Republic of the
Supreme Court
SECOND DIVISION
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ATTY. PEDRO M. FERRER, |
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G.R. No. 165300 |
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Petitioner, |
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Present: |
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- versus - |
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CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson, |
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BRION, |
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SPOUSES ALFREDO DIAZ |
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ABAD, |
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and IMELDA DIAZ, |
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REINA COMANDANTE and |
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PEREZ, JJ. |
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SPOUSES BIENVENIDO |
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PANGAN and ELIZABETH PANGAN, |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondents. |
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April 23, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
The basic
questions to be resolved in this case are:
Is a waiver of hereditary rights
in favor of another executed by a future heir while the parents are still
living valid? Is an adverse claim annotated on the title of a property on the basis
of such waiver likewise valid and effective as to bind the subsequent owners
and hold them liable to the claimant?
This Petition
for Review on Certiorari[1]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the
The parties’
respective versions of the factual antecedents are as follows:
Version of the Petitioner
Petitioner Atty. Ferrer claimed in his original
Complaint[6]
that on P1,118,228.00. The loan was secured by a Real Estate
Mortgage Contract[8] by
way of second mortgage over Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-6604[9]
and a Promissory Note[10]
payable within six months or up to
Petitioner further claimed that prior to this
or on P600,000.00, which amount
formed part of the abovementioned secured loan, executed in his favor an
instrument entitled Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real
Property (Still Undivided),[11]
the pertinent portions of which read:
I, REINA D. COMANDANTE, of legal age, Filipino, married, with residence
and postal address at No. 6, Road 20, Project 8, Quezon City, Metro Manila,
Philippines, for a valuable consideration of SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P600,000.00)
which constitutes my legal obligation/loan to Pedro M. Ferrer, likewise of
legal age, Filipino, married to Erlinda B. Ferrer, with residence and postal
address at No. 9, Lot 4, Puerto Rico Street, Loyola Grand Villas, Quezon City,
Metro Manila, Philippines, by virtue of these presents, do hereby WAIVE, and/or
REPUDIATE all my hereditary rights and interests as a legitimate heir/daughter
of Sps. Alfredo T. Diaz and Imelda G. Diaz in favor of said Pedro M. Ferrer,
his heirs and assigns over a certain parcel of land together with all the
improvements found thereon and which property is more particularly described as
follows:
TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
NO. RT-6604 (82020) PR-18887
x x x x
and which property is titled and registered in the name of my parents
Alfredo T. Diaz and Imelda G. Diaz, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. RT 6604 (82020) PR-18887.
(sgd.)
REINA
D. COMANDANTE
Affiant
On the basis of said waiver, petitioner
executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim[12]
which he caused to be annotated at the back of TCT No. RT-6604 on
The Diazes, however, reneged on their
obligation as the checks issued by Comandante were dishonored upon presentment.
Despite repeated demands, said
respondents still failed and refused to settle the loan. Thus, petitioner filed on
Petitioner twice amended his complaint. First, by including as an alternative relief
the Judicial Foreclosure of Mortgage[14]
and, second, by impleading as additional defendants the Pangans as the mortgaged
property covered by TCT No. RT-6604 was already transferred under their names in
TCT No. N-209049. Petitioner prayed in
his second amended complaint that all the respondents be ordered to jointly and
solidarily pay him the sum of P1,118,228.00, exclusive of interests,
and/or for the judicial foreclosure of the property pursuant to the Real Estate
Mortgage Contract.
Version of the Respondents
In her Answer[15]
to petitioner’s original complaint, Comandante alleged that petitioner and his
wife were her fellow members in the Couples for Christ Movement. Sometime in 1998, she sought the help of
petitioner with regard to the mortgage with a bank of her parents’ lot located
at No. 6, Rd. 20, Project 8, P500,000.00. Comandante, however, claimed that these loans
were secured by chattel mortgages over her taxi units in addition to several
postdated checks she issued in favor of petitioner.
As she could not practically comply with her
obligation, petitioner and his wife, presented to Comandante sometime in May
1998 a document denominated as Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a
Real Property (Still Undivided) pertaining to a waiver of her hereditary share
over her parents’ abovementioned property.
Purportedly, the execution of said waiver was to secure Comandante’s
loan with the couple which at that time had already ballooned to P600,000.00
due to interests.
A year later, the couple again required
Comandante to sign the following documents: (1) a Real Estate Mortgage Contract
over her parents’ property; and, (2) an undated Promissory Note, both
corresponding to the amount of P1,118,228.00, which petitioner claimed
to be the total amount of Comandante’s monetary obligation to him exclusive of
charges and interests. Comandante alleged that she reminded petitioner that she
was not the registered owner of the subject property and that although her
parents granted her SPA, same only pertains to her authority to mortgage the
property to banks and other financial institutions and not to individuals. Petitioner nonetheless assured Comandante that
the SPA was also applicable to their transaction. As Comandante was still
hesitant, petitioner and his wife threatened to foreclose the former’s taxi
units and present the postdated checks she issued to the bank for payment. For fear of losing her taxi units which were
the only source of her livelihood, Comandante was thus constrained to sign the
mortgage agreement as well as the promissory note. Petitioner, however, did not furnish her with
copies of said documents on the pretext that they still have to be notarized, but,
as can be gleaned from the records, the documents were never notarized. Moreover, Comandante claimed that the SPA
alluded to by petitioner in his complaint was not the same SPA under which she
thought she derived the authority to execute the mortgage contract.
Comandante likewise alleged that on September
29, 1999 at 10:00 o‘ clock in the morning, she executed an Affidavit of
Repudiation/Revocation of Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over A
(Still Undivided) Real Property,[16]
which she caused to be annotated on the title of the subject property with the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on the same day. Interestingly, petitioner
filed his complaint later that day too.
By way of special and affirmative defenses,
Comandante asserted in her Answer to the amended complaint[17]
that said complaint states no cause of action against her because the Real
Estate Mortgage Contract and the waiver referred to by petitioner in his
complaint were not duly, knowingly and validly executed by her; that the Waiver
of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) is a
useless document as its execution is prohibited by Article 1347 of the Civil
Code,[18]
hence, it cannot be the source of any right or obligation in petitioner’s favor;
that the Real Estate Mortgage was of doubtful validity as she executed the same
without valid authority from her parents; and, that the prayer for collection
and/or judicial foreclosure was irregular as petitioner cannot seek said
remedies at the same time.
Apart from executing the affidavit of
repudiation, Comandante also filed on
For their part, the Diazes asserted that
petitioner has no cause of action against them.
They claimed that they do not even know petitioner and that they did not
execute any SPA in favor of Comandante authorizing her to mortgage for the
second time the subject property. They also
contested the due execution of the SPA as it was neither authenticated before
the Philippine Consulate in the
At the Pangans’ end, they alleged that they
acquired the subject property by purchase in good faith and for a consideration
of P3,000,000.00 on
However, on
As affirmative defense, the Pangans asserted
that the annotation of petitioner’s adverse claim on TCT No. RT-6604 cannot
impair their rights as new owners of the subject property. They claimed that the Waiver of Hereditary
Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) upon which petitioner’s
adverse claim is anchored cannot be the source of any right or interest over
the property considering that it is null and void under paragraph 2 of Article
1347 of the Civil Code.
Moreover, the Pangans asserted that the Real
Estate Mortgage Contract cannot bind them nor in any way impair their ownership
of subject property because it was not registered before the Register of Deeds.[23]
All the respondents interposed their
respective counterclaims and prayed for moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees in varying amounts.
After the parties have submitted their
respective pre-trial briefs, the Diazes filed on March 29, 2001 a Motion for
Summary Judgment[24] alleging
that: first, since the documents alluded to by petitioner in his
complaint were defective, he was not entitled to any legal right or relief; and,
second, it was clear from the pleadings that it is Comandante who has an
outstanding obligation with petitioner which the latter never denied. With these, the Diazes believed that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact against them and, hence, they were
entitled to summary judgment.
On
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
After the filing of the parties’ respective
Oppositions to the said motions for summary judgment, the trial court, in an
Order dated
WHEREFORE, premises considered, summary judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of plaintiff and against defendants by:
a)
ORDERING all defendants jointly and
solidarily to pay plaintiff the sum of ONE MILLION ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEEN
THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT PESOS (P1,118,228.00) which is blood
money of plaintiff;
b)
ORDERING the Honorable Registrar of Deeds of
Quezon City that the rights and interest of the plaintiff over subject property
be annotated at the back of T.C.T. No. N-209049;
c)
SENTENCING all defendants to pay plaintiff’s
expenses of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) and to pay the costs of
suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[28]
The
Pangans, the Diazes, and Comandante appealed to the CA.[29] The Pangans faulted the trial court in
holding them jointly and severally liable with the Diazes and Comandante for
the satisfaction of the latter’s personal obligation to petitioner in the total
amount of P1,118,228.00. The
Diazes and Comandante, on the other hand, imputed error upon the trial court in
rendering summary judgment in favor of petitioner. They averred that assuming the summary
judgment was proper, the trial court should not have considered the Real Estate
Mortgage Contract and the Promissory Note as they were defective, as well as
petitioner’s frivolous and non-registrable adverse claim.
In
its Decision[30]
dated
As
regards the Pangans, the CA ruled that the mortgage contract was not binding
upon them as they were purchasers in good faith and for value. The property was free from the mortgage
encumbrance of petitioner when they acquired it as they only came to know of
the adverse claim through petitioner’s phone call which came right after the
former’s acquisition of the property. The
CA further ruled that as Comandante’s waiver of hereditary rights and interests
upon which petitioner’s adverse claim was based is a nullity, it could not be a
source of any right in his favor. Hence,
the Pangans were not bound to take notice of such claim and are thus not liable
to petitioner.
Noticeably,
the appellate court did not rule on the propriety of the issuance of the Summary
Judgment as raised by the Diazes and Comandante. In the ultimate, the CA merely modified the assailed
Summary Judgment of the trial court by excluding the Pangans among those
solidarily liable to petitioner, in effect affirming in all other respects the
assailed summary judgment, viz:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 in Civil Case No. Q-99-38876 is hereby
MODIFIED, as follows:
1. Ordering defendants-appellants Comandante and
Spouses Diaz to jointly and severally pay plaintiff the sum of Php 1,118,
228.00; and
2. Ordering defendants-appellants Comandante and
Spouses Diaz to jointly and severally pay plaintiff the amount of Php10,000.00
plus cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.[31]
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration[32]
having been denied by the CA in its Resolution[33]
dated P1,118,228.00.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioner merely reiterates his contentions
in the Motion for Summary Judgment he filed before the trial court. He insists that his Adverse Claim annotated
at the back of TCT No. RT-6604 is not merely anchored on Comandante’s Waiver of
Hereditary Rights and Interests Over A Real Property (Still Undivided) but also on her being the attorney-in-fact of
the Diazes when she executed the mortgage contract in favor of petitioner. He
avers that his adverse claim is not frivolous or invalid and is registrable as
the Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City even allowed its annotation. He also claims that even prior to the sale of
subject property to the Pangans, the latter already knew of his valid and
existing adverse claim thereon and are, therefore, not purchasers in good
faith. Thus, petitioner maintains that
the Pangans should be held, together with the Diazes and Comandante, jointly
and severally liable to him in the total amount of P1,118,228.00.
Petitioner’s contentions are untenable.
The Affidavit of Adverse Claim executed by petitioner reads in part:
x x x x
1. That I am the Recipient/Benefactor of compulsory heir’s share over an
undivided certain parcel of land together with all the improvements found
therein x x x as evidenced by
Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over A Real Property, executed by
REINA D. COMANDANTE (a compulsory/legitimate heir of Sps. Alfredo T. Diaz and
Imelda G. Diaz), x x x.
2. That in order to protect my interest over said property as a Recipient/Benefactor, for the registered
owners/parents might dispose (of) and/or encumber the same in a fraudulent
manner without my knowledge and consent, for the owner’s duplicate title was
not surrendered to me, it is petitioned that this Affidavit of Adverse Claim be
ANNOTATED at the back of the said title particularly on the original copy of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-6604 (82020) PR-18887 which is on file
with the Register of Deeds of
3. That I am executing this Affidavit in order to
attest (to) the truth of the foregoing facts and to petition the Honorable
Registrar of Deeds,
Clearly, petitioner’s Affidavit of Adverse
Claim was based solely on the waiver
of hereditary interest executed by Comandante.
This fact cannot be any clearer especially so when the inscription of
his adverse claim at the back of TCT No. RT-6604 reads as follows:
P.E. 2468/T-(82020)RT-6604 - - AFFIDAVIT OF ADVERSE CLAIM - - Executed
under oath by PEDRO M. FERRER, married to Erlinda B. Ferrer, claiming
among others that they have a claim, the interest over said property as Recipient/Benefactor,
by virtue of a waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest over a real property
x x x[34]
(Emphasis ours)
Therefore,
there is no basis for petitioner’s assertion that the adverse claim was also anchored
on the mortgage contract allegedly executed by Comandante on behalf of her
parents.
The questions next to be resolved are: Is Comandante’s waiver of hereditary rights
valid? Is petitioner’s adverse claim based on such waiver likewise valid
and effective?
We note at the outset that the validity of petitioner’s adverse claim should have been
determined by the trial court after the petition for cancellation of
petitioner’s adverse claim filed by Comandante was consolidated with Civil Case
No. Q-99-38876.[35]
This is in consonance with Section 70 of
PD 1529 which provides:
Section 70.
Adverse Claim. – Whoever claims any part or interest in
registered land adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date
of the original registration, may, if no other provision is made in this Decree
for registering the same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully his
alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, a reference to the
number of the certificate of title of the registered owner, the name of the
registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or interest
is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to,
and shall state the adverse claimant’s residence, and a place at which all
notices may be served upon him. This
statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim on the
certificate of title. The adverse claim
shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of
registration. After the lapse of said
period, the annotation of adverse
claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party
in interest: Provided,
however, That after cancellation, no second adverse claim based on the same
ground shall be registered by the same claimant.
Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in interest may file a
petition in the Court of First Instance where the land is situated for the
cancellation of the adverse claim, and the court shall grant a speedy hearing
upon the question of validity of such adverse claim, and shall render judgment
as may be just and equitable. If the
adverse claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration thereof shall be
ordered cancelled. If, in any
case, the court, after notice and hearing, shall find that the adverse claim
thus registered was frivolous, it may fine the claimant in an amount not less
than one thousand pesos nor more than five thousand pesos, in its
discretion. Before the lapse of thirty
days, the claimant may withdraw his adverse claim by filing with the Register
of Deeds a sworn petition to that effect. (Emphasis ours)
Pursuant to the third
paragraph of the afore-quoted provision, it has been held that the validity or
efficaciousness of an adverse claim may only be determined by the Court upon
petition by an interested party, in which event, the Court shall order the
immediate hearing thereof and make the proper adjudication as justice and
equity may warrant. And, it is only when
such claim is found unmeritorious that the registration of the adverse claim
may be cancelled.[36]
As correctly pointed
out by respondents, the records is bereft of any showing that the trial court conducted
any hearing on the matter. Instead, what
the trial court did was to include this material issue among those for which it
has rendered its summary judgment as shown by the following portion of the
judgment:
x x x it will be NOTED that subject Adverse
Claim annotated at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-6604 (82020) PR-18887, and
carried over to defendants-Sps. Pangan’s Title No. N-20909, is not merely
anchored on defendant Reina Comandante’s “Waiver of Hereditary Rights and
Interest Over a Real Property” but also on her being the Attorney-In-Fact of
the previous registered owners/parents/defendants Sps. Alfredo and Imelda Diaz
about the Real Estate Mortgage Contract for a loan of P1,118,228.00
which is a blood money of the plaintiff.
Moreover, subject Adverse
Claim in LRC Case No. Q-12009 (99) is NOT frivolous and invalid and consequently,
REGISTRABLE by virtue of Section 110 of the Land Registration Act (now Section
70 of Presidential Decree No. 1529). [37] (Emphasis ours)
It does not escape our attention that the trial
court merely echoed the claim of petitioner that his adverse claim subject of
LRC Case No. Q-12009 (99) is not frivolous, invalid and is consequently
registrable. We likewise lament the
apparent lack of effort on the part of said court to make even a short
ratiocination as to how it came up with said conclusion. In fact, what followed the above-quoted
portion of the summary judgment are mere recitals of the arguments raised by
petitioner in his motion for summary judgment. And in the dispositive portion, the trial
court merely casually ordered that petitioner’s adverse claim be inscribed at
the back of the title of the Pangans. What is worse is that despite this
glaring defect, the CA manifestly overlooked the matter even if respondents
vigorously raised the same before it.
Be that as it may,
respondents’ efforts of pointing out this flaw, which we find significant, have
not gone to naught as will be hereinafter discussed.
All the respondents contend that the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest
Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by Comandante is null
and void for being violative of Article 1347 of the Civil Code, hence, petitioner’s
adverse claim which was based upon such waiver is likewise void and cannot
confer upon the latter any right or interest over the property.
We
agree with the respondents.
Pursuant
to the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code, no contract may be
entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by
law. For the inheritance to be
considered “future”, the succession must not have been opened at the time of
the contract. A contract may be
classified as a contract upon future inheritance, prohibited under the second
paragraph of Article 1347, where the following requisites concur:
(1)
That the succession has not yet been opened.
(2)
That the object of the contract forms part of
the inheritance; and,
(3)
That the promissor has, with respect to the
object, an expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in nature.[38]
In this case, there is no question that at
the time of execution of Comandante’s Waiver
of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided), succession
to either of her parent’s properties has not yet been opened since both of them
are still living. With respect to the
other two requisites, both are likewise present considering that the property subject
matter of Comandante’s waiver concededly forms part of the properties that she expect
to inherit from her parents upon their death and, such expectancy of a right,
as shown by the facts, is undoubtedly purely hereditary in nature.
From the
foregoing, it is clear that Comandante and petitioner entered into a contract
involving the former’s future inheritance as embodied in the Waiver of
Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed
by her in petitioner’s favor.
In Tañedo
v. Court of Appeals,[39]
we invalidated the contract of sale between Lazaro Tañedo and therein
private respondents since the subject matter thereof was a “one hectare of
whatever share the former shall have over Lot 191 of the cadastral survey of
Guided by the above discussions, we similarly
declare in this case that the Waiver
of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided)
executed by Comandante in favor of petitioner as not valid and that same cannot
be the source of any right or create any obligation between them for being
violative of the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code.
Anent the validity
and effectivity of petitioner’s adverse claim, it is provided in Section 70 of PD
1529, that it is necessary that the claimant has a right or interest in the
registered land adverse to the registered owner and that it must arise
subsequent to registration. Here, as no
right or interest on the subject property flows from Comandante’s invalid waiver
of hereditary rights upon petitioner, the latter is thus not entitled to the
registration of his adverse claim. Therefore,
petitioner’s adverse claim is without any basis and must consequently be
adjudged invalid and ineffective and perforce be cancelled.
Albeit
we have already resolved the issues raised by petitioner, we shall not stop
here as the Diazes and Comandante in their Comment[40] call our attention to
the failure of the CA to pass upon the issue of the propriety of the issuance
by the trial court of the Summary Judgment in favor of petitioner despite the
fact that they have raised this issue before the appellate court. They argue that summary judgment is proper
only when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact in the
action. Thus, where the defendant
presented defenses tendering factual issue which call for presentation of
evidence, as when he specifically denies the material allegations in the
complaint, summary judgment cannot be rendered.
The Diazes and
Comandante then enumerate the genuine issues in the case which they claim
should have precluded the trial court from issuing a summary judgment in
petitioner’s favor. First, the
execution of the SPA in favor of Comandante referred to by petitioner in his
complaint was never admitted by the Diazes.
They assert that as such fact is disputed, trial should have been
conducted to determine the truth of the matter, same being a genuine issue. Despite this, the trial court merely took the
word of the plaintiff and assumed that said document was indeed executed by
them. Second, although Comandante
acknowledges that she has a personal obligation with petitioner, she
nevertheless, did not admit that it was in the amount of P1,118,228.00. Instead, she claims only the amount of P500,000.00
or P600,000.00 (if inclusive of interest) as her obligation. Moreover,
the Diazes deny borrowing any money from petitioner and neither did the Pangans
owe him a single centavo. Thus, the true
amount of the obligation due the
petitioner and how each of the respondents are responsible for such amount are
genuine issues which need formal presentation of evidence. Lastly, they aver that the trial court
ignored factual and material issues such as the lack of probative value of Comandante’s
waiver of hereditary rights as well as of the SPA; the fact that Comandante
signed the mortgage contract and promissory note in her personal capacity; and,
that all such documents were prepared by petitioner who acted as a lawyer and
the creditor of Comandante at the same time.
Rule 35 of the
Rules of Court provides for summary judgment, the pertinent provisions of which
are the following:
Section 1.
Summary
Judgment for claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time
after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting
affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon
all or any part thereof.
Section 2.
Summary
Judgment for the defending party. A party against whom a claim,
counterclaim or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may,
at any time, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a
summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.
Section
3. Motion and proceedings thereon. The
motion shall be served at least ten (10) days before the time specified for the
hearing. The adverse party may serve
opposing affidavits, depositions, or admissions at least three (3) days before
the hearing. After the hearing, the
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting
affidavits, depositions and admissions on file, show that, except as to the
amount of damages, there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.
As can be deduced
from the above provisions, summary judgment is a procedural devise resorted to
in order to avoid long drawn out litigations and useless delays. When the pleadings on file show that there
are no genuine issues of facts to be tried, the Rules of Court allows a party
to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment. That is, when the facts
are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by
applying the law to the material facts. Conversely, where the pleadings tender
a genuine issue, summary judgment is not proper. A genuine issue is such fact which requires
the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious,
contrived or false claim.[41]
Here, we find the
existence of genuine issues which removes the case from the coverage of summary
judgment. The variance in the
allegations of the parties in their pleadings is evident.
Petitioner anchors
his complaint for sum of money and/or judicial foreclosure on the alleged real
estate mortgage over the subject property allegedly entered into by Comandante
in behalf of her parents to secure payment of a loan amounting to P1,118,228.00. To support this claim, petitioner attached to
his complaint (1) the SPA alleged to have been executed by the Diazes; (2) the Real Estate Mortgage Contract pertaining
to the amount of P1,118,228.00; and, (3) a Promissory Note.
Comandante, in her
Answer to petitioner’s Amended Complaint, assailed the validity and due
execution of the abovementioned documents.
She asserted that the same were not duly, knowingly and validly executed
by her and that it was petitioner who prepared all of them. Also, although she admitted owing petitioner,
same was not an absolute admission as she limited herself to an obligation
amounting only to P600,000.00 inclusive of charges and interests. She likewise claimed that such obligation is
her personal obligation and not of her parents.
The Diazes, for
their part, also denied that they executed the SPA authorizing their daughter
to mortgage their property to petitioner as well as having any obligation to the
latter.
Clearly, there are
genuine issues in this case which require the presentation of evidence. For one, it is necessary to ascertain in a
full blown trial the validity and due execution of the SPA, the Real Estate
Mortgage and the Promissory Notes because the determination of the following
equally significant questions depends on them, to wit: (1) Are the Diazes obligated
to petitioner or is the obligation a purely personal obligation of Comandante?
and, (2) Is the sum of P1,118,228.00 as shown in the Real Estate
Mortgage and the Promissory Note, the amount which is really due the
petitioner?
To stress, trial courts have limited
authority to render summary judgments and may do so only when there is clearly
no genuine issue as to any material fact.
When the facts as pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested,
proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of trial.[42] From the foregoing, it is apparent that the
trial court should have refrained from issuing the summary judgment but instead
proceeded to conduct a full blown trial of the case. In view of this, the present case should be
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings and proper disposition
according to the rudiments of a regular trial on the merits and not through an
abbreviated termination of the case by summary judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated
SO
ORDERED.
MARIANO C.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
ARTURO D. BRION Associate
Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate
Justice |
JOSE
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 13-14.
[2] CA rollo, pp. 140-149; penned by Associate Justice Arsenio J. Magpale and concurred in by Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Bienvenido L. Reyes.
[3] Entitled “Atty. Pedro M. Ferrer, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Spouses Alfredo Diaz and Imelda Diaz, Reina Commandante and Spouses Bienvenido Pangan and Elizabeth Pangan”.
[4] Records, pp. 287-291; penned by Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr.
[5] CA rollo, p. 91.
[6] Records, pp. 3-6.
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[18] ART. 1347. All things which are not outside the commerce of men, including future things, may be the object of a contract. All rights which are not intransmissible may also be the object of contracts.
No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law.
All services which are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy may likewise be the object of a contract.
[19] Records, p. 1.
[20]
[21] See Answer with Compulsory Counter-Claim of the Diazes, id. at 231-237.
[22] See Answer with Compulsory Counter-Claim of the Pangans, id. at 172-183.
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[30] CA rollo, pp. 140-149.
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[34] Dorsal side of p. 13 of the Records.
[35] Records, p. 66.
[36] Sajonas v. Court of Apeals, 327 Phil. 689, 712 (1996).
[37] Records, p. 290.
[38] J.L.T. Agro Inc. v. Balansag, 493 Phil. 365, 378-379 (2005).
[39] 322 Phil 84 (1996).
[40] Rollo, pp. 192-210.
[41]
D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Duvas
Corporation, G.R. No. 155174,
[42]