Republic of the
Supreme Court
SECOND DIVISION
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ASSOCIATED ANGLO-AMERICAN TOBACCO CORPORATION and
FLORANTE DY, |
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G.R. No. 167237 |
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Petitioners, |
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Present: |
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- versus - |
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CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson, |
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BRION, |
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HON. COURT OF APPEALS, |
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ABAD, and |
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HON. CRISPIN C. LARON, in his capacity as PRESIDING
JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, REGION 1, BRANCH 44, DAGUPAN CITY, SHERIFF
VIRGILIO F. VILLAR, OFFICE OF THE EX-OFFICIO SHERIFF OF PASAY CITY, REGISTER
OF DEEDS OF LINGAYEN, PANGASINAN and SPOUSES PAUL PELAEZ, JR. and ROCELI
MAMISAY PELAEZ, |
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PEREZ, JJ. Promulgated: |
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Respondents. |
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April 23, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
The appeal of a
final order substantially amending only some matters in a previously rendered Decision
is also an appeal of the other intimately interwoven matters passed upon in the
original decision.
In the present Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioners assail the
Factual Antecedents
Spouses
Paul Pelaez, Jr. (Paul) and Roceli Mamisay Pelaez (Roceli) were employees of
petitioner Associated Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation (the
Corporation). Paul worked as Sales
Supervisor and later as Senior Salesman while Roceli worked as secretary.
As
salesman, Paul was required, on
Upon
its determination that Paul had defaulted in remitting the sales proceeds, the Corporation
initiated the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage bond.
To
stop the extrajudicial sale, Paul and Roceli filed on
Ruling of the
Regional Trial Court
The
RTC issued a restraining order and, subsequently, a writ of preliminary
injunction to stop the extrajudicial sale.
Then, on
WHEREFORE, judgment
is rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, as follows:
1. The defendants Associated Anglo-American
Tobacco Corporation and Florante C. Dy are ordered to jointly and severally pay
plaintiffs the amount of P23,820.16 representing the overage and the
account of Plaintiff Paul Pelaez, Jr. and to release the mortgage on the parcel
of land covered by, and release to plaintiffs, Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 155994;
2. The defendants Associated Anglo-American
Tobacco Corporation and Florante C. Dy are ordered to pay the plaintiffs moral,
exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses in the amount of P50,000.00;
3. The injunction is made permanent.
With costs against
defendants.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Upon
motion of the spouses Pelaez, the RTC amended its Decision in its
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration
is granted and the dispositive portion of the Decision dated
The defendants
Associated Anglo-American Tobacco Corp. and Florante C. Dy are ordered to
jointly and severally pay plaintiffs the amount of P843,383.11
representing the overage and the amount of award of moral and exemplary damages
and attorney's fees is increased from P50,000.00 to P2,000,000.00.
Furnish copies of
this Order to Atty. Efren Moncupa and Atty. Da Vinci Crisostomo.
SO ORDERED.[4]
On
Ruling
on the motion, the RTC in its May 9, 2002 Order, found that the petitioners’
Notice of Appeal was filed timely "only insofar as the Order of the Court
dated February 7, 2001 is concerned."
Hence, it disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal insofar as to all matters
not raised in the plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Reconsideration is DISMISSED.
Let a writ of
execution issue for the release of the mortgage on the parcel of land covered
by, and release to plaintiffs Transfer Certificate of Title No. 155994 and that
the injunction is made permanent.
Furnish copies of
this Order to Atty. Rafael Declaro, Jr., Atty. Da Vinci Crisostomo and Mr.
Sancho Esquillo.
SO ORDERED.[5]
On
June 7, 2002, a Writ of Execution in favor of the spouses Pelaez was issued and
on December 12, 2002, the RTC issued two Orders, one denying petitioners’
motion for reconsideration of the May 9, 2002 Order; and the other mandating
the release of the mortgage under TCT No. 155994 and causing the issuance of a
new title in the name of spouses Pelaez free from any liens or encumbrances.
Ruling of the
Court of Appeals
Petitioners
then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. The CA found that the September 14, 2000
Decision of the RTC had become final and executory. It found no cogent reason to disturb the
RTC's Decision and its subsequent amendment as embodied in the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[6]
After
the denial by the CA of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed the
present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.
Issues
Petitioners
raise the following issues:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed
grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction in holding the
trial court's decision to be final and executory notwithstanding that said
decision had been modified, superseded and substituted by a subsequent order
upon which petitioner had duly perfected an appeal?
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused
its discretion in holding that the petition for certiorari is not the right
judicial remedy but ordinary appeal notwithstanding the latter course of action
had already been availed of to no avail?
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed
grave abuse of discretion when in dismissing the petition for certiorari it
validated in effect the trial court's order to release the mortgage and
declaring the injunction permanent notwithstanding the loss of jurisdiction due
to the perfection of an appeal?[7]
Petitioners' Arguments
Petitioners
contend that their petition for certiorari is the proper remedy and that it was
filed on time within 60 days from their receipt of the CA's assailed
Resolution.
They
contend that the CA gravely abused its discretion when it regarded the
September 14, 2000 Decision of the trial court as final and executory even if
said Decision was already modified, superseded, vacated and substituted by the
subsequent February 7, 2001 Order.
They
also contend that it is grossly erroneous for the CA to conclude that the Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition is not the right judicial remedy but
ordinary appeal, when the latter action had already been taken and perfected by
petitioners but the trial court simply refused to elevate the records to the
CA.
Respondents' Arguments
Respondents
on the other hand contend that petitioners failed to demonstrate patent and
gross abuse of discretion on the part of the CA and since all they say is that
the CA erred in dismissing their petition, the CA Resolution can only be
assailed by means of a petition for review, not an original petition for certiorari. They also contend that the availability of
the remedy of filing a petition for review foreclosed the filing of this
original petition for certiorari and justifies its dismissal.
Respondents
also submit that the February 7, 2001 RTC Order granting the spouses Pelaez'
Partial Motion for Reconsideration by increasing the monetary awards only, did
not amend the RTC Decision but merely supplemented it. Thus, they contend that the finality of the
Decision was therefore not affected.
Our Ruling
The
petition has merit.
Mode
of Appeal
Petitioners
are questioning a final decision of the CA by resorting to Rule 65, when their
remedy should be based on Rule 45. This
case would normally have been dismissed outright for failure of the petitioners
to adopt the proper remedy. While
ordinarily, certiorari is unavailing where the appeal period has lapsed,
there are exceptions. Among them are (a)
when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the
broader interest of justice so requires; (c) when the writs issued are null and
void; or (d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of
judicial authority.[8] In the present case, the CA's act of
dismissing petitioners' petition for certiorari and in finding the RTC's
Decision already final and executory in its entirety, despite the filing
by the petitioners of a Notice of Appeal within 15 days from their receipt of
the February 7, 2001 RTC Order amending the said RTC Decision is an oppressive
exercise of judicial authority. Hence,
in the interest of substantial justice, we deem it wise to overlook the
procedural technicalities.
Trial
Court's Decision and Its Modification
Both
parties agree that the February 7, 2001 Order increased the monetary awards in
the Decision, specifically, the amount of overage from P23,820.16 to P843,383.11
and the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees from P50,000.00
to P2,000,000.00. They however,
differ on whether these changes constituted an amendment of the Decision or
merely provided a supplement to the Decision.
Petitioners argue that the change constituted a substantial amendment,
which therefore makes the entire case reviewable on appeal, while respondents
argue that the Order merely supplements the Decision which therefore makes only
the changes reviewable on appeal. They
both cite Esquivel v. Alegre[9]
which states:
There is a difference between an amended judgment and
a supplemental judgment. In an amended
and clarified judgment, the lower court makes a thorough study of the original
judgment and renders the amended and clarified judgment only after considering
all the factual and legal issues. The
amended and clarified decision is an entirely new decision which supersedes the
original decision. Following the court's
differentiation of a supplemental pleading from an amending pleading, it can be
said that a supplemental decision does not take the place or extinguish the
existence of the original. As its very
name denotes, it only serves to bolster or adds something to the primary
decision. A supplement exists side by
side with the original. It does not replace that which it supplements.
In
the present case, the dispositive portion of the
Hence,
we further take into consideration that what plaintiffs filed was merely a Partial
Motion for Reconsideration. It is
clear they were seeking a partial change in the original Decision. It follows that there were some parts of the Decision
that they sought to remain unchanged. The RTC, thus made a study of only a
portion of its original Decision and then amended the pertinent portion. The RTC Decision was indeed, only partially
amended. The February 7, 2001 Order
cannot be considered as a supplemental Decision because it cannot exist side by
side with the original pertinent portion on overage, damages and attorney's
fees. The former replaced and superceded
the latter.
Now
what is the effect of this partial amendment?
Is the subject RTC Decision divisible, such that a portion may be
considered already final and unappealable while another portion may be
considered as not yet final and unappealable? To answer this question we draw some light
from some provisions of the Rules of Court that permit divisions, to wit:
Rule 37, Sec. 7.
Partial new trial or reconsideration.- If the grounds for a
motion under this Rule appear to the court to affect the issues as to only a
part, or less than all of the matter in controversy, or only one, or less than
all, of the parties to it, the court may order a new trial or grant
reconsideration as to such issues if severable without
interfering with the judgment or final order upon the rest. (Italics and
emphasis supplied)
Rule 36, Sec. 5. Separate judgments.-When
more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, the court, at any
stage, upon a determination of the issues material to a particular claim
and all counterclaims arising out of the transaction or occurrence which is the
subject matter of the claim, may render a separate judgment disposing
of such claim. The judgment shall terminate the action with respect to the
claim so disposed of and the action shall proceed as to the remaining
claims.
It
can be seen that when matters, issues or claims can properly and conveniently
be separately resolved, then division is permitted, otherwise it is not. We see no hindrance in applying this thesis
to the current situation.
In the present
case, the matter of the release of the mortgaged property is material and
intertwined with the issue of the amount of overage as well as the issue on the
amount of damages.[10] It is difficult to separate these matters
because a determination of the correct amount of overage would require the
examination and computation of the entire account of deliveries and
payments. Necessarily, upon
re-examination of the subject account during an appeal, the possibility of
finding a shortage instead of an overage is present. And dependent on the result of the
re-examination of the entire account is the determination of the correctness of
either the foreclosure or release of the mortgaged property. It follows that the ruling on the amount of
damages and attorney's fees, if any, may also be affected by a re-examination
of the entire account.
As
the disposition of some inter-related issues in the original RTC Decision were
materially amended by the
Appeal and Partial Execution
Petitioners
received their copy of the
When
an appeal had been duly perfected, execution of the judgment, whether wholly or
partially,[12]
was not a matter of right, but of discretion provided good reasons therefor
existed. The compelling grounds for the
issuance of the writ must be stated in a special order after due hearing. Aside from the existence of good reasons, the
rules also require that the motion for partial execution should have been filed
while the trial court still had jurisdiction over the case.[13]
In the present
case, the RTC's
Furthermore, the
motion for partial execution was filed only on
Aside
from the fact that the appeal was filed on time and should thus not have been
dismissed in the assailed May 9, 2002 Order, the said Order, which also resolved
the motion for partial execution, fell short of the requirements of Section 2,
Rule 39, as previously discussed. Where the order of execution is not in
conformity with the rules, the same is null and void.[15]
Therefore, the CA erred in not nullifying the
Finally, we
address the
WHEREFORE, the petition
is GRANTED. The assailed May 31, 2004 Decision and
January 17, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 75347
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
SO
ORDERED.
MARIANO
C.
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
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ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice |
JOSE
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] CA rollo, pp. 334-340; penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and concurred in by Presiding Justice Cancio C. Garcia and Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin.
[2]
[3] Rollo, pp. 136-137.
[4]
[5] CA rollo, pp. 241-242.
[6] Rollo, p. 229.
[7]
[8] Martillano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 148277, June 29, 2004, 433 SCRA 195, 201; Sps. Go v. Tong, 462 Phil. 256, 266 (2003); Uy Chua v. Court of Appeals, 398 Phil. 17, 30 (2000).
[9] 254 Phil. 316, 325-326 (1989).
[10] Cf. De Leon v. Court of Appeals, 432 Phil 775, 786-787 (2002); Bangkok Bank Public Company Limited v. Lee, G.R. No. 159806, January 20, 2006, 479 SCRA 267, 273.
[11] Cf. De
[12] Rules of Court, Rule 39, Section 2(b).
[13] Rules of Court, Rule 39, Section 2 provides:
Sec.
2. Discretionary execution. – (a)
Execution of a judgment or a final order pending appeal.- On motion of
the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party filed in the trial court while it has jurisdiction over the case
and is in possession of either the original record or the record on appeal,
as the case may be, at the time of the filing of such motion, said court may,
in its discretion, order execution of a judgment or final order even before the
expiration of the period to appeal.
After the
trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending appeal may
be filed in the appellate court.
Discretionary execution may only issue
upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing.
(b) Execution of several, separate or partial judgments. - A several, separate or partial judgment may be executed under the same terms and conditions as execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal.
[14] Rules of Court, Rule 41, Section 9: [P]rior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal, the court may issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance with section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal.
[15]