FIRST DIVISION
|
PEOPLE OF
THE Plaintiff-Appellee, -
versus - TIRSO SACE y
MONTOYA, Accused-Appellant. |
G.R. No. 178063 [Formerly
G.R. No. 149894] Present: PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BERSAMIN, and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. Promulgated: April 5, 2010 |
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DECISION
VILLARAMA,
JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision[1]
dated November 20, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02324
which affirmed the June 1, 2001 Decision[2]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Boac, Marinduque, Branch 94 convicting appellant
Tirso Sace y Montoya of the crime of rape with homicide.
Appellant was charged in
an Information[3]
which reads,
That on or about the 9th day of September 1999, at around 7:00 o’clock in the evening, at barangay Tabionan, municipality of Gasan, province of Marinduque, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there by means of force and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and succeed in having carnal knowledge of [AAA][4] against her will and consent and thereafter, the accused did then and there, with intent to kill, stab with a sharp bladed weapon, said victim, inflicting upon her fatal injuries causing her death, to the damage and prejudice of her legal heirs represented by her mother….
CONTRARY TO LAW.
At the arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not
guilty. Trial thereafter ensued.
The prosecution presented the following as witnesses: BBB,
CCC, Rafael Motol, Bonifacio Vitto, Maribeth Mawac (Maribeth), Carmelita Mawac,
Dr. Erwin Labay, SPO2 Praxedo Seño and Domingo Motol. On the other hand,
appellant testified for his own behalf.
The prosecution’s evidence established the following
version:
On
CCC, together with her elder daughter DDD and a
certain Abelardo Motol (Abelardo), was on her way home when she and her
companions heard AAA scream. They hurried towards the house and searched it but
found it to be empty. As they searched further, appellant came out from
somewhere in the kitchen area of the house. They noticed that he was bloodied
and he told them that he was chasing someone. Appellant then joined in the
search for AAA. Before long, Abelardo found the lifeless body of AAA lying on the
ground nearby. AAA was half-naked and she appeared to have been ravished when
they found her. Immediately, Abelardo called the barangay officials and the
police.
Barangay Kagawad Carmelita Mawac (Carmelita)
and other barangay officials and tanods, including Rafael Motol and
Bonifacio Vitto, arrived. Upon arrival, they noticed the bloodstains on
appellant’s clothing. Carmelita asked appellant what he did, but appellant
denied any knowledge of what happened. Carmelita then went to the half-naked
body of AAA and again asked appellant why he did such a thing to his cousin. At
that point, appellant admitted to the barangay officials and tanods that
he was the one (1) who committed the crime. He admitted that he raped and
killed AAA.[6]
Barangay Tanod Rafael Motol also obtained the same confession from appellant
when he interviewed him infront of other people, namely, Abelardo, Carmelita,
and Bonifacio Vitto, as well as Arnaldo Mawac, Conchita and Iboy Serdeña, and
Dr. Erwin M. Labay examined AAA’s body. He found stab
wounds and lacerations on the body, and also found irregular corrugations and
lacerations of the hymenal ring.[7]
On the part of the defense, appellant denied
participation in the crime. Appellant claimed that he was on his way home from
a drinking spree when he passed by AAA’s house. As he was walking, appellant
saw AAA who was bloodied and lying on the ground. He held his cousin to
determine whether she was still alive. He then saw in the vicinity of AAA’s
house, two (2) men whom he allegedly chased. Appellant could not identify nor remember what
the two (2) men were wearing because it was dark at the time. Convinced that
AAA was already dead, appellant did not any more call for help. Instead,
appellant went to the house of his aunt and slept. When CCC and her companion
arrived, he relayed to them how he had chased two (2) men who may have been
responsible for AAA’s death. Appellant denied that he confessed to the crime.[8]
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered and
finding the accused Tirso Sace y Montoya GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Rape with Homicide defined and punished under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA No. 7659 and RA No. 8353, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH and to indemnify the heirs of
[AAA] the amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as
moral damages, and P30,000.00 for exemplary damages.
The body of said accused is committed to
the custody of the Bureau of Corrections,
Let the entire records of this case be
forwarded to the Supreme Court,
SO ORDERED.
The trial court did not give credence to appellant’s
alibi since he even categorically admitted that he was at the crime scene and
saw AAA’s lifeless body. Because the crime occurred more or less around the
time appellant left the drinking session, the trial court held that it was not
impossible for appellant to accomplish his bestial act shortly after he left
the drinking session as he had to pass by AAA’s house on his way home. Also, other
than his bare denial, appellant did not offer any evidence to support his
alibi.
The trial court further pointed out that during the
trial, appellant was positively identified by the 10-year-old brother of AAA,
BBB, as the culprit who chased AAA with a bladed weapon and threatened to kill
her if she would not remove her clothes. BBB, who was only an arm’s length away
from AAA and appellant, was able to describe vividly the appearance of
appellant that night, his attire, and how appellant tried to embrace and chase
AAA. The trial court found no improper motive on the part of BBB to testify
falsely against appellant. BBB’s testimony was notably straightforward and
spontaneous and considering his age, the trial court held that it was improbable
for him to concoct such a terrifying story against his own cousin.[9]
The RTC found appellant’s defense as not only
incredible and incredulous but also innately false and fatuous. Appellant never
bothered to ask for help nor made an outcry when he found his cousin AAA dead.
Instead, he claimed to have left the area and proceeded to the house of his
aunt to sleep. When asked why he was bloodied, appellant merely said that he
was chasing someone without disclosing that he carried the dead body of AAA.
Appellant also disclaimed any knowledge on what happened to AAA when the others
asked him.[10]
Lastly, the RTC also took into consideration the
confession of appellant that he was the one (1) who raped and killed AAA. The trial
court noted that the confession was made voluntarily and spontaneously in
public, and witnessed by prosecution’s witnesses, who were not shown to have
any ill motive against appellant. Thus, appellant’s declaration was admissible
as part of res gestae, his statement
concerning the crime having been made immediately subsequent to the
rape-slaying before he had time to contrive and devise.[11]
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision
dated 1 June 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque is AFFIRMED, except insofar as Republic
Act No. 9346 retroactively reduces the penalty for heinous crimes from death to
reclusion perpetua.
The death penalty imposed by the trial court is
consequently REDUCED to reclusion perpetua and herein judgment
may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with this court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The appellate court ruled that while appellant’s
bloodied shirt and pants alone do not establish that he committed the crime, his
version is too perforated with inconsistencies to be believable. Appellant
claimed to have previously located and embraced the corpse of AAA then left her
at the crime scene before he went to the house of his aunt to sleep but he
pretended to look for AAA with the others. And assuming that he took pity and
wanted to help AAA, who was wounded and half-naked, appellant’s behavior was
inconsistent with human nature when he went to his aunt’s house to sleep
instead of asking for assistance. Likewise, the Court of Appeals found
appellant’s testimony to be too evasive and vague. Moreover, the appellate
court noted that, while flight oftentimes denotes guilt, the failure of the
accused to flee does not per se establish his innocence. It held that appellant
was in all probability too drunk to think of escape in the darkness of the
night.[12]
Hence this appeal.
Appellant had assigned an error in his appeal initially passed upon by
the Court of Appeals, to wit: whether the RTC erred in finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide.[13]
Appellant claimed that the circumstantial evidence
relied upon by the RTC did not prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The
fact that appellant was wearing a bloodstained shirt did not mean that he
committed the crime charged. Appellant had explained that when he saw AAA he
held her in his arm to see if she was still alive; thus, his shirt was stained
with blood. Moreover, if indeed he was guilty of the crime, he would not have assisted
in the search for AAA’s body as he could have just escaped or at least changed
his clothing. He stressed that it was not impossible that the two (2) unidentified
men he chased had committed the crime.
We affirm appellant’s conviction.
It is doctrinal that the requirement
of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal law does not mean such a degree of
proof as to exclude the possibility of error and produce absolute certainty.
Only moral certainty is required or that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind.[14]
While it is established that nothing less than proof beyond reasonable doubt is
required for a conviction, this exacting standard does not preclude resort to
circumstantial evidence when direct evidence is not available. Direct
evidence is not a condition sine qua non to prove the guilt of an
accused beyond reasonable doubt. For in the absence of direct evidence,
the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its
burden. Crimes are usually committed in secret and under conditions where
concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted on under
all circumstances, the prosecution of vicious felons who commit heinous crimes
in secret or secluded places will be hard, if not impossible, to prove.[15]
In this case, as found by the RTC, the
following chain of events was established by prosecution’s evidence: (a) a
drunken appellant came to AAA’s house; (b) appellant tried to embrace AAA but
when the latter resisted and ran away, he chased her with a knife; (c) when
appellant caught up with AAA at the upper portion of the house, he was heard
uttering the words “Pag hindi daw po naghubad
ay asaksakin”; (d) appellant was hiding when CCC and her companion searched
the house for AAA, then he suddenly appeared from his hiding place with
bloodied apparels; (e) when asked by CCC, appellant denied any knowledge of the
whereabouts of AAA and what happened to her; and (f) appellant voluntarily
confessed to having committed the rape with homicide infront of many witnesses
then he submitted himself to police custody.[16]
BBB’s candid and unequivocal narration,
which positively identified appellant as the culprit who tried to force himself
on AAA, debunks appellant’s denial of any participation in the crime. BBB testified,
Fiscal Balquiedra : x x x On
Witness : At our house.
Fiscal Balquiedra : Who were your companion at that time?
Witness : My sister and my “pamangkin”.
Fiscal Balquiedra : How old is that “pamangkin” of yours?
Witness : Four (4) years old.
x x x x
Fiscal Balquiedra : What happened during that time?
Witness : Manong Tirso came to our house, sir.
Fiscal Balquiedra : That Manong Tirso of yours who came to your house, where is he now?
Witness (Interpreter): Witness pointing to a man who identified himself as Tirso Sace.
Fiscal Balquiedra : What happened when Tirso Sace arrived?
Witness : When Manong Tirso arrived at our house he was drunk.
x x x x
Fiscal Balquiedra : When he did not leave, what else happened?
Witness : “Ayapusin po si Ate noong hindi po siya umalis”.
Fiscal Balquiedra : What happened next when Tirso tried to embrace your Ate [AAA]?
Witness : “Hindi po nagpayapos si Ate”.
Fiscal Balquiedra : And what happened next?
Witness : “Tumayo po si Ate and Manong Tirso also stand up and bumunot ng patalim”.
Fiscal Balquiedra : What happened when he pulled out bladed weapon?
Witness : Ate [AAA] ran towards the upper portion of our house.
Fiscal Balquiedra : How about Tirso, what did he do?
Witness : He ran after her.
Fiscal Balquiedra : Then what happened next?
Witness : Ate [AAA] shouted.
Fiscal Balquiedra : What happened after your Ate [AAA] shouted?
Witness : My pamangkin was awakened and he went to the lower portion of our house.
Fiscal Balquiedra : How about Tirso, what did he do?
Interpreter : No answer.
Fiscal Balquiedra : When your Ate [AAA] shouted, did you hear Tirso say anything?
Witness : Yes, sir.
Fiscal Balquiedra : What did he say?
Witness : “Pag hindi daw po naghubad ay asaksakin”.
Fiscal Balquiedra : Who said that?
Witness : Manong Tirso.
Fiscal Balquiedra : After hearing that, what did you and your pamangkin do?
Witness : We hid, sir.
Fiscal Balquiedra : Why did you and your pamangkin hide?
Witness : Because we were afraid, sir.
Fiscal Balquiedra : You said that your Ate [AAA] ran and Tirso ran after her, when Tirso ran after her, where was the “patalim”?
Witness : On his hands, “kinuha po sa bulsa niya”.
Fiscal Balquiedra : What happened next?
Witness : Ate [AAA] ran when she saw the knife of Tirso.[17]
BBB did not waver during
cross-examination, to wit:
Atty. de Luna : You testified that accused embraced the victim, is that correct?
Witness : Yes, sir.
Atty. de Luna : And was the accused successful when he allegedly embraced the victim?
Witness : No, sir.
Atty. de Luna : Why?
Witness : [AAA] evaded.
Atty. de Luna : When the accused allegedly embraced the victim, was he behind or infront the victim?
Witness : Infront, sir.
Atty. de Luna : How far were you from the victim when accused allegedly embraced her/or when he tried to embrace her?
Witness : “Kalahating dipa”.
x x x x
Atty. de Luna : When accused arrived in your house, were you sleeping at that time?
Witness : No, sir.
Atty. de Luna : You testified that Tirso Sace pulled up a bladed weapon that night, is that correct?
Witness : Yes, sir.
Atty. de Luna : Did the accused pulled the knife before or after accused tried to embrace [AAA]?
Witness : After embracing, sir.
x x x x
Atty. de Luna : Where did the accused get the knife?
Witness : From his pocket, sir.
Atty. de Luna : And how far were you when you saw it?
Witness : “Mga isang dipa po”.[18]
x x x x
It is axiomatic that a
witness who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank
manner and remains consistent on cross-examination is a credible witness.[19]
We see no justification to reverse the
RTC’s appreciation of the testimony of BBB. Having observed the witness’s
deportment while testifying, the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of
BBB deserves our highest respect.
In contrast, appellant could only
offer denial and alibi in his defense. Denial and alibi are weak defenses
which must be supported by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit
credibility. These are negative self-serving evidence which cannot be
given greater weight than the testimony of a credible witness who testified on
affirmative matters. Between the positive declarations of a prosecution
witness and the negative statements of the accused, the former deserves more
credence.[20]
Thus, between the positive identification made by BBB and the bare denial and
alibi of appellant, there is scarcely any doubt that decisive weight must be
given to the positive testimony of BBB.
Also, the facts in this case clearly show that
appellant admitted the commission of the crime to the prosecution’s witnesses.
According to their testimonies, appellant admitted having raped and killed AAA.
Their testimonies were not rebutted by the defense. Appellant’s statements infront
of the prosecution witnesses are admissible for being part of the res gestae.
Under the Revised Rules on Evidence,[21]
a declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in
evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites
concur: (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to
contrive or devise; and (3) the statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediately attending circumstances.[22]
All these requisites are present in this
case. Appellant had just been through a startling and gruesome occurrence,
AAA’s death. His admission was made while he was still under the
influence of said startling occurrence and before he had an opportunity to
concoct or contrive a story. In addition, he was still under the influence of
alcohol at that time, having engaged in a drinking spree from
The rule is settled that where the
culpability or innocence of the accused hinges on the credibility of the
witnesses and the veracity of their testimonies, the findings of trial courts
are given the highest degree of respect. Hence, their findings on such
matters are binding and conclusive on appellate courts, unless some fact or
circumstance of weight and substance has been overlooked, misapprehended or
misinterpreted.[23]
We find no circumstance of weight or substance that was overlooked by the trial
court.
With regard to damages, we modify the
award of moral damages affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The heirs of AAA are entitled to moral
damages amounting to P75,000.00,[24]
pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence. Likewise,
as to actual damages, we have held that if the amount of the actual damages
cannot be determined because no receipts were presented to prove the same, but
it was shown that the heirs are entitled thereto, temperate damages amounting
to P25,000.00 may be awarded.[25] There being a sufficient showing in the
instant case that the heirs of AAA incurred funeral expenses, the award of
temperate damages is in order.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of Tirso Sace y Montoya
is DISMISSED and the November 20,
2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR- H.C. No. 02324 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Temperate damages amounting to P25,000.00
are hereby awarded in lieu of actual damages and the award of moral damages is increased
to P75,000.00 in line with current jurisprudence.
With costs
against the accused-appellant.
SO
ORDERED.
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MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice |
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WE
CONCUR: REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice Chairperson |
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
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LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
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C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-17. Penned by Associate Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Josefina Guevara-Salonga and Vicente Q. Roxas.
[2] CA rollo, pp. 16-32. Penned by Executive Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano.
[3]
[4] See People v. Ching, G.R. No.
177150,
[5] TSN,
[6] TSN,
[7] Records, pp. 44-45.
[8] TSN,
[9] CA rollo, pp. 22-25.
[10]
[11]
[12] Rollo, pp. 10-13.
[13] CA rollo, p. 51.
[14] People v. Guihama, G.R. No. 126113,
[15] People v. Navarro, Jr.,
G.R. No. 132218,
[16] CA rollo, pp. 17-21.
[17] TSN,
[18] TSN,
[19] People v. Torres, G.R. Nos. 135522-23,
[20] People v. Amante, G.R. Nos.
149414-15,
[21] Rule 130, SEC. 42. Part of the res gestae. – Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.
[22] People
v. Lobrigas, G.R. No.
147649,
[23] Supra note 14, at 666.
[24] People v.
[25] People v. Abrazaldo, 445 Phil.109, 126 (2003).