GREAT SOUTHERN MARITIME G.R. No. 183646
SERVICES
CORP. and IMC
SHIPPING CO.,
PTE. LTD.,
Petitioners, Present:
Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Chico-Nazario,
Velasco, Jr.,
Nachura, and
Peralta, JJ.
LEONILA
SURIGAO for Herself and
In
Behalf of Her Minor Children, Promulgated:
Namely
KAYE ANGELI and MIRIAM,
Both
Surnamed SURIGAO,
Respondents. September 18, 2009
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YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:
Assailed
in this petition for review on certiorari
is the Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100113 dated February 14, 2008, which
reversed the Decision and Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, and reinstated the Decision of the Labor Arbiter
finding the death of Salvador M. Surigao as compensable. Also assailed is the Resolution[2]
dated July 8, 2008 denying the motion for reconsideration.
The
facts as correctly summarized by the appellate court are as follows:
[Respondent Leonila Surigao’s]
husband, the late Salvador M. Surigao, was hired as Fitter by [petitioner]
Great Southern Maritime Services Corporation, for and in behalf of
[co-petitioner]
However, on August 22, 2001, as per
Ship Master’s advice, a doctor was sent on board the vessel to medically attend
to
Prior to his repatriation, though,
or on August 26, 2001, at around seven o’clock in the morning,
As an heir of the deceased seaman, petitioner, for in behalf of her minor children, filed for death compensation benefits under the terms of the standard employment contract, but her claims were denied by the [petitioners]. Since efforts to settle the case amicably proved futile, the Labor Arbiter directed the parties to submit their respective position papers. On October 28, 2003, the Labor Arbiter rendered his decision, the dispositive portion of which reads, thus:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered, ordering the [petitioners] Great Southern Maritime Services
Corporation and/or
All
other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO
ORDERED.”
On appeal, the NLRC reversed and set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter and declared [petitioners] not liable for death benefits. In lieu thereof, however, the commission directed the [petitioners] to grant financial assistance to the [respondent] in the amount of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00). The dispositive portion reads as follows:
“PREMISSES
CONSIDERED, the Decision of October 28, 2003, is REVERSED and VACATED. [Petitioners] however, are directed to grant
financial assistance to complainants in the amount of five thousand US dollars
(US$5,000.00) at the prevailing rate at the time of payment.
SO
ORDERED.”
[Respondent] moved for the reconsideration of the aforequoted decision, but the commission in a Resolution, dated May 24, 2007, denied the same. The dispositive portion reads, thus:
“ACCORDINGLY,
the instant Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
No
further Motions for Reconsideration shall be entertained.
SO
ORDERED.”[3]
Respondent thereafter elevated the
case to the appellate court which reversed the decision of the NLRC and
reinstated that of the Labor Arbiter in its herein assailed February 14, 2008
Decision. The appellate court found that
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission are, hereby, REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, while the Decision of the Labor Arbiter is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated July
8, 2008.
Hence, this petition raising the
following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO DEATH BENEFITS FOR THE DEATH OF HER HUSBAND UNDER THE POEA STANDARD EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT FOR SEAFARERS.
2.
WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO
DAMAGES
The
pertinent provisions of the Standard
Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board
Ocean-Going Vessels, or the POEA
Standard Employment Contract, which
SECTION 20. COMPENSATION
A. COMPENSATION
1. In case of death of the seafarer during the term of his contract, the employer shall pay his beneficiaries the Philippine Currency equivalent to the amount of Fifty Thousand US dollars (US$50,000) and an additional amount of Seven Thousand US dollars (US$7,000) to each child under the age of twenty-one (21) but not exceeding four (4) children at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment.
x x x x
D. No compensation and benefits shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death of the seafarer resulting from his willful or criminal act or intentional breach of his duties, provided however, that the employer can prove that such injury, incapacity, disability or death is directly attributable to the seafarer.
The
general rule is that the employer is liable to pay the heirs of the deceased
seafarer for death benefits once it is established that he died during the
effectivity of his employment contract.
However, the employer may be exempted from liability if he can
successfully prove that the seafarer’s death was caused by an injury directly
attributable to his deliberate or willful act.[6] In sum, respondents’ entitlement to any death
benefits depends on whether the evidence of the petitioners suffices to prove
that the deceased committed suicide; the burden of proof rests on his employer.[7]
Petitioners
insist that respondents are not entitled to death benefits because
The
petition is impressed with merit.
While it is settled that the Court is not a trier of
facts and does not, as a rule, re-examine the evidence presented by the parties
to a case, there are a number of recognized exceptions, such as when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; when the findings of facts of
lower courts are conflicting; or when the findings of facts are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence but which are contradicted by the evidence on
record.[8]
In holding
that
The findings of the employer that
complainant’s husband died of hanging is questionable and deserves no
consideration at all for the following reasons: First, seaman Surigao was found
lying on the floor with a belt around his neck.
If he died hanging, why was he found lying on the floor? It is very unlikely for him to dislodge
himself from being hang [sic] before his last breath. Second, the respondents failed to show the
place where Surigao could have possibly hanged himself. What seems absurd is that the respondents
took picture of the doors, locks and shower pipes but not the place where he
allegedly hanged himself. And third, the
presence of the broken showerhead near the body of Surigao is confusing. If Surigao hanged himself in the said
showerhead and it broke down, then Surigao could not have died since he fell
therefrom. All these circumstances are
contrary to the allegation that seafarer Surigao committed suicide. Moreover, this Office opines that had
respondents conducted a thorough investigation on the circumstances, it would
have yielded a result not favorable to the respondents.[9]
We find the
foregoing ratiocination anchored on pure guesswork and speculation. In stark contrast, we find the foregoing circumstances
as constituting substantial evidence supporting a conclusion that
1.
2.
At 6:30
a.m. of the same day, when no one answered to the repeated knocks of the
attending nurse, the hospital staff forcibly opened the main door of the room;[11]
3.
Things
inside the room were found in order;[12]
4.
The
bathroom door was locked from inside and the hospital staff gained entrance
therein only through a closed door with a mesh leading to the ceiling of the
bathroom;[13]
5.
The
window in the bathroom has grills;[14]
6.
7.
A broken
pipe and showerhead were found near the body;[16]
and
8.
The
post-mortem examination result stating an opinion on the cause of death as
Asphyxia due to hanging.[17]
The post-mortem examination
conclusively established that the true cause of death was asphyxia or
suffocation. The appellate court’s
ruling that while it may be consistent with the theory that the deceased hanged
himself but it does not rule out the possibility that he might have died of
other causes,[18]
does not persuade. Aside from being
purely speculative, we find it hard to believe that someone strangled
Moreover, the conclusion that
Indeed, we are not unaware of our
ruling in Becmen Service Exporter and
Promotion, Inc. v. Cuaresma,[20]
where we held that Jasmin Cuaresma, also an overseas Filipino worker, did not
commit suicide; that Filipinos are resilient people, willing to take on
sacrifices for the good of their family; and that we do not easily succumb to
hardships and difficulties. Nevertheless,
the circumstances prevailing in said case are totally different from this
case. In Becmen, the postmortem examination and the police report did not
state with specificity that poisoning or suicide was the cause of Jasmin’s
death. In fact, both reports mentioned
that the cause of death of Jasmin was still under investigation. In contrast, the postmortem examination and
the police report in this case, categorically mentioned that
In Mabuhay
Shipping Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,[21]
the Court held that the death of a seaman even during the term of employment
does not automatically give rise to compensation. The circumstances which
led to the death as well as the provisions of the contract, and the right and
obligation of the employer and the seaman must be taken into consideration, in
consonance with the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution.
It is true that the beneficent
provisions of the Standard Employment Contract are liberally construed in favor
of Filipino seafarers and their dependents.[22] We commiserate with respondents for the unfortunate
fate that befell their loved one; however, we find that the factual
circumstances in this case do not justify the grant of death benefits as prayed
for by them as beneficiaries of
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100113
dated February 14, 2008 and its July 8, 2008 Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The March 30, 2007 Decision and May 24, 2007
Resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 13-25; penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Myrna Dimaranan Vidal.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6] NFD International Manning Agents v. National Labor Relations Commission, 348 Phil. 264, 273 (1998).
[7] Lapid v. National Labor Relations Commission, 366 Phil. 10, 17 (1999).
[8] La
[9] Rollo, p. 23.
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20] G.R. Nos. 182978-79 & 184298-99, April 7, 2009.
[21] G.R. No. 94167, January 21, 1991, 193 SCRA 141.
[22] Hermogenes v. Osco Shipping Service, Inc., G.R. No. 141505, August 18, 2005, 467 SCRA 301, 311.