Republic of the
Supreme Court
SECOND DIVISION
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TRINIDAD GO, joined by her |
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G.R. No. 182341 |
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husband, GONZALO GO, SR., |
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Petitioners, |
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- versus - |
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Present: |
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VICENTE VELEZ CHAVES,* |
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CARPIO, J., Chairperson, |
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Respondent, |
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BRION, |
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ALICE CHAVES, |
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ABAD, and |
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Respondent-Intervenor, |
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PEREZ, JJ. |
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MEGA-INTEGRATED AGRO |
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Promulgated: |
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LIVESTOCK FARMS, INC., |
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Respondent-Intervenor, |
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April 23, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
On purely technical grounds, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed petitioners’
appeal and denied their plea for reconsideration. Hence, petitioners come to this Court via
this Petition for Review on Certiorari to assail the Resolutions dated
Factual Antecedents
On P23.2
million from Trinidad Go (Trinidad), using his and his wife’s real properties
as collaterals. The Yap spouses were
able to do this by presenting a forged Special Power of Attorney (SPA)[4] purporting to authorize the
Because some portions of said lots were disposed of, Vicente
consolidated and subdivided the remaining lots (which included the mortgaged
properties to
Vicente prayed that the SPA and mortgage to petitioners be invalidated,
and that the Go spouses be directed to surrender the owner’s duplicate
certificates of title over the subject properties.
Subsequently, the trial court allowed two parties to intervene in the
case: a) Alice, who alleged that her rights to the share of the conjugal
partnership are being trampled upon and who, like her husband, averred that she
had never authorized the Yap spouses to mortgage the conjugal properties[10]
and; b) Mega Integrated Agro-Livestock Farms, Inc. (Mega), which claimed that
it had purchased from Vicente in December 1996 a portion of the property
covered by TCT No. T-114415, and that it could not effect the transfer of said title
in its name because the Go spouses are in possession of the owner’s copy of TCT
No. T-114415.[11]
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
After due hearing, the RTC rendered a Decision[12]
dated
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered:
1. DECLARING, as between
plaintiff, intervenor Alice C. Chaves and defendants, the Special Power of
Attorney (Exh. 1-Go and Exh. “A”) allegedly executed by plaintiff and
intervenor Alice C. Chaves as well as the second mortgage (Exh. 2-Go) as
INEFFECTIVE, INVALID, AND UNENFORCEABLE as against plaintiff and intervenor
ALICE CHAVES as they did not sign said special power of attorney and second
mortgage. Consequently, the adverse
claim, notice of lis pendens and the annotation of the second mortgage on TCT
No. T-114415, TCT No. T-114416 and TCT No. T-114417 must be cancelled and or
removed they being clouds to said titles.
For said purpose, the Register of Deeds of the City of
2. DECLARING plaintiff and
intervenor Alice C. Chaves as not bound by the effects of the second mortgage
they having not signed the Special Power of Attorney and said second mortgage.
What defendants should do is to demand the amount mentioned in the second
mortgage from Paquito S. Yap and Evelyn Nellie Chaves Yap;
3. ORDERING defendant TRINIDAD
GO to surrender to MEGA INTERGRATED AGRO-LIVESTOCK INDUSTRIAL FARMS, INC. the
owner’s copy of TCT No. T-114415 and to intervenor ALICE C. CHAVES the owner’s
copy of TCT No. T-114416 and T-114417;
4. Ordering MEGA INTEGRATED
AGRO-LIVESTOCK INDUSTRIAL FARMS, INC. thru [sic] See Hong to pay intervenor
Alice C. Chaves the balance of P15,074,000.00 as her share in the
conjugal partnership but only after the land sold consisting of Lot Nos. 1 and
2 covered by TCT No. 114414 and TCT No. 114415 shall have been cleared of
squatters by intervenor Alice Chaves.
5. DENYING the prayer for
attorney’s fees and moral damages there being no proof shown that in annotating
the second mortgage on TCT No. T-114415, TCT No. T-114416, and TCT No.
T-114417, all of the Registry of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City, defendants were
motivated by evident bad faith;
6. DENYING defendants’
counterclaim for lack of merit it not being shown that in filing the case,
plaintiff was motivated by malice and evident bad faith.[13]
The Procedural Blunders that Prodded the CA to Dismiss Petitioners’
Appeal
The Go spouses appealed to the CA Cagayan de Oro. They filed their brief and furnished Vicente
with a copy thereof before the
a)
Mega argued in its Motion to
Dismiss[14]
that Go spouses failed to file their brief on time. It appears that Go spouses failed to furnish
Mega with a copy of their brief. Their
counsel, Atty. Kathryn Dela Serna, claimed inadvertence for the mistake.[15] Nonetheless, when Go spouses received Mega’s
Motion to Dismiss on
b)
Vicente (now substituted by his
children in view of his death) on the other hand, complained about the form of
the appellants’ brief he received, pointing to want of the following requirements
under Rule 44 of the Rules of Court: 1) subject index, page references, and
legal citations as required under Section 13; and 2) certified true copy of the
assailed RTC Decision as required in Section 13(f) [should be (h)]. Petitioners’ counsel again professed
inadvertence and good faith, reasoning that the errors cannot be considered
fatal, for the body/contents of the appellants’ brief have substantially
complied with the provisions of Rule 44.
Nevertheless, she submitted the subject index/table of contents of the
brief;[17]
c)
More than two months after the
filing of the appellant’s brief,
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Acceding to all the appellees’ objections and opining that an utter and
flagrant disregard of the rules of procedure is inexcusable, the CA dismissed
the appeal of the Go spouses on the following grounds: First, that Go spouses failed to serve a copy of their appellants’
brief upon the intervenors on time,[22]
and, second, that their appellants’
brief does not contain a subject index and that no copy of the assailed Decision
was appended thereto, in violation of Section 44, Section 13 (a) and (h) in
relation to Rule 50, Section 1(f).[23]
It reasoned:
In the case at bench,
appellants [Go spouses] even admitted that they failed to serve a copy of their
brief to Mega Farms as well as to Alice Chaves on the same day they filed the
brief with this Court. Belated
compliance with this requirement does not suffice. Proper procedure dictates that a copy of the
pleading be first furnished the opposing party so that proof of such service
may be duly indicated on the original of the pleading to be filed shortly
afterward in court, such indication being either a handwritten acknowledgment
by the adverse party or the registry receipt of the copy mailed to the adverse
party. Service precedes filing; both
within the time allowed by the Rules.
Second. It is a matter of fact that the appellants’
brief does not contain a subject index nor does it have as an appendix the copy
of the assailed decision. x x x
The first requirement of
an appellant’s brief is a subject index.
The index is intended to facilitate the review of appeals by providing
ready reference, functioning much like a table of contents. This jurisdiction prescribes no limit on the
length of appeal briefs or appeal memoranda filed before appellate courts. The downside of this liberal rule is, of
course, the very real possibility that the reviewing tribunal will be swamped
with voluminous documents. This occurs
even though the rules consistently urge the parties to be “brief” or “concise”
in the drafting of pleadings, briefs, and other papers to be filed in
court. Herein lies the reason and the
need for a subject index. The subject
index makes readily available at one’s fingertips the subject of the contents
of the brief so that the need to thumb through the brief page after page to
locate a party’s arguments, or a particular citation, or whatever else needs to
be found and considered, is obviated.
x x x x
Although appellants may
have subsequently rectified those deficiencies, the belated compliance,
however, is not by itself sufficient to warrant suspension of the strict
requirements of the rules, absent any showing that the initial non-compliance
was not in any way attributable to negligence, or that there are highly justifying
equitable reasons for this Court to make an extraordinary disposition in the
interest of justice.
It has long been
recognized that strict compliance with the rules is indispensable for the
prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and expeditious dispatch of
judicial business. Utter disregard of
the rules cannot just be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal
construction. While courts should, in
all cases, endeavor to do substantial justice without undue subservience to
technicalities, the mere invocation by the parties of liberality and
substantial justice does not automatically do away with the rules laid down for
the orderly administration of justice.[24]
Issue
Stated simply, the lone issue for our consideration is whether the appellate
court erred in dismissing the appeal.
Our Ruling
Facing up to all these objections and admitting the mistakes committed,
the Gos beseech liberality in the application of the rules. Even if clearly their counsel committed a
number of palpable mistakes which, as a general rule should bind the client, we shall grant the petition in the interest of
justice.[25]
Our rules of procedure are designed to
facilitate the orderly disposition of cases and permit the prompt disposition
of unmeritorious cases which clog the court dockets and do little more than
waste the courts’ time.[26] These technical and procedural rules, however, are intended to ensure,
rather than suppress, substantial justice.[27]
A deviation from their rigid enforcement may thus be allowed, as petitioners
should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of their case,
rather than lose their property on mere technicalities.[28]
We held in Ong Lim Sing, Jr. v. FEB
Leasing and Finance Corporation[29]
that:
Courts have the prerogative to relax procedural rules
of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the
need to speedily put an end to litigation and the parties' right to due
process. In numerous cases, this Court has allowed liberal construction of the
rules when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and equity.
We agree that the CA had the discretion to dismiss petitioners’
appeal. The discretion, however, must be
a sound one, to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair
play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case.[30]
Here, we find that the failure to serve a copy of the appellant’s brief
to two of the adverse parties was a mere oversight, constituting excusable
neglect.[31] A litigant's failure to furnish his
opponent with a copy of his appeal brief does not suffice to warrant dismissal
of that appeal. In such an instance, all
that is needed is for the court to order the litigant to furnish his opponent
with a copy of his brief.[32] Anent the failure to append a copy of the
assailed judgment, instead of dismissing the appeal on that basis, it is more
in keeping with equity to simply require the appellants to immediately submit a
copy of the Decision of the lower court rather than punish litigants for the
reckless inattention of their lawyers.
The purpose of a subject index in an appellant’s/appellee’s brief
obviates the court to thumb through a possibly lengthy brief page after page to
locate whatever else needs to be found and considered, such as arguments and
citations.[33] In the case at bar, notably, the appeal brief
submitted to the CA consists only of 17 pages which the appellate court may
easily peruse to apprise it of what the case is all about and of the relief sought. Thus, the belated submission of the subject
index may be considered excusable. Our
discussion in Philippine Coconut Authority v. Corona
International, Inc.[34]
is apropos:
x x x the purpose of the brief is to
present the court in coherent and concise form the point and questions in
controversy, and by fair argument on the facts and law of the case, to assist
the court in arriving at a just and proper conclusion. A haphazard and pellmell
presentation will not do for the brief should be so prepared as to minimize the
labor of the court in examination of the record upon which the appeal is heard
and determined. It is certainly, 'the vehicle of counsel to convey to the court
the essential facts of his client's case, a statement of the questions of law
involved, the law he should have applied, and the application he desires of it
by the court'. There should be an honest compliance with the requirements
regarding contents of appellant's brief, and among which is that it should
contain "a subject index of the matter in the brief with a digest of the
argument and page references."
We do not disagree with the appellate court's above
exposition. The requirements laid down in Section 13, Rule 43 are intended to
aid the appellate court in arriving at a just and proper conclusion of the
case. However, we are of the opinion that despite its deficiencies petitioner's
appellant's brief is sufficient in form and substance as to apprise the
appellate court of the essential facts and nature of the case as well as the
issues raised and the laws necessary for the disposition of the same.
This case involves voluminous records meriting a
review on the merits by the CA.
Otherwise, the efforts of the petitioners to protect their collateral in
their judicial battle will lead to naught once they lose their remedy of an
appeal just because of procedural niceties.
Adherence to legal technicalities allows
individual error to be suffered in order that justice in the maximum may be
preserved. Nonetheless, "we should indeed
welcome," as Judge Learned Hand once wrote, "any efforts that help
disentangle us from the archaisms that still impede our pursuit of truth".[35] Our ruling in Aguam v. Court of Appeals[36]
also bears recalling:
Every party litigant must be
afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his
cause, free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities. Thus, dismissal of
appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the
court is to encourage hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules of
procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of
procedure are used only to help secure, not override substantial justice. It is
a far better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a
technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain
the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a
grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of
cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
The Resolutions dated
SO
ORDERED.
MARIANO
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
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ARTURO
D. BRION Associate
Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate
Justice |
JOSE P. PEREZ
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Substituted
by Ronaldo Chaves, Lino Chaves, Carlos Chaves and Tessie C. Aldana, per Order
dated
[1] Rollo, pp. 204-209, penned by Associate
Justice Edgardo A. Camello and concurred in by Associate Justices Jane Aurora
C. Lantion and Elihu A. Ybańez.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18] CA rollo,
pp. 112-113.
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22] Rule 44,
Sec. 7. Appellant’s brief. – It shall be the duty of the appellant to file
with the court, within forty-five (45) days from receipt of the notice of the
clerk that all the evidence, oral and documentary, are attached to the record,
seven (7) copies of his legibly typewritten, mimeographed or printed brief,
with proof of service of two (2) copies thereof upon the appellee.
[23] Rule 44,
Sec. 13. Contents of appellant’s brief. –
The appellant’s brief shall contain, in the order herein indicated, the
following:
(a) A
subject index of the matter in the brief with a digest of the arguments and
page references, and a table of cases alphabetically arranged, textbooks and
statutes cited with references to the pages where they are cited;
x x x x
(h) In cases not brought up by record on appeal,
the appellant’s brief shall contain, as an appendix, a copy of the judgment or
final order appealed from.
Rule 50, Sec. 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. – An appeal may be
dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the
appellee, on the following grounds:
x x
x x
(f)
Absence of specific assignment of errors in the appellant’s brief, or of page
references to the record as required in section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d)
and (f) of Rule 44;
[24] CA rollo, pp. 206-208.
[25] Friend v.
Unionbank, G.R.
No. 165767,
[26]
[27] Bigornia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 173017,
[28] Sangalang v. Barangay
Maguihan, G.R. No. 159792, December
23, 2009; Acme Shoe, Rubber
& Plastic Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phi. 531, 538 (1996).
[29] G.R. No.
168115,
[30] Aguam
v. Court of Appeals, 388 Phil. 587, 593 (2000).
[31] Sunrise
Manning Agency, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 485 Phil. 426,
430-431 (2004); Carnation
[32] Perez v.
Court of Appeals, 374 Phil. 388, 408 (1999), citing Precision
Electronics Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
86657, October 23, 1989, 178 SCRA 667, 670.
[33] De Liano v. Court of Appeals, 421 Phil. 1033, 1042 (2001).
[34] 395 Phil.
742, 750 (2000).
Citations omitted.
[35] United States v. Allied Stevedoring Corp., 241 F.2d 925,
934 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 984,
77 S.Ct. 1282, 1 L.Ed.2d 1143 (1957).
[36] 388 Phil.
587, 594 (2000). See also American Express International, Inc. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-70766,