EN BANC
|
RAMON R. YAP, Petitioner, - versus - COMMISION ON AUDIT,
Respondent. |
G.R. No. 158562
Present: PUNO, C.J., CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: April
23, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, in accordance with Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or
preliminary injunction. The said
Petition seeks to annul and set aside the following decisions of respondent
Commission on Audit (COA): (1) COA Decision No. 2002-213[1]
dated September 24, 2002 on the “Request of Mr. RAMON YAP for reconsideration
of the decision of the Director, Corporate Audit Office II (CAO II), affirming
the disallowance of various allowances and reimbursements paid to him in his
capacity as Vice-President for Finance and Treasurer of the Manila Gas
Corporation (MGC)”; and (2) COA Decision No. 2003-087[2]
dated June 17, 2003, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The undisputed facts of this case as gathered from
the assailed COA Decision No. 2002-213[3]
are as follows:
x x x Ramon R. Yap is holder of a regular position
of Department Manager of the National Development Company (NDC), a
government-owned and controlled corporation with original charter. He was
appointed by the Board of Directors, Manila Gas Corporation (MGC), a subsidiary
of NDC as Vice-President for Finance effective
In the course of the regular audit, the Corporate
Auditor, MGC issued the following notices of disallowances against Mr. Ramon R.
Yap:
|
Notice of Disallowance |
Date |
Amount |
Nature |
|
ND
99- 03(98)MGC |
|
|
Subscription to National
Geographic and Reader’s Digest |
|
ND 99-10(98)MGC |
|
2,848.00 |
Car maintenance allowance |
|
|
|
1,500.00 |
Annual fee of
VISA card |
|
ND 99-12(98)MGC |
|
789.00
|
Representation
expense on a Sunday |
|
ND 99-16(98)MGC |
|
4,180.56 |
Fellowship
with other PCA club Members on Sunday |
|
ND 99-07(98)IIGSI |
|
11,500.00 |
Car
maintenance allowance |
|
ND 99-14(98)IIGSI |
|
7,000.00 |
Executive
check-up |
|
ND 99-09(99)MGC |
|
119,508.90 |
Monthly
allowance |
|
ND 2000-01(99)MGC |
|
2,304.32 |
Car
maintenance allowance |
|
ND 2000-08(99)MGC |
|
21,523.00 |
Monthly
allowance |
|
ND 2000-07(99)MGC |
|
445.00 |
Car
maintenance allowance |
|
|
|
1,862.00 |
Car
maintenance allowance |
|
ND 2000-01(99)MGC |
|
35,433.70 |
Gasoline
allowance and driver’s subsidy |
which were predicated on the ground that appellant’s
appointment to MGC in addition to his regular position as Department Manager
III of NDC and the subsequent receipt of the questioned allowances and
reimbursements from the former directly contravened the proscription contained
in Section 7 (2) and Section 8, Article IX-b of the Constitution to wit:
“Section 7. x x x
Unless
otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government
or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.”
“Section
8. x x x
No
elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional,
double or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, x x x”
Mr.
Yap appealed the Auditor’s disallowances primarily contending that the
questioned benefits were all approved by the MGC Board of Directors. x x x x.
Petitioner’s
appeal was denied by the CAO II,[4]
which affirmed the MGC Corporate Auditor’s findings that the allowances and
reimbursements at issue were given in violation of Sections 7(2) and 8, Article
IX-b of the 1987 Constitution.
Unperturbed,
petitioner sought a reconsideration of the CAO II ruling from respondent COA
via a Letter[5]
addressed to the COA Chairman wherein he argued that his assignment to MGC was required
by the primary functions of his office and was also authorized by law, namely
Executive Order No. 284 issued on July 25, 1987, the pertinent provision of
which provides:
SECTION 1. Even if allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, a member of the Cabinet, undersecretary, assistant
secretary or other
appointive official of the Executive Department may,
in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the
government and government corporations and receive the corresponding
compensation therefore: Provided, That this limitation shall not apply
to ad hoc bodies or committees, or to boards, councils or bodies of
which the President is the Chairman. (Emphasis supplied.)
In turn,
respondent COA denied petitioner’s appeal in herein assailed COA Decision No.
2002-213.[6] It upheld the CAO II’s ruling that
characterized the disallowed allowances and reimbursements as prohibited by the
Constitution. Furthermore, it also ruled
that the said allowances and reimbursements claimed by petitioner “failed to
pass the test of ‘public purpose requirement’ of the law” and further
emphasized that “it is not enough that payments made to [petitioner] be
authorized by the Board of Directors of the MGC but it is likewise necessary
that said payments do not contravene the principles provided for under Section
4 of [Presidential Decree No.] 1445 on the use of government funds,” more
specifically on the public purpose requirement that is provided in Section 4(2)
of Presidential Decree No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing
Code of the Philippines, to wit:
Section 4. Fundamental
Principles. – Financial transactions and operations of any government
agency shall be governed by the fundamental principles set forth hereunder, to
wit:
x x x x
(2) Government funds or property shall be spent or
used solely for public purposes.
In elaborating this point,
respondent COA stated that:
x x x [T]his Commission sees no connection to link
payments for subscription to the National Geographic and Reader’s Digest, car
maintenance allowance, annual fee of VISA card, representation on a Sunday, a
non-working day, fellowship with PCA club members to social services, promotion
of the general welfare, social justice as well as human dignity and respect for
human rights, slum clearance, low-cost housing, squatter resettlement, urban
and agrarian reform and the like. For it is not enough that payments made to
him be authorized by the Board of Directors of the MGC but it is likewise
necessary that said payments do not contravene the principles provided for
under Section 4 of P.D. 1445 on the use of government funds.
Viewed from all the foregoing premises, it is
regretted that the herein request for reconsideration of Mr. Yap is DENIED.
Accordingly, the audit disallowances as heretofore mentioned are affirmed in
toto.[7]
A
Motion for Reconsideration[8]
was subsequently filed by petitioner, but this was likewise denied by
respondent COA in COA Decision No. 2003-087,[9]
wherein it ruled that although petitioner was correct in arguing that there was
no legal impediment to the validity of petitioner’s appointment as
Vice-President and Treasurer of MGC and to his entitlement to compensation for
the second office, “[s]ince the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284
has been upheld by the Court insofar as other appointive officials are
concerned x x x[,]” however, “of more important consideration is the condition sine
qua non, that ‘government funds or property shall be spent or used
solely for public purpose’ (Section 4(2), PD 1445).” Therefore, respondent
COA affirmed its original finding that the disallowed allowances and
reimbursements did not satisfy the public purpose requirement. The dispositive portion of the said Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant motion
for reconsideration is hereby DENIED and the assailed COA Decision No. 2002-213
dated
Hence,
this Petition wherein petitioner puts forth the following grounds in support:
I
RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON AUDIT
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
USED AS A BASIS THE “PUBLIC PURPOSE” REQUIREMENT IN AFFIRMING THE QUESTIONED
DISALLOWANCES
II
RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE
DISALLOWANCES ON A GROUND [different from the ground] RELIED UPON BY THE
RESIDENT AUDITOR
III
ASSUMING, WITHOUT CONCEDING, THAT
THE PUBLIC PURPOSE REQUIREMENT IS RELEVANT TO THE PRESENT CASE, RESPONDENT
COMMISSION ON AUDIT STILL COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISALLOWED ALL THE ALLOWANCES RECEIVED BY HEREIN
PETITIONER”[10]
We
rule to deny the instant Petition.
As regards the first ground,
petitioner puts forward the argument that although it cannot be denied that the
MGC, being a government-owned and controlled corporation, is under the
jurisdiction of respondent COA, the respondent’s act of subjecting the salaries,
allowances and benefits of MGC employees to the “public purpose test” is not
only wrong, but also an act of grave abuse of discretion since the said
salaries, allowances and benefits are intended to compensate MGC employees for
services performed on behalf of the corporation. According to petitioner, if the “public
purpose requirement” will be applied in auditing these salaries, allowances and
benefits being given to government employees, no such compensation could ever
pass audit, as, by their very nature, they are solely intended to benefit their
recipients, who are the employees of the government department, office, agency
or corporation concerned.[11]
We cannot countenance
petitioner’s misleading assertion on this point. The mere act of disbursing public funds to
pay the allowances and salaries of government employees does not by itself
constitute release of government funds for public purpose as petitioner would
want us to believe; otherwise, as petitioner dares to conclude, no salary,
benefit or allowance would ever pass the requisite government audit. This is a rather simplistic and narrow view
of the nature of government employee compensation. Not unlike other government expenditures, it
is necessary that the release of public funds to pay the salaries and
allowances of government employees must not contravene the law on disbursement
of public funds. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1445 lays out the basic
guidelines that government entities must follow in disbursing public funds, to
wit:
Section 4. Fundamental principles. – Financial
transactions and operations of any government agency shall be governed by the
fundamental principles set forth hereunder, to wit:
(1) No
money shall be paid out of any public treasury or depository except in pursuance
of an appropriation law or other specific statutory authority.
(2)
Government funds or property shall
be spent or used solely for public purposes.
(3)
Trust funds shall be available and
may be spent only for the specific purpose for which the trust was created or
the funds received.
(4)
Fiscal responsibility shall, to the
greatest extent, be shared by all those exercising authority over the financial
affairs, transactions, and operations of the government agency.
(5)
Disbursements or disposition of
government funds or property shall invariably bear the approval of the proper
officials.
(6)
Claims against government funds
shall be supported with complete documentation.
(7)
All laws and regulations applicable
to financial transactions shall be faithfully adhered to.
(8)
Generally accepted principles and
practices of accounting as well as of sound management and fiscal
administration shall be observed, provided that they do not contravene existing
laws and regulations. (Emphases supplied.)
To summarize, any disbursement of public funds,
which includes payment of salaries and benefits to government employees and
officials, must (a) be authorized by law, and (b) serve a public purpose.
In this regard, it is necessary
for this Court to elaborate on the nature and meaning of the term “public
purpose,” in relation to disbursement of public funds. As understood in the traditional sense,
public purpose or public use means any purpose or use directly available to the
general public as a matter of right.
Thus, it has also been defined as “an activity as will serve as benefit
to [the] community as a body and which at the same time is directly related
function of government.”[12] However, the concept of public use is not
limited to traditional purposes. Here as
elsewhere, the idea that “public use” is strictly limited to clear cases of
“use by the public” has been discarded.[13] In fact, this Court has already categorically
stated that the term “public purpose” is not defined, since it is an elastic
concept that can be hammered to fit modern standards. It should be given a broad interpretation;
therefore, it does not only pertain to those purposes that which are
traditionally viewed as essentially government functions, such as building
roads and delivery of basic services, but also includes those purposes designed
to promote social justice. Thus, public
money may now be used for the relocation of illegal settlers, low-cost housing
and urban or agrarian reform.[14] In short, public use is now equated with public
interest,[15] and
that it is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a
limited number of persons.[16]
To our mind, in view of the
public purpose requirement, the disbursement of public funds, salaries and
benefits of government officers and employees should be granted to compensate
them for valuable public services rendered, and the salaries or benefits paid
to such officers or employees must be commensurate with services rendered. In the same vein, additional allowances and
benefits must be shown to be necessary or relevant to the fulfillment of the
official duties and functions of the government officers and employees. We cannot accept petitioner’s theory that the
compensation and benefits of public officers are intended purely for the
personal benefit of such officers, or that the mere payment of salaries and
benefits to a public officer satisfies the public purpose requirement. That theory would lead to the anomalous
conclusion that government officers and employees may be paid enormous sums
without limit or without any justification necessary other than that such sums
are being paid to someone employed by the government. Public funds are the property of the people
and must be used prudently at all times with a view to prevent dissipation and
waste.
With regard to the second ground,
petitioner underscores the fact that respondent COA abandoned the ground of
double compensation as a basis for the questioned disallowances and affirmed
the same on the new ground that the allowances did not meet the test of “public
purpose requirement.” Petitioner argues that this was an arbitrary and
whimsical action on the part of respondent COA, since petitioner had already
legally justified his opposition to the ground originally cited by the MGC Corporate
Auditor in support of the questioned disallowances, and yet respondent COA
affirmed said disallowances on a new ground – failure to pass the “public
purpose requirement” - that was never mentioned in the findings made by the MGC
Corporate Auditor and the CAO II ruling that was appealed to respondent COA by
the petitioner.[17] In response, respondent COA maintains that
there is no provision in the Constitution, the Government Auditing Code or the
Administrative Code that restricts its power and authority to examine and audit
government expenditures to merely reviewing and deciding on the validity of the
findings and conclusions of its auditors.[18]
In resolving this issue, it is
imperative that we examine the powers vested in respondent COA by the pertinent
laws of the land. The 1987 Constitution
has made the COA the guardian of public funds, vesting it with broad powers
over all accounts pertaining to government revenue and expenditures and the
uses of public funds and property including the exclusive authority to define
the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods
for such review, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations.[19] Section 11, Chapter 4, Subtitle B, Title I,
Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 echoes this constitutional mandate
given to COA, to wit:
Section 11. General Jurisdiction. – (1) The
Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine,
audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and
expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or
pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies,
commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this
Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d)
such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or
indirectly, from or through the Government, which are required by law or the
granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or
equity. However, where the internal control system of the audited agencies is
inadequate, the Commission may adopt such measures, including temporary or
special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct the
deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of the Government and, for
such period as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other
supporting papers pertaining thereto.
(2) The Commission shall have exclusive authority,
subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and
examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and
promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for
the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and
properties.
In light of these express
provisions of law granting respondent COA its power and authority, we have
previously ruled that its exercise of its general audit power is among the
constitutional mechanisms that give life to the check and balance system
inherent in our form of government.[20]
Furthermore, we have also declared that COA is endowed with enough latitude to
determine, prevent and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant
or unconscionable expenditures of government funds.[21]
Based on the foregoing discussion
and due to the lack or absence of any law or jurisprudence saying otherwise, we
rule that, in resolving cases brought before it on appeal, respondent COA is
not required to limit its review only to the grounds relied upon by a
government agency’s auditor with respect to disallowing certain disbursements
of public funds. In consonance with its
general audit power, respondent COA is not merely legally permitted, but is
also duty-bound to make its own assessment of the merits of the disallowed
disbursement and not simply restrict itself to reviewing the validity of the
ground relied upon by the auditor of the government agency concerned. To hold otherwise would render COA’s vital
constitutional power unduly limited and thereby useless and ineffective.
As a third ground for the
petition, petitioner also contends that assuming, without conceding, that the
other allowances and benefits do not pass the “public purpose” test, the rest
of the allowances, such as the basic monthly allowances, executive check-up and
the gasoline allowances should not be disallowed, as they are normally given to
officers of corporations, whether private or government-owned and controlled.[22]
We cannot uphold petitioner’s
plausible but unsubstantiated argument on this point since, as previously
discussed, respondent COA is in the best position to determine which allowances
and benefits may be properly allowed under the circumstances, as it is the sole
constitutional body mandated to examine, audit and settle all accounts
pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds
and property owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations such as the MGC and the
NDC in the case at bar. Even if we
assume the truth of petitioner’s assertion that the said allowances are
“normally given,” this fact alone does not operate to preclude respondent COA
from performing its constitutional mandate.
That certain allowances are
enjoyed by corporate officers in the private sector does not justify the grant
of the same benefits to similarly designated public officers, even if they are
officers of government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs), which perform
purely proprietary functions. As aptly
observed by the Solicitor General, the funds of GOCCs are still public funds
and that is precisely the reason such funds are subject to audit by the COA. Thus, there is a valid distinction between
the officers of public corporations and those of private corporations.
To reiterate, the public purpose
requirement for the disbursement of public funds is a valid limitation on the
types of allowances and benefits that may be granted to public officers. It was incumbent upon petitioner to show that
his allowances and benefits were authorized by law and that there was a direct
and substantial relationship between the performance of his public functions
and the grant of the disputed allowances to him.
While subscriptions to newspapers
and magazines by government offices may be justified, petitioner’s personal subscriptions to magazines and
the annual fee of his credit card cannot ipso
facto be considered as part of his remunerations or benefits as a public
official.
There is likewise no evidence
that the purported representation and “fellowship” expenses on weekends are
necessary and related to petitioner’s work as Vice-President of Finance and
Treasurer of the MGC. We find no reason
to believe that as an MGC officer, his duties include business relations or
clientele-building functions, since a finance officer and treasurer, even in
the private sector, is ordinarily tasked with accounting, disbursement and
custody of corporate funds.
Medical expenses, such as those
for an executive check-up, may be justified if specifically authorized by the
appropriate laws, rules or circulars.
However, petitioner failed to point to the existence of such law or
regulation applicable to his case. It
also appears from the records that petitioner already receives medical benefits
from the NDC,[23] and
that the ground cited by the MGC Corporate Auditor for the disallowance of his
expense for executive check-up was his own failure to submit appropriate
supporting documents to claim such benefit.[24]
The COA’s disallowance of the car
maintenance, gasoline allowance and driver’s subsidy was likewise in order
since petitioner neither alleged nor proved that these benefits were also
authorized by law or regulation.[25] He did not even allege that the car was an
official company vehicle or that the driver was an employee of the MGC. On the contrary, the MGC Corporate Auditor
found that the vehicle involved was the personal
vehicle of petitioner, although it was granted to him under an NDC car plan,
and that he was already receiving gasoline and/or transportation allowance from
the NDC.[26] It was also found that petitioner reported to
the MGC office, at most, once a week to attend meetings; and documents, which
required his signature, were often brought to him at the NDC.[27] Since petitioner did not dispute these
findings, he failed to show that the grant of similar or additional gasoline
and transportation benefits to him by the MGC was warranted.
In order to demonstrate the legality
of the grant of his benefits, it was insufficient for the petitioner to assert
that the disputed allowances and benefits were approved by the board of
directors of the MGC. Such board action
should in itself be authorized by law or regulation or have valid legal
basis. Otherwise, it becomes an illegal
corporate act that is void and cannot be validated.[28] In this case, the MGC board action that
permitted the disallowed disbursements was not shown to have complied with
Section 15(d) of both Republic Act No.
8522 and Republic Act No. 8745, otherwise known as the General Appropriations
Act of 1998 and the General Appropriations Act of 1999, respectively, which
provide:
Sec.
15. Restrictions
on the Use of Government Funds. – No
government funds shall be utilized for the following purposes:
x x x x
d. To
pay honoraria, allowances or other forms of compensation to any government
official or employee, except those specifically authorized by law;
x x x x
The
provisions of this Section shall also apply to government- owned and/or
controlled corporations.
On a final note, petitioner
claims that respondent COA acted with grave abuse of discretion since, as a
result of the disallowances, petitioner in effect rendered his services to MGC
for free. This, petitioner points out,
would constitute unjust enrichment on the part of MGC.[29]
We have ruled before that there
is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of
another, or when a person retains the money or property of another against the
fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience.[30] In the case at bar, the assailed COA Decision
No. 2002-213 dated September 24, 2002 and the CAO II’s 1st
Indorsement dated December 12, 2000 recognized that petitioner’s appointment to
the Board of Directors of MGC “entitled him to honoraria equivalent to fifty
percent (50%) of his basic salary at NDC and various allowances attached to the
office.”[31] Furthermore, petitioner’s own assertion in
his Motion for Reconsideration of COA Decision No. 2002-213 belies his claim of
being totally uncompensated, since petitioner stated therein that “[a]s the NDC
representative in MGC, he was not getting the entire compensation package for
such position.”[32] Thus, petitioner did not render his services
to MGC for free, because it did not appear that his honoraria were among the
expenditures that were disallowed by respondent COA.
We have previously declared that
it is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of
administrative authorities, especially one that was constitutionally created
like herein respondent COA, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation
of powers, but also of their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted
to enforce. It is, in fact, an oft-repeated
rule that findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but
also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or
arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion.[33] Thus, only when the COA acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, may this Court entertain a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.[34]
There is grave abuse of
discretion when there is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when the
judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim and
despotism.[35] In the case at bar, we find no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondent COA in issuing the assailed
Decisions. On the contrary, we hold that
respondent COA’s pronouncements in both assailed rulings were made in faithful
compliance with its mandate and in judicious exercise of its general audit
power as conferred on it by the Constitution and the pertinent laws.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed COA
Decision No. 2002-213 dated
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA
J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
|
RENATO C. CORONA Associate
Justice |
|
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate
Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate
Justice |
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
|
ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice
|
|
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate
Justice |
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate
Justice |
|
MARIANO C. Associate Justice
|
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice
|
|
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate
Justice |
JOSE P. PEREZ Associate
Justice |
JOSE
CATRAL
Associate
Justice
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Commission on Audit (COA) Chairman Guillermo N. Carague with Commissioners Raul C. Flores and Emmanuel M. Dalman concurring. Rollo, pp. 18-21.
[2]
[3] Supra note 1.
[4] Rollo, pp. 19, 22-23.
[5]
[6] Supra note 1.
[7] Rollo, p. 21.
[8]
[9] Supra note 2.
[10] Rollo, pp. 8-9.
[11]
[12] Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 1231, (6th
ed., 1990), citing Pack v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 215
[13] Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes,
Nos. L-60549, 60553-60555,
[14] Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation, G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 485, 510-511.
[15] Bengzon v. Drilon, G.R. No.
103524,
[16] Binay v. Domingo, G.R. No.
92389,
[17] Rollo, p. 99.
[18]
[19] Sec. 2(1) and (2), Art. IX, 1987 Constitution.
[20] Olaguer v. Domingo, G.R. No.
109666,
[21] Sanchez v. Commission on Audit,
G.R. No. 127545,
[22] Rollo, p. 100.
[23] See
2nd Indorsement dated
[24] See
Notice of Disallowance dated
[25] Significantly, Section 15(c) in
both Republic Act No. 8522 (General Appropriations Act of 1998) and Republic
Act No. 8745 (General Appropriations Act of 1999) allows the use of government
funds for car fuel, maintenance and parts only for government vehicles that are
properly identified as such. The relevant portions of Section 15 reads:
Sec.
15. Restrictions on the Use of Government
Funds. – No government funds shall be utilized for the following purposes:
x x
x x
c. To provide fuel, parts, repair and maintenance to any government vehicle which is not permanently marked “For Official Use Only” with the name or logo of the agency, nor otherwise properly identified as a government vehicle and does not carry its official government plate number x x x.
[26] Supra note 23.
[27]
[28] Atrium Management Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109491, February 28, 2001, 353 SCRA 23, 30.
[29] Rollo, p. 101.
[30] Allied Banking Corporation v. Lim Sio Wan, G.R. No. 133179, March 27, 2008, 549 SCRA 504, 524 citing Reyes v. Lim, 408 SCRA 560, 570.
[31] Rollo, pp. 18 and 22.
[32]
[33] Supra note 20 at 489.
[34] Reyes v. Commission on Audit,
G.R. No. 125129,
[35] Ferrer v. Office of the Ombudsman,
G.R. No. 129036,