THIRD
DIVISION
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JOANIE SURPOSA UY,
Petitioner, - versus
- JOSE NGO CHUA, Respondent. |
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G.R. No. 183965 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, and PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: September 18, 2009 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a
Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Resolution dated 25 June 2008 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 24, which granted the demurrer to
evidence of respondent Jose Ngo Chua, resulting in the dismissal of Special
Proceeding No. 12562-CEB.
Petitioner
Joanie Surposa Uy filed on
Petitioner
alleged in her Complaint that respondent, who was then married, had an illicit
relationship with Irene Surposa (Irene).
Respondent and Irene had two children, namely, petitioner and her
brother, Allan. Respondent attended to Irene
when the latter was giving birth to petitioner on 27 April 1959, and instructed
that petitioner’s birth certificate be filled out with the following names: “ALFREDO
F. SURPOSA” as father and “IRENE DUCAY” as mother. Actually, Alfredo F. Surposa was the name of
Irene’s father, and Ducay
was the maiden surname of Irene’s mother.
Respondent financially supported petitioner and Allan. Respondent had consistently and regularly
given petitioner allowances before she got married. He also provided her with employment. When petitioner was still in high school,
respondent required her to work at the Cebu Liberty Lumber, a firm owned by his
family. She was later on able to work at the Gaisano-
Borromeo Branch through respondent’s efforts.
Petitioner and Allan were introduced to each other and became known in
the Chinese community as respondent’s illegitimate children. During petitioner’s wedding, respondent sent
his brother Catalino Chua (Catalino) as his representative, and it was the
latter who acted as father of the bride.
Respondent’s relatives even attended the baptism of petitioner’s
daughter.[2]
In his Answer[3] to
the Complaint, filed on
It turned out that prior to
instituting Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB on
Under
consideration is a Compromise Agreement filed by the parties on
“1. Petitioner JOANIE SURPOSA UY declares, admits and acknowledges that there is no blood relationship or filiation between petitioner and her brother Allan on one hand and [herein respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA on the other. This declaration, admission or acknowledgement is concurred with petitioner’s brother Allan, who although not a party to the case, hereby affixes his signature to this pleading and also abides by the declaration herein.
2. As a gesture of goodwill and by way of
settling petitioner and her brother’s (Allan) civil, monetary and similar
claims but without admitting any liability, [respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA hereby
binds himself to pay the petitioner the sum of TWO MILLION PESOS (P2,000,000.00)
and another TWO MILLION PESOS (P2,000,000.00) to her brother, ALLAN
SURPOSA. Petitioner and her brother
hereby acknowledge to have received in full the said compromise amount.
3. Petitioner and her brother (Allan) hereby declare that they have absolutely no more claims, causes of action or demands against [respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA, his heirs, successors and assigns and/or against the estate of Catalino Chua, his heirs, successors and assigns and/or against all corporations, companies or business enterprises including Cebu Liberty Lumber and Joe Lino Realty Investment and Development Corporation where defendant JOSE NGO CHUA or CATALINO NGO CHUA may have interest or participation.
4. [Respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA hereby waives all counterclaim or counter-demand with respect to the subject matter of the present petition.
5. Pursuant to the foregoing, petitioner hereby asks for a judgment for the permanent dismissal with prejudice of the captioned petition. [Respondent] also asks for a judgment permanently dismissing with prejudice his counterclaim.”
Finding the said compromise agreement to be in order, the Court hereby approves the same. Judgment is rendered in accordance with the provisions of the compromise agreement. The parties are enjoined to comply with their respective undertakings embodied in the agreement.[7]
With no appeal having been filed
therefrom, the
Petitioner filed on 15 April 2008 her
Opposition[8] to
respondent’s Demurrer to Evidence in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB. Thereafter, RTC-Branch 24 issued its now
assailed Resolution dated
RTC-Branch 24 summarized the
arguments of respondent and petitioner in the Demurrer and Opposition,
respectively, as follows:
This is to resolve the issues put across in the Demurrer to the Evidence submitted to this Court; the Opposition thereto; the Comment on the Opposition and the Rejoinder to the Comment.
x x x x
1. The instant case is barred by the principle of res judicata because there was a judgment entered based on the Compromise Agreement approved by this multiple-sala Court, branch 09, on the same issues and between the same parties.
2. That such decision of Branch 09, having attained finality, is beyond review, reversal or alteration by another Regional Trial Court and not even the Supreme Court, no matter how erroneous.
3. Judicial Admissions or admission in petitioner’s pleadings to the effect that there is no blood relationship between petitioner and respondent, which is a declaration against interest, are conclusive on her and she should not be permitted to falsify.
4. That the Certificate of Live Birth showing that petitioner’s father is Alfredo Surposa is a public document which is the evidence of the facts therein stated, unless corrected by judicial order.
5. After receiving the benefits and concessions pursuant to their compromise agreement, she is estopped from refuting on the effects thereof to the prejudice of the [herein respondent].
The summary of the Opposition is in this wise:
1. That the illegitimate filiation of petitioner to respondent is established by the open, and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child.
2. The Demurrer to the evidence cannot set up the affirmative grounds for a Motion to Dismiss.
3. The question on the civil status, future support and future legitime can not be subject to compromise.
4. The decision in the first case does not bar the filing of another action asking for the same relief against the same defendant.[9]
Taking into consideration the aforementioned
positions of the parties, RTC-Branch 24 held that:
Looking at the issues from the
viewpoint of a judge, this Court believes that its hands are tied. Unless the Court of Appeals strikes down the
Compromise Judgment rendered by Branch 09 of the
This court upholds the Policy of Judicial Stability since to do otherwise would result in patent abuse of judicial discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The defense of lack of jurisdiction cannot be waived. At any rate, such is brought forth in the Affirmative Defenses of the Answer.
This Court, saddled with many cases, suffers the brunt of allowing herein case involving same parties to re-litigate on the same issues already closed.[10]
In the end, RTC-Branch 24 decreed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Demurrer to the Evidence is hereby given due course, as the herein case is hereby ordered DISMISSED.[11]
RTC-Branch 24 denied petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration[12]
in a Resolution[13] dated
Petitioner then filed the instant Petition
raising the following issues for resolution of this Court:
I
Whether
or not the principle of res judicata is
applicable to judgments predicated upon a compromise agreement on cases
enumerated in Article 2035 of the Civil Code of the
II
Whether or not the compromise agreement entered into by the parties herein before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 09 of Cebu City effectively bars the filing of the present case.[14]
At the outset, the Court notes that from
the RTC Resolution granting respondent’s Demurrer to Evidence, petitioner went
directly to this Court for relief. This
is only proper, given that petitioner is raising pure questions of law in her
instant Petition.
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court provides:
SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. – A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
Clearly, a party may directly appeal
to this Court from a decision or final order or resolution of the trial court on
pure questions of law. A question of law
lies, on one hand, when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on
a certain set of facts; a question of fact exists, on the other hand, when the
doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. Here, the facts are not disputed; the
controversy merely relates to the correct application of the law or
jurisprudence to the undisputed facts.[15]
The central issue in this case is
whether the Compromise Agreement entered into between petitioner and respondent,
duly approved by RTC-Branch 9 in its Decision dated
The doctrine of res judicata is a rule that pervades every well- regulated system
of jurisprudence and is founded upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of
the common law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which makes it in the
interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation, interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium,
and (2) the hardship of the individual that he should be vexed twice for the
same cause, nemo debet bis vexari pro
eadem causa.[16]
For res judicata, to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action,
the following requisites must concur: (1) there must be a final judgment or
order; (2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and
(4) there must be, between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter,
and causes of action.[17]
It is undeniable that Special Proceeding
No. 8830-CEB, previously before RTC-Branch 9, and Special Proceeding No.
12562-CEB, presently before RTC-Branch 24, were both actions for the issuance
of a decree of illegitimate filiation filed by petitioner against respondent. Hence, there is apparent identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action between the two cases. However, the question arises as to whether the
other elements of res judicata exist
in this case.
The
court rules in the negative.
A compromise is a contract whereby
the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end
to one already commenced.[18] In Estate
of the late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic,[19] the
Court pronounced that a judicial compromise has the effect of res judicata. A judgment based on a compromise agreement is
a judgment on the merits.
It must be emphasized, though, that like
any other contract, a compromise agreement must comply with the requisites in
Article 1318 of the Civil Code, to wit:
(a) consent of the contracting parties; (b) object certain that is the
subject matter of the contract; and (c) cause of the obligation that is
established. And, like any other
contract, the terms and conditions of a compromise agreement must not be
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy and public order. Any compromise agreement that is contrary to
law or public policy is null and void, and vests no rights in and holds no
obligation for any party. It produces no
legal effect at all.[20]
In
connection with the foregoing, the Court calls attention to Article 2035 of the
Civil Code, which states:
ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:
(1) The
civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation;
(4) Future
support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6)
Future
legitime. (Emphases ours.)
The
Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent, executed on 18 February
2000 and approved by RTC-Branch 9 in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in
Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, obviously intended to settle the question of
petitioner’s status and filiation, i.e.,
whether she is an illegitimate child of respondent. In exchange for petitioner and her brother
Allan acknowledging that they are not
the children of respondent, respondent would pay petitioner and Allan P2,000,000.00
each. Although unmentioned, it was a
necessary consequence of said Compromise Agreement that petitioner also waived
away her rights to future support and future legitime as an illegitimate child of
respondent. Evidently, the Compromise
Agreement dated
Advincula v. Advincula[21] has a factual background closely
similar to the one at bar. Manuela
Advincula (Manuela) filed, before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
It is
settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and filiation of a
child cannot be compromised. Public
policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a
child.[22] Paternity and filiation or the lack of the
same, is a relationship that must be judicially established, and it is for the
Court to declare its existence or absence.
It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.[23]
Being contrary to law and public
policy, the Compromise Agreement dated
Neither can it be said that RTC-Branch
9, by approving the Compromise Agreement, in its Decision dated
It is a universal rule of law that parties cannot, by consent, give a court, as such, jurisdiction in a matter which is excluded by the laws of the land. In such a case the question is not whether a competent court has obtained jurisdiction of a party triable before it, but whether the court itself is competent under any circumstances to adjudicate a claim against the defendant. And where there is want of jurisdiction of the subject-matter, a judgment is void as to all persons, and consent of parties can never impart to it the vitality which a valid judgment derives from the sovereign state, the court being constituted, by express provision of law, as its agent to pronounce its decrees in controversies between its people. (7 R. C. L., 1039.)
A judgment void for want of
jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right or the
creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims
emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence,
it can never become final, and any writ of execution based on it is void. It may be said to be a lawless thing that can
be treated as an outlaw and slain on sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it
exhibits its head.[26]
In sum, Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB before RTC-Branch 24 is not barred
by res judicata, since RTC-Branch 9
had no jurisdiction to approve, in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in
Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, petitioner and respondent’s Compromise
Agreement, which was contrary to law and public policy; and, consequently, the
Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, being null
and void for having been rendered by RTC-Branch 9 without jurisdiction, could
not have attained finality or been considered a judgment on the merits.
Nevertheless,
the Court must clarify that even though the Compromise Agreement between
petitioner and respondent is void for being contrary to law and public policy, the
admission petitioner made therein may still be appreciated against her in Special
Proceeding No. 12562-CEB. RTC-Branch 24
is only reminded that while petitioner’s admission may have evidentiary value, it
does not, by itself, conclusively establish the lack of filiation.[27]
Proceeding
from its foregoing findings, the Court is remanding this case to the RTC-Branch
24 for the continuation of hearing on Special Proceedings No. 12562-CEB, more
particularly, for respondent’s presentation of evidence.
Although
respondent’s pleading was captioned a Demurrer to Evidence, it was more appropriately
a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of res
judicata.
Demurrer to Evidence is governed by
Rule 33 of the Rules of Court, Section 1 of which is reproduced in full below:
SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence. – After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.
Demurrer to evidence authorizes a
judgment on the merits of the case without the defendant having to submit
evidence on his part, as he would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff's
evidence shows that he is not entitled to the relief sought. Demurrer, therefore, is an aid or instrument
for the expeditious termination of an action, similar to a motion to dismiss,
which the court or tribunal may either grant or deny.[28]
The Court has recently established
some guidelines on when a demurrer to evidence should be granted, thus:
A demurrer to evidence may be issued when, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. Where the plaintiff's evidence together with such inferences and conclusions as may reasonably be drawn therefrom does not warrant recovery against the defendant, a demurrer to evidence should be sustained. A demurrer to evidence is likewise sustainable when, admitting every proven fact favorable to the plaintiff and indulging in his favor all conclusions fairly and reasonably inferable therefrom, the plaintiff has failed to make out one or more of the material elements of his case, or when there is no evidence to support an allegation necessary to his claim. It should be sustained where the plaintiff's evidence is prima facie insufficient for a recovery.[29]
The essential question to be resolved
in a demurrer to evidence is whether petitioner has been able to show that she is
entitled to her claim, and it is incumbent upon RTC-Branch 24 to make such a
determination. A perusal of the Resolution dated
It must be kept in mind that
substantial justice must prevail. When
there is a strong showing that grave miscarriage of justice would result from
the strict application of the Rules, this Court will not hesitate to relax the
same in the interest of substantial justice.
The Rules of Court were conceived and promulgated to set forth
guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hand
that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of
technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion.
That is precisely why courts in rendering real justice have always been,
as they in fact ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that when on
the balance, technicalities take backseat against substantive rights, and not
the other way around.[30]
WhereforE, premises considered, the Resolution dated
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M.
PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Records, pp. 1-7.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5] Rollo, p. 53.
[6] Copy of the Petition and the RTC decision in Special Proceeding 8830-CEB not attached to the records of the petition before this Court.
[7] Records, pp. 210-211.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] Rollo, p. 7.
[15] Philippine
Veterans Bank v. Monillas, G.R. No. 167098,
[16] Arenas v. Court of Appeals, 399 Phil. 372, 385 (2000).
[17] Estate
of the late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic, G.R. No. 168661,
[18] Civil Code, Article 2028.
[19] Supra note 17, citing Romero v. Tan, 468 Phil. 224, 239 (2004).
[20] Rivero
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141273,
[21] 119 Phil. 448 (1964).
[22]
[23] De Asis v. Court of Appeals, 362 Phil. 515, 522 (1999).
[24] See Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good
Government, 366 Phil. 863, 871 (1999).
[25] 61 Phil. 752, 757-758 (1935).
[26]
[27] See
De Asis v. Court of Appeals, supra
note 23.
[28] Condes
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161304,
[29]
[30] See People v. Flores, 336 Phil. 58, 64 (1997), citing De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, 326 Phil. 182, 188 (1996).