Republic of the
Supreme Court
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NARCISO TUMIBAY,* RUPERTO
TUMIBAY, ELENA TUMIBAY, EDUARDO TUMIBAY, CORAZON TUMIBAY, MANUELA SEVERINO
VDA. DE PERIDA and GREGORIA DELA CRUZ, Petitioners, - versus - SPS. YOLANDA T. SORO and HONORIO SORO,
SPS. JULITA T. STA. ANA and FELICISIMO STA. ANA, Respondents. - |
G.R. No. 152016
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION, PEREZ, and **MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: April 13, 2010 |
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D E
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BRION, J.: |
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Before
us is the petition for review on certiorari,[1] filed by petitioners
Narciso Tumibay (Narciso), Ruperto
Tumibay, Elena Tumibay, Eduardo Tumibay, Corazon Tumibay, Manuela Severino Vda.
De Perida and Gregoria Dela Cruz (petitioners),
to reverse and set aside the decision[2]
dated August 24, 2001 and resolution[3]
dated January 29, 2002 of the Former Special Tenth Division of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 56489.
The assailed CA decision nullified, for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion, the order dated September 6, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30,
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The
facts of the case, gathered from the records, are briefly summarized below.
The
petitioners, including the respondent Julita T. Sta. Ana (Julita), were the defendants in Civil Case No. 8269, an action for
annulment and recovery of ownership with damages, filed on January 17, 1984 by
the respondent Yolanda T. Soro (Yolanda)
and her husband, respondent Honorio Soro.
The subject of the case was a 1,083 square meter parcel of land in
Cabanatuan City (subject property) originally
titled in the name of Francisca Sacdal, the grandmother of Yolanda and Julita,
under Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. 1738 of the Registry of Deeds of Cabanatuan City. Thru a “Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa” dated
February 2 and 13, 1967, OCT No.1738 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-11574 was issued in
Narciso’s name. Narciso subsequently sold the subject property to the other
petitioners in this case, thereby causing the issuance of TCT Nos. T-23150,
27151 and 42467 in their names.
On
December 30, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision, whose dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, decision is hereby rendered, as follows:
1. Declaring the “Bilihang
Tuluyan ng Lupa” dated February 2 & 13, 1967 and all sales executed
subsequent thereto as null and void ab initio;
2. Ordering the annulment
of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-11574, issued in the name of Narciso
Tumibay and all subsequent titles issued thereafter, such as TCT Nos. T-23150,
27151 and 42467 of the Register of Deeds of Cabanatuan City, in the name of the
other defendants;
3. Declaring the plaintiff
Yolanda T. Soro and defendant Julita T. Sta. Ana, as the sole heirs of Estela
Perida and owners of the land covered originally by Original Certificate of
Title No. 1738;
4. Ordering the defendants
to reconvey the said property to the said Yolanda T. Soro and Julita T. Sta.
Ana, and in default thereof, the Branch Clerk of Court of this Court is hereby
authorized to execute the necessary deed of conveyance in favor of said Yolanda
T. Soro and Julita T. Sta. Ana; and
5. Ordering the defendants,
jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff P5,000.00 as actual and moral
damages, and attorney’s fee of P5,000.00 and cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.
The
RTC decision was affirmed, successively, by the CA and by this Court. After
finality, the RTC – on Yolanda’s motion – issued a writ of execution. In
obedience to the writ, the Register of Deeds of Cabanatuan City issued TCT
No.T-98649[4] and TCT
No. T-98650[5] in the
names of Yolanda and Perlita.
On
March 3, 1999, Yolanda and Perlita, with their respective spouses, filed with
the RTC a motion to be restored to the possession of the subject property and
to demolish the improvements thereon, in accordance with paragraphs (c) and (d)
of Section 10, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.[6]
The
petitioners opposed the motion on the ground that there was nothing in the RTC
decision that ordered the demolition of existing improvements.
THE RTC RULING
The
RTC issued an Order (dated September 6, 1999) denying the respondents’ motion.
In sustaining the petitioners’ views, the RTC noted that a writ of execution
should conform to the dispositive portion of the decision sought to be
executed; it cannot go beyond the terms of the judgment.[7]
When
the RTC denied[8] their motion
for reconsideration,[9] the
respondents elevated their case to the CA via
a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. They insisted that the removal or demolition of the
improvements was the logical consequence of the RTC decision.
THE CA RULING
The
CA decided the petition on August 24, 2001. The appellate court, applying Rule
39, Section 10, paragraph (d) of the Rules of Court, noted that since the RTC
ordered the petitioners to reconvey to the respondents the subject property
that contains improvements the petitioners introduced, the demolition of the
improvements can be done only after a special order of the RTC, issued upon the
respondents’ motion, after due hearing, and after the petitioners failed to
remove the improvements within the time fixed by the RTC. Thus, the CA declared
void the September 6, 1999 RTC Order and directed the RTC to fix the time
within which the petitioners should remove the improvements from the subject
property.
After
the CA’s denial[10] of their
motion for reconsideration,[11] the
petitioners filed the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
THE PETITION
The
petitioners argue that the writ of execution should conform to the dispositive
portion of the decision sought to be executed and the demolition of the
existing improvements was not expressly ordained in the decision. They submit
that to effect the demolition, the respondents must file an ejectment case.
They cite Nazareno v. Court of Appeals,[12] which
held that “being declared owner of the subject lot does not also mean that [the
winning party] is automatically entitled to possession of all improvements
thereon.”
THE CASE FOR THE RESPONDENTS
The
respondents submit that the petitioners’ argument runs counter to the express
provisions of Rule 39, Section 47 of the Rules of Court that a judgment is
conclusive on all matters that the parties could have raised; to further
require them to file an ejectment suit to oust the petitioners would amount to
encouraging multiplicity of suits.
THE ISSUE
The
core issue is whether the CA erred when it declared void the September 6, 1999
RTC Order denying the respondents’ motion to be restored to possession of the
subject property and to demolish the improvements thereon.
OUR RULING
We find no merit in the petition.
A judgment is
not confined to what appears on the face of the decision
We are not persuaded by the petitioners’ argument
that, since the RTC decision to reconvey to respondents the subject property did
not expressly order the removal of improvements thereon, the RTC cannot, by
order, reach these improvements and accordingly act to enforce its decision.
As a general rule, the writ of execution should conform to the dispositive portion of the decision to be executed; an
execution is void if it is in excess of and beyond the original judgment or
award. The settled general principle is that
a writ of execution must conform strictly to every essential particular of the
judgment promulgated,[13] and may not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks
to enforce, nor may it go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be
executed.[14]
Nonetheless, we have held that a judgment is not
confined to what appears on the face of the decision, but extends as well to
those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.[15] Thus, in Perez
v. Evite,[16] where the ownership of a parcel of land was decreed
in the judgment, the delivery of possession of the land was considered included
in the decision where the defeated party's claim to possession was based solely
on his claim of ownership.
In Baluyut v.
Guiao,[17] we stressed that this rule fully conforms with Rule
39, Section 47, paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court that provides:
SECTION 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or
final order rendered by a court of the
x x x x
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors
in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or
final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which
was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. (Emphasis
supplied.)
[18]
Petitioners misread Nazareno v. Court of Appeals
We find that the petitioners misread the ruling in Nazareno v. Court of Appeals[19] when they understood the ruling to mean that in all
cases, a declaration of ownership does not include a declaration of the right
to possession. What Nazareno actually
holds is that adjudication of ownership would include the delivery of
possession if the defeated party has not shown any right to possess the land
independently of his rejected claim of ownership. This ruling, as understood in its correct
sense, fully applies to the present case, as there is no allegation, much less any
proof, that the petitioners have any right to possess the improvements on the land
independently of their claim of ownership of the subject property. Thus, the respondents have full right to
possession of the subject property.
We remind the petitioners that we do not allow the
piecemeal interpretation of our
Decision as a means to
advance one’s case. To get the true
intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be
isolated and read in this context; the decision must be considered in its
entirety.[20] Read in this manner, the respondents’ right to
possession of the subject property fully follows.
Rule 39, Section 10 sets the procedure for
execution of judgment for specific acts
In addition, Rule 39, Section 10, paragraphs (c) and
(d), of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for execution of judgments
for specific acts, as follows:
SECTION 10. Execution of judgments
for specific act.-
x x x x
(c) Delivery or restitution of real property. - The
officer shall demand of the person against whom the judgment for the delivery or restitution of real property is rendered and all persons
claiming rights under him to peaceably vacate the property within the three (3)
working days, and restore possession thereof to the judgment obligee;
otherwise, the officer shall oust all such persons therefrom with the
assistance, if necessary, of appropriate peace officers, and employing such
means as may be reasonably necessary to retake possession, and place the
judgment obligee in possession of such property. Any costs, damages, rents or
profits awarded by the judgment shall be satisfied in the same manner as a judgment for money.
(d) Removal of improvements on
property subject of execution. - When the property subject of execution
contains improvements constructed or planted by the judgment obligor or his
agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said improvements,
except upon special order of the court, issued upon motion of the
judgment obligee after due hearing and after the former has failed to remove
the same within a reasonable time fixed by the court. (Emphasis supplied)
In Buñag v.
Court of Appeals,[21] we explained that a judgment for the delivery or
restitution of property is essentially an order to place the prevailing party
in possession of the property. If the defendant refuses to surrender possession
of the property to the prevailing party, the sheriff or other proper officer
should oust him. No express order to
this effect needs to be stated in the decision; nor is a categorical statement
needed in the decision that in such event the sheriff or other proper officer
shall have the authority to remove the improvements on the property if the defendant
fails to do so within a reasonable period of time. The removal of the improvements on the land under
these circumstances is deemed read into the decision, subject only to the
issuance of a special order by the court for the removal of the improvements.[22]
In light of the foregoing, we find that the CA
committed no reversible error in declaring void the September 6, 1999 RTC
Order.
Treble costs against petitioners
We lament that the petitioners, by instituting the
present petition, has effectively delayed the full execution of the final and
executory RTC judgment. In doing so, they deprived the winning respondents of
the fruits of the judgment, and made a mockery of the RTC judgment that has
stood scrutiny all the way to our level. We have always frowned upon any scheme
to prolong litigations and we view the present dispute as an unwarranted effort
to avoid the implementation of a judgment painstakingly arrived at. We cannot
countenance, and in fact, condemn this kind of abuse of judicial process. Thus,
we deem it fit to impose treble costs against the petitioners.
We note that the petitioners filed a Manifestation
dated August 28, 2008[23] informing us that Julita sold her pro indiviso share in the subject
property to one Corazon T. Logramente thru a “Bilihang Lubusan ng Lupa” dated July 17, 2003, and the latter
caused the annotation of her adverse claim in the TCT Nos. T-98649 and T-98650.
However, this supervening event has no
bearing to the present case where the only issue involved is the propriety of
the September 6, 1999 RTC Order that denied the respondents’ motion to be
restored in possession. Besides, whatever right Corazon T. Logramente, a third
party to the present dispute, may have on the subject property is adequately
protected by the inscription of her adverse claim in the land titles. Any right
she may have can only be raised or brought by her as the affected party, or the
real party-in-interest, in a proper forum.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we hereby DENY the
petition and AFFIRM the decision dated August 24, 2001 and
resolution dated January 29, 2002 of the Former Special Tenth Division of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 56489 insofar as it declared void the Order dated September 6, 1999 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 30,
Treble costs
against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
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ANTONIO T.
CARPIO Associate Justice Chairperson |
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MARIANO C.
Associate
Justice |
JOSE Associate Justice |
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Died
on September 30, 2003. See rollo, p. 146.
** Designated additional Member vice Justice Roberto A. Abad per Special Order No. 832 dated March 30, 2010.
[1] Filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales (now a member of this Court), with Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes and Rebecca De Guia-Salvador, concurring. See rollo, pp. 17-23.
[3] Rollo, pp. 24-25.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] Resolution of June 29, 2002; id. at 24-25.
[11]
[12] 383 Phil. 229 (2000).
[13] Mahinay v. Asis, G.R. No. 170349, February 12, 2009, 578 SCRA 562, 574.
[14] Ingles v. Cantos, G.R. No. 125202, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 140.
[15] DHL Philippines Corp. United Rank and File Asso.-Federation of Free Workers v. Buklod ng Manggagawa ng DHL Philippines Corp., 478 Phil. 842, 853; Jaban v. Court of Appeals, 421 Phil. 896, 904; 370 SCRA 221,228 (2001).
[16] 111 Phil 564 (1961).
[17] 373 Phil 1013 (1999).
[18]
[19] Supra note 12.
[20] Suico Rattan & Buri Interiors, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138145, June 15, 2006, 490 SCRA 560, 579.
[21] 363 Phil 216 (1999).
[22]
[23] Rollo, pp. 152-154.