FIRST
DIVISION
|
PCI
LEASING and FINANCE, INC., Petitioner, - versus - ANTONIO C. MILAN,
Doing Business Under the Name and Style of “A. Respondents. |
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G.R. No.
151215
Present: PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, CARPIO
MORALES, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BERSAMIN, and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
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D E C I S I O N
LEONARDO
– DE CASTRO, J.:
This
Petition for Review on Certiorari[1]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is directed against the Resolutions of the
Court of Appeals dated
The instant case was commenced on February 18, 2000,
upon the filing of a Complaint for Sum of Money[6]
by petitioner PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. (PCI Leasing) against herein
respondents Antonio C. Milan (Antonio) and Laura M. Milan. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case
No. Q-00-40010 in the RTC of
PCI Leasing alleged that it extended loans to
respondents on P2,327,833.33 as of
On
On
In view of the above situation, PCI Leasing filed on
In an Order[14]
dated April 13, 2000, the RTC denied the Motion to Archive given that the
circumstances of the case were not within the purview of the provisions of
paragraph II (c) of Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92 (Guidelines in the
Archiving of Cases),[15]
which read:
In civil cases, the
court may motu proprio or upon
motion, order that a civil case be archived only in the following instances:
x x x x
“c) When defendant, without fault or neglect of
plaintiff, cannot be served with summons within six (6) months from issuance of
original summons.
Subsequently, on
On
On
When this case was called for hearing on the Motion
for Issuance of Alias Summons, there was no appearance for [PCI Leasing]. It should be recalled that as early as
PCI Leasing sought a reconsideration[24]
of the above Order, explaining that its counsel was already in the courtroom
when Judge
Leah S. Domingo-Regala of the RTC
was dictating the order of dismissal.
Allegedly, the counsel of PCI Leasing even expressed profuse apologies
to the trial court for his late appearance. PCI Leasing prayed that the
order of dismissal be reconsidered and the second Motion for Issuance of Alias
Summons be considered submitted for resolution.
In a Resolution[25]
dated
[I]t is clear that [PCI Leasing] had been remiss in its duty to prosecute this case diligently.
The Court has already
given [PCI Leasing] several chances within a span of almost one (1) year to
prosecute the instant case but [PCI Leasing] failed to do so.
If only to serve as a lesson to [PCI Leasing] to be more
considerate of the time and resources of the Court, the Court resolves to DENY
the instant motion for reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED, for lack of merit.”
(Emphases ours.)
On
The RTC denied the Ex Parte Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution[27]
dated
On
NOTICE OF APPEAL
Plaintiff, through counsel, to this Honorable Court
respectfully gives notice that it is appealing to the Honorable Court of
Appeals its 13 October 2000 Order
received on 13 November 2000 which dismissed the case, its 04 January 2001 Resolution received on 17 January 2001 denying the
Motion for Reconsideration dated 17 October 2000 and its 06 April 2001 Resolution received on 03 May 2001 denying the
Ex-parte Motion for Reconsideration dated 23 January 2001, on the ground that
said Order and Resolutions are contrary
to the applicable laws and jurisprudence on the matter. (Emphases
ours.)
On
At any rate, the Notice
of Appeal was filed late. Record shows
that the Resolution of
Thus [PCI Leasing] had only seven (7) days from
receipt of the Resolution of
Quoting the pertinent doctrines on
the finality of judgments, the RTC underlined that:
On this score, the Hon. Supreme Court has time and
again emphasized that an award or judgment becomes final and executory upon the
expiration of the period to appeal and no appeal was made within the
reglementary period. The basic rule of
finality of judgment is applicable indiscriminately to one and all since the
rule is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound
practice that at the risk of occasional error, the judgments of courts must
become final at some definite date fixed by law. (Alto Sales Corporation vs.
IAC, 197 SCRA 618)
Although in a few instances, the court had
disregarded procedural lapses so as to give due course to appeals beyond the
reglementary period, the court did so on the basis of strong and compelling
reasons, such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a grave miscarriage
thereof. (Vide Retoni, Jr. vs. CA, 218 SCRA 468)
Thus, the perfection of an appeal within the
reglementary period fixed by the rules is mandatory and jurisdictional and the
failure to do so renders the questioned decision final and executory that
deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment much
less to entertain the appeal. (De Castro, Jr. vs. CA, 158 SCRA 288.)[31]
The RTC decreed, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Notice of Appeal is DISMISSED, for
having been taken out of time.[32] (Emphasis ours.)
Without filing a Motion for
Reconsideration, PCI Leasing assailed the above Resolution before the Court of
Appeals through a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66546.
The appellate court, however, dismissed
outright the aforesaid petition in a Resolution dated
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set
aside the Resolutions of respondent Judge dismissing the appeal of [PCI
Leasing] for having been taken out of time.
Section 13, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that the trial court may, motu proprio or on motion,
dismiss the appeal for having been taken out of time.
Settled is the rule that the perfection of an appeal
in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory, but
jurisdictional and the failure to perfect that appeal renders the judgment
of the court final and executory.
Moreover, the notice of appeal filed by [PCI Leasing] states that it is
appealing the assailed Order and resolutions to the Court of Appeals on the
ground that the same are contrary to the applicable laws and jurisprudence on
the matter. In Reyes vs.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.[33]
(Emphases ours, citations omitted.)
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[34]
of the aforementioned Court of Appeals Resolution but the same was denied in a
Resolution issued on
[The motion for reconsideration of PCI Leasing] dated
Admittedly, the filing of the notice of appeal was late by one day.
Moreover, [PCI Leasing] has not disputed that as stated in the notice of
appeal, it is appealing the assailed Orders and Resolutions of respondent Judge
to this Court on the ground that the same are contrary to the applicable law
and jurisprudence and, therefore, this Court has no jurisdiction over the
intended appeal as only questions of law would be raised therein.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.[35]
On
On
On
Considering that respondents still
failed to file their comment to the petition within the period required
therefor, the Court issued a Resolution[40]
dated May 17, 2004, ordering respondent Antonio[41]
to “(a) SHOW CAUSE why he should not
be held in contempt of court for such failure, and (b) COMPLY with the said resolution of February 4, 2002, both within
ten days from notice hereof.”
The above resolution was apparently
not complied with as well. Thus, in a
Resolution[42]
dated P1,000.00 against Antonio, payable to the
Court within ten days from notice. If
the fine is not paid within said period, a penalty of imprisonment of five days
would instead be imposed. Antonio was
also required to file a comment to the petition filed by PCI Leasing within ten
days from notice. The said Resolution
was once more returned unserved, with the postmaster’s notation “RTS, Mr.
Antonio Milan, unknown; Ms. Laura Milan, deceased; ML Merchandising PG Dealer
refused to received.”[43]
Accordingly, we again required[44]
PCI Leasing to notify this Court of the correct address of Antonio within a
non-extendible period of ten days from notice; otherwise, the case will be
dismissed.
On January 27, 2005, PCI Leasing filed
its Compliance,[45]
stating that it sent its Credit Investigator/Appraiser to the place where
Antonio was reportedly maintaining his business, M.L. Merchandising PG Dealer,
at “Gen. Luis Street, Novaliches, Quezon City” to determine the address of said
respondent. The person found in the
store at the said address allegedly refused to reply to inquiries made or to
reveal his identity to the Credit Investigator/Appraiser.
On
(a) to let the said copies
of the resolutions of
(b) to ISSUE an ALIAS WARRANT OF ARREST against respondent Milan,
directing the NBI to cause his immediate arrest and to DETAIN him until he complies with the said resolutions of February
4, 2002, May 17, 2004 and August 18, 2004; and
(c) to require the NBI to
make a RETURN thereof within ten
(10) days from notice hereof.[47]
On
On
In a Resolution[52]
dated
On
On
PCI Leasing thereafter filed its Reply[57]
on
In the Resolution[58]
dated
In its Memorandum, PCI Leasing put forward only one
issue for our resolution, to wit:
THE COURT OF APPEALS, IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FILED BY PETITIONER
BEFORE IT AND, IN EFFECT, DEPRIVING PETITIONER OF ITS RIGHT TO RECOVER THE SUMS
IT HAD LOANED TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS, HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF
As what it emphasized in the Petition for Certiorari filed before the Court of
Appeals, PCI
Leasing likewise brings to the attention of the Court the details of the
so-called “procedural path” that was taken by the RTC and the supposed mistakes
it committed along the way.[62] On the basis of its allegations, PCI Leasing
points out that the case it laid out before the Court of Appeals involved not
only questions of law but a combination of facts and law, such that the said
case would fall within the purview of the appellate court’s jurisdiction. However, PCI Leasing laments that the Court
of Appeals ignored the former’s efforts to seek a rectification of the acts of
the RTC. PCI Leasing accuses both the
Court of Appeals and the RTC of defeating its right to recover the sums of
money it had loaned to the respondents simply because it allegedly committed
“some procedural lapses” in the prosecution of its case. If the rulings of the Court of Appeals and
the RTC would be allowed to stand, the respondents would allegedly be enriched
by the amounts they had obtained from PCI Leasing. Although it acknowledges that “there was some
measure of breach of procedure” on its part, PCI Leasing contends that the
consequence imposed by the Court of Appeals and the RTC was disproportionate to
the breach committed. Calling for a
liberal application of the pertinent rules of procedure and invoking the
inherent equity jurisdiction of courts, PCI Leasing ultimately prays for the
reinstatement of Civil Case No. Q-00-40010, which it previously filed before
the RTC.
We
grant the petition.
The Court of Appeals indeed committed a mistake in
issuing the Resolutions dated
To recall, the Court of Appeals based the dismissal
of the Petition for Certiorari on the
fact that (1) the appeal of PCI Leasing was filed out of time and (2) the
Notice of Appeal supposedly involved pure questions of law.
For
purposes of clarity and organization, the Court deems it proper to address the
second of the above grounds first.
The
Court of Appeals concluded that the Notice of Appeal involved pure questions of
law on the basis of the statement therein that the Order
dated October 13, 2000, the Resolution dated January 4, 2001 and the Resolution
dated April 6, 2001 of the RTC would be appealed to the Court of Appeals on the
ground that the same were “contrary
to the applicable laws and jurisprudence on the matter.” The Court of Appeals was of the opinion that
it would not have jurisdiction over the intended appeal since the same should
be raised to the Supreme Court via a
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
We hold that the Court of Appeals was
unreasonably hasty in inferring its lack of jurisdiction over the intended appeal
of PCI Leasing. The above-stated
conclusion of the Court of Appeals was simply uncalled for, notwithstanding the
said statement in the Notice of Appeal.
Under Rule 41, Section 5 of the Rules
of Court, a notice of appeal is only required to indicate (a) the parties to
the appeal, (b) the final judgment or order or part thereof appealed from, (c)
the court to which the appeal is being taken, and (d) the material dates
showing the timeliness of the appeal. In usual court practice, a notice of
appeal would consist of one or two pages.
Only
after the specific issues and arguments of PCI Leasing are laid out in detail
before the Court of Appeals in the appropriate substantive pleading can it make
a conclusion as to whether or not the
issues raised therein involved pure questions of law.
As
regards the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the appeal of PCI Leasing was
filed out of time, the same was in concurrence with the findings of the RTC
that the Notice of Appeal was filed one day late. On this matter, we hold that the conclusion
of the RTC that PCI Leasing belatedly filed its appeal was correct, but the
premise therefor was evidently mistaken.
In
accordance with Section 3, Rule 41[63]
of the Rules of Court, an ordinary appeal of a judgment by the RTC shall be
taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order
appealed from. Said period shall be
interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. In Neypes
v. Court of Appeals,[64]
the Court had the occasion to clarify the rule regarding the period within
which an appeal may be taken should a motion for new trial or reconsideration
be filed. Thus:
To standardize the
appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity
to appeal their cases, the Court deems
it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice
of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this “fresh
period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal
Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from
the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from
quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals
by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the
appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the
motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or
any final order or resolution.
x x x x
To recapitulate, a party
litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of
the Regional Trial Court’s decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of
the order (the “final order”) denying his motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. Obviously, the new
15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the
decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal
period provided in Rule 41, Section 3. (Emphases ours.)
In
the case at bar, PCI Leasing filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC
Order dated
Contrary to the findings of the RTC,
the period within which to file the Notice of Appeal should not be reckoned
from
The aforesaid Ex Parte Motion for Reconsideration was already the second attempt
on the part of PCI Leasing to seek a reconsideration of the RTC Order dated
SEC. 5. Second motion
for new trial. – A motion for new trial shall include all grounds then
available and those not so included shall be deemed waived. A second motion for
new trial, based on a ground not existing nor available when the first motion
was made, may be filed within the time herein provided excluding the time
during which the first motion had been pending.
No party shall be allowed a second motion for
reconsideration of a judgment or final order.
(Emphasis ours.)
As
PCI Leasing was not able to file the Notice of Appeal within the reglementary
period allowed therefor, the RTC Order dated
Social Security System v. Isip[67]
reiterates the well-established doctrine regarding finality of judgments, thus:
A judgment becomes "final and executory" by operation of law. Finality becomes a fact when the reglementary period to appeal lapses and no appeal is perfected within such period. As a consequence, no court (not even this Court) can exercise appellate jurisdiction to review a case or modify a decision that has became final.
When a final judgment is
executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect
either by the court which rendered it or even by this Court. The doctrine is founded on considerations of
public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional errors,
judgments must become final at some definite point in time.
The doctrine of
immutability and inalterability of a final judgment has a two-fold purpose: (1)
to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make
orderly the discharge of judicial business and (2) to put an end to judicial
controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why courts
exist. Controversies cannot drag on
indefinitely. The rights and obligations
of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time.
Notwithstanding
the doctrine on immutability of final judgments, the Court finds, after a
through review of the records, that compelling circumstances are extant in this
case, which clearly warrant the exercise of our equity jurisdiction.
Relevantly,
Barnes v. Padilla[68]
states an exception to the rule on the finality of judgments in this wise:
However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial
justice considering (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the
existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case,
(d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the
review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will
not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
Even the Rules of Court reflects this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules
can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court
itself had already declared to be final.
In
the instant case, the crux of the controversy involves the property of PCI
Leasing, i.e., the sum of money
supposedly owed to it by the respondents.
To our mind, it will not serve the ends of substantial justice if the
RTC’s dismissal of the case with prejudice on pure technicalities would be
perfunctorily upheld by appellate courts likewise on solely procedural grounds,
unless the procedural lapses committed were so gross, negligent, tainted with
bad faith or tantamount to abuse or misuse of court processes.
In
this instance, PCI Leasing would be left without any judicial recourse to
collect the amount of P2,327,833.33
it loaned to the respondents.
Corollarily, if PCI Leasing would be forever barred from collecting the
aforesaid amount, respondent Antonio stands to be unjustly enriched at the
expense of PCI Leasing.
Thus,
in order to obviate the occurrence of the above-mentioned scenario, the Court
finds it necessary to subject to judicial review the RTC Order dated
Section 3, Rule 17 of the
Rules of Court is the applicable rule in the instant case, which provision
reads:
Sec. 3. Dismissal due to fault of
plaintiff. — If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on
the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to
prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with
these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon
motion of the defendant or upon the court’s own motion, without prejudice to
the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a
separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon
the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.
Gomez v. Alcantara[69] explains that “[t]he aforequoted provision
enumerates the instances when a complaint may be dismissed due to the
plaintiff's fault: (1) if he fails to appear on the date for the presentation
of his evidence in chief on the complaint; (2) if he fails to prosecute his
action for an unreasonable length of time; or (3) if he fails to comply with
the Rules or any order of the court. The dismissal of a case for failure
to prosecute has the effect of adjudication on the merits, and is necessarily
understood to be with prejudice to the filing of another action, unless otherwise provided in the order
of dismissal. Stated differently, the general rule is that dismissal of a
case for failure to prosecute is to be regarded as an adjudication on the
merits and with prejudice to the filing of another action, and the only
exception is when the order of dismissal expressly contains a qualification
that the dismissal is without prejudice.”
Furthermore, in Marahay
v. Melicor,[70]
we pronounced that “[w]hile a court can dismiss a case on the ground of non
prosequitur, the real test for the exercise of such power is whether, under
the circumstances, plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in
failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude.
In the absence of a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the
case or a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules on
the part of the plaintiff, as in the case at bar, courts should decide to
dispense with rather than wield their authority to dismiss.”
Guided
by the foregoing principles, we find that the RTC grievously erred in
dismissing Civil Case No. Q-00-40010.
According to the RTC Order dated October 13, 2000,
the trial court dismissed the case filed by PCI Leasing in view of the absence
of the latter’s counsel at the hearing scheduled for that day. PCI Leasing had also been directed, on
To our mind, the above circumstances do not
constitute sufficient bases to warrant the conclusion that PCI Leasing had lost
interest in prosecuting Civil Case No. Q-00-40010.
In its Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
dated
Despite this, the RTC still dismissed the case and
eventually denied the Motion for Reconsideration thereof. While trial courts have the discretion to
impose sanctions on counsels or litigants for tardiness or absence at hearings,
such sanctions should be proportionate to the offense and should still conform
to the dictates of justice and fair play.
Likewise, only a period of one month has passed since PCI Leasing was ordered by the RTC to actively pursue its case, up to the time when Civil Case No. Q-00-40010 was actually dismissed. It does not escape this Court’s notice that PCI Leasing failed to successfully prosecute the case for several months due to the difficulties it encountered in locating respondents, who appeared to have a propensity for changing addresses and refusing to accept court processes. Under these circumstances, the delay in the trial court proceedings was not entirely the fault of PCI Leasing.
Verily, it can hardly be said that PCI Leasing
engaged in a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of Civil Case No. Q-00-40010 or
committed a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules.
On this score, Calalang
v. Court of Appeals[72] underscores that “[u]nless a
party's conduct is so negligent, irresponsible, contumacious, or dilatory as to
provide substantial grounds for dismissal for non-appearance, the courts should
consider lesser sanctions which would still amount into achieving the desired
end.”
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated September 20,
2001 and December 20, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66546, as
well as the Order dated October 13, 2000 and the Resolution dated August 3,
2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 226, in Civil Case No. Q-00-40010, are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. Q-00-40010 is hereby ordered REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
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LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice
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MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice |
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Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-45.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon with Associate Justices Eubulo G. Verzola and Bienvenido L. Reyes concurring; rollo, pp. 48-50.
[3] Rollo, pp. 46-47.
[4] Penned by Presiding Judge Leah S. Domingo-Regala; rollo, pp. 104-106.
[5] Rollo, p. 88.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] Records, p. 20.
[12] Rollo, p. 77-A.
[13]
[14]
[15] Effective on
[16] Rollo, p. 81.
[17]
[18]
[19] The
Notice of Hearing reads:
NOTICE OF HEARING
THE CLERK OF COURT
Regional Trial Court
Branch 226,
Greetings:
Please submit
the foregoing Motion for the consideration and approval of the Honorable Court immediately upon receipt hereof.
(signed)
JOSE M. SURATOS, JR. (Rollo,
p. 83.)
[20] The
corresponding Notice of Hearing of the second Motion for Issuance of Alias
Summons reads:
NOTICE OF HEARING
THE CLERK OF COURT
Regional Trial Court
Branch 226,
Greetings:
Please submit
the foregoing Motion for the consideration and approval of the Honorable Court on
(signed)
JOSE M. SURATOS, JR. (Records, pp. 67-68.)
[21] Rollo, p. 87.
[22] Records, p. 71.
[23] Rollo, p. 88.
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28] The
provisions of Section 3, Rule 17 recite:
SEC. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. – If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.
[29] Rollo, pp. 102-103.
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39]
[40]
[41] The Court Resolution dated
[42] Rollo, p. 139.
[43]
[44]
[45]
[46]
[47]
[48]
[49]
[50]
[51]
[52]
[53]
[54]
[55]
[56]
[57]
[58]
[59]
[60]
[61]
[62]
[63] The pertinent portions of Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court read:
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. – The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record
on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record
on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
[64] G.R. No. 141524,
[65] Records, back of p. 85.
[66]
[67] G.R. No. 165417,
[68] 482 Phil. 903, 915 (2004).
[69] G.R. No. 179556,
[70] G.R. No. L-44980,
[71] Section 4, Rule 15, Rules of Court.
[72] G.R. No. 103185,