|
PEOPLE OF THE Plaintiff-Appellee, |
G.R. No. 185849
|
|
- versus - |
Present: PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, Carpio Morales, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BERSAMIN,
and VILLARAMA,
JR., JJ.
|
|
JONJIE ESOY y HUNGOY, ROLANDO
CIANO y Accused-Appellants. |
Promulgated: April 7, 2010 |
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
The present appeal assails the Decision[1]
dated April 30, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. HC-CR No. 02701
affirming the February 27, 2007 Decision[2]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
In an Information[3]
dated
That on
or about January 18, 2001, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, with
intent to gain and by means of force, violence against and intimidation, that
is, by boarding a passenger jeepney pretending to be paying passengers,
suddenly pulling out their deadly bladed weapons, stabbing on the chest one
LORENZO CORO Y BARREDO, a paying passenger, and grabbing his cellphone worth
P7,000.00, Philippine currency, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, rob and carry away the said cellphone of Lorenzo B. Coro
against his will, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the same sum as
aforesaid; that by reason and on the occasion of the said robbery the said
Lorenzo B. Coro, sustained fatal stab wounds which were the direct cause of his
death immediately thereafter.
CONTRARY
TO LAW.
At
the arraignment, appellants pleaded not guilty.[4]
Trial thereafter ensued. The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses: Andrea Pabalan, SPO1 Raul Olavario
and Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Filemon C. Porciuncula. Taken altogether, the
evidence for the prosecution established the following facts:
On
On
Several days after, or on
PNP Crime Laboratory Police Senior Inspector and Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Filemon C. Porciuncula testified on the autopsy he performed on the cadaver of the victim and the Medico-Legal Report No. M-0208-01[5] he submitted. The autopsy revealed that the victim sustained a stab wound and multiple abrasions on the right knee.
Appellants, for their part, denied any
involvement in the robbery-homicide incident. They claimed that they were at their
workplace in Bacood, Sta. Mesa,
Lauro Dela Cruz, supervisor of appellants, was called to testify to corroborate appellants’ defense. Though Dela Cruz recognized the faces of the appellants as among those who have worked under him, he could not categorically state that they were at the workplace at the times and dates they specified because he was not there all the time and he does not keep time records.
On
WHEREFORE,
finding accused Jonjie Esoy y Hungoy, Rolando Ciano y Soledad, and Roger
Bolalacao y Dadivas all GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the complex crime of
Robbery with Homicide defined and penalized under Articles 293 and 294 (1) of
the Revised Penal Code, as recently amended by Republic Act No. 9346, the aforenamed
accused are each sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
and shall indemnify the heirs of Lorenzo Coro in the amount of One Hundred
Fifty Thousand (P150,000.00) Pesos as actual and compensatory damages
and the further sum of Seventy-Five Thousand (P75,000.00) Pesos as moral
damages.
SO
ORDERED.[6]
On
WHEREFORE,
the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 54,
SO
ORDERED.[7]
Hence, this appeal.
On
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ALTHOUGH THEIR IDENTITIES AS THE PERPETRATORS WERE NOT
ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING SCANT
CONSIDERATION TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WHICH IS MORE
CREDIBLE THAN THAT OF THE PROSECUTION’S.
III.
ASSUMING THAT THE APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY, THE TRIAL
COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THEM OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE NOTWITHSTANDING
THE FACT THAT ROBBERY WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
CONSPIRACY EXISTED BETWEEN AND AMONG THE ALLEGED PERPETRATORS.
V.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING ACTUAL AND
MORAL DAMAGES NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THERE WAS NO BASIS FOR ITS GRANT.[12]
Essentially, the issue for our resolution is whether the guilt of the appellants for the crime of robbery with homicide has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellants contend that their
identities as perpetrators of the crime were not established beyond reasonable
doubt. They argue that even if at the time of the incident there were many
light posts along
We are not persuaded.
As narrated by Pabalan, two (2) of the appellants – Esoy and
Ciano – sat infront of them while the other, Bolalacao, sat beside the victim.
Considering the limited space inside a passenger jeepney, the faces of
appellants can be easily seen by Pabalan in close range. Moreover, it is of no
moment that the inside of a jeepney was only illuminated by a small bulb. The said kind of light has already been held
by the Court as enough lighting for identification purposes.[13] Considering also the busy
thoroughfare of
Furthermore, the reliability of Pabalan’s memory should not be doubted
by the mere fact that identification of the appellants at the police line-up happened
several days after the incident. It is known that the most natural reaction of
a witness to a crime is to strive to look at the appearance of the perpetrator
and to observe the manner in which the offense is perpetrated.[16] Most often the face of the assailant and body
movements thereof, create a lasting impression which cannot be easily erased
from a witness’s memory.[17]
Experience dictates that precisely because of the unusual acts of violence
committed right before their eyes, eyewitnesses can remember with a high degree
of reliability the identity of criminals at any given time.[18]
As to
appellants’ defense of alibi, it cannot prevail over the positive
identification of appellants as the perpetrators of the crime, especially in
the face of categorical statements coming from a credible witness who has no
ill motives in testifying.[19] Pabalan’s
testimony was straightforward and though she became emotional during the middle
part of her testimony, she remained consistent all through out even on
cross-examination. Appellants have also not shown any reason for Pabalan to
testify falsely against them.
To establish alibi, an accused must prove (a) that he was
present at another place at the time the crime was perpetrated, and (b) that it
was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. Physical
impossibility “refers to the distance between the place where the accused was
when the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the
facility of access between the two places.”[20]
Here, appellants failed to satisfy the
said requisites, especially the second. The crime happened along
Appellants next argue that (1) no evidence was presented by the prosecution establishing that personal property was taken from the victim except for the hearsay allegation of Pabalan; and (2) no witness testified that the victim or Pabalan actually saw one (1) of the appellants take something from the victim. The contentions, however, are likewise without merit.
The pertinent portion of Pabalan’s testimony is hereunder quoted verbatim:
Witness:
q What
about Lorenzo Coro, do you know before this – just at the moment you had this
jeepney ride, do you know if he had a cellular phone?
a Yes,
sir, it was clipped on the right side of his waist.
Court:
Clipped
at the?
Court Interpreter:
Right
side of the waist.
Fiscal Carisma:
(continuing)
q Try to
recall, Madam Witness, what else, if any, did you see at the moment that these
two (2) male persons who were seated in front of you motioned to the point that
they drew out their balisong and lunged the same towards you and any other
direction. What else, if any, did you see in relation to Lorenzo Coro?
Witness:
(continuing)
a After
the commotion, when I was about to alight from the jeep, he told me that “my
cellular phone was snatched.” I told him “let’s go.” He asked me “where did
they run?” I told him not to bother about that and let’s go to the hospital.[21] [Emphasis and underscoring supplied.]
Though
Pabalan’s testimony as to the victim’s utterance that his cellular phone was
taken is only hearsay, the testimony is considered an exception to the hearsay
rule, the victim’s spontaneous utterance being part of res gestae.
Res gestae refers to those
exclamations and statements made by either the participants, the victim or
spectator to a crime immediately before, during or immediately after the
commission of the crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements
were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by excitement of the
occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to
fabricate a false statement.[22] In the instant
case, all the elements of res gestae are sufficiently established
insofar as the aforequoted spontaneous utterance is concerned: (1) the
principal act (res gestae) – the robbery and stabbing of the victim – is a startling occurrence; (2) the
statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise, that
is, within minutes after the victim was stabbed and his cellular phone was snatched;
and (3) the statement concerns the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances – his cellular phone was stolen during the startling
occurrence. The testimony being an
exception to the hearsay rule, the trial court did not err in admitting the
same.
Appellants also dispute the finding of conspiracy among them. They contend that the mere fact that they boarded the jeepney at the same time does not necessarily mean that they acted in conspiracy. Again, we are unconvinced.
Conspiracy may be deduced
from the acts of the appellants before, during, and after the commission of the
crime which are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action, and concurrence
of sentiments.[23] All three (3) appellants
boarded the jeepney at the same time. Two (2) strategically sat infront of the
victim and Pabalan while the other sat beside the victim. A few moments later,
two (2) of the appellants (Esoy and Ciano) suddenly drew out their balisongs
and swung the same at Pabalan and the victim. In the ensuing commotion, the
victim’s cellular phone was snatched and he was stabbed in the process. The appellants then hurriedly alighted from
the jeepney at the same time. Their
original and principal intention was undoubtedly to stage a robbery with the
use of violence. As conspiracy had been established among appellants, all of
them are liable as co-principals regardless of the manner and extent of their
participation since, in point of law, the act of one (1) is the act of all.
Lastly, appellants challenge the award of actual damages claiming it was not proven for failure to present any documentary evidence particularly the proof of funeral expenses.
The argument is without merit.
Article 2199 of the Civil Code is clear:
ART.
2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation,
one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss
suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual
or compensatory damages. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied.]
The defense has stipulated
during the trial that the victim’s family incurred P150,000 for funeral
expenses, to wit:
Fiscal Carisma:
The
wife of the deceased is here, your Honor. Anyway, she will only testify on the
civil liability. To abbreviate the proceedings, may we respectfully stipulate
from the counsel for the accused that should all the accused be found guilty by
the honorable court, the civil liability be fixed, it representing actual
expenses for the burial expenses of Lorenzo Coro to P150,000.00.
Atty. Fontanilla:
We
object to the manifestation, your Honor.
Fiscal Carisma:
Should
the accused be found guilty.
Atty. Fontanilla:
We
don’t stipulate, your Honor.
Fiscal Carisma:
That’s
why I am stating that should all the accused be found guilty. So, we rather
prove the actual expenses.
Court:
q Anyway,
how many days was the wake of the deceased?
Witness:
a Ten
(10) days, your Honor.
Court:
q Where
was the funeral held?
Witness:
a We
brought the body at the province at the house of my mother, your Honor.
Atty. Fontanilla:
Your
Honor, with the premise that they spent for the burial and funeral, I think we
can stipulate in the amount of ---
Fiscal Carisma:
P150,000.00
Atty. Fontanilla:
More
or less, yes, we stipulate, your Honor.
Fiscal Carisma:
Thank
you. So, we will no longer be presenting the witness.[24] [Emphasis and underscoring supplied.]
Hence, the requirement of proof in Article 2199 for the recovery of actual and compensatory damages can be dispensed with having been stipulated by the defense during trial.
As to the other civil liabilities, we
uphold the appellate court’s award of the moral damages of P50,000 and
civil indemnity of P50,000 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.[25]
The penalty imposed is likewise proper. The special complex crime of robbery with homicide is punished under Article 294 (as amended by Republic Act No. 7659) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, by reclusion perpetua to death. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that when the law prescribes a penalty consisting of two (2) indivisible penalties, and the crime is neither attended by mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the lesser penalty shall be imposed. Considering that no modifying circumstance attended the commission of the crime, the RTC correctly sentenced the appellants to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the April 30, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. HC-CR No. 02701 is AFFIRMED in toto.
With costs against the accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MARTIN
S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice |
|
WE CONCUR: REYNATO
S. PUNO Chief Justice Chairperson |
|
|
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
|
LUCAS
P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
|
C E
R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
|
|
REYNATO
S. PUNO Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo, pp. 2-24. Penned by
Associate Justice Magdangal M. De
[2] Records, pp. 188-193. Penned by Judge (now
an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals) Manuel M. Barrios.
[3]
[4]
[5] Exhibit “D,” folder of exhibits.
[6] Records, p. 193.
[7] Rollo, p. 23.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] CA rollo, pp. 56-73.
[12]
[13] People v. Pulusan, G.R. No. 110037, May 21, 1998, 290 SCRA 353, 373, citing People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 104461, February 23, 1996, 254 SCRA 61, 75.
[14] Tapdasan, Jr. v. People, G.R. No.
141344,
[15] People v. Fajardo, G.R. Nos. 105954-55, September 28, 1999, 315 SCRA 283, 292, citing People v. Fabrigas, Jr., G.R. No.115005, September 5, 1996, 261 SCRA 436, 446.
[16] People v. Intong, G.R. Nos.
145034-35,
[17] People v. Dolar, G.R. No. 100805,
[18] People v. Sumallo, G.R. No. 116737,
[19] People v. Mosquerra, G.R. No. 129209,
[20]
[21] TSN,
[22] Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139150, July 20, 2001, 361 SCRA 636, 649.
[23] People v. Salvatierra, G.R. No.
111124,
[24] TSN,
[25] People v. Musa, G.R. No. 170472,