THIRD DIVISION
|
JULIO FLORES
(deceased), substituted by his heirs; BENITO Petitioners, - versus - MARCIANO BAGAOISAN, Respondent. |
G.R.
No. 173365
Present:
Chairperson, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, PERALTA, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: April 15,
2010 |
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DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Petitioners seek a review of the March
29, 2006 Decision[1] and the June
20, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA), denying their motion for
reconsideration.
The case involves a 13,552-square meter
portion of a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
P-11880[2] in
the name of the Heirs of Victor Flores, namely: Julio, Benito, Dolores, and
Virginia, herein petitioners. OCT No. P-11880 was issued pursuant to Homestead
Patent No. 138892, given on November 12, 1973. This property is located in the
On December 20, 1976, petitioners,
together with their mother Luisa Viernes, executed a Deed of Confirmation and
Quitclaim[3] in
favor of Vicente T. Lazo. Through this document, petitioners
agreed to “sell, cede, convey, grant, and transfer by way of QUITCLAIM” the
subject property to Lazo. Thereafter, respondent, Marciano Bagaoisan, bought
the subject property from Lazo, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 20, 1977.[4]
On April 4, 1983, Viernes
and petitioner Virginia Flores-Dalere executed a Palawag A Nasapataan (Affidavit), attesting to the fact that they
conveyed to Lazo the subject property through the Deed of Confirmation and
Quitclaim. Affiants also attested that Lazo and his predecessors-in-interest had
been in possession of the disputed portion since 1940 and that the same was
mistakenly included in the patent application of Victor Flores.
On June 21, 1996, respondent filed an
action for ownership, quieting of title, partition and damages against
petitioners, praying that he be declared as the true owner of the subject
property and that the entire property covered by OCT No. P-11880 be partitioned
among them. In the Complaint, respondent asserted that he was a tenant of Lazo
and that he had been working on the subjec0t property since time immemorial. He
said that, since he bought the property in 1977, he possessed the land as owner
and paid real property tax thereon. He claimed that the subject property was erroneously
covered by OCT No. P-11880 and that petitioners have previously recognized such
fact, considering that they executed an affidavit acknowledging the erroneous
inclusion of the property in their title. He averred that, lately, petitioners had
denied his ownership of the land and asserted their ownership thereof by
working and harvesting the crops thereon.[5]
In answer, petitioners stated that
they did not relinquish ownership or possession of the land to Lazo. While
admitting that they executed the Deed of Confirmation and Quitclaim in favor of
Lazo, petitioners claimed that they were misled into signing the same, with Lazo
taking advantage of their lack of education. Petitioners contended that it was
too late for respondent to assert title to the disputed portion because the
title covering the same had already become indefeasible one year after it was
issued.[6]
On February 3, 2000, the Regional Trial
Court rendered a decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment
is hereby rendered ordering the defendants, jointly and severally:
1. To recognize plaintiff Marciano Bagaoisan as
owner of the 13,552 sq.m. parcel of land situated in Barrio Maab-abucay (now
Estancia)
2. To cease and desist from further possession
of said parcel of land and to immediately reconvey the same to plaintiff;
3. To pay said plaintiff such amount as would be
the peso equivalent of 100 cavanes of
palay per year, for the loss of harvest he incurred in 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997,
1998 and 1999, computed as the price then obtaining in said years; and
4. To pay plaintiff the amount of P20,000.00
as reasonable attorney’s fees.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[7]
On
appeal, the CA upheld the validity of the Deed of Confirmation and Quitclaim.
In light of petitioners’ admission that they signed the deed after it was read
to them, the CA dismissed their assertion that they did not know the contents
of the document. It further declared that the deed merely confirmed
petitioners’ non-ownership of the subject property and it did not involve an
alienation or encumbrance. Accordingly, it concluded that the five-year
prohibition against alienation of a property awarded through homestead patent did
not apply.
The CA likewise
rejected petitioners’ contention that the action was barred by prescription or
laches. Citing Vital v. Anore,[8]
the CA held that where the registered owner knew that the property described in
the patent and the certificate of title belonged to another, any statute
barring an action by the real owner would not apply, and the true owner might file
an action to settle the issue of ownership.
The
dispositive portion of the assailed March 29, 2006 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of sufficient merit. The assailed 3 February 2000 decision by the Regional
Trial Court,
SO ORDERED.[9]
The CA likewise
denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration in its Resolution dated June 20,
2006.[10]
Consequently,
petitioners filed this petition for review, insisting that the Deed of
Confirmation and Quitclaim is void as its contents were not fully explained to
them, and it violates Section 118 of the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No.
141), which prohibits the alienation of lands acquired through a homestead
patent.
The petition is meritorious.
Without going into petitioners’ allegation
that they were unaware of the contents of the Deed of Confirmation and
Quitclaim, we nonetheless hold that the deed is void for violating the
five-year prohibitory period against alienation of lands acquired through
homestead patent as provided under Section 118 of the Public Land Act, which
states:
Sec. 118. Except in favor of the Government or any of
its branches, units, or institutions, lands acquired under free patent or
homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the
date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and
after the date of issuance of the patent and grant, nor shall they become
liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of
said period, but the improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or
pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.
No
alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after five years and
before twenty-five years after the issuance of title shall be valid without the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, which approval shall not
be denied except on constitutional and legal grounds.
We do not agree
with the CA that the Deed of Confirmation and Quitclaim merely “confirmed”
petitioners’ non-ownership of the subject property. The deed uses the words
“sell,” “cede,” “convey,” “grant,” and “transfer.” These words admit of no
other interpretation than that the subject property was indeed being transferred
to Lazo.
The use of
the words “confirmation” and “quitclaim” in the title of the document was an
obvious attempt to circumvent the prohibition imposed by law. Labeling the deed
as a confirmation of non-ownership or as a quitclaim of rights would actually make
no difference, as the effect would still be the alienation or conveyance of the
property. The act of conveyance would
still fall within the ambit of the prohibition. To validate such an arrangement
would be to throw the door open to all possible fraudulent subterfuges and
schemes that persons interested in land given to a homesteader may devise to
circumvent and defeat the legal provisions prohibiting their alienation within
five years from the issuance of the patent.[11]
It bears
stressing that the law was enacted to give the homesteader or patentee every
chance to preserve for himself and his family the land that the State had
gratuitously given to him as a reward for his labor in cleaning and cultivating
it.[12]
Its basic objective, as the Court had
occasion to stress, is to promote public policy, that is to provide home and
decent living for destitutes, aimed at providing a class of independent small
landholders which is the bulwark of peace and order.[13]
Hence, any act which would have the
effect of removing the property subject of the patent from the hands of a grantee
will be struck down for being violative of the law.
To repeat, the
conveyance of a homestead before the expiration of the
five-year prohibitory period following the issuance of the homestead patent is null and void and cannot be enforced, for it is not
within the competence of any citizen to barter away what public policy by law
seeks to preserve.[14]
There is, therefore, no doubt that the Deed
of Confirmation and Quitclaim, which was executed three years after the
homestead patent was issued, is void and cannot be enforced.
Furthermore, respondent failed to present
sufficient evidence to surmount the conclusiveness and indefeasibility of the certificate
of title.
An OCT issued on the strength of a
homestead patent partakes of the nature of a certificate issued in a judicial
proceeding and becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of
one year from the date of the promulgation of the Director of Lands’ order for
the issuance of the patent.[15] After the lapse of such period, the sole remedy
of a landowner, whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
another’s name is to file an action for reconveyance so
long as the property has not passed to an innocent purchaser for value.[16] In order that an action for reconveyance
based on fraud may prosper, it is essential for the party seeking reconveyance
to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, his title to the property and the
fact of fraud.[17]
Respondent did not allege in his
complaint or prove during the trial that fraud attended the registration of the
subject property in petitioners’ names. In
fact, there was no allegation as to how petitioners were able to secure title
to the property despite the alleged ownership of respondent’s predecessor.
More importantly, respondent failed
to prove that he has title to the subject property. He merely asserted that his
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the property since 1940. The
basic presumption is that lands of whatever classification belong to the State
and evidence of a land grant must be “well-nigh incontrovertible.” The Public
Land Act requires that the possessor or his predecessors-in-interest must be in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
land for at least thirty years. When these conditions are complied with, the possessor
is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a government grant,
without the necessity of a certificate of title being
issued. The
land ceases to be a part of the public domain and beyond the
authority of the Director of Lands,[18]
such that the latter would have no more right to issue a homestead patent to
another person.
Respondent merely established that he
had been in possession of the property and that he had been paying real
property taxes thereon since 1977. The only evidence on record attesting to the
fact that respondent and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of
the property since 1940 was the affidavit executed by some of petitioners.
This, however, would not suffice.
In closing, it would be well to mention
that the execution of the Deed of Confirmation and Quitclaim within the
five-year prohibitory period also makes the homestead patent susceptible to
cancellation, and the subject property being reverted to the public domain.[19] It is the Solicitor General, on behalf of the
government, who is by law mandated to institute an action for
reversion.[20] Should the Solicitor General decide to file
such an action, it is in that action that petitioners’ defenses, particularly
their alleged lack of knowledge of the contents of the deed, will have to be
resolved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
The March 29, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals and its June 20,
2006 Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The complaint for ownership, quieting of title and damages is DISMISSED, without prejudice to an
action for reversion that the Solicitor General may decide to file for the
State.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate
Justice |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate
Justice |
JOSE CATRAL
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Santiago Javier Ranada, with Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Mario L. Guariña III, concurring; rollo, pp. 92-99.
[2] Exhibit A; Folder of Exhibits.
[3] Exhibit B; Folder of Exhibits.
[4] Exhibit A-5; Folder of Exhibits.
[5] Records, pp. 1-2.
[6]
[7] Rollo, pp. 60-61.
[8] 90 Phil. 855 (1952).
[9] Rollo, pp. 98-99.
[10] CA rollo, p. 113.
[11] Pangilinan v. Ramos, G.R. No. 44617, January 23, 1990, 181 SCRA 350, 358.
[12] Heirs of Venancio Bajenting v. Bañez, G.R. No. 166190, September 20, 2006, 502 SCRA 531, 553.
[13]
[14] De Romero v. Court of Appeals, 377 Phil.189, 201 (1999).
[15] Buston-Arendain v. Gil, G.R. No. 172585, June 26, 2008, 555 SCRA 561, 574.
[16] Abejaron v. Nabasa, G.R. No. 84831, June 20, 2001, 359 SCRA 47, 56-57.
[17]
[18] De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 442 Phil. 534, 548 (2002).
[19] Section 124 of the
[20] Abejaron v. Nabasa, supra note 16, at 67.