Republic of the
Supreme
Court
|
ATTY.
SYLVIA BANDA, CONSORICIA O. PENSON, RADITO V. PADRIGANO, JEAN R. DE MESA,
LEAH P. DELA CRUZ, ANDY V. MACASAQUIT, SENEN B. CORDOBA, ALBERT BRILLANTES,
GLORIA BISDA, JOVITA V. CONCEPCION, TERESITA G. CARVAJAL, ROSANNA T.
MALIWANAG, RICHARD ODERON, CECILIA ESTERNON, BENEDICTO CABRAL, MA. VICTORIA
E. LAROCO, CESAR ANDRA, FELICISIMO GALACIO, ELSA R. CALMA, FILOMENA A.
GALANG, JEAN PAUL MELEGRITO, CLARO G. SANTIAGO, JR., EDUARDO FRIAS, REYNALDO
O. ANDAL, NEPHTALIE IMPERIO, RUEL BALAGTAS, VICTOR R. ORTIZ, FRANCISCO P.
REYES, JR., ELISEO M. BALAGOT, JR., JOSE C. MONSALVE, JR., ARTURO ADSUARA,
F.C. LADRERO, JR., NELSON PADUA, MARCELA C. SAYAO, ANGELITO MALAKAS, GLORIA
RAMENTO, JULIANA SUPLEO, MANUEL MENDRIQUE, E. TAYLAN, CARMELA BOBIS, DANILO
VARGAS, ROY-LEO C. PABLO, ALLAN VILLANUEVA, VICENTE R. VELASCO, JR., IMELDA
ERENO, FLORIZA M. CATIIS, RANIEL R. BASCO, E. JALIJALI, MARIO C. CARAAN,
DOLORES M. AVIADO, MICHAEL P. LAPLANA, GUILLERMO G. SORIANO, ALICE E. SOJO,
ARTHUR G. NARNE, LETICIA SORIANO, FEDERICO RAMOS, JR., PETERSON CAAMPUED,
RODELIO L. GOMEZ, ANTONIO D. GARCIA, JR., ANTONIO GALO, A. SANCHEZ, SOL E.
TAMAYO, JOSEPHINE A.M. COCJIN, DAMIAN QUINTO, JR., EDLYN MARIANO, M.A.
MALANUM, ALFREDO S. ESTRELLA, and JESUS MEL SAYO, Petitioners, -
versus - EDUARDO R.
ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, The Director General of the Philippine Information Agency
and The National Treasurer, Respondents. |
|
G.R. No.
166620
Present: PUNO, C.J., CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, ABAD,* VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: April 20, 2010 |
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The present
controversy arose from a Petition for Certiorari and prohibition
challenging the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 378 dated
The NPO was formed on
SECTION 6. Creation of the National Printing Office. – There is hereby created a National Printing Office out of the merger of the Government Printing Office and the relevant printing units of the Philippine Information Agency. The Office shall have exclusive printing jurisdiction over the following:
a. Printing, binding and distribution of all standard and accountable forms of national, provincial, city and municipal governments, including government corporations;
b. Printing of officials ballots;
c. Printing of public documents such as the Official Gazette, General Appropriations Act, Philippine Reports, and development information materials of the Philippine Information Agency.
The Office may also accept other government printing jobs, including government publications, aside from those enumerated above, but not in an exclusive basis.
The details of the organization, powers, functions, authorities, and related management aspects of the Office shall be provided in the implementing details which shall be prepared and promulgated in accordance with Section II of this Executive Order.
The Office shall be attached to the Philippine Information Agency.
On
SECTION 1. The NPO shall continue to provide printing services to government agencies and instrumentalities as mandated by law. However, it shall no longer enjoy exclusive jurisdiction over the printing services requirements of the government over standard and accountable forms. It shall have to compete with the private sector, except in the printing of election paraphernalia which could be shared with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, upon the discretion of the Commission on Elections consistent with the provisions of the Election Code of 1987.
SECTION 2. Government agencies/instrumentalities may source printing services outside NPO provided that:
2.1 The printing services to be provided by the private sector is superior in quality and at a lower cost than what is offered by the NPO; and
2.2 The private printing provider is flexible in terms of meeting the target completion time of the government agency.
SECTION 3. In the exercise of its functions, the amount to be appropriated for the programs, projects and activities of the NPO in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) shall be limited to its income without additional financial support from the government. (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 378, government agencies and instrumentalities are allowed to source their printing services from the private sector through competitive bidding, subject to the condition that the services offered by the private supplier be of superior quality and lower in cost compared to what was offered by the NPO. Executive Order No. 378 also limited NPO’s appropriation in the General Appropriations Act to its income.
Perceiving
Executive Order No. 378 as a threat to their security of tenure as employees of
the NPO, petitioners now challenge its constitutionality, contending that: (1)
it is beyond the executive powers of President Arroyo to amend or repeal Executive
Order No. 285 issued by former
President Aquino when the latter still exercised legislative powers; and (2)
Executive Order No. 378 violates petitioners’ security of tenure, because it
paves the way for the gradual abolition of the NPO.
We
dismiss the petition.
Before
proceeding to resolve the substantive issues, the Court must first delve into a
procedural matter. Since petitioners instituted this case as a class suit, the
Court, thus, must first determine if the petition indeed qualifies as one. In Board
of Optometry v. Colet,[2] we
held that “[c]ourts must exercise utmost caution before allowing a class suit,
which is the exception to the requirement of joinder of all indispensable
parties. For while no difficulty may
arise if the decision secured is favorable to the plaintiffs, a quandary would
result if the decision were otherwise as those who were deemed impleaded by
their self-appointed representatives would certainly claim denial of due
process.”
Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines a class suit, as follows:
Sec. 12. Class suit. – When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the court finds to be sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully protect the interests of all concerned may sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the right to intervene to protect his individual interest.
From the foregoing definition, the requisites of a class suit are: 1) the subject matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons; 2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and 3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and can fully protect the interests of all concerned.
In Mathay v. The Consolidated Bank and Trust
Company,[3] the Court held that:
An action does not become a class suit merely because it is designated as such in the pleadings. Whether the suit is or is not a class suit depends upon the attending facts, and the complaint, or other pleading initiating the class action should allege the existence of the necessary facts, to wit, the existence of a subject matter of common interest, and the existence of a class and the number of persons in the alleged class, in order that the court might be enabled to determine whether the members of the class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, to contrast the number appearing on the record with the number in the class and to determine whether claimants on record adequately represent the class and the subject matter of general or common interest. (Emphases ours.)
Here,
the petition failed to state the number of NPO employees who would be affected
by the assailed Executive Order and who were allegedly represented by
petitioners. It was the Solicitor
General, as counsel for respondents, who pointed out that there were about 549
employees in the NPO.[4] The 67 petitioners undeniably comprised a
small fraction of the NPO employees whom they claimed to represent. Subsequently, 32 of the original petitioners
executed an Affidavit of Desistance, while one signed a letter denying ever
signing the petition,[5]
ostensibly reducing the number of petitioners to 34. We note that counsel for the petitioners
challenged the validity of the desistance or withdrawal of some of the
petitioners and insinuated that such desistance was due to pressure from people
“close to the seat of power.”[6] Still, even if we were to disregard the
affidavit of desistance filed by some of the petitioners, it is highly doubtful
that a sufficient, representative number of NPO employees have instituted this
purported class suit. A perusal of the
petition itself would show that of the 67 petitioners who signed the
Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, only 20 petitioners were in
fact mentioned in the jurat as having
duly subscribed the petition before the notary public. In other words, only 20 petitioners
effectively instituted the present case.
Indeed,
in MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic
Da’wah Council of the Philippines, Inc.,[7] we
observed that an element of a class suit or representative suit is the adequacy of representation. In determining the question of fair and
adequate representation of members of a class, the court must consider (a)
whether the interest of the named party is coextensive with the interest of the
other members of the class; (b) the proportion of those made a party, as it so
bears, to the total membership of the class; and (c) any other factor bearing
on the ability of the named party to speak for the rest of the class.
Previously,
we held in Ibañes v. Roman Catholic
Church[8]
that where the interests of the plaintiffs and the other members of the class
they seek to represent are diametrically opposed, the class suit will not
prosper.
It is
worth mentioning that a Manifestation of Desistance,[9] to
which the previously mentioned Affidavit of Desistance[10]
was attached, was filed by the President of the National Printing Office
Workers Association (NAPOWA). The said
manifestation expressed NAPOWA’s opposition to the filing of the instant
petition in any court. Even if we take
into account the contention of petitioners’ counsel that the NAPOWA President
had no legal standing to file such manifestation, the said pleading is a clear
indication that there is a divergence of opinions and views among the members
of the class sought to be represented, and not all are in favor of filing the
present suit. There is here an apparent
conflict between petitioners’ interests and those of the persons whom they
claim to represent. Since it cannot be
said that petitioners sufficiently represent the interests of the entire class,
the instant case cannot be properly treated as a class suit.
As to
the merits of the case, the petition raises two main grounds to assail the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 378:
First, it is contended that President
Arroyo cannot amend or repeal Executive Order No. 285 by the mere issuance of
another executive order (Executive Order No. 378). Petitioners maintain that former President
Aquino’s Executive Order No. 285 is a legislative enactment, as the same was
issued while President Aquino still had legislative powers under the Freedom
Constitution;[11] thus,
only Congress through legislation can validly amend Executive Order No. 285.
Second, petitioners maintain that the
issuance of Executive Order No. 378 would lead to the eventual abolition of the
NPO and would violate the security of tenure of NPO employees.
Anent
the first ground raised in the petition, we find the same patently without
merit.
It is a
well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the power to
reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with
the President’s constitutionally granted power of control over executive
offices and by virtue of previous delegation of the legislative power to
reorganize executive offices under existing statutes.
In Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v.
Sec. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office. – The President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he may take any of the following actions:
(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the immediate Offices, the President Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another;
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the President from other Departments and Agencies; and
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other Departments or agencies. (Emphases ours.)
Interpreting
the foregoing provision, we held in Buklod
ng Kawaning EIIB, thus:
But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any department or agency in the executive branch does not have to end here. We must not lose sight of the very source of the power – that which constitutes an express grant of power. Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987), “the President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President.” For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. In Canonizado v. Aguirre [323 SCRA 312 (2000)], we ruled that reorganization “involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions.” It takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the Department of Finance. It falls under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the President’s continuing authority to reorganize.[13] (Emphasis ours.)
It is undisputed that the NPO, as an
agency that is part of the Office of the Press Secretary (which in various
times has been an agency directly attached to the Office of the Press Secretary
or as an agency under the Philippine Information Agency), is part of the Office
of the President.[14]
Pertinent to the case at bar, Section
31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 quoted above authorizes the President (a)
to restructure the internal
organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the immediate
Offices, the President Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff
Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or
transferring functions from one unit to another, and (b) to transfer functions
or offices from the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency
in the Executive Branch, and vice versa.
Concomitant to such power to abolish,
merge or consolidate offices in the Office of the President Proper and to transfer
functions/offices not only among the offices in the Office of President Proper
but also the rest of the Office of the President and the Executive Branch, the
President implicitly has the power to effect less radical or less substantive
changes to the functional and internal structure of the Office of the
President, including the modification of functions of such executive agencies
as the exigencies of the service may require.
In the case at bar, there was neither
an abolition of the NPO nor a removal of any of its functions to be transferred
to another agency. Under the assailed
Executive Order No. 378, the NPO remains the main printing arm of the
government for all kinds of government forms and publications but in the
interest of greater economy and encouraging efficiency and profitability, it
must now compete with the private sector for certain government printing jobs,
with the exception of election paraphernalia which remains the exclusive
responsibility of the NPO, together with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, as
the Commission on Elections may determine.
At most, there was a mere alteration of the main function of the NPO by
limiting the exclusivity of its printing responsibility to election forms.[15]
There is a view that the
reorganization actions that the President may take with respect to agencies in
the Office of the President are strictly limited to transfer of functions and
offices as seemingly provided in Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987.
However, Section 20, Chapter 7, Title
I, Book III of the same Code significantly provides:
Sec. 20. Residual Powers. – Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided for under the laws and which are not specifically enumerated above, or which are not delegated by the President in accordance with law. (Emphasis ours.)
Pursuant to Section 20, the power of
the President to reorganize the Executive Branch under Section 31 includes such
powers and functions that may be provided for under other laws. To be sure, an inclusive and broad
interpretation of the President’s power to reorganize executive offices has
been consistently supported by specific provisions in general appropriations laws.
In the oft-cited
Larin v. Executive Secretary,[16]
the Court likewise adverted to
certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7645, the general appropriations law for
1993, as among the statutory bases for the President’s power to reorganize
executive agencies, to wit:
Section 48 of R.A. 7645 provides that:
“Sec. 48. Scaling Down and Phase Out of Activities of
Agencies Within the Executive Branch. — The heads of departments, bureaus and
offices and agencies are hereby directed to identify their respective
activities which are no longer essential in the delivery of public services and
which may be scaled down, phased out or abolished, subject to civil [service]
rules and regulations. x x x. Actual
scaling down, phasing out or abolition of the activities shall be effected pursuant
to Circulars or Orders issued
for the purpose by the Office of the President.”
Said provision clearly mentions the acts of "scaling down, phasing out and abolition" of offices only and does not cover the creation of offices or transfer of functions. Nevertheless, the act of creating and decentralizing is included in the subsequent provision of Section 62, which provides that:
“Sec. 62. Unauthorized
organizational changes. — Unless otherwise created by law or directed by the
President of the Philippines, no organizational unit or changes in key
positions in any department or agency shall be authorized in their respective
organization structures and be funded from appropriations by this Act.”
The foregoing provision evidently shows that the President is authorized to effect organizational changes including the creation of offices in the department or agency concerned.
The contention of petitioner that the two provisions are riders deserves scant consideration. Well settled is the rule that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Unless and until a specific provision of the law is declared invalid and unconstitutional, the same is valid and binding for all intents and purposes.[17] (Emphases ours)
Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora,[18]
where the Court upheld as valid then President Joseph Estrada’s Executive Order
No. 191 “deactivating” the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau
(EIIB) of the Department of Finance, hewed closely to the reasoning in Larin. The Court, among others, also traced from the General Appropriations Act[19]
the President’s authority to effect organizational changes in the department or
agency under the executive structure, thus:
We adhere to the precedent or ruling in Larin that this provision recognizes the authority of the President to effect organizational changes in the department or agency under the executive structure. Such a ruling further finds support in Section 78 of Republic Act No. 8760. Under this law, the heads of departments, bureaus, offices and agencies and other entities in the Executive Branch are directed (a) to conduct a comprehensive review of their respective mandates, missions, objectives, functions, programs, projects, activities and systems and procedures; (b) identify activities which are no longer essential in the delivery of public services and which may be scaled down, phased-out or abolished; and (c) adopt measures that will result in the streamlined organization and improved overall performance of their respective agencies. Section 78 ends up with the mandate that the actual streamlining and productivity improvement in agency organization and operation shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the purpose by the Office of the President. x x x.[20] (Emphasis ours)
Notably,
in the present case, the 2003 General Appropriations Act, which was reenacted
in 2004 (the year of the issuance of Executive Order No. 378), likewise gave
the President the authority to effect a wide variety of organizational changes
in any department or agency in the Executive Branch. Sections 77 and 78 of said
Act provides:
Section
77. Organized Changes. – Unless otherwise provided by law or
directed by the President of the
Section 78. Institutional
Strengthening and Productivity Improvement in Agency Organization and
Operations and Implementation of Organization/Reorganization Mandated by
Law. The Government shall adopt institutional strengthening and productivity improvement
measures to improve service delivery and enhance productivity in the
government, as directed by the President of the
Implicitly, the aforequoted
provisions in the appropriations law recognize the power of the President to
reorganize even executive offices already funded by the said appropriations
act, including the power to implement structural,
functional, and operational adjustments in the executive bureaucracy and,
in so doing, modify or realign appropriations of funds as may be necessary
under such reorganization. Thus, insofar
as petitioners protest the limitation of the NPO’s appropriations to its own
income under Executive Order No. 378, the same is statutorily authorized by the
above provisions.
In the 2003 case of Bagaoisan v. National Tobacco Administration,[21]
we upheld the “streamlining” of the National Tobacco Administration through a
reduction of its personnel and deemed the same as included in the power of the
President to reorganize executive offices granted under the laws,
notwithstanding that such streamlining neither involved an abolition nor a
transfer of functions of an office. To
quote the relevant portion of that decision:
In the recent case of Rosa Ligaya C. Domingo, et al. vs. Hon. Ronaldo D. Zamora, in his capacity as the Executive Secretary, et al., this Court has had occasion to also delve on the President’s power to reorganize the Office of the President under Section 31(2) and (3) of Executive Order No. 292 and the power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper. x x x
x x x x
The first sentence of the law is an express grant to the President of a continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. The succeeding numbered paragraphs are not in the nature of provisos that unduly limit the aim and scope of the grant to the President of the power to reorganize but are to be viewed in consonance therewith. Section 31(1) of Executive Order No. 292 specifically refers to the President’s power to restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units hereof or transferring functions from one unit to another, while Section 31(2) and (3) concern executive offices outside the Office of the President Proper allowing the President to transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency and vice-versa, and the transfer of any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or agency and vice-versa.
In the present instance, involving neither an abolition nor transfer of offices, the assailed action is a mere reorganization under the general provisions of the law consisting mainly of streamlining the NTA in the interest of simplicity, economy and efficiency. It is an act well within the authority of the President motivated and carried out, according to the findings of the appellate court, in good faith, a factual assessment that this Court could only but accept.[22] (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
In the
more recent case of Tondo Medical Center
Employees Association v. Court of Appeals,[23] which involved a structural and functional reorganization of the Department of Health
under an executive order, we reiterated the principle that the power of the
President to reorganize agencies under the executive department by executive or
administrative order is constitutionally and statutorily recognized. We held in that case:
This Court has already ruled in a number of cases that the President may, by executive or administrative order, direct the reorganization of government entities under the Executive Department. This is also sanctioned under the Constitution, as well as other statutes.
Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, clearly states: “[T]he president shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices.” Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of Executive Order No. 292, also known as the Administrative Code of 1987 reads:
SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office - The President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he may take any of the following actions:
x x x x
In Domingo v. Zamora [445 Phil. 7 (2003)], this Court explained the rationale behind the President’s continuing authority under the Administrative Code to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. The law grants the President the power to reorganize the Office of the President in recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his or her office “to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.” To remain effective and efficient, it must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner the Chief Executive deems fit to carry out presidential directives and policies.
The Administrative Code provides that the Office of the President consists of the Office of the President Proper and the agencies under it. The agencies under the Office of the President are identified in Section 23, Chapter 8, Title II of the Administrative Code:
Sec. 23. The Agencies under the Office of the President.—The agencies under the Office of the President refer to those offices placed under the chairmanship of the President, those under the supervision and control of the President, those under the administrative supervision of the Office of the President, those attached to it for policy and program coordination, and those that are not placed by law or order creating them under any specific department.
x x x x
The power of the President to reorganize the executive department is likewise recognized in general appropriations laws. x x x.
x x x x
Clearly, Executive Order No. 102 is well within the constitutional power of the President to issue. The President did not usurp any legislative prerogative in issuing Executive Order No. 102. It is an exercise of the President’s constitutional power of control over the executive department, supported by the provisions of the Administrative Code, recognized by other statutes, and consistently affirmed by this Court.[24] (Emphases supplied.)
Subsequently,
we ruled in Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. Executive Secretary[25]
that:
The Constitution’s express grant of the power of control in the President justifies an executive action to carry out reorganization measures under a broad authority of law.
In enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to have deliberated with full knowledge of all existing laws and jurisprudence on the subject. It is thus reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute which places an agency under the Office of the President, it was in accordance with existing laws and jurisprudence on the President’s power to reorganize.
In establishing an executive department, bureau or office, the legislature necessarily ordains an executive agency’s position in the scheme of administrative structure. Such determination is primary, but subject to the President’s continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure. As far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are concerned, the power of control may justify the President to deactivate the functions of a particular office. Or a law may expressly grant the President the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures. The Administrative Code of 1987 is one such law.[26]
The issuance of Executive Order No. 378 by President Arroyo is an exercise of a delegated legislative power granted by the aforementioned Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987, which provides for the continuing authority of the President to reorganize the Office of the President, “in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.” This is a matter already well-entrenched in jurisprudence. The reorganization of such an office through executive or administrative order is also recognized in the Administrative Code of 1987. Sections 2 and 3, Chapter 2, Title I, Book III of the said Code provide:
Sec. 2. Executive Orders. - Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in executive orders.
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. - Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders. (Emphases supplied.)
To
reiterate, we find nothing objectionable in the provision in Executive Order
No. 378 limiting the appropriation of the NPO to its own income. Beginning with Larin and in subsequent cases, the Court has noted certain
provisions in the general appropriations laws as likewise reflecting the
power of the President to reorganize executive offices or agencies even to the
extent of modifying and realigning appropriations for that purpose.
Petitioners’
contention that the issuance of Executive Order No. 378 is an invalid exercise
of legislative power on the part of the President has no legal leg to stand on.
In all,
Executive Order No. 378, which purports to institute necessary reforms in
government in order to improve and upgrade efficiency in the delivery of public
services by redefining the functions of the NPO and limiting its funding to its
own income and to transform it into a self-reliant agency able to compete with
the private sector, is well within the prerogative of President Arroyo under
her continuing delegated legislative power to reorganize her own office. As pointed out in the separate concurring
opinion of our learned colleague, Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, the
objective behind Executive Order No. 378 is wholly consistent with the state
policy contained in Republic Act No. 9184 or the Government Procurement Reform
Act to encourage competitiveness by extending equal opportunity to private
contracting parties who are eligible and qualified.[27]
To be
very clear, this delegated legislative power to reorganize pertains only to the
Office of the President and the departments, offices and agencies of the
executive branch and does not include the Judiciary, the Legislature or the
constitutionally-created or mandated bodies.
Moreover, it must be stressed that the exercise by the President of the
power to reorganize the executive department must be in accordance with the
Constitution, relevant laws and prevailing jurisprudence.
In this
regard, we are mindful of the previous pronouncement of this Court in Dario v. Mison[28]
that:
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in “good faith” if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the “abolition,” which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid “abolition” takes place and whatever “abolition” is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid “abolition” as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds. (Emphasis ours.)
Stated
alternatively, the presidential power to reorganize agencies and offices in the
executive branch of government is
subject to the condition that such reorganization is carried out in good faith.
If the reorganization is done in good faith,
the abolition of positions, which results in loss of security of tenure of
affected government employees, would be valid.
In Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v.
This
brings us to the second ground raised in the petition – that Executive Order No. 378, in allowing government agencies to
secure their printing requirements from the private sector and in limiting the
budget of the NPO to its income, will purportedly lead to the gradual abolition
of the NPO and the loss of security of tenure of its present employees. In other words, petitioners avow that the
reorganization of the NPO under Executive Order No. 378 is tainted with bad
faith. The basic evidentiary rule is
that he who asserts a fact or
the affirmative of an issue has the burden of proving it.[31]
A
careful review of the records will show that petitioners utterly failed to
substantiate their claim. They failed to
allege, much less prove, sufficient facts to show that the limitation of the
NPO’s budget to its own income would indeed lead to the abolition of the
position, or removal from office, of any employee. Neither did petitioners present any shred of
proof of their assertion that the changes in the functions of the NPO were for
political considerations that had nothing to do with improving the efficiency
of, or encouraging operational economy in, the said agency.
In sum, the Court finds that the petition failed to show any
constitutional infirmity or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in President Arroyo’s issuance of Executive Order No.
378.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the prayer for a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby DENIED.
No costs.
SO
ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIOAssociate Justice
|
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
|
|
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice
|
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice
|
|
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
ARTURO D. BRIONAssociate Justice |
|
DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA Associate Justice
|
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
|
|
MARIANO C.
Associate Justice |
On official
leave ROBERTO A.
ABAD Associate Justice |
|
MARTIN S.
VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice |
JOSE P.
PEREZ Associate Justice |
JOSE C. MENDOZA
Associate Justice
C E R T I F
I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions
in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* On official leave.
[1] ABOLISHING THE GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION AND TRANSFERRING ITS FUNCTIONS TO APPROPRIATE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES.
[2] 328 Phil. 1187, 1204 (1996).
[3] 157 Phil. 551, 563-564 (1974).
[4] Respondents’ Comment on the Manifestation of Desistance, rollo, p. 86.
[5]
[6]
[7] 444 Phil. 230, 257 (2003); citing 59 Am Jur 2d, 456 (1977).
[8] 12 Phil. 227, 241 (1908).
[9] Rollo, p. 29.
[10]
[11] DECLARING NATIONAL POLICY TO IMPLEMENT THE REFORMS MANDATED BY THE PEOPLE, PROTECTING THEIR BASIC RIGHTS, ADOPTING A PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION, AND PROVIDING FOR AN ORDERLY TRANSITION TO A GOVERNMENT UNDER A NEW CONSTITUTION.
[12] 413 Phil. 281 (2001).
[13]
[14] Section 23, Chapter 8, Title II, Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides:
Section 23. The Agencies under the Office of the President. - The agencies under the Office of the President refer to those offices placed under the chairmanship of the President, those under the supervision and control of the President, those under the administrative supervision of the Office of the President, those attached to it for policy and program coordination, and those that are not placed by law or order creating them under any specific department.
[15] Subsequently, in order to harmonize
Executive Order No. 378 with other executive issuances and laws relating to the
printing of government forms, President Arroyo, through the Executive
Secretary, issued Memorandum Circular No. 180 (dated
[16] G.R. No. 112745,
[17]
[18] Supra note 12.
[19] Republic Act 8760, signed into law
on
[20] Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, supra note 12 at 293-294.
[21] 455 Phil. 761 (2003).
[22]
[23] G.R. No. 167324,
[24]
[25] G.R. No. 166052,
[26]
[27] It is, however, highly debatable whether Executive Order No. 378 is a mere implementation of the Government Procurement Reform Act, as Justice Carpio proposes, since there is nothing in the said statute that authorizes modification of the functions or appropriations of an executive office or agency.
[28] G.R. Nos. 81954, 81967, 82023,
83737, 85310, 85335 and 86241,
[29] Supra note 12.
[30]
[31] Eureka Personnel & Management Services, Inc. v. Valencia, G.R. No. 159358, July 15, 2009, citing Republic v. Orbecido III, G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA 114; Noceda v. Court of Appeals, 372 Phil. 383 (1999); Luxuria Homes, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 989 (1999).