Republic
of the
Supreme Court
SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION
|
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING
CORPORATION, EUGENIO LOPEZ, JR., AUGUSTO ALMEDA-LOPEZ, and OSCAR M. LOPEZ, Petitioners, - versus - OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO, EXEQUIEL B. GARCIA, MIGUEL V. GONZALES, and SALVADOR
(BUDDY) TAN, Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 133347
Present: CARPIO MORALES, J.,* VELASCO, JR.,** NACHURA, Chairperson, VILLARAMA, JR.,***
and MENDOZA, JJ.**** Promulgated: April 23,
2010 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
Before us is a Motion for
Reconsideration filed by petitioners Eugenio, Jr., Oscar and Augusto Almeda,
all surnamed Lopez, in their capacity as officers and on behalf of petitioner
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation (ABS-CBN), of our Decision in G.R. No. 133347,
dismissing their petition for certiorari
because of the absence of grave abuse of discretion in the Ombudsman Resolution
which, in turn, found no probable cause to indict respondents for the following
violations of the Revised Penal Code (RPC): (1) Article 298 – Execution of Deeds by Means
of Violence or Intimidation; (2) Article 315, paragraphs 1[b], 2[a], and 3[a] –
Estafa; (3) Article 308 – Theft; (4) Article 302 – Robbery; (5) Article 312 –
Occupation of Real Property or Usurpation of Real Rights in Property; and (6)
Article 318 – Other Deceits.
The
assailed Decision disposed of the case on two (2) points: (1) the dropping of
respondents Roberto S. Benedicto and Salvador (Buddy) Tan as respondents in this
case due to their death, consistent with our rulings in People v. Bayotas[1] and
Benedicto v. Court of Appeals;[2]
and (2) our finding that the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in dismissing petitioners’ criminal complaint against respondents.
Undaunted, petitioners ask for a
reconsideration of our Decision on the following grounds:
I.
WITH DUE RESPECT,
THE EXECUTION AND VALIDITY OF THE LETTER-AGREEMENT DATED
II.
WITH DUE RESPECT, RESPONDENTS BENEDICTO AND TAN SHOULD NOT BE DROPPED AS RESPONDENTS SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY MET THEIR UNTIMELY DEMISE DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE CASE.[3]
Before anything else, we note that
petitioners filed a Motion to Refer the Case to the Court en banc.[4] Petitioners aver that the arguments contained
in their Motion for Reconsideration, such as: (1) the irrelevance of the civil law concept
of ratification in determining whether a crime was committed; and (2) the
continuation of the criminal complaints against respondents Benedicto and Tan
who have both died, to prosecute their possible civil liability therefor,
present novel questions of law warranting resolution by the Court en banc.
In
the main, petitioners argue that the Decision is contrary to law because: (1) the
ratification of the June 8, 1973 letter-agreement is immaterial to the
determination of respondents’ criminal liability for the aforestated felonies
in the RPC; and (2) the very case cited in our Decision, i.e. People v. Bayotas,[5] allows for the continuation of a criminal
case to prosecute civil liability based on law and is independent of the civil
liability arising from the crime.
We disagree with petitioners. The
grounds relied upon by petitioners in both motions, being intertwined, shall be
discussed jointly. Before we do so, parenthetically, the counsel for respondent
Miguel V. Gonzales belatedly informed this Court of his client’s demise on July
20, 2007.[6] Hence,
as to Gonzales, the case must also be dismissed.
Contrary to petitioners’ assertion,
their motion for reconsideration does not contain a novel question of law as
would merit the attention of this Court sitting en banc. We also find no
cogent reason to reconsider our Decision.
First and foremost, there is, as yet,
no criminal case against respondents, whether against those who are living or those
otherwise dead.
The question posed by petitioners on
this long-settled procedural issue does not constitute a novel question of law.
Nowhere in People v. Bayotas[7] does it state that a criminal complaint
may continue and be prosecuted as an independent civil action. In fact, Bayotas, once and for all, harmonized
the rules on the extinguished and on the subsisting liabilities of an accused
who dies. We definitively ruled:
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:
1. Death of an accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, “the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.”
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) xxx xxx xxx
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery thereof may be pursued but only by filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible [de]privation of right by prescription.
From the foregoing, it is quite
apparent that Benedicto, Tan, and Gonzales, who all died during the pendency of
this case, should be dropped as party respondents. If on this score alone, our
ruling does not warrant reconsideration. We need not even delve into the
explicit declaration in Benedicto v.
Court of Appeals.[8]
Second, and more importantly, we
dismissed the petition for certiorari
filed by petitioners because they failed to show grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Ombudsman when he dismissed petitioners’ criminal complaint
against respondents for lack of probable cause. We reiterate that our inquiry
was limited to a determination of whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse
of discretion when he found no probable cause to indict respondents for various
felonies under the RPC. The invocation of our certiorari jurisdiction over the act of a constitutional officer,
such as the Ombudsman, must adhere to the strict requirements provided in the
Rules of Court and in jurisprudence. The determination of whether there was
grave abuse of discretion does not, in any way, constitute a novel question of
law.
We first pointed out in our Decision that
the complaint-affidavits of petitioners, apart from a blanket charge that
remaining respondents, Gonzales (who we thought was alive at that time) and
Exequiel Garcia, are officers of KBS/RPN and/or alter egos of Benedicto, are
bereft of sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that crimes have
been committed and that respondents, namely, Gonzales and Garcia, are probably
guilty thereof and should be held for trial. Certainly, no grave abuse of
discretion can be imputed to the Ombudsman that would warrant a reversal of his
Resolution.
The charges of individual petitioners
Eugenio, Jr., Oscar and Augusto Almeda against respondents, Gonzales and
Garcia, contained in their respective complaint-affidavits simply consisted of
the following:
1. Complaint-affidavit
of Eugenio, Jr.
32.1. I was briefed that Senator Estanislao Fernandez in representation of Benedicto, met with Senator Tañada at the Club Filipino in June 1976. Discussions were had on how to arrive at the “reasonable rental” for the use of ABS-CBN stations and facilities. A second meeting at Club Filipino took place on July 7, 1976 between Senators Tañada and Fernandez, who brought along Atty. Miguel Gonzales, a close associate and lawyer of Benedicto and an officer of KBS.
x x x x
38.2. The illegal takeover of ABS-CBN stations, studios and facilities, and the loss and/or damages caused to our assets occurred while Benedicto, Exequiel Garcia, Miguel Gonzales, and Salvador Tan were in possession, control and management of our network. Roberto S. Benedicto was the Chairman of the Board of KBS-RPN and its Chief Executive Officer (CEO), to whom most of the KBS-RPN officers reported while he was in Metro Manila. Miguel Gonzales, the Vice-President of KBS, and Exequiel Garcia, the Treasurer, were the alter egos of Benedicto whenever the latter was out of the country; x x x.[9]
2. Complaint-affidavit
of Oscar
25. All the illegal activities as complained of above, were done upon the orders, instructions and directives of Roberto S. Benedicto, the Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the KBS/RPN group; Miguel Gonzales and Exequiel Garcia, close colleagues and business partners of Benedicto who were either directors/officers KBS/RPN and who acted as Benedicto’s alter egos whenever the latter was out of the country; x x x.
x x x x
38. Senator Estanislao Fernandez, in representation of Benedicto, met with Senator Tañada at the Club Filipino on June 1976. Discussions were had on how to arrive at the “reasonable rental” for the use of ABS stations and facilities. A second meeting at Club Filipino took place on July 7, 1976 between Senators Tañada and Fernandez, who brought along Atty. Mike Gonzales, a close associate and friend of Benedicto and an officer of KBS.[10]
3. Complaint-affidavit
of Augusto Almeda
21.1. Barely two weeks from their entry into the
x x x x
31. Senator Estanislao Fernandez, in representation of Benedicto, met with Senator Tañada at the Club Filipino on June 1976. Discussions were had on how to arrive at the “reasonable rental” for the use of ABS stations and facilities. A second meeting at Club Filipino took place on July 7, 1976 between Senators Tañada and Fernandez, who brought along Atty. Mike Gonzales, a close associate and friend of Benedicto and an officer of KBS.[11]
From the foregoing, it is beyond
cavil that there is no reason for us to depart from our policy of
non-interference with the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause or lack
thereof. On the strength of these allegations, we simply could not find any
rational basis to impute grave abuse of discretion to the Ombudsman’s dismissal
of the criminal complaints.
Third, we did not state in the
Decision that ratification extinguishes criminal liability. We simply applied
ratification in determining the conflicting claims of petitioners regarding the
execution of the letter-agreement. Petitioners, desperate to attach criminal
liability to respondents’ acts, specifically to respondent Benedicto, alleged
in their complaint-affidavits that Benedicto forced, coerced and intimidated
petitioners into signing the letter-agreement. In other words, petitioners
disown this letter-agreement that they were supposedly forced into signing,
such that this resulted in a violation of Article 298 of the RPC (Execution of
Deeds by means of Violence or Intimidation).
However, three elements must concur
in order for an offender to be held liable under Article 298:
(1) that the offender has intent to defraud another.
(2) that the offender compels him to sign, execute, or deliver any public
instrument or document.
(3) that the compulsion is by means
of violence or intimidation.[12]
The element of intent to defraud is
not present because, even if, initially, as claimed by petitioners, they were forced
to sign the letter-agreement, petitioners made claims based thereon and invoked
the provisions thereof. In fact, petitioners wanted respondents to honor the letter-agreement and to pay
rentals for the use of the ABS-CBN facilities.
By doing so, petitioners effectively, although they were careful not
to articulate this fact, affirmed their signatures in this letter-agreement.
True,
ratification is primarily a principle in our civil law on contracts. Yet, their
subsequent acts in negotiating for the rentals of the facilities ― which
translate into ratification of the letter-agreement ― cannot be
disregarded simply because ratification is a civil law concept. The claims of
petitioners must be consistent and must, singularly, demonstrate respondents’
culpability for the crimes they are charged with. Sadly, petitioners failed in this
regard because, to reiterate, they effectively ratified and advanced the
validity of this letter-agreement in their claim against the estate of
Benedicto.
Finally, we take note of the
conflicting claim of petitioners by filing a separate civil action to enforce a
claim against the estate of respondent Benedicto. Petitioners do not even
specifically deny this fact and simply sidestep this issue which was squarely
raised in the Decision. The Rules of Court has separate provisions for
different claims against the estate of a decedent under Section 5 of Rule 86
and Section 1 of Rule 87:
RULE 86.
SECTION 5. Claims which must be filed under the
notice. If not filed, barred; exceptions.
– All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or
implied, whether the same be due, not due, or
contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last
sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be
filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever,
except that they may be set forth as counter claims in any action that the
executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. Xxx Claims not yet
due, or contingent, may be approved at their present value.
RULE 87.
SECTION 1. Actions which may and which may not be
brought against executor or administrator. – No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or
interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but
actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the
estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an
injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against him.
If, as
insisted by petitioners, respondents committed felonies in forcing them to sign
the letter-agreement, petitioners should have filed an action against the
executor or administrator of Benedicto’s estate based on Section 1, Rule 87 of
the Rules of Court. But they did not. Instead they filed a claim against the
estate based on contract, the unambiguous letter-agreement, under Section 5,
Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. The existence of this claim against the estate of
Benedicto as opposed to the filing of an action against the executor or
administrator of Benedicto’s estate forecloses all issues on the circumstances
surrounding the execution of this letter- agreement.
We
are not oblivious of the fact that, in the milieu prevailing during the Marcos
years, incidences involving intimidation of businessmen were not uncommon. Neither are we totally unaware of the reputed
closeness of Benedicto to President Marcos.
However, given the foregoing options open to them under the Rules of
Court, petitioners’ choice of remedies by filing their claim under Section 5,
Rule 86 ― after Marcos had already been ousted and full democratic space
restored ― works against their contention, challenging the validity of
the letter-agreement. Now, petitioners
must live with the consequences of their choice.
WHEREFORE, in
light of the foregoing, the Motion to Refer the Case to the Court en banc and the Motion for
Reconsideration are DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate
Justice
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate
Justice |
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate
Justice |
JOSE CATRAL
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Special Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
* Additional member per Raffle dated February 25, 2009.
** Additional member per Raffle dated May 18, 2009.
*** Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago per Raffle dated November 20, 2009.
**** Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario per Memorandum dated January 5, 2010.
[1] G.R. No. 102007, September 2, 1994, 236 SCRA 239, 255-256.
[2] 416 Phil. 722 (2001).
[3] Rollo, pp. 823-847.
[4]
[5] Supra note 1.
[6] Rollo, pp. 973-977.
[7] Supra note 1, at 255-256.
[8] Supra note 2. The Court, taking cognizance of respondent Benedicto’s death on May 15, 2000, has ordered that the latter be dropped as a party, and has declared extinguished any criminal liability, as well as civil liability ex delicto, that might be attributable to him in Criminal Case Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883, 91-101884 to 101892, and 92-101959 to 92-101969 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
[9] Rollo, pp. 69-70.
[10]
[11]
[12] Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book Two, 14th Ed., p. 657.