Republic of the
Supreme Court
TECHNOL
EIGHT PHILIPPINES CORPORATION,
Petitioner, - versus - NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND DENNIS AMULAR,
Respondents. -- - |
G.R. No. 187605
Present:
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
BRION, PEREZ, and *MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: April 13, 2010 |
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D E
C I S
I O N
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BRION, J.: |
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For resolution is the present Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] addressing the decision[2] and resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) of November 18, 2008 and April 17, 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 100406.[4]
THE
ANTECEDENTS
The
facts are summarized below.
The
petitioner Technol Eight Philippines Corporation (Technol), located at
On
April 16, 2002 at about 5:30 p.m.,
Upon
learning of the incident, Technol’s management sent to Amular and Ducay a
notice of preventive suspension/notice of discharge dated May 18, 2002[5]
advising them that their fistfight with
Thereafter,
Amular received a notice dated June 8, 2002[7]
informing him that Technol management will conduct an administrative hearing on
June 14, 2002. He was also given two (2)
days to respond in writing to the statements attached to and supporting the
notice. A day before the hearing or on
June 13, 2002, Amular filed a complaint for illegal suspension/constructive
dismissal with a prayer for separation pay, backwages and several money claims,
against Technol. Amular failed to attend
the administrative hearing. On July 4,
2002, Technol sent him a notice of dismissal.[8]
Before
the Labor Arbiter, Amular alleged that in the afternoon of April 16, 2002,
while he and his co-employee Ducay were walking around the shopping mall in
Balibago, Sta. Rosa, Laguna, they “incidentally” saw Mendoza with whom
they wanted to discuss some personal matters.
When they approached
Amular
further alleged that he was asked by his immediate supervisor to submit a
report on the incident, which he did on April 18, 2002.[9] Subsequently, Amular, Mendoza and Ducay were
called by Technol management to talk to each other and to settle their
differences; they agreed and settled their misunderstanding.
THE
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION DECISIONS
On
November 18, 2003, Executive Labor Arbiter Salvador V. Reyes rendered a
decision[10] finding
that Amular’s preventive suspension and subsequent dismissal were illegal. He ruled that Amular’s preventive suspension
was based solely on unsubscribed written statements executed by Mendoza,
Rogelio R. Garces and Mary Ann Palma (subscribed only on August 8, 2002) and
that Mendoza, Amular and Ducay had settled their differences even before Amular
was placed under preventive suspension. With
respect to Amular’s dismissal, the Arbiter held that Technol failed to afford
him procedural due process since he was not able to present his side because he
had filed a case before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) at the time he was called to a
hearing; Technol also failed to substantiate its allegations against Amular; the
fistfight occurred around 200 to 300 meters away from the work area and it
happened after office hours. Arbiter
Reyes awarded Amular separation pay (since he did not want to be reinstated),
backwages, 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay and
attorney’s fees in the total amount of P158,987.70.
Technol
appealed to the NLRC. In its decision
promulgated on March 30, 2005,[11]
the NLRC affirmed the labor arbiter’s ruling.
It found that Amular was unfairly treated and subjected to
discrimination because he was the only one served with the notice to explain
and placed under preventive suspension; his co-employee Ducay who was also
involved in the incident was not.
Technol moved for reconsideration, but the NLRC denied the motion in a
resolution rendered on May 30, 2007.[12] Technol thereafter sought relief from the CA
through a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[13]
THE CA DECISION
In
its decision promulgated on November 18, 2008, the CA found no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the NLRC when it affirmed the labor arbiter’s ruling
that Amular was illegally dismissed.
While the appellate court noted that Amular was dismissed on the ground
of serious misconduct, a just cause for employee dismissal under the Labor
Code,[14]
it opined that Technol failed to comply with the jurisprudential guidelines that
misconduct warranting a dismissal: (1) must be serious; (2) must relate to the
performance of the employees duties; and (3) must show that the employee has
become unfit to continue working for the employer.[15]
The
appellate court pointed out that the mauling incident occurred outside the
company premises and after office hours; it did not in any manner disrupt
company operations nor pose a threat to the safety or peace of mind of Technol
workers; neither did it cause substantial prejudice to the company. It explained that although it was not
condoning Amular’s misconduct, it found that “the penalty of dismissal
imposed by Technol on Amular was too harsh and evidently disproportionate to
the act committed.”[16] The CA denied the motion for reconsideration
Technol subsequently filed;[17] hence, the present petition.[18]
THE PETITION
Technol posits that the
CA gravely erred in ruling that Amular was illegally dismissed, contending that
Amular was discharged for violation of Section 1-k of its HRD Manual which
penalizes the commission of a crime against a co-employee. It submits that Section 1-k of the HRD Manual
is a reasonable company rule issued pursuant to its management
prerogative. It maintains that the case
should have been examined from the perspective of whether the company rule is
reasonable and not on the basis of where and when the act was committed, or
even whether it caused damage to the company.
It adds that the manual does not distinguish whether the crime was
committed inside or outside work premises or during or after office hours. It insists that if the rule were otherwise,
any employee who wishes to harm a co-employee can just wait until the
co-employee is outside the company premises to inflict harm upon him, and later
argue that the crime was committed outside work premises and after office
hours. It submits that the matter
assumes special and utmost significance in this case because Amular inflicted
physical injuries on a supervisor. In
any event, Technol argues that even if the misconduct was committed outside
company premises, the perpetrator can still be disciplined as long as the
offense was work-related, citing Oania v.
NLRC[19]
and Tanala v. NLRC[20] in support of its position.
Technol bewails the CA’s
appreciation of the implication of Amular’s misconduct in the workplace,
especially the court’s observation that it did not cause damage to the company
because it did not disrupt company operation, that it did not create a hostile
environment inside the company, and that the fight was “nipped in the bud by
the timely intervention of those who saw the incident.”[21] Technol insists that it had to order Amular’s
dismissal in order to uphold the integrity of the company rules and to avoid
the erosion of discipline among its employees.
Also, it disputes the CA’s conclusion that the fact that Amular’s
liability should be mitigated because the fight “was nipped in the bud.” It submits that
Further, Technol
maintains that the CA gravely erred in going beyond the issues submitted to it,
since the NLRC decision only declared Amular’s dismissal illegal on the ground
that he was the only one subjected to disciplinary action and that the company
merely relied on the written statements of Amular’s co-employees.
On the rejection by the
CA of the statements of Amular’s co-employees regarding the incident, Technol
contends that the statements of the witnesses, together with Amular’s
admission, constitute substantial evidence of guilt. It points out that the statement of
Technol likewise disputes
the NLRC’s conclusion that Amular was discriminated against and unfairly
treated because he was the only one preventively suspended after the mauling
incident. It maintains that from the
records of the case and as admitted by Amular himself in his position paper,[25] his
co-employee Ducay was also preventively suspended.[26] That Mendoza was not similarly placed under
preventive suspension was considered by Technol as an exercise of its
management prerogative, since the circumstances surrounding the incident
indicated the existence of a reasonable threat to the safety of Amular’s
co-employees and that Mendoza appeared to be the victim of Amular’s and Ducay’s
assault.
THE
CASE FOR AMULAR
In his Comment filed on
August 12, 2009,[27]
Amular asks that the petition be dismissed for “utter lack of merit.” He admits that the mauling incident happened,
but claims however that on April 18, 2002, the Technol’s management called
Mendoza, Ducay, and him to a meeting, asked them to explain their sides and
thereafter requested them to settle their differences; without hesitation, they
agreed to settle and even shook hands afterwards. He was therefore surprised that on May 18,
2002, he received a memorandum from Technol’s HRD charging him and his co-employee
Ducay for the incident. Without waiting
for an explanation, Technol’s management placed him under preventive
suspension, but not Ducay. Adding insult
to injury, when Amular followed up his case while on preventive suspension, he
was advised by the HRD manager to simply resign and accept management’s offer
of P22,000.00, which offer was reiterated during the mandatory
conference before the labor arbiter.
Amular particularly laments
that his employment was terminated while the constructive dismissal case he
filed against the company was still pending.
He posits that his employment was terminated first before he was
informed of the accusations leveled against him – an indication of bad faith on
the part of Technol.
Amular asks: if it were true that the mauling incident was
a serious offense under company policy, why did it take Technol a month to give
him notice to explain the mauling incident?
He submits that the memorandum asking him to explain was a mere
afterthought; he was dismissed without giving him the benefit to be informed of
the true nature of his offense, thus denying him his right to be heard.
Finally, Amular questions
the propriety of the present petition contending that it only raises questions
of fact, in contravention of the rule that only questions of law may be raised
in a petition for review on certiorari.[28] He points out that the findings of facts of
the labor tribunals and the CA are all the same and therefore must be given
respect, if not finality.[29]
THE
RULING OF THE COURT
The Procedural Issue
We find no procedural
impediment to the petition. An objective
reading of the petition reveals that Technol largely assails the correctness of
the conclusions drawn by the CA from the set of facts it considered. The question therefore is one of law and not
of fact, as we ruled in Cucueco v. Court
of Appeals.[30] Thus, while there is no dispute that a fight
occurred between Amular and Ducay, on the one hand, and Mendoza, on the other,
the CA concluded that although Amular committed a misconduct, it failed to
satisfy jurisprudential standards to qualify as a just cause for dismissal –
the conclusion that Technol now challenges.
We see no legal problem, too, in wading into the factual records, as the
tribunals below clearly failed to properly consider the evidence on
record. This is grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the labor tribunals that the CA failed to appreciate.
The Merits of the Case
The CA misappreciated the true nature of Amular’s involvement in the
mauling incident. Although it acknowledged
that Amular committed a misconduct, it did not consider the misconduct as
work-related and reflective of Amular’s unfitness to continue working for
Technol. The appellate court’s benign
treatment of Amular’s offense was based largely on its observation that the
incident happened outside the company premises and after working hours; did not
cause a disruption of work operations; and did not result in a hostile
environment in the company.
Significantly, it did not condone Amular’s infraction, but it considered
that Amular’s dismissal was a harsh penalty that is disproportionate with his
offense. It found support for this
liberal view from the pronouncement of the Court in Almira v. B.F. Goodrich Philippines, Inc.,[31] that “where
a penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever missteps may be committed by
labor ought not to be visited with a consequence so severe.”
The record of the case, however, gives us a different picture. Contrary to the CA’s perception, we find a
work-connection in Amular's and Ducay’s assault on
The incident revealed a
disturbing strain in Amular's and Ducay’s characters – the urge to get even for
a perceived wrong done to them and, judging from the circumstances, regardless
of the place and time. The incident
could very well have happened inside company premises had the two employees
found time to confront
From the records, Ducay
appeared to have cooperated with Amular in the violent confrontation with
In an obvious effort to
mitigate his involvement in the mauling incident, Amular claimed in the
administrative proceedings that while he and Ducay were walking around the
shopping mall in Balibago, Sta. Rosa, Laguna, they “incidentally” saw their
co-employee Mendoza “with whom they wanted to clear some personal matters.”[35] We find this claim a clear distortion of what
actually happened. Again, based on
their written statements,[36] Amular
and Ducay purposely set out for the Balibago commercial area on April 16, 2002
looking for
Amular and Ducay point to
Under these circumstances,
Amular undoubtedly committed a misconduct or exhibited improper behavior that
constituted a valid cause for his dismissal under the law[39] and jurisprudential
standards.[40] The circumstances of his misdeed, to our
mind, rendered him unfit to continue working for Technol; guilt is not
diminished by his claim that Technol’s management called the three of them to a
meeting, and asked them to explain their sides and settle their differences,
which they did.[41]
Neither do we believe
that Amular was discriminated against because he was not the only one
preventively suspended. As the CA itself
acknowledged, Ducay received his notice of preventive suspension/notice of
charge[43] on May
19, 2002 while Amular received his on May 21, 2002. These notices informed them that they were
being preventively suspended for 30 days from May 19, 2002 to June 17, 2002 for
Ducay, and May 21, 2002 for Amular.[44]
Thus, Amular was not illegally dismissed; he was dismissed for cause.
The Due Process Issue
The labor arbiter ruled
that Technol failed to afford Amular procedural due process, since he was not
able to present his side regarding the incident; at the time he was called to a
hearing, he had already filed the illegal dismissal complaint.[45] The NLRC, on the other hand, held that the
memorandum terminating Amular’s employment was a mere formality, an
afterthought designed to evade company liability since Amular had already filed
an illegal dismissal case against Technol.[46]
We disagree with these conclusions.
The notice of preventive suspension/notice of discharge served on Amular
and Ducay required them to explain within forty-eight (48) hours why no
disciplinary action should be taken against them for their involvement in the
mauling incident.[47] Amular submitted two written statements: the first received by the company on May 19,
2002[48] and the
other received on May 20, 2002.[49] On June 8, 2002, Technol management sent
Amular a memorandum informing him of an administrative hearing on June 14, 2002
at 10:00 a.m., regarding the charges against him.[50] At the bottom left hand corner of the
memorandum, the following notation appears:
“accept the copy of notice but refused to receive, he will study
first.” A day before the administrative
hearing or on June 13, 2002, Amular filed the complaint for illegal
suspension/dismissal[51] and did not appear at the administrative hearing. On July 4, 2002, the company sent Amular a
notice of dismissal.[52]
What we see in the
records belie Amular’s claim of denial of procedural due process. He chose not to present his side at the
administrative hearing. In fact, he avoided
the investigation into the charges against him by filing his illegal dismissal
complaint ahead of the scheduled investigation.
Under these facts, he was given the opportunity to be heard and he cannot
now come to us protesting that he was denied this opportunity. To belabor a point the Court has repeatedly
made in employee dismissal cases, the essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard; it is the denial of this opportunity that constitutes
violation of due process of law.[53]
In view of all the foregoing, we find the petition meritorious.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition. The
assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint for
illegal dismissal is DISMISSED for
lack of merit. Costs against respondent AMULAR.
SO
ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice Chairperson |
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MARIANO C.
Associate
Justice |
JOSE Associate Justice |
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Designated additional Member vice Justice Roberto A. Abad per Special Order No. 832 dated March 30, 2010.
[1] Rollo, pp. 8-53; filed under Rule 45 of the RULES OF COURT.
[2] Id. at 58-66; penned by Associate Justice Isaias Dicdican, with Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, concurring.
[3]
[4] Technol Eight Philippines Corporation v.
NLRC and Dennis Amular.
[5] Rollo, p. 133.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] Article 282 (a).
[15] Supreme Steel Pipe Corporation v. Bardaje, G.R. No. 170811, April 24, 2007, 522 SCRA 155.
[16] Rollo, p. 64.
[17] Supra note 3.
[18] Supra note 1.
[19] 314 Phil 655 (1995).
[20] 322 Phil 343 (1996).
[21] Rollo, p. 64.
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26] Supra note 5.
[27] Rollo, pp. 411-418.
[28] RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, Section 1.
[29] Rollo, p. 417.
[30] 440 Phil 254 (2004).
[31] 157 Phil 110, 121 (1972).
[32] Rollo, p. 59.
[33]
[34] Rollo, p. 207
[35]
[36] Supra note 6.
[37] Rollo, p. 126.
[38]
[39] Supra note 35.
[40] Supra note 15.
[41] Supra note 6.
[42] Rollo, p. 186.
[43] Supra note 5.
[44] Rollo, p. 60.
[45]
[46]
[47] Supra note 5.
[48] Rollo, p. 135.
[49]
[50]
[51]
[52] Supra note 8.
[53] Solid Development Corporation Workers Association v. Solid Development Corporation, G.R. No. 165995, August 14, 2007, 530 SCRA 132.