Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
|
ENGR. CARLITO PENTECOSTES, JR., Petitioner, - versus - PEOPLE OF THE Respondent. |
G.R. No. 167766 Present: VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, PERALTA, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: April 7, 2010 |
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DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed
before Us is the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA), dated
The antecedents are as follows:
On
The
people who assisted him initially brought him to the Municipal Hall of Gonzaga,
Cagayan, where he was interrogated by a policeman who asked him to identify his
assailant. He informed the policeman that
petitioner was the one who shot him.
After he was interrogated, he was later brought to the
On
That on or about September 2, 1998, in the
[M]unicipality of Gonzaga, [P]rovince of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a gun, with intent
to kill, with evident premeditation and with treachery, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot one Rudy
Baclig, inflicting upon the latter gunshot injuries.
That the accused had performed all the acts of
execution which would have produce[d] the crime of Murder as a consequence, but
which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his
own will.
That the same was aggravated by the use of an
unlicensed firearm.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Duly arraigned, petitioner pleaded Not Guilty to the crime as charged.[7]
During
the trial, it was established that at the time the incident occurred, petitioner
was employed by the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) as Irrigation
Superintendent assigned at the Baua River Irrigation System (BRIS). Petitioner vehemently denied any involvement
in the incident, alleging that he was in
On
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Engr. Carlito Pentecostes,
Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Attempted
Murder and sentences him the penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one
(1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision
mayor, as maximum. Further, the
accused is ordered to pay private complainant Rudy Baclig the amount of Two
Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00).
SO ORDERED.[11]
The
RTC concluded that Rudy positively identified the petitioner as the one who
shot him − there was sufficient lighting for Rudy to identify the
perpetrator and he knew petitioner ever since he attained the age of reason. As
to petitioner’s defense of alibi, the RTC ratiocinated that when petitioner personally
appeared before Engr. Hondrade on
Petitioner then sought recourse before the CA, arguing that the RTC committed serious errors in finding that he was guilty of attempted murder and that the RTC failed to consider the testimonies of his witnesses and the documentary evidence presented in his favor.[13]
On
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated
SO ORDERED.[14]
In convicting the petitioner to a lesser offence, the CA opined that it was not established that petitioner intended to kill Rudy when he shot him. Petitioner’s act of shooting Rudy once was not followed by any other assault or any act which would ensure his death. Considering that petitioner was driving a car, he could have chased Rudy if he really intended to kill the latter, or run him over since Rudy went to the rear of the car. Petitioner’s desistance displayed his nonchalance to cause the death of Rudy. Moreover, Rudy only sustained a gunshot wound on the arm, which required only 10 days of medical attendance.[15]
Not
satisfied, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[16] but
was denied in a Resolution dated
Hence, this petition which raises the following issues:
The honorable Court of
Appeals, with due respect, committed a grave abuse of discretion when it gives
credence to the statement of the private complainant presuming that the
petitioner-appellant is the assailant allegedly due to his voice and his
alleged ownership of the vehicle, and considering that the private complainant
was then intoxicated, and the crime was committed at nighttime, such conclusion
is entirely grounded on speculations, surmises and conjectures.
The honorable fourteenth
division committed grave abuse of discretion when it failed to give weight,
discuss and consider the arguments and defenses made the petitioner-appellant
in our brief, vis-à-vis the manifestation and motion of the solicitor general.
The honorable fourteenth
division committed an error when it relied heavily on an unfounded, baseless
and alleged motive of petitioner, being a crusader of illegal drugs in their
own town, to be the basis that he is the assailant.[17]
Petitioner questions the conclusion of the CA when it found him guilty of the crime of less serious physical injuries. He argues that Rudy failed to positively identify him as the assailant, since Rudy never admitted that he was able to identify the petitioner through his physical appearance, but only through his voice, despite the fact that it was the first time Rudy heard petitioner’s voice when he allegedly shot him. Petitioner also insists that when the incident occurred, Rudy’s vision was impaired as he just drank half a bottle of gin and the place was not properly lit. Rudy also failed to identify the type of gun used during the shooting. Moreover, the prosecution failed to establish that the car used by the perpetrator was owned by the petitioner.
Further,
petitioner maintains that it was impossible for him to have shot the victim on
the night of
The petition is bereft merit.
In sum, petitioner submits before this Court two issues for
resolution. First, whether or not the
prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner was the one who
shot the victim; Second, whether or
not petitioner’s defense of alibi would prosper.
As regards the first issue, this Court finds that the
prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner was the one who
shot Rudy that fateful night of
Private complainant Rudy Baclig averred
that he personally knew the accused since he was of the age of reason. Rudy knew accused Engr. Carlito Pentecostes
Jr. to be working with the NIA at Sta. Cruz, Gonzaga, Cagayan. Both private complainant Rudy Baclig and
accused Engr. Carlito Pentecostes Jr. were residents of Gonzaga, Cagayan,
although they reside in different barangays.
Rudy was residing at Brgy. Batangan, while the accused was living two-and-a-half
kilometers away at Brgy. Flourishing.
Rudy Baclig categorically stated that when the car of the accused passed
by him, it slowly stopped then moved backward and when the car was at a
distance of about two arms’ length, which was about three (3) meters, the
accused called Rudy’s nickname Parrod.
Hearing his nickname, Rudy went towards the car, but he was only able to
take one step, accused Engr. Carlito Pentecostes Jr. opened the door of the car
and shot Rudy once and afterwards the accused hurriedly sped away. Asked how he was able to identify Engr.
Carlito Pentecostes Jr. to be the person who shot him when it was night time, Rudy said that he was able to identify the
accused through the lights of the car and on cross-examination he said that
aside from the lights of the car, there were also lights coming from a store
nearby the place of the incident. The
Court believes that with these kinds of lights, Rudy Baclig was able to
identify the accused, considering the distance between the assailant and the
victim was only three (3) meters.
x x x x.
Rudy Baclig was not telling a lie when he
declared that he was shot at about two arms’ length only because the doctor who
treated him, Dr. Mila M. Marantan, declared that Rudy Baclig suffered a gunshot
wound, the entry was with powder burns which is an evidence that Rudy Baclig was
shot at a close range.
The defense harped on the fact that the
private complainant smelled liquor. The
complainant at first denied having taken liquor, but he admitted he took
one-half bottle of gin before he went to buy coffee and sugar. On cross-examination, the complainant
admitted also that every afternoon, he drank liquor. He admitted that he could still walk
naturally a distance of about one kilometer.
He also said that his vision might be affected. This testimony of Rudy Baclig cannot be
considered as evidence that he was not able to identify the accused. He was categorical in stating that he was
able to identify the accused. The doctor
who treated Rudy of his injury declared the patient smelled liquor, but she
could not tell how much liquor the patient took, however, the patient could
answer all her questions.
x x x x.
There are other evidences that tend to
show that Rudy Baclig was able to identify the assailant. Immediately after he was shot, Rudy told a police
investigator, a certain Torres and Dr. Mila Marantan that it was Engr. Carlito
Pentecostes, Jr. who shot him.[18]
This conclusion was concurred into by the CA, which
categorically stated in its decision that “[t]he prosecution was able to
present a witness, in the person of Baclig, who categorically identified petitioner
as his assailant and whose testimony was characterized by frankness.”[19] Contrary to petitioner’s contention, Rudy saw
him and positively identified him as his shooter, viz:
Q: When
you heard the driver of the car calling you by your nickname Parrod, what was
your reaction?
A: I went near because I thought he was telling
me something.
Q: And
what made you decide to go near the driver of the vehicle?
A:
Because he called me by my name, Sir.
Q: When the driver of the car called you by
your [nickname], were you able to recognize the driver of the car who called
you?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And who was that person who called you by
your name Parrod?
A: It was Engr. Pentecostes, Sir.
Q: The same person you identified a while
ago?
A: Yes, Sir.[20]
Corollarilly, petitioner already raised these arguments in
his motion for reconsideration of the decision of the court a quo, which the CA addressed point by
point in the assailed resolution denying the motion. We quote with approval the following
discussion of the CA:
On the first allegation, accused-appellant
wrongly read the decision. The Court
upheld the trial court’s finding that it was indeed accused-appellant who
attacked the private complainant, not because the latter heard
accused-appellant’s voice but that he was able to see him through the lights of
the car when he opened the window and the door.
x x x
x x x x
Clearly, it was not merely hearing the
assailant’s voice, but that he was able to see him, that private-complainant
was able to identify the accused-appellant.
It was admittedly a fact that private complainant had a drink but it
does not mean that he was intoxicated, especially since he admitted that he drinks
everyday. Thus, his body’s tolerance to
alcohol is probably heightened. There
was also no proof that his vision had been affected by the alcohol intake, and
that he would have mistaken someone else for the accused.
Again, positive declaration is given more
weight than the denial of the accused-appellant. In addition, the same findings were
previously reached by the trial court which had the opportunity to observe
first-hand the demeanor of the witnesses, and assess their credibility.
Regarding the Solicitor General’s
recommendation, the Court is not bound to follow it although in some cases, we
are persuaded by the same. However, in
this case, it was not able to persuade Us as it only adopted the same arguments
advanced by accused- appellant’s counsel.
Some of these arguments include the
failure to present any document or evidence showing that the car used was owned
by the accused-appellant. The ownership
of the car, however, is immaterial in the light of the positive identification
of the accused. In addition, the
statement of the prosecution’s witnesses that the car was often used by
accused-appellant’s father does not remove the possibility that he may also use
it.
On the third allegation of error, again,
accused-appellant has misread the decision and exaggerated by accusing us of
relying heavily on the existence of a probable motive on the part of accused-appellant
to commit the act complained of. This is
clear in the decision that the same was meant to assess whether there was a
probable motive for the private complainant to lie.[21]
It is clear that the arguments advanced by the petitioner in
the case at bar, questioning the conclusion of the RTC and the CA that
petitioner shot the victim, are trivial. The fact remains that Rudy has been shot with
a gun and he positively identified his shooter as the petitioner. Petitioner faulted the RTC and the CA for
giving credence to the testimony of Rudy.
However, it is to be noted that even the lone declaration of a sole
eyewitness is sufficient to convict if that testimony is found to be
credible. Credibility of witnesses is to be weighed and should not
be based on numbers. The matter of
assigning values to declaration on the witness stand is best and most
competently performed by the trial judge who had the unmatched opportunity to observe
the witnesses and to assess their credibility by various indicia
available but not reflected on the record.[22]
This
Court has meticulously scrutinized the transcripts of stenographic notes of
this case and finds that the RTC, as well as the CA, committed no error in
giving credence to the evidence of the prosecution. The Court has long adhered to the rule that
findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies are accorded great respect unless it overlooked substantial facts
and circumstances, which if considered, would materially affect the result of
the case. This deference to the trial
court’s appreciation of the facts and of the credibility of witnesses is
consistent with the principle that when the testimony of a witness meets the
test of credibility, that alone is sufficient to convict the accused.[23] This is especially true when the factual
findings of the trial court are affirmed by the appellate court.[24]
As regards petitioner’s defense of alibi, well settled
is the rule that alibi is an inherently weak defense which cannot prevail over the positive identification of the
accused by the victim.[25] Moreover, in order for the defense
of alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the
petitioner was somewhere else when the offense was committed, but it must
likewise be demonstrated that he was so far away that it was not possible for
him to have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate
vicinity at the time of its commission.[26] In the case at bar, it was established that
petitioner personally appeared before Engr. Hondrade only on September 1 and 4,
1998. His whereabouts for the two days
in between the said dates are unaccounted for.
There was no showing that he could not have gone back to Cagayan,
committed the crime, and went back to
As to the crime committed by petitioner, this Court also
concurs with the conclusion of the CA that petitioner is guilty of the crime of
less serious physical injuries, not attempted murder.
The principal and essential element of attempted or frustrated murder is the intent on the part of the assailant to take the life of the person attacked. Such intent must be proved in a clear and evident manner to exclude every possible doubt as to the homicidal intent of the aggressor.[27] In the present case, intent to kill the victim could not be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. Petitioner only shot the victim once and did not hit any vital part of the latter’s body. If he intended to kill him, petitioner could have shot the victim multiple times or even ran him over with the car. Favorably to petitioner, the inference that intent to kill existed should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove this fact beyond reasonable doubt.[28] When such intent is lacking but wounds are inflicted upon the victim, the crime is not attempted murder but physical injuries only. Since the Medico-Legal Certificate[29] issued by the doctor who attended Rudy stated that the wound would only require ten (10) days of medical attendance, and he was, in fact, discharged the following day, the crime committed is less serious physical injuries only. The less serious physical injury suffered by Rudy is defined under Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that "(A)ny person who inflicts upon another physical injuries not described as serious physical injuries but which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor for ten (10) days or more, or shall require medical attendance for the same period, shall be guilty of less serious physical injuries and shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor."
As to the aggravating circumstance of treachery, this Court finds that the CA erroneously concluded that treachery attended the commission of the crime. To establish treachery, the following must be proven: (1) the employment of such means of execution as would give the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of execution.[30] The circumstances attending the commission of the crime negate the existence of treachery in its execution. Although petitioner deliberately assaulted Rudy and there was suddenness in his attack, he did not logically plan to assault the latter when he chanced upon him while he was driving. In treachery, the perpetrator intentionally and purposely employs ways and means to commit the crime. There was no evidence, however, to show that petitioner employed such means of execution that would ensure the commission of the crime without harm to his person. Thus, treachery did not attend the commission of the crime.
There being no aggravating and no mitigating circumstance, the penalty for the crime of less serious physical injuries should be taken from the medium period of arresto mayor, which is from two (2) months and one (1) day to four (4) months. The Indeterminate Sentence Law finds no application in the case at bar, since it does not apply to those whose maximum term of imprisonment is less than one year.[31]
As regards the awards for damages, moral damages may be recovered in criminal offenses resulting in physical injuries, but there must be a factual basis for the award.[32] We have studied the records and find no factual basis for the award of moral damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice Chairperson |
|
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
|
JOSE CATRAL Associate Justice |
|
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Third Division,
Chairperson
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., with Associate Justices Lucas P. Bersamin (now a member of this Court) and Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, rollo, pp. 38-63.
[2] Penned by Judge Rolando R. Velasco; id. at 71-83.
[3] Rollo, pp. 65-70.
[4]
[5]
[6] Records, p. 1.
[7]
[8]
[9] Rollo, pp. 74-77.
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] CA rollo, pp. 127-144.
[17] Rollo, p. 18.
[18]
[19]
[20] TSN,
[21] Rollo, pp. 67-69.
[22] People v. Coscos, 424 Phil. 886, 900-901 (2002).
[23] People v. Ramos, G.R. No. 172470,
[24] People v. Gallego, 453 Phil. 825, 849 (2003).
[25] People v. Malones, 469 Phil. 301, 328 (2004).
[26]
[27] People v. Pagador, 409 Phil. 338, 351 (2001).
[28]
[29] Records, p. 6.
[30] People v. Catbagan, G.R. Nos 149430-32,
[31] People v. Glino, G.R. No. 173793,
[32] Civil Code, Art. 2219 (1); See Civil Code, Art. 2217; See People v. Molina, 391 Phil. 282, 301 (2000).