SPOUSES ROGELIO F. LOPEZ G.R. No. 184225
AND TEOTIMA G. LOPEZ,
Petitioners, Present:
Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Chico-Nazario,
Velasco, Jr.,
Nachura, and
Peralta, JJ.
SPOUSES
SAMUEL R. ESPINOSA
AND ANGELITA
S. ESPINOSA, Promulgated:
Respondents.
September 4, 2009
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YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Assailed in this petition[1] for review on certiorari is the March 24, 2008 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 00113 finding petitioners, Spouses Rogelio F. Lopez and Teotima
G. Lopez, liable for forcible entry and damages as well as the August 7, 2008
Resolution[3] denying petitioners’
motion for reconsideration.
Respondents,
Spouses Samuel R. Espinosa and Angelita S. Espinosa, owned a house located at
Barangay
It appears from the records that the parties have
had conflicting claims over the subject property since 1994 when petitioners,
together with a Mr. Nolan Kaimo, filed an action for recovery of possession
against respondents. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 4301 before Branch 2 of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities of Surigao City, but was dismissed on September 7, 1994 on technical grounds.[5] On June 9, 1997 and July 2, 1997, petitioners
were also summoned by the Office of the Punong Barangay of Barangay
Meanwhile, the
instant case stemmed from a complaint[7] for Forcible Entry with
Damages filed by respondents against petitioners on September 30, 2002. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
02-5950 before Branch 2 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Surigao City.
Respondents alleged that
on May 10, 2002, petitioners took advantage of their absence and demolished
their house by means of stealth and strategy. Aided by hired personnel, petitioners removed
and destroyed respondents’ house and enclosed the property with a concrete
fence.
In
their Answer,[8]
petitioners denied having demolished respondents’ house and claimed that it was
destroyed by the elements. They also averred
that respondents permanently transferred residence in 1999 considering that
they paid their water bill only until February 1999 while the electrical
utility was disconnected on the same year.[9]
On
February 5, 2004, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities ruled in favor of
respondents and held that petitioners forcibly entered the subject
premises. It noted that:
[I]n 1994
defendant Lopez and a certain Nolan Kaimo filed a case for recovery of
possession versus herein plaintiffs [respondents] who were already occupants of
a portion thereof, but the same was dismissed for technical reasons. In 1996, the defendants were able to secure
TCT T-12332 in their name and which cover not only their residential lot but
also the adjacent lot which plaintiffs occupied and where their house was
erected. Then, in 1997 the plaintiffs
had a clash with defendants when the latter allegedly destroyed plaintiffs’
fence which conflict reached Barangay Captain Laxa’s attention. These series of
events clearly tend to show the many attempts of defendant Lopez to oust the
plaintiffs from the premises and occupy the same as his own. And, the last event is the one related in the
instant case where the defendants, sensing that plaintiffs were not present and
their house already destroyed by the elements, had the lot relocated and fenced
as a consequence of which plaintiffs were totally deprived of possession
thereof.[10]
The
Municipal Trial Court did not lend credence to petitioners’ claims that
respondents abandoned their house and that the same was destroyed by natural
elements. It held that despite petitioners’
constructive possession following the issuance of TCT No. T-12332, they were not
justified in making such forcible entry.[11] The dispositive portion of the Decision[12] states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1.
Directing defendants [petitioners] to remove the
concrete fence, steel gate, grills and other structures found on the premises
occupied by plaintiffs previous to the forcible entry, and after which to
deliver possession thereof to plaintiffs smoothly and peacefully;
2.
Directing defendants [petitioners] to pay the value
of the house and improvements in the sum of P85,200.00;
3.
Ordering defendants [petitioners] to further pay
litigation expenses and the costs, and the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney’s
fees.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Petitioners appealed to the Regional Trial
Court of Surigao City/Surigao del Norte, which reversed the ruling of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities. In its August
17, 2004 Decision, [14]
the Regional Trial Court dismissed the case on the ground that the evidence
clearly prove abandonment on the part of respondents.[15]
Respondents filed a petition for review[16]
before the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the Decision of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities. It found
that while respondents left the house in 1999 when respondent Samuel was
assigned to Placer, Surigao del Norte, this fact alone does not establish
abandonment. Moreover, the appellate
court noted that respondents enjoy priority of possession, and that they paid
the corresponding taxes due on the house.[17] Thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 17
August 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Tenth (10th) Judicial
Region, Branch No. 29 of
SO ORDERED.[18]
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was
denied, hence this petition on the following grounds:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
HEREIN RESPONDENTS DID NOT ABANDON THEIR NIPA HOUSE DESPITE THE FOLLOWING
UNDISPUTED FACTS, TO WIT:
A
THE
B
NOBODY WAS LEFT STAYING IN THE NIPA HOUSE FOR
YEARS AND THE WATER AND ELECTRICAL CONNECTIONS IN THE NIPA HOUSE WERE ALREADY
CUT OFF AS EARLY AS 1999.
Petitioners argue that the
disconnection of water and electric supply in respondents’ house is proof of
their intention to abandon the house, especially because respondents are not
the owners of the land on which the house stood. Petitioners also allege that, even assuming arguendo
that the Municipal Trial Court correctly decided on the issue of
possession, the award of Php85,200.00 representing the value of improvements
and attorney’s fees is not supported by evidence.
On the other hand, respondents claim that they
did not abandon their house, and that the abandonment of a right, claim or
property must be clear, absolute, and irrevocable. On the award of Php85,200.00, respondents
aver that the issue was raised for the first time on appeal.
The petition lacks merit.
In Dy v. Mandy Commodities Co., Inc.,[19]
the Court held that there is forcible entry or desahucio when one is deprived of physical possession of land or
building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. The basic inquiry centers on who has the
prior possession de facto. The
plaintiff must prove that he was in prior possession and that he was deprived
thereof.
In the instant case, respondents’ house was
constructed in 1983 and they had prior physical possession until they were
deprived thereof by petitioners. To
substantiate their claims, respondents submitted the affidavit, dated September
20, 2002,[20]
of Carlos C. Menil and Lolito S. Bito, who witnessed the demolition of
respondents’ house during the latter’s absence.
Mr. Menil and Mr. Bito attested that they saw petitioner Rogelio
personally supervising the demolition of respondents’ house, and that he
erected a concrete fence enclosing the area where the house formerly stood. Petitioners
failed to refute the foregoing allegations except with bare denials.
While petitioners hold title to the subject
property where the house was located, the sole issue in forcible entry cases is who had prior
possession de facto of the disputed property.[21] In Dy,
the Court held that these are summary proceedings intended to provide an
expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right of possession of
property. Title is not involved; that is
why it is a special civil action with a special procedure.[22]
The Court of Appeals correctly held that respondents did not abandon
their house. Abandonment requires (a) a
clear and absolute intention to renounce a right or claim or to desert a right
or property; and (b) an external act by which that intention is expressed or
carried into effect. The intention to
abandon implies a departure, with the avowed intent of never returning,
resuming or claiming the right and the interest that have been abandoned.[23] There is none in this case.
The disconnection of water and electric supply
and the fact that respondents left the house when respondent Samuel was
assigned to Surigao del Norte in 1999, do not constitute abandonment. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals,
respondents left valuables inside the house and had the same padlocked, which
acts constitute assertion and protection of their right over the subject house
and negate renunciation and intention to lose the same.[24]
It bears stressing that the instant case was
preceded by the filing of actions for recovery of possession and malicious
mischief before the Office of the Punong Barangay. Likewise, upon discovery of petitioners’ acts
of intrusion, respondents immediately filed a complaint for forcible entry and
damages before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities. The Certification to File Action dated August
26, 2002 shows that no settlement or conciliation was reached.[25] It is clear from the foregoing that respondents
have not been remiss in asserting their rights and that petitioners’ claims
over the subject property have not gone unchallenged.
The Court affirms the award of Php85,200.00 representing
the value of improvements and attorney’s fees. The issue on the propriety of the award was
raised for the first time on motion for reconsideration before the Court of
Appeals. Well-settled is the rule that issues not raised below
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.[26]
WHEREFORE, based on
the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The March 24, 2008 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00113-MIN finding petitioners liable for forcible
entry is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 29-41.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] CA rollo, pp. 3-15.
[17] Rollo, p. 19.
[18]
[19] G.R. No. 171842, July 22, 2009.
[20] Rollo, p. 75.
[21] Perez v. Falcatan, G.R. No. 139536, September 26, 2005, 471 SCRA 21, 31.
[22] Supra note 19.
[23] Dela Cruz v. Quiazon, G.R. No. 171961, November 28, 2008.
[24] Rollo, pp. 16-17.
[25]
[26] Hermogenes
v. Osco, G.R. No. 141505,
August 18, 2005, 467 SCRA 301, 310.