Republic of the
Supreme Court
|
Roberto b. kalalo, Petitioner, - versus - office of the ombudsman, ernesto m. de chavez and marcelo l. agustin, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 158189 Present:
VELASCO, JR., PERALTA ABAD*, and MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated: April
23, 2010 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify and/or set aside the
Resolution dated
The antecedent facts are as follows.
Petitioner Roberto Kalalo, an employee
of Pablo Borbon Memorial Institute of Technology (PBMIT), now Batangas State
University, filed a Complaint Affidavit[1]
with the Office of the Ombudsman against the officials of the same school,
namely: Dr. Ernesto M. De Chavez, President; Dr. Virginia M. Baes, Executive
Vice-President; Dr. Rolando L. Lontok, Sr., Vice-President for Academic
Affairs; Dr. Porfirio C. Ligaya, Vice-President for Extension Campus
Operations; Professor Maximo C. Panganiban, Dean and Campus Administrator,
Districts 1 and 2; Dr. Amador M. Lualhati, University Secretary; and Marcelo L.
Agustin, Researcher, Office of the BSU President.
According to petitioner, the
above-named officials committed falsification of public documents and
violations of Sections 3 (a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, or the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, based on the following incidents:
The 129th General Meeting of
the Board of Trustees of the PBMIT/BSU transpired on
In March 2001, petitioner, who was then
the Board Secretary, claimed that he found in his table, a final print of the
Minutes[2] of
the above-mentioned General Meeting which was forwarded by respondent Marcelo
Agustin upon the order of respondent De Chavez, in order for the petitioner to
certify as to its correctness. The fact
that the said copy of the Minutes was given to him after a long period of time
and other inconsistencies found in the same document, caused suspicion on the
part of the petitioner. After conducting
his own investigation, petitioner questioned the following three (3)
resolutions, which, according to him, were inserted by De Chavez:
1) Resolution No. 6, s. 1997, which
ratified the referendum dated August 4, 1996 approving the adjustment of
charges or fees on the following documents issued by the college: 1) Admission
and Testing Fee, 2) Transcript of Records, 3) Certification, 4) Honorable
Dismissal, 5) Diploma, 6) Fine (late enrollees), 7) Library Card, and 8) second
copy of Diploma;
2) Resolution No. 25, which relates to
the authorizing of the President of PBMIT/BSU to deposit all the income of the
college with government depositary banks in the form of savings, time, money
placement and other deposit accounts, and to open a PBMIT testing, admission
and placement office account;
3) Resolution No. 26, refers to the
resolution approving the construction contracts entered into by PBMIT with C.S.
Rayos Construction and General Services for the construction of the
DOST/FNRI/PBMIT Regional Nutrition and Food Administration and P2,693,642.90
and P968,283.63, respectively.
As claimed by petitioner, the authentic
minutes had eight (8) pages, while the falsified one had nine (9) pages. Thus, he concluded that Resolution Nos. 25
and 26 were mere intercalations on the minutes of the annual meeting.
Petitioner also claimed that
respondent's deviation from the usual procedure in signing and approving the
minutes was highly suspicious. According
to petitioner, the usual procedure was for respondent De Chavez, in his
capacity as Vice-Chairman, to sign the minutes only after the same has been
attested by petitioner as the Board Secretary.
However, De Chavez submitted a copy of the minutes to petitioner with his
signature already affixed thereon. Thus,
petitioner refused to sign the said minutes.
Despite the refusal of petitioner to
sign the minutes, Resolution No. 25 was still implemented.
Respondents filed their Joint Counter-Affidavit[3]
denying petitioner's allegations and stating that it was ministerial on the
part of respondent De Chavez to sign the minutes prepared by petitioner himself
in his capacity as Board Secretary.
Petitioner, on the other hand, reiterated and stood by his allegations
in his Complainant's Reply to Respondents' Joint Counter-Affidavit[4]
dated
In its Resolution[5]
dated
A careful evaluation of the
case records and the evidence submitted reveals that the charge of
falsification against respondents has no leg to stand on.
What clearly appears on the
records was that complainant had issued certifications as to the correctness of
the resolutions in question, namely, Resolution Nos. 6, s. 1997; 25 and 26. Readily,
it can be said that said certifications did not only dispute complainant's
claim, but casts serious doubt as to the merit of the instant complaint as
well.
It must be pointed out that
complainant assailed the authenticity of the minutes of the 129th
General Assembly meeting of the Board of Trustees of PBMIT and accused herein
respondent for allegedly inserting/intercalating therein the aforesaid Resolution
Nos. 6, 25 and 26.
With the foregoing
certifications subscribed by complainant himself confirming the authenticity of
the subject resolutions and the contents thereof, we fail to see any grounds
for complainant to question the same.
IN THE LIGHT OF THE
FOREGOING, it is respectfully recommended that the instant complaint be
DISMISSED as it is hereby dismissed.
SO RESOLVED.[6]
Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[7]
dated
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner raises the following arguments:
I
PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
SERIOUSLY MISAPPRECIATING THE FACTS AND ISSUES OF THE INSTANT CASE.
II
PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
ISSUING THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION AND ORDER WITHOUT FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASES.
III
PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT
FINDING “PROBABLE CAUSE” AGAINST BOTH PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.[9]
The petition
is bereft of merit.
Petitioner extensively and
exhaustively discusses in his petition, the differences between what he claimed
to be the falsified Minutes and what he presented as the true and authentic
Minutes of the general meeting, and by not subscribing to his own findings, he now
comes to this Court alleging that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused
its discretion which amounted to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction.
A careful
reading of his arguments shows that the matters he raised were purely
factual. He claims that the Office of
the Ombudsman grievously erred in finding that petitioner had issued
certifications as to the correctness of the resolutions in question, namely
Resolution Nos. 6, s. 1997; 25 and 26, when, according to petitioner, he
positively asserted that the same were signed by mistake or out of sheer
inadvertence. He went on to state that
the signature on the questioned Minutes was forged and that the one inadvertently
signed was the excerpts, not the Minutes. This line of argument has been
repeatedly emphasized along with his own findings of falsification.
In alleging
the existence of grave abuse of discretion, it is well to remember Sarigumba v. Sandiganbayan,[10]
where this Court ruled that:
For grave abuse of discretion to prosper as a ground for certiorari, it must first be demonstrated that the lower court or tribunal has exercised its power in an arbitrary and despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be patent and gross as would amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. Grave abuse of discretion is not enough. Excess of jurisdiction signifies that the court, board or office, has jurisdiction over the case but has transcended the same or acted without authority.
After
considering all the issues and arguments raised by the parties, this Court
finds no clear showing
of manifest error or grave abuse of discretion committed by the Office
of the Ombudsman.
As a general rule, courts do not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman to
determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has
been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter,
to file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts.[11]
This Court has consistently held
that the Ombudsman has discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given
its facts and circumstances, should be filed or not. It is basically his call. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith should
he find it to be insufficient in form and substance, or should he find it
otherwise, to continue with the inquiry; or he may proceed with the
investigation if, in his view, the complaint is in due and proper form and
substance.[12]
In the present
case, the Office of the Ombudsman did not find probable cause that would
warrant the filing of Information against respondents. Probable cause,
for purposes of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts
as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that respondents are probably guilty thereof. The
determination of its existence lies within the discretion of the prosecuting
officers after conducting a preliminary investigation upon complaint of an
offended party.[13]
Probable cause is meant such set of facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense charged
in the Information, or any offense included therein, has been committed by the
person sought to be arrested. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without
resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no
technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on
evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and that
it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less than
evidence which would justify conviction.[14] Unless it is shown that the
questioned acts were done in a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
evidencing a clear case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, this Court will not interfere in the findings of probable cause determined by the Ombudsman.[15]
The findings of the Office of the
Ombudsman, as contained in its Order[16]
dated
While we do acknowledge that the purpose of a preliminary
investigation is to determine the existence of probable cause that which
engender a well-founded belief that an offense has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof, we should not, however, lose sight of its
other objective. In the case of Duterte v. Sandiganbayan, 289 SCRA 721, it is
equally intoned that the rationale for conducting a preliminary investigation
is “to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious, oppressive prosecution,
and to protect him from an open and public accusation of a crime, from the
trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.” With the questioned minutes bearing the
signature of complainant-movant, the evidence at hand tends to tilt in favor of
the dismissal of the case. This is
rightfully so as complainant-movant’s signature was never alleged to have been
falsified, although he claims to have signed the minutes through inadvertence.
In relation thereto, complainant-movant’s assertion that
his signature in the disputed minutes was a case of oversight is hardly
impressive. It should be noted that the
minutes of the 129th Regular Meeting of the then PBMIT Board of
Trustees was approved during its 130th Regular Meeting held on
More telling is the fact that complainant-movant again
certified correct the excerpts of the minutes of the 129th Regular
Meeting of then PBMIT Board of Trustees pertaining to Resolution No. 6, s. of
1997, approving the adjustment of charges or fees not only to the admission/testing
fees but including transcript of records, certification, honorable dismissal,
diploma, library card, fine (late enrollees) and second copy of diploma. Given such situation, we could not believe
that complainant-movant signed such excerpts of the minutes through the same
inadvertence or oversight. A single
mistake may be acceptable but to commit the same twice is no longer a case of
honest mistake. Corollary thereto, this
finding precludes any further discussion that the letter dated
It
is not sound practice to depart from the policy of non-interference in the Ombudsman's exercise of discretion to determine whether or not
to file information against an accused. As cited in a long line of cases, this
Court has pronounced that it cannot pass upon the sufficiency or insufficiency
of evidence to determine the existence of
probable cause. The rule is based not only upon respect for the
investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office
of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. If it were otherwise, this Court will be
clogged with an innumerable list of cases assailing investigatory proceedings
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to
complaints filed before it, to determine if there is probable cause.[18]
Furthermore,
it is not amiss to state that the findings of the Ombudsman are essentially
factual in nature. Therefore, when petitioner assailed
the findings of the Ombudsman on the guise that the latter committed grave abuse of discretion, questions of fact
are inevitably raised. Clearly, petitioner centered his arguments on the Ombudsman’s appreciation of facts. It
must always be remembered that a petition for certiorari admits only of
questions of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and never on questions of fact.
Petitioner raises as an incidental issue in his Memorandum[19]
that the Solicitor General cannot act as the counsel of private respondents in
the instant criminal case, which is indisputable. However, petitioner failed to understand that
the Office of the Solicitor General represents the public respondent − the
Office of the Ombudsman − upon which his petition revolves. The Office of
the Ombudsman is an instrumentality of the government and, as mandated by law,
the Office of the Solicitor General has the authority to represent the said
office. Cooperative
Development Authority v. DOLEFIL Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative,
Inc., et al.[20] is instructive as to the
jurisdiction of the Office of the Solicitor General, which reads:
The authority of the Office of the Solicitor
General to represent the Republic of the
SEC. 35. Powers and
Functions.—The Office
of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and intrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. When
authorized by the President or head of the office concerned, it shall also
represent government owned or controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor General shall
constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge
duties requiring the services of lawyers.
It shall have the following specific powers and functions:
(1) Represent the
Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court,
Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and
special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his
official capacity is a party.
The import of the above-quoted provision of the Administrative
Code of 1987 is to impose upon the Office of the Solicitor General the duty to
appear as counsel for the Government, its agencies and instrumentalities and
its officials and agents before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and
all other courts and tribunals in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or
matter requiring the services of a lawyer.
Its mandatory character was emphasized by this Court in the case of Gonzales
v. Chavez,[21] thus:
It is patent that the intent of the lawmaker was to give the
designated official, the Solicitor General, in this case, the unequivocal
mandate to appear for the government in legal proceedings. Spread out in the laws creating the office is
the discernible intent which may be gathered from the term “shall”, which is
invariably employed, from Act No. 136 (1901) to the more recent Executive Order
No. 292 (1987).
x x x x x
x x x x
The decision of this Court as early as 1910 with
respect to the duties of the Attorney-General well applies to the Solicitor
General under the facts of the present case.
The Court then declared:
In this
jurisdiction, it is the duty of the Attorney General “to perform the duties
imposed upon him by law” and “he shall prosecute all causes, civil and criminal,
to which the Government of the Philippine Islands, or any officer thereof, in
his official capacity, is a party” xxx.
x x x x x x x x x
The
Court is firmly convinced that considering the spirit and the letter of the
law, there can be no other logical interpretation of Sec. 35 of the
Administrative Code than that it is, indeed, mandatory upon the OSG to
“represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer.”
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED
for lack of merit. The Resolution dated
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M.
PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
|
Chairperson |
|
|
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
ROBERTO
A. ABAD Associate Justice |
|
JOSE CATRAL Associate Justice |
|
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson
Chief Justice
* Designated as additional member per Raffle dated August 5, 2009 in lieu of Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura.
[1] Rollo, pp. 40-61.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] G.R. Nos. 154239-41,
[11] Principio v. Barrientos,
G.R. No. 167025,
[12] Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, G.R. No. 137777, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 428, citing Espinosa v. Office of the Ombudsman, 343 SCRA 744 (2000) and The Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Hon. Aniano Desierto, 362 SCRA 730 (2001); see also Blanco v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 136757-58, November 27, 2000, 346 SCRA 108 (2001).
[13] Advincula
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131144, October 18, 2000, 343
SCRA 583, 589-590.
[14] Okabe v. Hon. Gutierrez, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Pasay City, Branch 119, et
al., 473 Phil. 758, 781 (2004).
[15] Galario v. Ombudsman, G. R. No. 166797, July 10, 2007, 527 SCRA 190, 206-207.
[16] Rollo, pp. 36-39.
[17]
[18] Galario v. Ombudsman, supra note 15, at 206.
[19] Rollo, pp. 525-532.
[20] 432 Phil. 290 (2002).
[21] G.R. No. 97351,