FIRST DIVISION
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NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, Petitioner, - versus - AUGUSTO BASA, JR., LUZ BASA and EDUARDO S. BASA, Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 149121 Present: PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, CARPIO,* LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BERSAMIN, and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. Promulgated: April
20, 2010 |
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LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the Amended Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals dated
On P556,827.10 secured
by a real estate mortgage over their properties covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCTs) Nos. 287008 and 285413, located at
After notice
and publication, the properties were sold at public auction where NHA emerged
as the highest bidder.[4] On
On
On
A Writ of
Possession[10] was
issued on
Before the
RTC could resolve the motion for the issuance of an alias writ of possession,
respondents spouses Basa and Eduardo Basa, on June 2, 1993, filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and Petition in Intervention (with Prayer
for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction).[11] Respondents anchored said petition for
intervention on Section 8[12]
of Act No. 3135, as amended, which gives the debtor/mortgagor the remedy to
petition that the sale be set aside and the writ of possession be
cancelled. In the said petition for
intervention, respondents averred that the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
subject properties was a nullity since notices were not posted and published,
written notices of foreclosure were not given to them, and notices of sale were
not tendered to the occupants of the sold properties, thereby denying them the
opportunity to ventilate their rights.[13] Respondents likewise insisted that even
assuming arguendo that the
foreclosure sale were valid, they were still entitled to redeem the same since
the one-year redemption period from the registration of the sheriff’s
certificate of foreclosure sale had not yet prescribed.[14] Citing Bernardez
v. Reyes[15] and Bass v. De la Rama,[16] respondents theorized that the
instrument is deemed registered only upon actual inscription on the certificate
of title in the custody of the civil registrar.[17] Since the sheriff’s certificate was only
inscribed on the owner’s duplicate certificate of title, and not on the certificate
of title in the possession of the Register of Deeds, then there was no
effective registration and the one-year redemption period had not even begun to
run. Thus, respondents asked the RTC,
among others, to declare the foreclosure sale null and void, to allow the
respondents to redeem the mortgaged properties in the amount of P21,160.00,
and to cancel the Writ of Possession dated
NHA opposed
respondents’ petition for intervention.[18] It countered that the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale was conducted validly and made in accordance with Act No. 3135
as evidenced by the publication of the Notice of Sheriff’s
On January 2,
1995, the RTC issued the first assailed Order[21]
with the following directives: 1) granting the issuance of the alias writ of possession which allowed
NHA to take possession of the subject properties; 2) admitting the Petition in
Intervention and “treating the same as the petition to set aside sale mentioned
in [Sec. 8] of Act No. 3155”; and 3) granting the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction in favor of respondents that ordered NHA to refrain from
selling or disposing of the contested properties. The pertinent portion of the order reads:
After
examining the record and following precedents x x x this Court hereby orders:
1. The issuance
of an alias writ of possession;
2. Admission of
the “Petition in Intervention,” treating the same as the “petition” to set
aside sale, etc., mentioned in [Sec. 8] of Act No. 3155;
3. The issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction, after a BOND in the amount of P20,000.00
had been duly filed by intervenors, ordering movant National Housing Authority,
its agents and/or any other person acting under its command, to desist and
refrain from selling or in any manner from disposing of the subject properties
covered by TCT Nos. 287008 and 285413 and located at No. 30, San Antonio
Street, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, pending the termination of this
proceeding and/or unless a contrary order is issued by this Court;
4. Setting the
hearing of the petition in intervention (to set aside) on
NHA filed a motion for reconsideration[23]
assailing the RTC’s Order insofar as it admitted respondents’ motion for
intervention and issued a writ of preliminary injunction. NHA argued that respondents should have
assailed the foreclosure sale during the hearing in the petition for the
issuance of a Writ of Possession, and not during the hearing in the petition
for the issuance of an alias writ of possession since the “petition” referred
to in Section 8 of Act No. 3135 pertains to the original petition for the
issuance of the Writ of Possession and not the Motion for the Issuance of an
Alias Writ of Possession. NHA stressed that another reason why the petition for
intervention should be denied was the finality of the Order dated
In the second
assailed Order[24] dated
The motion is without merit. The
admission of the intervention is sanctioned by Sec. 8 of Act No. 3135. And,
because, otherwise or if no preliminary injunction is issued, the movant NHA
may, before final judgment, do or continue the doing of the act with the
intervenor asks the court to restrain, and thus make ineffectual the final
judgment rendered afterwards which may grant the relief sought by the
intervenor.
ACCORDINGLY,
the motion for reconsideration is DENIED. [25]
Undaunted, NHA filed on
The Court of
Appeals rendered a Decision[26]
dated
WHEREFORE, the
petition is GRANTED, and the assailed order of
The
Court of Appeals defended its affirmation of the RTC’s grant of the alias writ
of possession in NHA’s favor by saying that it was a necessary consequence
after the earlier writ was left unserved to the party. It further explained that NHA was entitled to
the writ of possession as a matter of course after the lapse of the redemption
period.
As to the
RTC’s admission of respondents’ petition for intervention, the appellate court
opined that it was improperly and erroneously made. The Court of Appeals believed that the only
recourse available to a mortgagor, in this case the respondents, in a
foreclosure sale is to question the validity of the sale through a petition to
set aside the sale and to cancel the writ of possession, a summary procedure
provided for under Section 112 of the Land Registration Act. It also observed that the grant of the
preliminary injunction by the RTC was uncalled for as it would effectively
defeat the right of NHA to possession, the latter having been entitled by
virtue of the grant of the alias writ of possession.
Respondents
filed a motion for reconsideration.[28] They alleged that since they raised the issue
that their right of redemption had not prescribed, said fact should have
changed the whole scenario such that the issuance of a writ of possession
ceased to be summary in nature and was no longer ministerial. Respondents then concluded that their right
to redeem the properties against NHA’s right to the writ of possession must be
threshed out in a hearing of the case on its merits.
With regard
to the RTC Order dated
Also,
respondents would like the Court of Appeals to treat the petition for
intervention not only as an opposition to the issuance of the alias writ of
possession, but also as a proper remedy under Section 8 of Act No. 3135, as
amended, in view of the various issues raised.
On
WHEREFORE, the
motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. Our
decision dated
Unfazed, NHA filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in its
ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for
Reconsideration dated
Hence, the instant petition.
In its memorandum, NHA tendered the
following issues:
1.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ANNOTATION OF THE
SHERIFF’S CERTIFICATE OF
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE OF BASS VS. DE LA RAMA HAS BEEN SUPERSEDED.[31]
Respondents, on the other hand, offered the following
as issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE INSTANT PETITION COMPLIES WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 45 OF THE RULES OF COURT.[32]
On the procedural aspect,
respondents question NHA’s alleged failure to include in its petition copies of
material portions of the record such as pleadings filed in the RTC and the
Court of Appeals as required under Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. Respondents also pointed out the
purported defective verification of NHA in view of the fact that it merely
stated that the one verifying had read the allegations of the petition and that
the same were true and correct to the best of his knowledge. According to respondents, such declarations
were not in accordance with the rules which require that a verified pleading
must state that the affiant had read the pleading and that the allegations
therein were true and correct based on his personal knowledge and not
only to the “best” of his knowledge.
As to the merits, NHA stresses that the
annotation and entry in the owner’s duplicate certificate of titles of the
sheriff’s certificate of sale are sufficient compliance with the requirement of
law on registration. To support this,
NHA refers to Land Registration Administration Circular No. 3 dated
NHA faults
the Court of Appeals’ reliance on Bass v.
De la Rama since the ruling therein stating that entry and annotation of a
sale instrument on the owner’s duplicate copy only as insufficient
registration, was already abandoned in Development
Bank of the Philippines v. Acting Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, where
it was allegedly ruled that the primary entry alone of the transaction produces
the effect of registration so long as the registrant has complied with all that
is required of him for purposes of entry and annotation.
In contrast,
respondents submit that annotation of the sheriff’s certificate of sale on the
owner’s copy is inadequate to propel the running of the redemption period. They firmly believe that for the sale
instrument to be considered as registered, the inscription must be made on the
reconstituted titles.
Respondents
disagree with NHA’s opinion that Bass v.
De la Rama was superceded by Development
Bank of the Philippines v. Acting Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija. They are of the persuasion that the ruling in
DBP pertains exclusively to the unique factual milieu and the issues
attendant therein, but not to the instant case where Bass purportedly
applies. Respondents also assail NHA’s
citation of Sta. Ignacia Rural
Bank, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.[34] According to them, said case finds no
application to the instant controversy because the issue involved in the former
was whether the redemption period should be reckoned from the date of the
auction sale or the registration of the certificate of sale, which ostensibly
is not the bone of contention in this case.
Ascribing
NHA’s inaction to have the burned titles reconstituted, respondents assert that
such neglect should not be used as a justification for the non-inscription in
the original titles of the certificate of sale.
Additionally, respondents insist that the question of whether the
redemption period should be reckoned from the inscription on the owner’s
duplicate copies is a factual and legal issue that is appropriately adjudicated
in a hearing on the merits of their petition in intervention, and not in the
instant special civil action for certiorari and prohibition which is
limited in scope, namely, whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in admitting their petition in intervention.
Respondents
reiterate that the issuance of the writ of possession prayed for by NHA before
the RTC is no longer ministerial since it raised the issue of whether their
period of redemption has already expired.
They cite Barican v. Intermediate
Appellate Court[35]
as the authority to this argument.
We dwell
first with the procedural issues before the main controversy. Respondents
contend that the instant petition is dismissible on the ground that NHA failed
to attach pleadings filed in the RTC and the Court of Appeals as required under
Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which partly provides:
SEC. 4. Contents
of petition. — The petition shall be filed in eighteen (18) copies, with
the original copy intended for the court being indicated as such by the
petitioner, and shall x x x (d) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate
original, or a certified true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution
certified by the clerk of court of the court a quo and the requisite
number of plain copies thereof, and such material portions of the record as
would support the petition; x x x.
In its petition, NHA attached the
As held by this
Court in Air Philippines Corporation v.
[E]ven if a
document is relevant and pertinent to the petition, it need not be appended if
it is shown that the contents thereof can also [be] found in another document
already attached to the petition. Thus, if the material allegations in a
position paper are summarized in a questioned judgment, it will suffice that
only a certified true copy of the judgment is attached.
Third, a petition
lacking an essential pleading or part of the case record may still be given due
course or reinstated (if earlier dismissed) upon showing that petitioner later
submitted the documents required, or that it will serve the higher interest of
justice that the case be decided on the merits.
Nevertheless, even if the pleadings and other supporting documents were not attached to the petition, the dismissal is unwarranted because the CA records containing the promissory notes and the real estate and chattel mortgages were elevated to this Court. Without a doubt, we have sufficient basis to actually and completely dispose of the case.
We must stress
that cases should be determined on the merits, after all parties have been
given full opportunity to ventilate their causes and defenses, rather than on
technicalities or procedural imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice
would be served better. Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to expedite
the decision or resolution of cases and other matters pending in court. A
strict and rigid application of rules, resulting in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must be avoided. In fact,
Section 6 of Rule 1 states that the Rules shall be liberally construed in order
to promote their objective of ensuring the just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding.
Contrary to respondents’
assertion, NHA’s verification conforms to the rule. Section 4, Rule 7 of the
Rules of Court states:
SEC. 4. Verification.
– Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need
not be under oath, verified or accompanied
by affidavit.
A
pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and
that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or
based on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which
contains a verification based on “information and belief,” or upon “knowledge,
information and belief,” or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an
unsigned pleading.
The reason for requiring verification in
the petition is to secure an assurance that the allegations of a pleading are
true and correct; are not speculative or merely imagined; and have been made in
good faith.[37] To achieve this purpose, the verification of
a pleading is made through an affidavit or sworn statement confirming that the
affiant has read the pleading whose allegations are true and correct of the
affiant's personal knowledge or based on authentic records.[38]
The General Manager of NHA verified the
petition as follows:
3. I have read
the allegations contained therein and that the same are true and correct to the
best of my own personal knowledge.[39]
A reading of the above
verification reveals nothing objectionable about it. The affiant confirmed that he had read the
allegations in the petition which were true and correct based on his personal
knowledge. The addition of the words “to
the best” before the phrase “of my personal knowledge” did not violate the
requirement under Section 4 of Rule 7, it being sufficient that the affiant
declared that the allegations in the petition are true and correct based on his
personal knowledge.
Now, as to the merits of the case. The main issue before us is whether the
annotation of the sheriff’s certificate of sale on the owner’s duplicate
certificate of titles is sufficient registration considering that the
inscription on the original certificates could not be made as the same got burned.
Jurisprudence
is replete with analogous cases. Of
foremost importance is Development Bank
of the Philippines v. Acting Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija[40] where the Court listed cases where
the transaction or instrument was annotated not on the original certificate but
somewhere else. In that case, DBP,
following the extrajudicial foreclosure sale where it emerged as the highest
bidder, registered with the Register of Deeds the sheriff’s certificate of sale
in its favor. After it had paid the
required fees, said transaction was entered in the primary entry book. However, the annotation of the said
transaction to the originals of the certificates of title could not be done
because the same titles were missing from the files of the Registry. This prompted DBP to commence reconstitution
proceedings of the lost titles. Four
years had passed before the missing certificates of title were
reconstituted. When DBP sought the inscription
of the four-year old sale transaction on the reconstituted titles, the Acting
Register of Deeds, being in doubt of the proper action to take, referred the
matter to the Commissioner of the Land Registration Authority by consulta,
the latter resolved against the annotation of the sale transaction and opined
that said entry was “ineffective due to the impossibility of accomplishing
registration at the time the document was entered because of the
non-availability of the certificate (sic) of title involved.”[41] In other words, annotation on the primary
book was deemed insufficient registration. The Court disagreed with this
posture. Considering that DBP had paid
all the fees and complied with all the requirements for purposes of both
primary entry and annotation of the certificate of sale, the Court declared
that mere entry in the primary book was considered sufficient registration
since “[DBP] cannot be blamed that annotation could not be made
contemporaneously with the entry because the originals of the subject
certificates of title were missing and could not be found, since it had nothing
to do with their safekeeping. If anyone
was responsible for failure of annotation, it was the Register of Deeds who was
chargeable with the keeping and custody of those documents.”[42] To buttress its conclusion, the Court
reviewed the relevant jurisprudence starting from 1934. The Court noted that before the Second World
War, particularly in Government of the
Philippine Islands v. Aballe,[43]
the prevailing doctrine was an inscription in the book of entry even without
the notation on the certificate of title was considered as satisfactory and
produced all the effects which the law gave to its registration. During the war, however, the Court observed
that there was apparent departure from said ruling since in Bass v. De la Rama, the holding was that
entry of an instrument in the primary entry book does not confer any legal
effect without a memorandum thereof inscribed on the certificate of title.[44] DBP noted that Bass v. De la Rama, however, survived only for a little while since
“later cases appear to have applied the Aballe
ruling that entry in the day book, even without the corresponding annotation on
the certificate of title, is equivalent to, or produces the effect of,
registration to voluntary transactions, provided the requisite fees are paid and
the owner’s duplicates of the certificates of title affected are presented.”[45]
These later
cases are Levin v. Bass[46]
and Potenciano v. Dineros,[47]
both of which involve the issue of whether entry in the day book of a deed of
sale, payment of the fees, and presentation of the owner’s duplicate
certificate of title constitute a complete act of registration.[48]
Simply,
respondents’ resort to Bass v. De la Rama
is futile as the same was abandoned by the later cases, i.e., Bass, Potenciano and DBP.
In the recent
case of Autocorp Group v. Court of
Appeals,[49] the
respondent was awarded the foreclosed parcels of land. A sheriff’s certificate of sale was
thereafter issued in its favor.
Thereafter, petitioners in that case filed a complaint before the RTC
with a prayer for the issuance of an ex parte TRO aimed at preventing
the Register of Deeds from registering the said certificate of sale in the name
of the respondent and from taking possession of the subject properties.[50] Before the RTC could issue a TRO, respondent
presented the sheriff’s certificate of sale to the Register of Deeds who
entered the same certificate in the primary book, even if the registration fee
was paid only the following day. Four
days after, the RTC issued a TRO directing the Register of Deeds to refrain
from registering the said sheriff’s certificate of sale. A preliminary injunction was thereafter
issued as the TRO was about to expire.
The preliminary injunction was questioned by therein respondent. One of
the main issues raised there was whether the entry of the certificate of sale
in the primary book was equivalent to registration such that the TRO and the
preliminary injunction issues would not lie anymore as the act sought to be
restrained had become an accomplished act.
The Court held that the TRO and the preliminary injunction had already
become moot and academic by the earlier entry of the certificate of sale in the
primary entry book which was tantamount to registration, thus:
In fine,
petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of injunction, to prevent the
register of deeds from registering the subject certificate of sale, had been
rendered moot and academic by the valid entry of the instrument in the primary entry
book. Such entry is equivalent to registration. Injunction would not
lie anymore, as the act sought to be enjoined had already become a fait
accompli or an accomplished act.[51]
Indeed, the prevailing rule is
that there is effective registration once the registrant has fulfilled all that
is needed of him for purposes of entry and annotation, so that what is left to
be accomplished lies solely on the register of deeds. The Court thus once held:
Current
doctrine thus seems to be that entry alone produces the effect of registration,
whether the transaction entered is a voluntary or an involuntary one, so long
as the registrant has complied with all that is required of him for purposes of
entry and annotation, and nothing more remains to be done but a duty incumbent
solely on the register of deeds.[52]
In the case under
consideration, NHA presented the sheriff’s certificate of sale to the Register
of Deeds and the same was entered as Entry No. 2873 and said entry was further
annotated in the owner’s transfer certificate of title.[53] A year later and after the mortgagors did not
redeem the said properties, respondents filed with the Register of Deeds an
Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership[54]after
which the same instrument was presumably entered into in the day book as the
same was annotated in the owner’s duplicate copy.[55] Just like in DBP, Levin, Potenciano and Autocorp, NHA followed the procedure in order to have its sheriff’s
certificate of sale annotated in the transfer certificates of title. There would be, therefore, no reason not to
apply the ruling in said cases to this one.
It was not NHA’s fault that the certificate of sale was not annotated on
the transfer certificates of title which were supposed to be in the custody of
the Registrar, since the same were burned.
Neither could NHA be blamed for the fact that there were no
reconstituted titles available during the time of inscription as it had taken
the necessary steps in having the same reconstituted as early as
While it may
be true that, in DBP, the Court ruled that “in the particular situation
here obtaining, annotation of the disputed entry on the reconstituted originals
of the certificates of title to which it refers is entirely proper and
justified,” this does not mean, as respondents insist, that the ruling therein
applies exclusively to the factual milieu and the issue obtaining in said case,
and not to similar cases. There is
nothing in the subject declaration that categorically states its pro hac vice character. For in truth, what the said statement really
conveys is that the current doctrine that entry in the primary book produces
the effect of registration can be applied in the situation obtaining in that
case since the registrant therein complied with all that was required of it,
hence, it was fairly reasonable that its acts be given the effect of
registration, just as the Court did in the past cases. In fact the Court there
continued with this pronouncement:
To
hold said entry ineffective, as does the appealed resolution, amounts to
declaring that it did not, and does not, protect the registrant (DBP) from
claims arising, or transactions made, thereafter which are adverse to or in
derogation of the rights created or conveyed by the transaction thus entered. That, surely, is a result that is neither
just nor can, by any reasonable interpretation of Section 56 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 be asserted as warranted by its terms.[57]
What is more,
in Autocorp Group v. Court of Appeals,[58] the
pertinent DBP ruling was applied,
thereby demonstrating that the said ruling in DBP may be applied to
other cases with similar factual and legal issues, viz:
Petitioners contend that the aforecited
case of DBP is not apropos to the case at bar. Allegedly, in DBP, the bank not
only paid the registration fees but also presented the owner’s duplicate
certificate of title. We find no merit in petitioner’s posture x x x.
x x x x
Like
in DBP v. Acting Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, the instrument
involved in the case at bar, is a sheriff’s certificate of sale, We hold now,
as we held therein, that the registrant is under no necessity to present the
owner’s duplicates of the certificates of title affected, for purposes of
primary entry, as the transaction sought to be recorded is an involuntary
transaction.
x x x x
x x x Such entry
is equivalent to registration. Injunction would not lie anymore, as the act
sought to be enjoined had already become a fait accompli or an
accomplished act.[59]
Moreover, respondents’ stand on
the non-applicability of the DBP case to other cases, absent any
statement thereof to such effect, contravenes the principle of stare decisis which urges that courts
are to apply principles declared in prior decisions that are substantially
similar to a pending case.[60]
Since entry
of the certificate of sale was validly registered, the redemption period
accruing to respondents commenced therefrom, since the one-year period of
redemption is reckoned from the date of registration of the certificate of
sale.[61] It must be noted that on
As regards
respondents’ allegation on the defect in the publication and notice requirements
of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale, the same is unavailing. The rule is that it is the mortgagor who alleges
absence of a requisite who has the burden of establishing such fact.[62] This is so because foreclosure proceedings
have in their favor the presumption of regularity and the burden of evidence to
rebut the same is on the party who questions it.[63]
Here, except for their bare allegations, respondents failed to present any
evidence to support them. In addition,
NHA stated in its Comment to Motion for
Leave of Court to Intervene that it had complied with the publication of
the Notice of Sheriff’s
Considering
that the foreclosure sale and its subsequent registration with the Register of
Deeds were done validly, there is no reason for the non-issuance of the writ of
possession. A writ of possession is an
order directing the sheriff to place a person in possession of a real or
personal property, such as when a property is extrajudicially foreclosed.[67] Section 7 of Act No. 3135 provides for the
rule in the issuance of the writ of possession involving extrajudicial
foreclosure sales of real estate mortgage, to wit:
Sec.
7. In any sale made under the provisions
of this Act, the purchaser may petition the [Regional Trial Court] of the
province or place where the property or any part thereof is situated, to give
him possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an
amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to
indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without
violating the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of this
Act. Such petition shall be made under
oath and filed in the form of an ex parte motion in the registration or
cadastral proceedings if the property is registered, or in special proceedings
in the case of property registered under the Mortgage Law or under section one
hundred and ninety-four of the Administrative Code, or of any other real
property encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in the office of any
register of deeds in accordance with any existing law, and in each case the
clerk of the court shall, upon the filing of such petition, collect the fees specified
in paragraph eleven of section one hundred and fourteen of Act Numbered Four
Hundred and ninety-six, as amended by Act Numbered Twenty-eight hundred and
sixty-six, and the court shall, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of
possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the
property is situated, who shall execute said order immediately.
This provision of law authorizes the
purchaser in a foreclosure sale to apply for a writ of possession during the
redemption period by filing an ex parte motion under oath for that
purpose in the corresponding registration or cadastral proceeding in the case
of property with
The
time-honored precept is that
after the consolidation of titles in the buyer’s name, for failure of the
mortgagor to redeem, the writ of possession becomes a matter of right.[70] Its issuance to a purchaser in an
extrajudicial foreclosure is merely a ministerial function.[71] The writ of possession issues as a matter of
course upon the filing of the proper motion and the approval of the
corresponding bond. The judge issuing
the writ following these express provisions of law neither exercises his
official discretion nor judgment.[72] As such, the court granting the writ cannot
be charged with having acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion.[73] To accentuate the writ’s ministerial
character, the Court disallowed injunction to prohibit its issuance despite a
pending action for annulment of mortgage or the foreclosure itself.[74]
Believing
that the instant case does not come within the penumbra of the foregoing rule,
respondents resort to the ruling in Barican
v. Intermediate Appellate Court.[75] Unfortunately
for them, the instant case does not even come close to the cited case. There, the Court deemed it inequitable to
issue a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in the auction sale
considering that the property involved was already in the possession of a third
person by virtue of a deed of sale with assumption of mortgage even before the
purchaser could register the sheriff’s certificate of sale. Also, the auction buyer therein unreasonably
deferred to exercise its right to acquire possession over the property. These circumstances are not present in the
instant case.
Moreover, in Fernandez v. Espinoza,[76]
the Court refused to apply the ruling in Barican
v. Intermediate Appellate Court[77]
and Cometa v. Intermediate Appellate
Court,[78]
two cases which are exemptions to the stated rule, reasoning that:
In Cometa, which actually involved
execution of judgment for the prevailing party in a damages suit, the subject
properties were sold at the public auction at an unusually lower price, while
in Barican, the mortgagee bank took five years from the time of
foreclosure before filing the petition for the issuance of writ of possession.
We have considered these equitable and peculiar circumstances in Cometa
and Barican to justify the relaxation of the otherwise absolute rule.
None of these exceptional circumstances, however, attended herein so as to
place the instant case in the same stature as that of Cometa and Barican.
Instead, the ruling in Vaca v. Court of Appeals is on all fours with the
present petition. In Vaca, there is no dispute that the property was not
redeemed within one year from the registration of the extrajudicial foreclosure
sale; thus, the mortgagee bank acquired an absolute right, as purchaser, to the
issuance of the writ of possession. Similarly, UOB, as the purchaser at the
auction sale in the instant case, is entitled as a matter of right, to the
issuance of the writ of possession.
Just as in Fernandez, this Court does not see any compelling reason to veer
away from the established rule.
In fine, this Court finds that the Court of
Appeals committed reversible error in ruling that the annotation of NHA’s
sheriff’s certificate of sale on the duplicate certificates of title was not
effective registration and in holding that respondents’ redemption period had
not expired.
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.
The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
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ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice
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LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
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MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice |
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Chief Justice
*
Per Special Order No. 834,
dated
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis with Associate Justices Bernardo P. Abesamis and Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, concurring; rollo, pp. 22-26.
[2] Rollo, p. 10.
[3]
[4] CA rollo, p. 141.
[5] Rollo, p. 114.
[6]
[7]
[8] CA rollo, p. 19.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
SEC. 8. The debtor may, in the proceedings in which
possession was requested, but not later than thirty days after the purchaser
was given possession, petition that the sale be set aside and the writ of
possession canceled, specifying the damages suffered by him, because the
mortgage was not violated or the sale was not made in accordance with the provisions
hereof, and the court shall take cognizance of this petition in accordance with
the summary procedure provided for in section one hundred and twelve of Act
Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six; and if it finds the complaint of the
debtor justified, it shall dispose in his favor of all or part of the bond
furnished by the person who obtained possession. Either of the parties may
appeal from the order of the judge in accordance with section fourteen of Act
Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six; but the order of possession shall
continue in effect during the pendency of the appeal.
[13] CA rollo, pp. 30-31.
[14]
[15] G.R. No. 71832,
[16] 73 Phil. 682 (1942).
[17] CA rollo, p. 32.
[18] NHA’s opposition is embodied in its “Comment to Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Quash/Cancel Writ of Possession” dated June 3, 1993. CA rollo, pp. 37-40.
[19] CA rollo, p. 38.
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29] Rollo, p. 26.
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33] UDK No. 7671,
[34] G.R. No. 97872,
[35] G.R. No. L-79906,
[36] G.R. No. 180458,
[37] Valmonte
v. Alcala, G.R. No. 168667,
[38]
[39] Rollo, p. 18.
[40] Supra note 33.
[41]
[42]
[43] 60 Phil. 986 (1934).
[44] Development Bank of the
[45]
[46] 91 Phil. 419 (1952).
[47] 97 Phil. 196 (1955).
[48] Development Bank of the
[49] G.R. No. 157553,
[50]
[51]
[52] Development Bank of the
[53] Exhibit “E,” CA rollo, p. 19 for TCT No. 287008; Exhibit “D,” rollo, p. 35 for TCT No. 285413.
[54]
[55]
[56] CA rollo, pp. 183 and 189.
[57] Development Bank of the
[58] Supra note 49 at 686-689.
[59]
[60] Negros Navigation Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 346 Phil. 551, 565 (1997).
[61]
[62] Cristobal v. Court of Appeals, 384 Phil. 807, 815 (2000).
[63]
[64] CA rollo, p. 38.
[65]
[66]
[67] Fernandez v. Espinoza, G.R. No. 156421,
[68] Chailease Finance Corporation v. Ma, 456 Phil. 498, 504 (2003).
[69]
[70] Manalo v. Court of Appeals, 419 Phil. 215, 235 (2001).
[71]
[72]
[73]
[74] Chailease Finance Corporation v. Ma, supra note 68, citing Manalo v. Court of Appeals, id.
[75] Supra note 35.
[76] Supra note 67 at 153.
[77] Supra note 35.
[78]
235 Phil. 569 (1987).