Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Baguio City
|
DIVERSIFIED SECURITY, INC., Petitioner, - versus - ALICIA V. BAUTISTA, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 152234 Present: CORONA, J., Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, PERALTA, and MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated: April 15, 2010 |
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PERALTA, J.:
This resolves
the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, praying that the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) dated August 31, 2001 affirming the finding that
petitioner illegally dismissed respondent, and the CA Resolution[2]
dated February 11, 2002 denying herein petitioner's motion for reconsideration,
be reversed and set aside.
The undisputed facts are as follows.
Respondent was
employed by petitioner as an Executive Pool Secretary, but petitioner alleged
that respondent turned out to be incompetent.
Petitioner then assigned her to perform menial or insignificant jobs and
allegedly transferred her to their branch office in Makati City. However, respondent allegedly failed to
report for work at said branch office on the day she was supposed to do so.
On the other
hand, respondent claimed that petitioner dismissed her on October 31, 1997
without any valid reason, neither was she given any notice and hearing.
In December of
1997, respondent filed a case for illegal dismissal against petitioner. Petitioner countered that respondent was not
dismissed; rather, she was the one who severed her connection with petitioner
by her “voluntary and unequivocal acts.”
On September
29, 1998, the Labor Arbiter issued a Decision,[3]
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby entered,
ordering the respondents [herein petitioner and its officers], jointly and
severally, to pay the total sum of P92,733.33 as separation pay and
proportionate mandatory 13th month pay of complainant. Other issues or claims are hereby DISMISSED
for want of substantial evidence.
SO ORDERED.[4]
The foregoing Decision was appealed
to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), but the NLRC affirmed the
Labor Arbiter's ruling that herein respondent was illegally dismissed. The dispositive portion of the NLRC Decision[5]
dated February 23, 2000 is set forth hereunder:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision under review is
hereby MODIFIED by ordering the respondents, jointly and severally, to pay the
complainant her proportionate 13th month pay for 1997 and full
backwages from the date of her dismissal in October 31, 1997 up to the date of
the Labor Arbiter's decision when separation pay was adjudged as an alternative
relief to reinstatement in the total amount of SIXTY-SEVEN THOUSAND THREE
HUNDRED PESOS (P67,300.00).
Respondents are likewise ordered to pay the complainant severance
compensation equivalent to her one month salary for every year of service
reckoned from February 1990 to October 1997, a fraction of six (6) months being
considered as one year, the total amount being FORTY-ONE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
PESOS (P41,600.00).
SO ORDERED.[6]
Petitioners then filed a petition
for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and on
August 31, 2001, the CA issued the assailed Decision which disposed, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission is hereby MODIFIED,
in that, the liability of individual petitioners is hereby DELETED while
the rest of the decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration,
but the same was denied in the Resolution dated February 11, 2002. Hence, this petition wherein it is alleged
that:
I.
THE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT RESPONDENT BAUTISTA WAS DISMISSED FROM
EMPLOYMENT AND THE DISMISSAL WAS ILLEGAL, DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY ACT, ON
THE PART OF PETITIONER, CONSTITUTIVE OF DISMISSAL OR MUCH LESS ILLEGAL
DISMISSAL, IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE LAW AND THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE
SUPREME COURT;
II.
THE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER DSI DISMISSED RESPONDENT ON
THE GROUND OF ABANDONMENT, DESPITE THE UNCONTROVERTED FACT THAT THE SAID GROUND
WAS NEVER RAISED BY PETITIONER BY WAY OF DEFENSE AND ERRED IN THE AUTOMATIC
APPLICATION OF THE RULE THAT A COMPLAINT OF ILLEGAL DISMISSAL IS INCONSISTENT
WITH ABANDONMENT;
III.
THE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GRANTING SEPARATION PAY TO RESPONDENT COMPUTED FROM
1990 ON THE BASIS ALONE OR PETITIONER DSI'S ARTICLE OF INCORPORATION DATED
1990, DESPITE THE UNCONTROVERTED FACT THAT RESPONDENT WAS EMPLOYED BY
PETITIONER ONLY IN NOVEMBER 1996;
IV.
THE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING ARTICLE 279 OF THE LABOR CODE BY ORDERING
THE PAYMENT OF FULL BACKWAGES AND THIRTEENTH MONTH PAY TO THE RESPONDENT,
DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY SHOWING OF ILLEGAL DISMISSAL, OR EVEN OF ANY
DISMISSAL.[8]
The Court finds the petition
unmeritorious.
Petitioner's
assignment of errors boils down to the sole issue of whether the CA correctly
upheld the NLRC ruling that respondent was illegally dismissed by petitioner.
The Court sees it fit to reiterate and
emphasize the oft-repeated ruling in Reyes v. National Labor Relations
Commission,[9] to wit:
x x x findings of facts of
quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals in
due course, are conclusive on this Court, which is not a trier of facts.
x x x x
x x x Findings of fact of administrative
agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their
jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only
respect, but finality when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Such findings
deserve full respect and, without justifiable reason, ought not to be altered,
modified or reversed.[10]
In
this case, the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the CA were all consistent in their
factual findings that respondent's employment was indeed terminated without
giving her notice and hearing. The
NLRC's finding that respondent had been petitioner's employee since 1990, had
also been affirmed by the CA. A close
perusal of the records show that there is no cogent reason for this Court to
deviate from the settled rule that factual findings of the NLRC, when affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, are accorded not only respect but finality.
Moreover,
the Court cannot subscribe to petitioner's argument that it did not dismiss
respondent. Such a proposition
stretches credulity as it is not in accord with human nature for an employee to
go through all the trouble of filing a labor case against his or her employer
if he or she were not in fact dismissed from employment. It is also quite telling that petitioner
admitted in its Memorandum of Appeal[11]
dated January 29, 1998 and in its Position Paper[12]
dated July 21, 1998, that it considered respondent as “resigned”
starting November 1997. Notably,
such period of time coincides with respondent's contention that she was
dismissed by petitioner on October 31, 1997.
Petitioner's admission bolsters respondent's claim that she was, indeed,
dismissed by petitioner at that time.
For
the very same reason stated above, the Court cannot give any consideration to
petitioner's contention that did not put up as a defense the alleged
abandonment by respondent of her work.
Petitioner insists that its defense is that there was no dismissal to
speak of in the first place; respondent merely ceased reporting for work. Again, if that is indeed petitioner's
defense, then the lower courts were right in giving it short shrift. Verily, the scenario presented by petitioner,
i.e., that an employee who has not been terminated
from employment would, for no apparent reason, just
stop coming to work and
file a labor case against her employer, totally defies logic and common sense.
The
absurdity of petitioner's defense highlights the fact that respondent's claim,
that she was dismissed without any notice and hearing, rings with truth. This Court views with approval the
observation of the CA and the NLRC, to wit:
x x x the petitioners cannot justify their defense of
abandonment as they failed to prove that indeed private respondent had
abandoned her work. It did not even
bother to send a letter to her last known address requiring her to report for
work and explain her alleged continued absences. The ratiocination of public respondent [NLRC]
on this score merits our imprimatur, viz:
The
law clearly spells out the manner with which an unjustified refusal to return
to work by an employee may be established.
Thusly, respondent should have given complainant a notice with warning
concerning her alleged absences (Section 2, Rule XIV, Book V, Implementing
Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code).
The notice requirement actually consists of two parts to be separately
served on the employee to wit: (1)
notice to apprise the employee of his absences with a warning concerning a
possible severance of employment in the event of an unjustified excuse
therefor, and (2) subsequent notice of the decision to dismiss in the event of
an employee's refusal to pay heed to such warning. Only after compliance had been effected with
those requirements can it be reasonably concluded that the employee had
actually abandoned his job. In
respondent's case, it is noted that more than two (2) months had already lapsed
since complainant allegedly started to absent herself when the latter instituted
her action for illegal dismissal. During
the said period of time, no action was taken by the respondents regarding
complainant's alleged absences, something which is quite peculiar had
complainant's employment not been severed at all. Accordingly, we do not find respondents
defense of abandonment to be impressed with merit in view of an utter lack of
evidence to support the same. Hence,
complainant's charge of illegal dismissal stands uncontroverted x x x .[13]
From the foregoing, it is quite clear that the Labor
Arbiter, the NLRC and the CA committed no grave abuse of discretion in ruling
that there was illegal dismissal in this case.
Having
firmly established that petitioner dismissed respondent without just cause, and
without notice and hearing, then it is only proper to apply Article 279 of the
Labor Code which provides that an illegally dismissed employee “shall be
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges
and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits
or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was
withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.” In addition to full backwages, the Court has
also repeatedly ruled that in cases where reinstatement is no longer feasible
due to strained relations, then separation pay may be awarded instead of
reinstatement.[14] In Mt. Carmel College v. Resuena,[15]
the Court reiterated that the separation pay, as an alternative to
reinstatement, should be equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of
service.[16]
IN VIEW OF
THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated August 31, 2001 and February 11,
2002, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 64038, are AFFIRMED. Petitioner is ORDERED to pay respondent Alicia V.
Bautista (a) separation pay in the
amount equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of service; and (b)
backwages, computed from the time compensation was withheld from her when she
was unjustly terminated, up to the time of
payment thereof. For this purpose, the
records of this case are hereby REMANDED
to the Labor Arbiter for proper computation of said awards. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
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PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
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JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA Associate Justice |
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ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero, with Associate Justices Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. and Edgardo P. Cruz, concurring; rollo, pp. 32-40.
[2] Id. at 42-43.
[3] CA rollo, pp. 77-80.
[4] Id. at 80.
[5] Id. at 24-33.
[6] Id. at 31-32.
[7] Rollo, p. 39.
[8] Id. at 11-12.
[9] G.R. No. 160233, August 8, 2007, 529 SCRA 487.
[10] Id. at 494, 499. (Emphasis supplied.)
[11] Rollo, pp. 67-77.
[12] Id. at 50-58.
[13] CA Decision, rollo, pp. 37-38
[14] Nissan North Edsa Balintawak, Queson City v. Serrano, Jr., G.R. No. 162538, June 4, 2009, 588 SCRA 238, 247.
[15] G.R. No. 173076, October 10, 2007, 535 SCRA 518.
[16] Id. at 541.