SECOND DIVISION
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HUBERT NUÑEZ, Petitioner, -
versus - SLTEAS PHOENIX SOLUTIONS, INC.,
through its representative, CESAR SYLIANTENG
Respondent, |
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G.R. No. 180542 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, BRION, PEREZ, and Promulgated: April
12, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
PEREZ, J.:
The
determination of the jurisdiction of first level courts over ejectment cases is
at the heart of this Petition for Review on Certiorari
filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which seeks
the nullification and setting aside of the 31 July 2007 Decision rendered by
the Special Twelfth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91771.[1]
The Facts
The
subject matter of the instant suit is a 635.50 square meter parcel of land
situated at Calle Solana, Intramuros,
Manila and registered in the name of respondent SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc.
under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 87556 of the Manila City Registry
of Deeds. Despite having acquired the
same thru the 4 June 1999 Deed of Assignment executed in its favor by the
Spouses Ong Tiko and Emerenciana Sylianteng,[2] it
appears that respondent was constrained to leave the subject parcel idle and
unguarded for some time due to important business concerns. In October 2003, an ocular inspection
conducted by respondent’s representatives revealed that the property was
already occupied by petitioner Hubert Nuñez and 21 other individuals.[3] Initially faulting one Vivencia Fidel with
unjustified refusal to heed its verbal demands to vacate the subject parcel,
respondent filed its
Additionally
impleading petitioner and the rest of the occupants of the property, respondent
filed its 9 January 2004 amended complaint, alleging, among other matters, that
thru its representatives and predecessors-in-interest, it had continuously
possessed the subject realty, over which it exercised all attributes of
ownership, including payment of real property taxes and other sundry expenses;
that without the benefit of any lease agreement or possessory right, however,
petitioners and his co-defendants have succeeded in occupying the property by
means of strategy and stealth; and, that according to reliable sources, the
latter had been in occupancy of the same parcel since 1999. Together with the ejectment of the occupants
of the subject premises, respondent prayed for the grant of its claims for
reasonable rentals, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and the costs.[5]
Specifically
denying the material allegations of the foregoing amended complaint in his 14 February
2004 Answer, petitioner averred that the property occupied by him is owned by
one Maria Ysabel Potenciano Padilla Sylianteng, with whom he had concluded a
subsisting lease agreement over the same, and that, in addition to respondent’s
lack of cause of action against him, the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case
for lack of prior demand to vacate and referral of the controversy to the barangay authorities for a possible
amicable settlement.[6] Likewise questioning the MeTC’s jurisdiction
over the case, the rest of the defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss[7]
which they adopted as their answer subsequent to its
After
an ocular inspection conducted on
Wherefore, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against all the defendants and ordering the latter to:
1.
vacate the subject premises located at Lot 11, Block
45,
2. for each [defendant], to pay Php5,000.00 a month counted from October 2003 until defendants vacate the subject property;
3. to pay Php15,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees; and
4. to pay the costs of suit.[13]
On
appeal, the foregoing decision was affirmed in
toto in the 14 July 2005 Order issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila in Civil Case No. 05-112490.[14] Dissatisfied with said Order, petitioner
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review filed
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[15] Finding that the allegations in respondent’s
amended complaint sufficiently made out a cause of action for forcible entry
against petitioner, the Court of Appeals rendered the herein assailed decision,
dismissing said petition for review upon the following findings and
conclusions:
Parenthetically, although the dispossession took place more than one year from the illegal entry of petitioner and his co-defendants, knowledge of the same was only acquired by petitioner in 2003 when the ocular inspection was made. While ordinarily, the one-year prescriptive period should be reckoned from the date of the actual entry on the land, the same however, does not hold true when entry was made through stealth, in which case, the one year period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned thereof.
Neither
may petitioner seek refuge in the alleged demand letter dated
As to the identity of the premises occupied by petitioner Nuñez, We find that the RTC committed no reversible error in admitting the evidence of respondent which consists of the plan prepared by Geodetic Engineer Padilla. Suffice it to state that petitioner, during the proceedings below, agreed to secure an impartial survey from the Assessor’s Office or the Office of the City Engineer. However, when he took no action after failing to obtain the survey from said offices, his consequent failure to secure, on his own, the services of an impartial surveyor to determine and rebut respondent’s allegation, he did so on his own accord and had no other person but himself to blame.[16]
The Issues
Upon receipt
of the Court of Appeals’
I
THE COURTS HAVE NO JURISDICTION TO TRY THE INSTANT CASE CONSIDERING THAT THE ELEMENTS OF FORCIBLE ENTRY ARE NOT PRESENT AND ADDITIONALLY THERE IS A QUESTION OF OWNERSHIP.
II
THE PETITIONER SHOULD NOT VACATE THE LEASED PREMISES CONSIDERING THAT THERE IS AN EXISTING LEASE CONTRACT WITH THE OWNER WHICH IS IN VIOLATION OF THE PROVISION OF ARTICLE 1671 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.[18]
The Court’s Ruling
We find the
petition bereft of merit.
Designed to provide an expeditious
means of protecting actual possession or the right to possession of the
property involved,[19] there
can be no gainsaying the fact that ejectment cases fall within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of first level courts[20]
by express provision of Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, in relation to Sec.
1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[21] In addition to being conferred by law,[22] however, a court’s jurisdiction
over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint[23]
and the character of the relief sought,[24]
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some
of the claims asserted therein.[25] In much the same way that it cannot be made
to depend on the exclusive characterization of the case by one of the parties,[26]
jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer,
in a motion to dismiss or in a motion for reconsideration.[27]
The rule is no different in actions for forcible entry where the following requisites are essential for the MeTC’s acquisition of
jurisdiction over the case, viz.: (a) the plaintiffs must allege their
prior physical possession of the property; (b) they must assert that they were
deprived of possession either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth; and, (c) the action must be filed within one (1) year from the time
the owners or legal possessors learned of their deprivation of the physical
possession of the property.[28] As it is not essential that the complaint should expressly employ
the language of the law, it is considered a sufficient compliance of the
requirement where the facts are set up showing that dispossession took place
under said conditions.[29] The one-year period within which to bring an
action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry on
the land, except that when the entry is through stealth, the one-year period is
counted from the time the plaintiff learned thereof.[30]
Even prescinding from the fact that the
parties had admitted the MeTC’s jurisdiction,[31]
our perusal of the record shows that respondent’s
Then as now, petitioner argues that,
aside from the admission in the complaint that the subject parcel was left idle
and unguarded, respondent’s claim of prior possession is clearly negated by the
fact that he had been in occupancy thereof since 1999. While prior physical possession is,
admittedly, an indispensable requirement in forcible entry cases, the dearth of
merit in petitioner’s position is, however, evident from the principle that possession
can be acquired not only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a
thing is subject to the action of one's will or by the proper acts and legal
formalities established for acquiring such right.[34] Because possession can also be acquired by
juridical acts to which the law gives the force of acts of possession, e.g., donations, succession, execution
and registration of public instruments, inscription of possessory information
titles and the like, it has been held that one
need not have actual or physical occupation of every square inch of the
property at all times to be considered
in possession.[35]
In this case, the subject parcel was
acquired by respondent by virtue of the 4 June 1999 Deed of Assignment executed
in its favor by the Spouses Ong Tiko and Emerenciana Sylianteng. Although it did not immediately put the same
to active use, respondent appears to have additionally caused the property to
be registered in its name as of
Petitioner had, of course, endeavored
to establish that respondent’s predecessors-in-interest had served him a demand
to vacate the subject parcel as early as
A similar dearth of merit may be said
of the exceptions petitioner continues to take against the MeTC’s reliance on
the survey plan prepared by Geodetic Engineer Joseph Padilla to the effect that
that the premises occupied by petitioner lies within the metes and bounds of
respondent’s property. As mere allegation is not evidence,[43] the
rule is settled that plaintiff has the burden of proving the material
allegations of the complaint which are denied by the defendant, and the
defendant has the burden of proving the material allegations in his case where
he sets up a new matter.[44] Given the parties’ failure to make good on
their agreement to cause a survey of the property thru an impartial surveyor
from the Office of the City Assessor or City Engineer, respondent’s submission
of said report was evidently for the purpose discharging the onus of proving
petitioner’s encroachment on the subject parcel, as alleged in the
complaint. As the party asserting the
contrary proposition, petitioner cannot expediently disparage the admissibility
and probative value of said survey plan to compensate for his failure to prove
his own assertions.
Petitioner is, finally, out on a limb
in faulting the Court of Appeals with failure to apply the first paragraph of
Article 1676 of the Civil Code of the
WHEREFORE, the
petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
|
|
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE
CATRAL
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second
Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Per Special Order No. 832,
Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza is hereby designated as Additional Member
of the Second Division in place of Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad, who is on
Official Leave from
[1] Rollo, pp. 61-73.
[2] Records, p. 10a.
[3] Vivencia
Fidel, Maximo Mahipus, Jr., Hermigildo Mangubat, Epifanio Casolita II,
Erlinda Inciong, Edgar Amador, Joseph
Duerme, Rolando Jamang, Romeo Granada, Romeo Figueroa, Brando Galciso, Eunice
Banaag, Cecilia Agonos, Beth De Guzman, Mario P. Tampol, Elizabeth Francisco,
Edmundo R. Barela, Reynaldo Granada, Zedric Bananag, Estanislao J. La Fuente
and Danilo P. Jerusalem.
[4] Records, pp. 15-20.
[5] Rollo, pp. 24-30.
[6]
[7] Records, pp. 59-64.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] Rollo, pp. 37-43.
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19] Tubiano v. Razo, 390 Phil. 863, 868 (2000).
[20] Corpuz v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 117005,
[21] Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. – Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of a contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person may at anytime within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.
[22] Deltaventures Resources, Inc. v. Cabato, 384 Phil. 252, 259-260 (2000).
[23] Gochan v. Young, 406 Phil. 663, 673-674 (2001).
[24] Sunny Motor Sales, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 415 Phil. 517, 520 (2001).
[25] Ty v. Court of Appeals, 408 Phil. 793, 798 (2001).
[26] Pilipinas Bank v. Court of Appeals, 383 Phil. 18, 28 (2000).
[27] Tamano v. Ortiz, 353 Phil. 775, 780 (1998).
[28] De La Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139442, 6 December 2006, 510 SCRA 103, 115.
[29] Cajayon v. Sps. Batuyong, G.R. No. 149118,
[30] Ong v. Parel, 407 Phil. 1045, 1053 (2001).
[31] Records, pp. 94 and 145.
[32] Rollo, pp. 25-28.
[33] Heirs
of Demetrio Melchor v. Melchor, 461
Phil. 437, 443-444 (2003).
[34] Habagat Grill v. DMC-Urban Property
Developer, Inc., 494 Phil. 603, 619 (2005).
[35] Quizon v. Juan, G.R. No. 171442,
[36] Records, p. 21.
[37]
[38] Ong v. Parel, supra note 30.
[39] Rollo, pp. 18 and 59.
[40] Records, pp. 310-314.
[41] Almocera
v. Ong, G.R. No. 170479,
[42] Magaling
v. Ong, G.R. No. 173333,
[43] Gateway Electronics Corporation v. Asianbank Corporation, G.R. No. 172041, 18 December 2008, 574 SCRA 698, 718-719.
[44] Republic v. Vda. De Neri, 468 Phil. 842,
862 (2004).
[45] Art. 1676. The purchaser of a piece of land which is under a lease that is not recorded in the Registry of Property may terminate the lease, save when there is a stipulation to the contrary in the contract of sale, or when the purchaser knows of the existence of the lease.
[46] Cayabyab v. Gomez de Aquino, G.R. No.159974, 5 September 2007, 532
SCRA 353, 361.
[47] Tecson v. Gutierrez, 493 Phil. 132, 138 (2005).