Republic of the
Supreme Court
SECOND DIVISION
NEMESIO GOCO, LYDIA G. FABIAN,
NATALIA BROTONEL, FLORA GAYOSO, BLEMIE SORIANO, ELPIDIA NAVALES, SERGIO
ROMASANTA, CATALINA NAMIS and NANCY PAMATIGA, represented by their
Attorneys-in-Fact, LYDIA G. FABIAN, ELPIDIA NAVALES and NATALIA BROTONEL,
Petitioners, -
versus - HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ATTY. HICOBLINO CATLY, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 157449
Present: CARPIO, j., Chairperson,
BRION, DEL CASTILLO, ABAD, and PEREZ, JJ. Promulgated: April 6, 2010 |
|
|||
x
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
|
|||||
|
|
||||
|
D E C I S I O N
|
||||
|
|
||||
|
BRION, J.: |
|
|||
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The subject of the present petition for certiorari[1]
is Lot No. 2042, a parcel of land located in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro and
covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. 529, registered in the name of Feliciano Alveyra (Alveyra).
In 1952, the
To determine the extent of
Alveyra and the
We affirmed the CA’s
decision on February 23, 1976 in G.R. No. 40820. The petitioners’ title over
Meanwhile, while the heirs
of Alveyra and the Municipality of Calapan were litigating their conflicting
rights over Lot No. 2042, the heirs sold their one-half interest over the land (Lot
No. 2042-A) to respondent spouses Hicoblino and Lourdes Catly (respondent Catlys). Respondent Catlys then filed a petition for
judicial approval of the subdivision plan of Lot No. 2042-A.[4] On July 31, 1996, the trial court approved
the petition and ordered the subdivision of Lot No. 2042-A to into four lots
and the registration of four new titles under the name of the respondents.[5]
In 1999, respondent Catlys
alleged that a portion of their Lot No. 2042-A was being occupied by the
petitioners and sought to recover possession of the lot, initially, by
instituting an ejectment case against the petitioners. [6] When the ejectment case was dismissed,[7]
respondent Catlys then filed a complaint for recovery of possession[8]
against the petitioners; the case is still pending decision before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of
Allegedly to defend
themselves against the cases filed by respondent Catlys and to protect their
vested rights as lawful occupants of the land, the petitioners filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of the
four certificates of title issued in respondent Caltys’ names.[9] The petitioners claimed they are occupants of
the original Lot No. 2042 since 1946 and anchored their continued right to
occupy as lessees of the
In its September 7, 1999
Order,[10]
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Oriental Mindoro, Branch 39, ordered the dismissal of the complaint for declaration
of nullity of respondent Catlys’ titles.
It found that the petitioners were in fact occupying portions of respondent
Catlys’ Lot No. 2042-A. Although the
petitioners were asserting a legal right to occupy the land by virtue of a
lease contract, the lease covered only Lot No. 2042-B – the southern portion
which belonged to the
As consistently admitted by the
[petitioners], they are occupying the lot belonging to the Municipal Government
of Calapan as occupant-lessees x x x it
was ascertained that the [petitioners] are outside the area covered by the
Municipal Government’s title.[11]
Corollary to this, it declared
that the petitioners were not the real parties in interest who could assail and
seek the annulment of the respondents’ title.
The petitioners’ move to
have the September 7, 1999 Order reconsidered was denied by the RTC in its
March 30, 2000 Order.[12] They sought the reversal of the trial court’s
Orders by filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court before the CA.
In a decision dated
October 7, 2002,[13] the CA dismissed the petition
and affirmed the RTC’s dismissal of the complaint for annulment of respondent
Catlys’ titles. It ruled that
petitioners erred in filing a certiorari
petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to assail an order of dismissal by
the trial court. An order sustaining a motion to dismiss is a
final adjudication on the merits of the case and the remedy of the plaintiff is
to appeal the order. This procedural lapse notwithstanding, the CA
proceeded to consider the petition as an ordinary appeal filed under Rule 41.
Ruling on the merits of
case, the CA agreed with the RTC that the petitioners have no cause of action
against respondent Catlys. The
petitioners were assailing respondents Catlys’ titles which were derived from
TCT No. T-46154 covering Lot No. 2042-A.
These titles, however, are separate and distinct from the land that the petitioners
are occupying which is registered as TCT No. T-46155 covering Lot No. 2042-B in
the name of the
The petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration of the CA’s decision dated October 7, 2002.[14] The CA denied the motion in a resolution
dated March 6, 2003.[15] The petitioners now seek to reverse these CA
rulings before the Court via a
petition for certiorari filed under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. The petitioners
reiterate the same arguments they raised before the RTC and insist that they
have sufficient interest in praying for the annulment of respondent Catlys’
titles, as their vested rights have been impaired.
THE COURT’S RULING
The Court resolves to dismiss the petition.
A petition
for certiorari resolves only errors of jurisdiction
The petitioners have twice
erroneously availed of the remedy of
a certiorari petition, first, before the CA against the RTC
order dismissing its complaint for annulment of title, and second, before the Court against the CA’s decision thereon.
Time and again, we have discussed
the nature of a certiorari petition –
it is intended to correct only errors of jurisdiction where the court or tribunal has acted
with grave abuse of discretion. A
writ of certiorari cannot be used for
any other purpose; it cannot be used to resolve questions or issues beyond its
competence such as errors of judgment. Certiorari will not be issued to cure
errors by the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, its
conclusions anchored on the said findings, and its conclusions of law.[16]
The
supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot be exercised for the
purpose of reviewing the intrinsic
correctness of a judgment of the lower court on the basis either of the law
or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision.
Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction
over the case, such correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or
fact - a mistake of judgment - appeal is the remedy.[17]
[Emphasis supplied.]
In the two certiorari petitions the petitioners filed
before the CA and before the Court, they assailed rulings of the lower courts by
claiming that the findings and conclusions of these courts were merely
speculative and based on misapprehension of facts. These assigned errors, however, constitute an
attack on the correctness or soundness of the decision assailed and does not at
all affect the jurisdiction of the court to issue such decision. In other words, they amount to no more than
errors of judgment correctible by an appeal, not by a writ of certiorari that will issue only when there
is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[18]
Since an order of
dismissal by the trial court is a final order from which an ordinary appeal
under Rule 41 can be taken,[19]
the petitioners should have taken this avenue against the RTC order of September
7, 1999 instead of resorting to a petition for certiorari before the CA. Supreme
Court Circular No. 2-90 is unequivocal in directing the dismissal of an
inappropriate mode of appeal:
4. Erroneous Appeals – An appeal
taken to either the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong or
inappropriate mode shall be dismissed.
But rather than dismissing
outright the petition, the CA, “in the interest of justice,” decided to treat
it as an appeal filed under Rule 41 and consider the errors raised by the
petitioners. As it turned out, however,
the CA still ruled for the petition’s dismissal because it found that
petitioners’ did not have any cause of action against respondent Catlys and
were not the real parties in interest.
As the petitioners now raise before this Court the same errors of judgment already raised before
and resolved by the CA, the dismissal of the present certiorari petition is in order for being the wrong remedy. Errors of judgment committed by the CA are
reviewable by this Court via a
petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Erroneous findings and conclusion do not render the appellate court vulnerable
to the corrective writ of certiorari.[20]
The petitioners’
invocation of a liberal application of the rules of procedure is
unavailing. Even if the Court were to
consider the present petition as an appeal filed under Rule 45, we would
ultimately order its dismissal for failing to find any reversible error
committed by the CA.
An action for annulment of title, like any
other civil action, must be instituted by the real party in interest
Section 2, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court states:
Sec. 2. Parties in interest. – A real party in interest is the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit.
Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
This provision has two
requirements: 1) to institute an action, the plaintiff must be the real party
in interest; and 2) the action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party
in interest. Interest within the meaning of the Rules of Court means material
interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of
the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question
involved. One having no material
interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as the
plaintiff in an action. When the
plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case is dismissible on the
ground of lack of cause of action.[21]
An action for annulment of certificates of title to property into
the issue of ownership of the land covered by a Torrens title and the relief
generally prayed for by the plaintiff is to be declared as the land’s true
owner.[22] The real party in
interest in such action therefore is the person claiming title or ownership
adverse to that of the registered owner.
The
case of Tankiko v. Cezar[23]
has illustrated for us the application of this principle in the following manner:
It is evident that
respondents are not the real parties in interest. Because they admit that they are not the
owners of the land but mere applicants for sales patents thereon, it is
daylight clear that the land is public in character and that it should revert
to the State.
This being the case, Section 101 of the Public Land Act categorically declares
that only the government may institute an action to recover ownership of a
public land.
x x x x
Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party in interest. It further
defines a “real party in interest” as one who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit. x x x The interest
of the party must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the
constitutional right of some third and unrelated party.
Clearly, a suit filed by a person who is not a party in interest must
be dismissed. Thus, in Lucas v. Durian, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a Complaint
filed by a party who alleged that the patent was obtained by fraudulent means
and, consequently, prayed for the annulment of said patent and the cancellation
of a certificate of title. The Court
declared that the proper party to bring the action was the government, to which
the property would revert. Likewise affirming the dismissal of a Complaint for
failure to state a cause of
action, the Court in
Nebrada v. Heirs of Alivio
noted that the plaintiff, being a mere homestead applicant, was not the real party in interest to
institute an action for reconveyance.
x x x x
Verily, the Court stressed that
“if the suit is not brought in the name of or against the real party in
interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground that the complaint
states no cause of action.”[24]
[Emphasis supplied.]
The petitioners demand the
annulment of respondent Catlys’ titles because they allege that these included
portions belonging to the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the petitioners’ Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The Decision of October 7, 2002 and
Resolution of March 6, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 58307 are AFFIRMED. Cost against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
|
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO Associate Justice Chairperson |
|
|
MARIANO
C. Associate
Justice |
ROBERTO
A. ABAD Associate Justice |
JOSE
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 6-21.
[2] Civil Case No. R-2153.
[3] CA-G.R. No. R-41794
entitled Alveyra v. Municipality of
Calapan.
[4] Petition No. 18589.
[5] TCT No. T-46154 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof TCT Nos. 85655, 85656, 85657, and 85658 were
issued in respondent Catlys’ names.
[6] Civil Case No. 1531.
[7] The records do not
disclose the reason for the dismissal.
[8] Civil Case No. R-4901.
[9] Civil Case No. R-4750.
[10] Rollo, pp. 77-81.
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] Suyat v. Torres, 484 Phil
230 (2004); Tensorex Industrial
Corporation v. CA, 374 Phil. 824 (1999).
[17] Tagle v. Equitable PCI Bank,
G.R. No. 172299, April 22, 2008, 552 SCRA 424, 440-441.
[18] RULES OF COURT, Rule
65, Section 1.
[19] Madrigal Transport, Inc. v.
Lapanday Holdings Corporation, Inc.,
479 Phil. 768 (2004); First Bancorp, Inc.
v. CA, G.R. No. 151132, June 22, 2006, 492 SCRA 221, 235.
[20] New York Marine Managers, Inc. v. CA, 319 Phil. 538 (1995).
[21] Spouses Oco v. Limbaring,
G.R. No. 161298, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA
348.
[22] Heirs of Abadilla
v. Galarosa, G.R. No. 149041,
July 12, 2006, 494 SCRA 675.
[23] 362 Phil. 184 (1999).
[24]