THIRD DIVISION
|
PEOPLE OF THE Appellee, - versus - EDWIN DALIPE y PEREZ, Appellant. |
|
G.R. NO. 187154 Present: VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO,* and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: April 23, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O
N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the August 29,
2008 Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 01801, affirming with
modification the Decision[2]
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 79, which found the accused,
Edwin Dalipe y Perez, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
having committed three (3) counts of statutory
rape[3]
and two (2) counts of acts of lasciviousness[4]
against his stepdaughter AAA.[5]
The Information[6]
in Criminal Case No. Q-95-63737 indicting the accused reads:
The undersigned Public Prosecutor, upon complaint filed by AAA,
accuses EDWIN P. DALIPE of the crime of RAPE (3 counts) penalized under Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 7659, committed as follows:
That
on or about the first Friday of May 1992, or immediately prior and subsequent
thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused through abuse of moral ascendancy and
influence over AAA, his stepdaughter, then under eighteen (18) years of age,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and have carnal
knowledge of said AAA, against her will or consent, to her damage and
prejudice.
CONTRARY
TO LAW.
The
allegations in the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-95-63738[7]
and Q-95-63739[8]
are the same, except as to the dates of commission of the rape charges which
are “Friday of the second week of July 1992” and “
The information in Criminal Case No. Q-95-63740 reads:
The undersigned Public Prosecutor, upon prior sworn complaint of AAA,
assisted by Ma. Fatima Niñon, a Social Worker from the Department of Social
Welfare and Development, accuses EDWIN P. DALIPE of the crime of ACTS OF
LASCIVIOUSNESS penalized under Section 5, paragraph (b) of R.A. 7610, otherwise
known as the Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation
and Discrimination Act, committed as follows:
That
on February 17, 1994, Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with lewd design, did then and
there willfully unlawfully and feloniously touch, hold, fondle the breasts and
insert his finger inside the private parts of AAA, a victim of child abuse,
against her will or consent, accused being the stepfather of said victim, to
her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY
TO LAW.
The information in Criminal Case No. Q-95-63741[9]
is the same, except as to the date of commission of the charge of acts of
lasciviousness which is “on or about the first week of June 1994.”[10]
During the trial, the prosecution presented, as witnesses,
AAA herself; Karen Sangalang, her classmate; and Dr. Floresco P. Arizala, the
NBI Medico Legal Officer. The thrust of
the evidence of the prosecution, as summarized in the Appellee’s Brief,[11] is as
follows:
Private complainant AAA was born on
AAA
was raped by appellant for the first time on
two hands and removed her shorts. Appellant took off his shorts, went on top of
AAA, and forced his penis into her private parts. She tried to push appellant away, but the
latter only tightened his grip on AAA.
He then proceeded to have sexual intercourse with AAA, who felt pain (“masakit” and “mahapdi”) in her private parts.
After around three minutes, AAA felt a hot and sticky fluid come out of
appellant’s penis, after which appellant stood up. Appellant put his clothes on and went out of
the room (TSN, dated March 18, 1996, pp. 14-21).
AAA
also left her room and went to the room of her Lola BBB to tell the latter what appellant had done to her. Her grandmother only replied that she had
known that appellant had been abusing her. After reporting to her grandmother,
AAA went to her Lola BBB’s store,
located at the ground floor of the house, and hid herself out of fear that
appellant would repeat his dastardly deed.
Later on, she played with her two brothers on the ground floor of the
house. Upon the return of her mother,
who had been selling goods at Shoppersville, AAA reported to her that appellant
had raped her. But, her mother only
became angry with her. AAA could only
cry as her mother told her that she had been learning too much foolishness in
school (TSN, dated March 18, 1996, pp. 22-27).
That
night, nevertheless, AAA slept in her bed in their room together with appellant
and her mother in one bed and her two brothers in their respective beds (TSN,
dated March 18, 1996, pp. 24-25).
AAA
was raped for the second time by appellant on the second Friday of July
1992. Around
AAA
went to the room of her Lola BBB and
told the latter that appellant had again molested her. Her Lola
BBB became mad at appellant and called him a bad person and shameless (“salbahe” and “walanghiya”). AAA stayed
in her grandmother’s room for a
long time. Later that night, AAA returned to their room
to report the incident to her mother.
When AAA told her what had befallen her at the hands of appellant, FFF
became angry with her daughter and called her a liar. At that time, appellant was also in the room
and could hear what was taking place.
Afterwards, AAA went to where her two brothers had been playing and
joined them, after which she fell asleep (TSN, dated March 26, 1996, pp.
12-16).
AAA
also testified with regard to the acts of lasciviousness committed by appellant
against her. She said that around
AAA
later told her mother that appellant had inserted his finger into her private
parts. But her mother only called her a
liar and did not believe her. (TSN,
dated March 26, 1996, pp. 20-22).
The
second acts of lasciviousness committed by appellant against AAA took place on the first week of
June 1994. Around
Appellant
raped AAA for the last time in the evening of
AAA
again went to the room of her Lola
BBB to report to the latter that appellant had again raped her. Her Lola BBB then confronted appellant, who
denied what AAA had said and called the latter a liar. When FFF returned, AAA also told her mother
what appellant had done to her. Again,
FFF did not believe AAA and said that the latter had been making up lies about
appellant. Afterwards, AAA went beside
one of her brothers, afraid that appellant would come back to her (TSN, dated
March 27, 1996, pp. 8-14).
In
August 1995, AAA told her classmate, Karen Sangalang (hereafter, Karen), about
the rapes committed against her by appellant.
Karen, in turn, informed her teachers, Mrs. Villamin and Ms. Manzano,
about AAA’s plight. When her teachers
asked her, AAA confirmed that she had been raped by appellant. Her teachers thus took AAA to the DSWD office
and, later on, to the NBI office, where she executed a statement, dated
Karen
Sangalang testified that around
Dr.
Floresto P. Arizala was the NBI medico-legal officer who conducted the physical
examination of AAA. His findings are as
follows:
GENERAL PHYSICAL
EXAMINATION:
Height: 148.0 cm. Weight: 84 lbs.
Normally developed, fairly nourished,
conscious, coherent, cooperative, ambulatory subject
Breast, developing, Areolae, light
brown, 3.5 cm. in diameter.
No extragenital physical injuries
noted.
GENITAL
EXAMINATION:
Pubic hair, fully grown,
moderate. Labia majora and labia minora,
coaptated. Fourchette, tense. Vestibular
mucosa, pinkish. Hymen, originally
annular, tall, thick with an old healed superficial laceration at
CONCLUSIONS:
1. No evident sign of extragenital physical
injuries noted on the body of the subject at the time of the examination.
2. Old healed superficial hymenal laceration,
present.
(Exhibit “F,” Record, p.
146)
Dr.
Arizala explained that he first recorded the external injuries on the body of
AAA and afterwards proceeded with the actual genital examination. As regards the physical examination of AAA,
Dr. Arizala found no external injury on her body. With respect to the genital examination, he
found superficial lacerations on AAA’s hymen.
He opined that these lacerations could have been produced by the
insertion of a blunt object in the body of the victim, such as a male penis or
a finger. Considering that the
lacerations were already healed, he concluded that these were inflicted on the
victim at least three (3) months and even up to one (1) year prior to the
examination. Dr. Arizala also testified
that the hymenal orifice of the victim in this case could admit a tube measuring
two (2) centimeters in diameter (TSN, dated August 28, 1996, pp. 2-8).
Those who testified for the defense were the accused, Edwin
P. Dalipe; BBB, the grandmother of AAA; CCC, an uncle of AAA; and Baltazar
Sabanal. The defense of the accused, as summarized by the accused in his
Appellant’s Brief,[12] is as
follows:
On
the first day of May 1992, he was playing billiards with his friends namely,
Jude, Carlo, Andoy and others from
On
the second Friday of July 1992 at around
He
further denied raping the complainant on
He
said that his wife, mother-in-law, and brother-in-law never confronted him
regarding the alleged acts committed on AAA.
He said further that this is the first time that he was charged with an
offense. He and FFF started living
together with the De Santoses (FFF’s family) at No. 22 Salvador St., Loyola
Heights, Quezon City in 1984 when AAA was only one (1) year [old], but they
were driven away by BBB and CCC because they (FFF’s family) do [did] not
approve of his relationship with FFF.
Edwin and his family moved out and transferred residence from time to
time until in 1989 when FFF’s brothers, WWW and XXX, prevailed upon them to
return and live at the De Santos residence again to watch over the mother of
FFF, who was then living alone. They
moved in and stayed again with FFF’s mother, where he, FFF and the kids
occupied a room in the second floor of the house, adjacent to the room of his
mother-in-law.
He said he
treated the mother of FFF as his real mother but the latter treated him and the
kids indifferently. He claimed that CCC
and BBB were against him because they thought he was to share in the
inheritance given to his wife FFF, consisting of a portion of the house at No.
22 Salvador,
While
he was already under detention for two (2) months for the crimes charged, Tito
Santos offered him to sign an agreement, in which the De Santos family offered
to settle the instant cases with the assurance that his family will be taken
care of, provided that he (Edwin) would not return anymore to the De Santos
residence. (TSN, Oct. 14, 1996, pp. 16-13, October 21, 1996, pp. 2-4).
On
cross-examination, he testified that when he got married to FFF in 1991, he had
no knowledge that she was previously married.
He also testified that AAA was enticed by her Lola BBB to file these
cases against him because of the animosity existing between him and BBB. (TSN,
October 21, 1996, pp. 9-29).
BBB, is the grandmother of
private complainant AAA. As the defense,
hostile witness, she testified that her granddaughter was crying when she
complained to her that her stomach was painful because she was “sinalbahe” by the accused. She cannot remember the date and year when
AAA reported [the incident] to her. She
admitted that she did not confront the accused regarding the report of
AAA. She averred further that the
accused is not her son-in-law. He is
just the live-in partner of her daughter FFF.
(TSN, October 29, 1996, pp. 2-20).
CCC,
brother of Emily de Santos testified that he (CCC) is a resident of said house
since 1991. He first saw the accused for
the first time ten (10) years ago. The
second time he saw the accused was when the latter was already living at
He
said he did not confront the accused nor FFF about the report relayed by AAA to
her [grand]mother (BBB). But he called
up his elder sister YYY who was then living in Novaliches and asked her to take
AAA away from the house of
Baltazar
Sabanal testified that at about
On
cross-examination, he testified that the accused hired him in January 1995 to
work in the latter’s canteen. On
In its July 30, 1997 Decision, the
trial court convicted the accused of three (3) counts of statutory rape and two
(2) counts of acts of lasciviousness.
Thus, the trial court disposed:
WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Edwin Dalipe y Perez guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of statutory rape (3 counts).
In
Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-63737-38, the Court sentences him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for each count,
as penalized under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659,
and to indemnify the victim in the amount of P50,000.00
and P25,000.00 for each count, as moral and exemplary
damages, respectively.
In
Criminal Case Nos. Q-63739, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the
maximum penalty of DEATH, as penalized by Sec. 11, of RA 7659, and to indemnify
the victim, the amount of P50,000.00 and P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages, respectively.
In
Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-637340-41, judgment is likewise rendered finding the
said accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of acts of
lasciviousness (2 counts) penalized under Sec. 5, paragraph b) of RA 7610, and
he is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate sentence of 9 years and 1
day of prision mayor as minimum to 15 years, 8 months and 20 days of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, for each count.
SO
ORDERED.[13]
On
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City (Branch 79) is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that (i) the sentence
imposed on accused appellant Edwin Dalipe y Perez in Crim. Case. No. Q-95-6739
is REDUCED to reclusion perpetua; (ii) he is ordered to pay the offended
party, AAA, the sums of P225,000.00, P225,000.00 and P75,000.00,
or the total amount of P525,000.00, as civil
indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages, respectively, for the three
counts of rape in Crim. Case Nos. Q-95-63737, Q-95-63738 and Q-95-63739; and (iii) he is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as a minimum, to seventeen
(17) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for each count of acts of
lasciviousness subject of Crim. Cases Nos. Q-95-63740 and Q-95-63741.
SO
ORDERED.[14]
The
Court of Appeals was of the considered view that the trial court erred in
meting the accused the death penalty in Criminal Case No. Q-95-63739. In its Decision, said appellate court
reasoned:
Although it was stipulated during the pre-trial and admitted by
appellant that he is the stepfather of AAA, as alleged in the information,
serious doubts have been cast on such admission, considering BBB's testimony
that appellant was only a live-in partner of her daughter FFF. Besides, no marriage certificate was produced
to prove that appellant was married to FFF.
Neither has it been shown that FFF's marriage to GGG, AAA's biological father,
and who is still alive, has been legally dissolved or annulled.
Circumstances
that qualify a crime and increase its penalty to death cannot be subject of
stipulation. The accused cannot be condemned to suffer the extreme penalty of
death on the basis of stipulations or admissions. This strict rule is warranted
by the gravity and irreversibility of capital punishment (People v. Ibarrientos, 432 SCRA 424). To justify the death penalty, the prosecution
must specifically allege in the information and prove during the trial the
qualifying circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the
offender (People v. Escultor, supra). At any rate, death penalty has been
abolished pursuant to Rep. Act No. 9346.”[15]
On
the penalty imposed for acts of lasciviousness, the Court of Appeals ruled that
the accused should have been punished pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 5(b)
of R.A. No. 7610[16]
(Child Abuse Act) which provides that “the penalty for lascivious conduct when
the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in
its medium period.”
In his defense, the accused argues that the prosecution's
version is full of incredible and inconsistent statements, thus, creating
serious doubts as to the crimes imputed to him. He emphasizes that, on the
basis of the following
testimony of AAA, it was
impossible for him to have committed the offenses charged.
Q But you never bothered to shout and
call the attention of your two kid brothers and your Lola?
A I did not shout, sir.
Q All the time that he was doing the
push-up motion on top of you, one of his hand was holding your two hands and
the other hand was covering your mouth, that is what you want the court to
understand, correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q There was never an instance during that
occasion that he released your hands with his one hand and also removed his
other hand that was covering your mouth?
A He released my two hands and used his
knees in pinning me down, sir.
Q When you had already your hands freed
from his hold, you did not push him and shout?
A I pushed him, sir.
Q You did not shout?
A No, sir.
Q While the accused as you said was
pinning you down, your two hands with his knees, his two hands were
stucked [sic] on the bed to support his weight while he was doing the push
up motion?
A No, sir.
Q Will you demonstrate to the Court how
exactly the two hands of the accused
were doing while he was making the push-up motion?
A One of his hands was holding my hands
and the other was fondling my breast, sir.
x x x x x x x x x
Court:
She clarified that in her statement
at paragraph 23 because there are two (2) statements, one, before the penis was
inserted and there was a change of position – tapos po ipinasok na niya ang
pek-pek ko at habang ginagawa niya iyon ay dinaganan niya ng tuhod ang dalawang
kamay ko habang tutop pa rin ng kaliwang kamay niya and [sic] bibig ko at ang kanang kamay niya ang humipo sa bust ko.
(TSN, June 18, 1996, pp. 13-14).
The accused posits that,
from the scenario given by the victim, he could not have possibly committed the
bestial acts on her.
Determining the guilt or innocence of an accused, based
solely on the victim’s testimony, is not an easy task in reviewing convictions
for rape and sexual abuse cases. For
one, these crimes are usually committed in private so that only the two direct
parties can attest to what actually happened. Thus, the testimonies are largely
uncorroborated as to the exact details of the rape, and are usually in conflict
with one another. With this in mind, we
exercise utmost care in scrutinizing the parties’ testimonies to determine who
of them should be believed. Oftentimes, we rely on the surrounding
circumstances as shown by the evidence and on common human experience.
After due consideration,
we find no reason to doubt the veracity of AAA’s testimony and her version of
the events that led to the filing of the present charges.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found AAA's
testimony to be positive, direct and categorical.
Time
and again, this Court has emphasized that the manner of assigning values to
declarations of witnesses on the witness stand is best and most competently
performed by the trial judge who has the unique and unmatched opportunity to
observe the demeanor of witnesses and assess their credibility. In essence,
when the question arises as to which of the conflicting versions of the
prosecution and the defense is worthy of belief, the assessment of the trial
court is generally given the highest degree of respect, if not finality. The assessment made by the trial court is
even more enhanced when the Court of Appeals affirms the same, as in this
case.
It cannot be said that just because the brothers of AAA were
present in the same room, the accused could not have perpetrated the bestial
acts. Lust is not a respecter of time
and place. This Court has repeatedly
held that rape can be committed even in places where people congregate, in parks,
along the roadside, within school premises, and even inside a house where there
are other occupants or where other members of the family are also sleeping.
Thus, it is an accepted rule in criminal law that rape may be committed
even when the rapist and the victim are not alone. The fact is that rape may even be committed
in the same room while the rapist’s spouse is asleep, or in a small room where
other family members also sleep.[17]
The
accused also points to the apparent inconsistencies between the testimonies of
AAA and that of her grandmother. In her
testimony, AAA said that she reported every incident of rape and sexual
molestation to her grandmother, while the latter testified that AAA complained
to her only once.
We find the alleged inconsistencies to be minor and
inconsequential. As correctly held by
the Court of Appeals, the inconsistency does not refer to any of the material
ingredients of rape as would affect the criminal liability of the accused. In Merencillo v. People,[18]
we wrote:
Minor
discrepancies or inconsistencies do not impair the essential integrity of the
prosecution’s evidence as a whole or reflect on the witnesses’ honesty. The test is whether the testimonies agree on
essential facts and whether the respective versions corroborate and
substantially coincide with each other so as to make a consistent and coherent
whole.
Besides, as noted by the Court of
Appeals, the 83-year-old grandmother of AAA was oftentimes forgetful, as
testified to by CCC,[19] and
displayed utter reluctance in testifying as a hostile witness for the defense.
The accused adds that he could not have committed the acts
ascribed to him because during those dates enumerated by the victim, he was not
in the house, an alibi corroborated by his friend, Baltazar Sabanal.
We are not swayed.
Time-tested is the rule that between the positive assertions of
prosecution witnesses and the negative averments of an accused, the former
undisputedly deserves more credence and is entitled to greater evidentiary
value.[20] Thus, the positive assertions of the
prosecution witnesses cannot be overcome by mere denial or alibi. For alibi to prosper, not only must an
accused prove that he was at another place at the time of the commission of the crime, but
also that it was physically impossible for
him to be at the crime
scene at that time.[21]
The alibi of the accused, which was
supported by the testimony of Baltazar Sabanal, cannot overcome the convincing
positive evidence adduced by the prosecution. Such corroborative
testimonies of relatives and friends are viewed with suspicion and skepticism
by the court.[22]
The accused also points out that the delay in the reporting
of the charges casts doubt on the veracity thereof. This argument deserves scant consideration.
Indeed, the rule is that delay in the reporting of sexual abuse does not imply
that the charge is not true, as the victim prefers to bear the ignominy of pain
silently rather than reveal her harrowing experience and expose her shame to
the world. Such delay is not unusual,
especially when the victim is a minor.[23] It bears emphasis that AAA had, in fact,
immediately reported the crimes to her mother and to her grandmother. It is deplorable that neither of them did not
do anything about it.
In a desperate and futile attempt to escape liability, the
accused claims that the complainant’s family merely concocted the charges
against him, because they did not like him.
The contention is far from persuasive. We have ruled that a young girl’s revelation
that she had been raped, coupled with her voluntary submission to medical
examination and willingness to undergo public trial where she could be
compelled to give out the details of an assault on her dignity, cannot be so
easily dismissed as mere concoction.[24]
When a woman or a
girl-child says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape has indeed been committed.[25] Considering the age of the complainant, who
was ten years old when the crime was committed, the Court finds it improbable
for a girl of her age to fabricate a charge so humiliating to herself and her
family had she not been truly subjected to the painful experience of sexual
abuse.
In fine, there is no iota of doubt in
our mind that the accused is guilty of the crime of rape. In reducing the
penalty from death to reclusion perpetua,
the Court of Appeals failed to state that the reduction is without eligibility
for parole as held in the case of People
v. Antonio Ortiz.[26]
This should be rectified.
As previously stated above, the Court
of Appeals modified the trial court's decision with respect to the acts of
lasciviousness and convicted the accused under Sec. 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610. Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610,
defines and penalizes acts of lasciviousness committed against a child as
follows:
Section 5. Child
Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. —Children, whether male or female, who
for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and
other sexual abuse.
x x x
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to
other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victims is under twelve (12) years
of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3,
for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code,
for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty
for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall
be reclusion temporal in its medium period; and
The essential elements of
this provision are:
1. The accused commits the
act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct.
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.
3. The child whether male or female, is below 18
years of age.[27]
Section 32, Article XIII of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7610 defines lascivious conduct
as follows:
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing,
of the genitalia, anus,
groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into
the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite
sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify
the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious
exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.[28]
(emphasis supplied)
The
first element obtains in this case. It was clearly shown beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused inserted his finger into her vagina with lewd
designs as inferred from the nature of the acts themselves.
The
second element requires that the lascivious conduct be committed on a child who
is either exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. [29] In this case, AAA was sexually abused
because she was coerced or intimidated by the accused. AAA tried to remove the hands of the accused
when he was touching her vagina, but to no avail.
As regards the civil liability of the accused, we affirm the
award of P75,000.00
as civil indemnity and P75,000.00 as moral damages, without need of proof. To conform with existing jurisprudence,[30]
the amount of exemplary damages should be increased from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00 for each count of rape.
WHEREFORE, the August 18, 2008 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 018001 finding accused Edwin Dalipe y Perez
guilty of three (3) counts of rape and two (2) counts of acts of lasciviousness
is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. The penalty of reclusion perpetua should be without
eligibility for parole and that the award for exemplary damages is increased
from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00 for each count of rape.
SO
ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
TERESITA J.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T
I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate
Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
*
In lieu of Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales per Special Order No. 837,
dated
[1]Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz, with Associate Justices Fernanda Lampas Peralta and Normandie B. Pizzaro concurring; Rollo, pp. 3-19.
[2]CA rollo, pp. 35-53.
[3]Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-95-63737, Q-95-63738 and Q-95-63739; id. at 3-7.
[4]Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-95-63740 and Q-95-63741; id. at 8-11.
[5]Conformably
with Our ruling in People v. Cabalquinto (G.R. No. 167693,
subsequent cases, the identities of the offended party and her immediate family and household members,
including identifying information, are withheld.
[6]CA rollo, p. 2.
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]Counter statement of Facts, id. at 256-302.
[12]
[13]
[14]Rollo, p. 18.
[15]
[16]An Act Providing For Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination, And For Other Purposes.
[17]People v. Castel, G.R. No. 171164,
[18]
G.R. Nos. 142369-70,
[19]TSN,
[20]People
v. Monteron, G.R. No. 130709,
[21]People
v. Alvarado, G..R. No. 145730,
[22] People
v. Alvero, G.R. Nos. 134536-38,
[23]
People v. Andrade, G.R. No. 148902,
[24]People v. Cabillan, 267 SCRA 258 (1997); People v. Gaban, 262 SCRA 593 (1996); People v. Derpo,
168 SCRA 447 (1988); and People v. Molas, G.R. Nos. 88006-08,
[25]People v. Diaz, 338 Phil. 219, 230 (1997).
[26]G. .R.
No. 179944,
[27]People v. Larin, G.. R. No. 128777,
157718,
[28]People
v. Bon, G..R. No. 149199,
and People v. Abello, supra note
27.
[29]People
v. Abello, supra note 27.
[30]People
v. Elmer Peralta y Hidalgo, G..R. No. 187531,