THIRD DIVISION
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SILVINO A. LIGERALDE, Petitioner, - versus - MAY ASCENSION A. PATALINGHUG and the REPUBLIC OF THE Respondents. |
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G.R. NO. 168796 Present: VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, PERALTA, and MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated: April 15, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This petition seeks to set aside the November
30, 2004 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of
Dagupan City (RTC) declaring the
marriage between petitioner Silvino A. Ligeralde (Silvino) and private respondent May Ascension A. Patalinghug (May) null and void.
Silvino and May got married on
Sometime in September 1995, May arrived home at
In the midst of these, Silvino’s deep love for her, the
thought of saving their marriage for the sake of their children, and the
commitment of May to reform dissuaded him from separating from her. He still wanted to reconcile with her.
The couple started a new life. A few months after, however,
he realized that their marriage was hopeless. May was back again to her old
ways. This was demonstrated when Silvino arrived home one day and learned that she
was nowhere to be found. He searched for her and found her in a nearby
apartment drinking beer with a male lover.
Later, May confessed that she had no more love for
him. They then lived separately.
With May’s irresponsible, immature and immoral
behavior, Silvino came to believe that she is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
Prior to the filing of the complaint, Silvino referred
the matter to Dr. Tina Nicdao-Basilio for psychological evaluation. The
psychologist certified that May was psychologically incapacitated to perform her
essential marital obligations; that the incapacity started when she was still
young and became manifest after marriage; and that the same was serious and
incurable.[3]
On
The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision. It
ruled that private respondent’s alleged sexual infidelity, emotional immaturity
and irresponsibility do not constitute psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code and that the psychologist failed to identify
and prove the root cause thereof or that the incapacity was medically or
clinically permanent or incurable.
Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
The core issue raised by petitioner Silvino Ligeralde is that
“the assailed order of the CA is based on conjecture and, therefore, issued
without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.”[4]
The Court required the private respondent to comment
but she failed to do so. Efforts were exerted to locate her but to no avail.
Nevertheless, the petition is technically and
substantially flawed. On procedural grounds, the Court agrees with the public respondent
that the petitioner should have filed a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 instead of this petition for certiorari under Rule 65. For having
availed of the wrong remedy, this petition deserves outright dismissal.
Substantially,
the petition has no merit. In order to avail of the special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court,[5] the
petitioner must clearly show that the public respondent acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess in
jurisdiction. By grave abuse of
discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act
at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. In sum, for the extraordinary writ of certiorari to lie, there must be
capricious, arbitrary or whimsical exercise of power.[6]
In this case at bench, the Court
finds no commission of a grave abuse of discretion in the rendition of the assailed
CA decision dismissing petitioner’s complaint for declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. Upon close scrutiny of the
records, we find nothing whimsical, arbitrary or capricious in its findings.
A petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at
the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The
incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. It must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations
may emerge only after the marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.[7] The Court likewise laid down the
guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, based
on Article 36 of the Family Code, in Republic
v. Court of Appeals.[8] Relevant
to this petition are the following:
(1) The burden of proof to show the
nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in
the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the
decision; (3) the incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of
the celebration" of the marriage; (4) such incapacity must also be shown
to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable; and (5) such illness must
be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
Guided by these pronouncements, it is
the Court’s considered view that petitioner’s evidence failed to establish
respondent May’s psychological incapacity.
Petitioner's testimony did not prove
the root cause, gravity and incurability of private respondent’s condition. Even
Dr. Nicdao-Basilio failed to show the root cause of her psychological
incapacity. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified
as a psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained and
established by the totality of the evidence presented during trial.[9]
More importantly, the acts of private
respondent do not even rise to the level of the “psychological incapacity” that
the law requires. Private respondent's act of living an adulterous life cannot
automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when no
specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at
the inception of marriage. Petitioner must be able to establish that
respondent's unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality,
which makes her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the
marital state.[10]
Doubtless, the private respondent was far from
being a perfect wife and a good mother. She
certainly had some character flaws. But these imperfections do not warrant a
conclusion that she had a psychological malady at the time of the marriage that
rendered her incapable of fulfilling her marital and family duties and
obligations.[11]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M.
PERALTA
Associate Justice
A
T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
was reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. De
[2]
Promulgated on
[3] Due to the negligence of May in her duties as homemaker,
and due to her nocturnal activities with friends and business endeavors, heated
altercations ensue, causing physical and verbal abuse on both parties. A more serious cause of arguments were May’s
admission of infidelity, making her leave their home, leaving the care of the
children to an aunt.
[E]ven
when client had forgiven her several times, and took her in so that they can
start anew, May continued with her illicit relations with other men, causing
much shame and humiliation on client Silvino in their community.
x x
x x
In view of the above mentioned psychological
findings, it is the opinion of the undersigned psychologist that to a certain
extent, client’s wife May Ascension is not psychologically capable of
performing her duties and responsibilities as wife to her husband Silvino, and
mother to their four children who are grossly neglected as a result of her
behavior. (CA Decision, id. at 20)
[4] Petition for Review on Certiorari, id. at 9.
[5] Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure reads as follows:
SEC. 1. Petition
for certiorari—When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of
such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.
[6] Salma v. Hon. Miro, G.R. No. 168362,
[7] Rodolfo A. Aspillaga v. Aurora A. Aspillaga, G.R. No. 170925, October 26, 2009 citing Santos v. Court of AppealsA., G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20.
[8] Veronica Cabacungan Alcazar v. Rey C.
Alcazar, G.R. No. 174451,
[9] Id
[10]
[11] Navales v. Navales, G.R. No. 167523,