and took original cognizance of cases raising issues of paramount
public importance. The Jaworski
case ratiocinates:
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as
a petition for prohibition, the
transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we
set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition
at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially
pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation,
specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an
imperative need. This is in
accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not
inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
Anent the
locus standi requirement, this Court
has already uniformly ruled in Kilosbayan v. Guingona,[18] Tatad
v. Executive Secretary,[19] Chavez v.
Public Estates Authority[20] and Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,[21]
just to name a few, that absence of direct injury on the part of the party
seeking judicial review may be excused when the latter is able to craft an
issue of transcendental importance. In Lim
v. Executive Secretary,[22] this
Court held that in cases of transcendental importance, the cases must be
settled promptly and definitely, and so, the standing requirements may be
relaxed. This liberal stance has been
echoed in the more recent decision on Chavez v. Gonzales.[23]
Given the weight of the issue raised in the instant petition, the foregoing principles must apply. The beaten path must be taken. We go directly to the determination of whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province.
We deny the petition.
We start with the basics. Any law duly enacted by Congress
carries with it the presumption of constitutionality.[24] Before a law may be declared unconstitutional
by this Court, there must be a clear showing that a specific provision of the fundamental law has been violated or
transgressed. When there is neither a
violation of a specific provision of the Constitution nor any proof showing
that there is such a violation, the presumption of constitutionality will
prevail and the law must be upheld. To
doubt is to sustain.[25]
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that
must compose a legislative district.
As already mentioned, the petitioners rely
on the second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of the framers of the
Constitution to adopt a minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative
district.
The
second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly
provides: “Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or
each province, shall have at least one representative.”
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between
the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a
province to a district on the other. For
while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing
mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population minimum of
250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.
The use
by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase “each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand” from the phrase “or each
province” point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population
is only required for a city, but not for a province. [26]
Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.
The 250,000
minimum population requirement for legislative districts in cities was, in
turn, the subject of interpretation by this Court in Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC.[27]
In Mariano, the issue presented was the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7854, which was the law that converted
the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City. As it happened, Republic Act No. 7854 created
an additional legislative district for Makati, which at that time was a lone
district. The petitioners in that case
argued that the creation of an additional district would violate Section 5(3),
Article VI of the Constitution, because the resulting districts would be
supported by a population of less than 250,000, considering that Makati had a
total population of only 450,000. The
Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the law and the validity of
the newly created district, explaining the operation of the Constitutional
phrase “each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand,” to
wit:
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative
district in Makati is not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest
survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only four hundred
fifty thousand (450,000). Said section
provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative.
Even granting that the population of
Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000),
its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum
population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, Section
3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose
population has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall
be entitled to at least one congressional representative.[28]
(Emphasis supplied)
The Mariano case limited the
application of the 250,000 minimum population requirement for cities only to
its initial legislative
district. In other words, while
Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum
population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to
increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district.
There is no reason why the Mariano
case, which involves the creation of an additional district within a city,
should not be applied to additional
districts in provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative district created
within a city is not required to represent a population of at least 250,000 in
order to be valid, neither should such be needed for an additional district in
a province, considering moreover that a province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its
creation and regardless of its population.
Apropos
for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of
a province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a
legislative district. Thus, Section 461
of the Local Government Code states:
Requisites for Creation. – (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less
than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the
National Statistics Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an
indispensable requirement, but is merely an alternative addition to the
indispensable income requirement.
Mariano, it would turn out, is but a
reflection of the pertinent ideas that ran through the deliberations on the
words and meaning of Section 5 of Article VI.
The whats, whys, and wherefores of the
population requirement of “at least two hundred fifty thousand” may be gleaned
from the records of the Constitutional Commission which, upon framing the
provisions of Section 5 of Article VI, proceeded to form an ordinance that
would be appended to the final document.
The Ordinance is captioned “APPORTIONING THE SEATS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE DIFFERENT LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICTS IN PROVINCES AND CITIES AND THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA.” Such records would show that the 250,000
population benchmark was used for the 1986 nationwide apportionment of
legislative districts among provinces, cities and Metropolitan
Manila. Simply put, the population
figure was used to determine how many districts a province, city, or
Metropolitan Manila should have. Simply
discernible too is the fact that, for the purpose, population had to be the determinant. Even then, the requirement of 250,000
inhabitants was not taken as an absolute minimum for one legislative
district. And, closer to the point
herein at issue, in the determination of the precise district within the
province to which, through the use of the population benchmark, so many districts
have been apportioned, population as a factor was not the sole, though
it was among, several determinants.
From its journal,[29]
we can see that the Constitutional Commission originally divided the entire
country into two hundred (200) districts, which corresponded to the original
number of district representatives. The 200 seats were distributed by the
Constitutional Commission in this manner:
first, one (1) seat each was
given to the seventy-three (73) provinces and the ten (10) cities with a
population of at least 250,000;[30]
second, the remaining seats were then
redistributed among the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Area “in
accordance with the number of their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio.”[31]
Commissioner Davide, who later became a Member and then Chief Justice of the
Court, explained this in his sponsorship remark[32]
for the Ordinance to be appended to the 1987 Constitution:
Commissioner Davide: The ordinance fixes at 200 the number of legislative seats which are, in turn, apportioned among provinces and cities with a population of at least 250, 000 and the Metropolitan Area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. The population is based on the 1986 projection, with the 1980 official enumeration as the point of reckoning. This projection indicates that our population is more or less 56 million. Taking into account the mandate that each city with at least 250, 000 inhabitants and each province shall have at least one representative, we first allotted one seat for each of the 73 provinces, and each one for all cities with a population of at least 250, 000, which are the Cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan, Cebu, Iloilo, Bacolod, Cagayan de Oro, Davao and Zamboanga. Thereafter, we then proceed[ed] to increase whenever appropriate the number of seats for the provinces and cities in accordance with the number of their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. (Emphasis supplied).
Thus was the number of seats computed for
each province and city.
Differentiated from this, the determination of the districts within the
province had to consider “all protests and complaints formally received” which,
the records show, dealt with determinants other than population as already
mentioned.
Palawan is a case in point. Journal No. 107 of the Constitutional
Commission narrates:
INTERPELLATION OF MR. NOLLEDO:
Mr. Nolledo inquired on the reason for including Puerto Princesa in the northern towns when it was more affinity with the southern town of Aborlan, Batarasa, Brooke’s Point, Narra, Quezon and Marcos. He stated that the First District has a greater area than the Second District. He then queried whether population was the only factor considered by the Committee in redistricting.
Replying thereto, Mr. Davide explained that the Committee took into account the standards set in Section 5 of the Article on the Legislative Department, namely: 1) the legislative seats should be apportioned among the provinces and cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio; and 2) the legislative district must be compact, adjacent and contiguous.
Mr. Nolledo pointed out that the last factor was not met when Puerto Princesa was included with the northern towns. He then inquired what is the distance between Puerto Princesa from San Vicente.
x x x x
Thereupon, Mr. Nolledo stated that Puerto Princesa has a population of 75,480 and based on the apportionment, its inclusion with the northern towns would result in a combined population of 265,000 as against only 186,000 for the south. He added that Cuyo and Coron are very important towns in the northern part of Palawan and, in fact, Cuyo was the capital of Palawan before its transfer to Puerto Princesa. He also pointed out that there are more potential candidates in the north and therefore if Puerto Princesa City and the towns of Cuyo and Coron are lumped together, there would be less candidates in the south, most of whose inhabitants are not interested in politics. He then suggested that Puerto Princesa be included in the south or the Second District.
Mr. Davide stated that the proposal would be considered during the period of amendments. He requested that the COMELEC staff study said proposal.[33]
“PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF MR. NOLLEDO
On the districting of Palawan, Mr. Nolledo pointed out that it was explained in the interpellations that District I has a total population of 265,358 including the City of Puerto Princesa, while the Second District has a total population of 186,733. He proposed, however, that Puerto Princesa be included in the Second District in order to satisfy the contiguity requirement in the Constitution considering that said City is nearer the southern towns comprising the Second District.
In reply to Mr. Monsod’s query, Mr. Nolledo explained that with the proposed transfer of Puerto Princesa City to the Second District, the First District would only have a total population of 190,000 while the Second District would have 262,213, and there would be no substantial changes.
Mr. Davide accepted Mr. Nolledo’s proposal to insert Puerto Princesa City before the Municipality of Aborlan.
There being no objection on the part of the Members the same was approved by the Body.
APPROVAL OF THE APPORTIONMENT AND DISTRICTING OF PALAWAN
There being no other amendment, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the apportionment and districting for the province of Palawan was approved by the Body.[34]
The districting of Palawan disregarded
the 250,000 population figure. It was
decided by the importance of the towns and the city that eventually composed
the districts.
Benguet and Baguio are another reference point. The Journal further narrates:
At this juncture, Mr. Davide informed the Body that Mr. Regalado made a reservation with the Committee for the possible reopening of the approval of Region I with respect to Benguet and Baguio City.
REMARKS OF MR. REGALADO
Mr. Regalado stated that in the formulation of the Committee, Baguio City and Tuba are placed in one district. He stated that he was toying with the idea that, perhaps as a special consideration for Baguio because it is the summer capital of the Philippines, Tuba could be divorced from Baguio City so that it could, by itself, have its own constituency and Tuba could be transferred to the Second District together with Itogon. Mr. Davide, however, pointed out that the population of Baguio City is only 141,149.
Mr. Regalado admitted that the regular population of Baguio may be lower during certain times of the year, but the transient population would increase the population substantially and, therefore, for purposes of business and professional transactions, it is beyond question that population-wise, Baguio would more than qualify, not to speak of the official business matters, transactions and offices that are also there.
Mr. Davide adverted to Director de Lima’s statement that unless Tuba and Baguio City are united, Tuba will be isolated from the rest of Benguet as the place can only be reached by passing through Baguio City. He stated that the Committee would submit the matter to the Body.
Upon inquiry of the Chair whether he is insisting on his amendment, Mr. Regalado stated that the Body should have a say on the matter and that the considerations he had given are not on the demographic aspects but on the fact that Baguio City is the summer capital, the venue and situs of many government offices and functions.
On motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the Body approved the reconsideration of the earlier approval of the apportionment and districting of Region I, particularly Benguet.
Thereafter, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the amendment of Mr. Regalado was put to a vote. With 14 Members voting in favor and none against, the amendment was approved by the Body.
Mr. Davide informed that in view of the approval of the amendment, Benguet with Baguio City will have two seats. The First District shall comprise of the municipalities of Mankayan, Buguias, Bakun, Kabayan, Kibungan, Bokod, Atok, Kapangan, Tublay, La Trinidad, Sablan, Itogon and Tuba. The Second District shall comprise of Baguio City alone.
There
being no objection, the Body approved the apportionment and districting of
Region I.[35]
Quite emphatically, population was
explicitly removed as a factor.
It may be additionally mentioned
that the province of Cavite was divided into districts based on the
distribution of its three cities, with each district having a city: one
district “supposed to be a fishing area; another a vegetable and fruit area;
and the third, a rice growing area,” because such consideration “fosters common
interests in line with the standard of compactness.”[36]
In the districting of Maguindanao, among the matters discussed were “political
stability and common interest among the people in the area” and the possibility
of “chaos and disunity” considering the “accepted regional, political,
traditional and sectoral leaders.”[37] For Laguna, it was mentioned that
municipalities in the highland should not be grouped with the towns in the
lowland. For Cebu, Commissioner Maambong
proposed that they should “balance the area and population.”[38]
Consistent with Mariano and with the framer
deliberations on district apportionment, we stated in Bagabuyo v. COMELEC[39]
that:
x x x Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the districts. The Constitution, however, does not require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality of representation. x x x. To ensure quality representation through commonality of interests and ease of access by the representative to the constituents, all that the Constitution requires is that every legislative district should comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. (Emphasis supplied).
This 2008 pronouncement is fresh
reasoning against the uncompromising stand of petitioner that an additional
provincial legislative district, which does not have at least a 250,000
population is not allowed by the Constitution.
The foregoing reading and review lead
to a clear lesson.
Neither in the text nor in the essence
of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution can, the petition find
support. And the formulation of the
Ordinance in the implementation of the provision, nay, even the Ordinance
itself, refutes the contention that a population of 250,000 is a constitutional
sine qua non for the formation of an additional legislative district in a
province, whose population growth has increased beyond the 1986 numbers.
Translated in the terms of the present
case:
1.
The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated population
of 1,693,821 in 2007 is ─ based on the formula and constant number of
250,000 used by the Constitutional Commission in nationally apportioning
legislative districts among provinces and cities ─ entitled to two (2)
districts in addition to the four (4) that it was given in the 1986
apportionment. Significantly, petitioner Aquino concedes this point.[40] In other words, Section 5 of Article VI as
clearly written allows and does not prohibit an additional district for
the Province of Camarines Sur, such as that provided for in Republic Act No.
9786;
2.
Based on the pith and pitch of the exchanges on the
Ordinance on the protests and complaints against strict conformity with the
population standard, and more importantly based on the final districting in the
Ordinance on considerations other than population, the reapportionment or
the recomposition of the first and second legislative districts in the Province
of Camarines Sur that resulted in the creation of a new legislative district is
valid even if the population of the new district is 176,383 and not
250,000 as insisted upon by the petitioners.
3.
The factors mentioned during the deliberations on
House Bill No. 4264, were:
(a) the dialects spoken in the grouped
municipalities;
(b) the size of the original groupings compared to
that of the regrouped municipalities;
(c) the natural division separating the
municipality subject of the discussion from the reconfigured District One; and
(d) the balancing of the areas of the three
districts resulting from the redistricting of Districts One and Two.[41]
Each of such factors and in relation to the others considered
together, with the increased population of the erstwhile Districts One and Two,
point to the utter absence of abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse of
discretion,[42]
that would warrant the invalidation of Republic Act No. 9716.
To be clear about our judgment, we do not say that in the
reapportionment of the first and second legislative districts of Camarines Sur,
the number of inhabitants in the resulting additional district should not be
considered. Our ruling is that
population is not the only factor but is just one of several other factors in
the composition of the additional district.
Such settlement is in accord with both the text of the Constitution and
the spirit of the letter, so very clearly given form in the Constitutional
debates on the exact issue presented by this petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Republic Act No. 9716 entitled “An Act
Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd)
Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a
New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment” is a VALID LAW.
SO ORDERED.
|
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO C.
CORONA
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
Associate
Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO
C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
(On Official Leave)
ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA,
JR.
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Republic
Act No. 9716 was published in the 15 October 2009 issue of the Manila Standard.
[2] Figures
based on the 2007 Census of Population conducted by the National Statistics
Office.
[3] Figures
based on the 2007 Census of Population conducted by the National Statistics
Office.
[4] Rollo, p. 40.
[5] Id.
at 12.
[6] Id.
at 14-15.
[7] Id.
[8] Id.
[9] Id.
at 16.
[10] Id.
[11] Id.
[12] Id.
at 12-13.
[13] Id.
at 96.
[14] Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation, 400 Phil. 307 (2000); Fortich v. Corona, 352
Phil. 461 (1998).
[15] Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, 433
Phil. 506, 528 (2002); Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan v. Zamora, 396 Phil. 623, 646 (2000); Lim v. Executive Secretary, 430 Phil. 555, 580 (2002).
[16] Id.
[17] 464
Phil. 375, 385 (2004).
[18] G.R.
No. 113375, 5 May 1994, 232 SCRA 110.
[19] 346
Phil. 321 (1997).
[20] Supra
note 15.
[21] Id.
[22] Supra
note 15 at 580.
[23] G.R.
No. 168338, 15 February 2008, 545 SCRA 441.
[24] Alvarez v. Guingona, 322 Phil. 774, 789
(1996).
[25] The Philippine Judges Association v. Prado,
G.R. No. 105371, 11 November 1993, 227 SCRA 703, 705-706.
[26] Records
of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, pp. 136-138.
[27] 312
Phil. 259 (1995).
[28] Id.
at 272-273.
[29] Journal
of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. III, pp. 1859-1881.
[30] Record
of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. V, p. 949.
[31] Id.
[32] Id.
[33] Journal
of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. III, p. 1861.
[34] Id.
at 1867.
[35] Id. at 1872.
[36] Id. at 1867-1868.
[37] Id.
at 1861.
[38] Id.
at 1874.
[39] G.R.
No. 176970, 8 December 2008, 573 SCRA 290, 309-310.
[40] Rollo, p. 4.
[41] Sen.
Aquino, Mr. President, we have to respond to the last statement. The others that have been recommended
together with the Camarines Sur bill were all tested based on one standard, not
separate standards for everybody. It is
our opinion and that is the source of this discussion and of this debate; that
we hold that there is a 250,000-rule embodied in so many provisions of the
Constitution. Our distinguished collegue
from the Bicol and Makati areas does not agree.
I think we have established that we do not agree on our interpretation
of the Constitution.
With
his permission, Mr. President, since I am against of his time, may we move on
to the next point so as not to be accused of delaying the passage of the bill
any further?
May
we ask: Why was Libmanan not considered
to be a portion of the proposed first district? Because having done the same,
instead of having the 170,000-figure, we would have a 269,222 population
figure.
Sen.
Arroyo. All right. Look at that map.
Sen.
Aquino. May we just move to another
rostrum, Mr. President. We cannot view
the details from this particular rostrum, with the indulgence of our
distinguished colleague.
Sen. Arroyo. x x x.
x x x x.
Now,
the first district of Camarines Sur is so big that it consists of 40% of the
province, area-wise. Libmanan is the
biggest municipality in the entire or present first district. It stuck in the middle. We cannot move that no matter what – because
that is the biggest. Anyway, we move it
left, we move it right, it would change the configuration. Those are the practical difficulties in
trying to figure out how. That is the
situation. As we see, there is a water
extension of the gulf. We cannot connect
them because they are separated by water.
So it is no longer contiguous because it is separated by water and there
is nothing we can do about it. That is
what I was saying about mathematical formula.
We cannot have mathematical formula when a natural boundary like water
cannot make the municipalities contiguous.
That is the picture. It is all
there.
The
violet is the tagalog-speaking
province. The green is the
Bicol-speaking province so that is the only way to divide it. So much has been done in the Lower House in
trying to figure it out. But as long as
the three Congressman do not agree, then there is nothing we can do about
it. That Representative, what the
Congressman say in his district is “king”.
He is the king there, there is nothing we can do about it. We respect that.
Libmanan
is the biggest one. We cannot move that
anyway. (TSN, Senate Plenary Debates on
H.B. No. 4264, 22 September 2009).
[42] Grave
abuse of discretion contemplates a situation where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility – so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined by, or to act at all in contemplation of
law. (Cabrera v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 182084, 6 October 2008, 567 SCRA 686,
691).