|
SIMEON M.
Petitioner, -versus- FINANCIERA MANILA, INC., Respondent. |
G.R. No. 183387 Present: Ynares-Santiago,
J., Chairperson, chico-nazario, VELASCO, JR., nachura, and PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: September 29, 2009 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner Simeon M. Valdez comes to
this Court seeking to nullify the Decision[1]
dated
The antecedent facts can be
summarized as follows:
Petitioner and his wife, Lydia D.
Valdez, among others,[2]
filed a Complaint for a sum of money with prayer for preliminary attachment on
September 18, 1998 against respondent Financiera Manila, Inc. and five of its
corporate officers,[3] at
Branch 227, RTC of Quezon City,[4] seeking
to recover damages for failure of respondent Financiera and the corporate
officers to pay petitioner's money market investments on their maturity dates.
A preliminary attachment[5]
was issued by the RTC against respondent Financiera which resulted into the
levying of the latter's Account Nos. A-04-000324 to A-000355 with Scholarship
Plan Philippines, Inc. (SPPI), including its parcels of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-36316 and T-36317 of the Register of Deeds of
P4,069,439.90, with P3,920,313.24 going to petitioner
Valdez and his spouse, P126,885.52, to Belen Guevara, P11,120.57
to Pauline R. Petelo and P11,120.57 to Teddy Aurelio; and remanded the
case to the RTC for the determination of the award for moral and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney's fees.
Subsequently, on
1. For valuable consideration paid by
defendant FINANCIERA Manila, Inc. (hereinafter called FINANCIERA, for short) to
the plaintiffs, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged by the plaintiffs to
their entire satisfaction, the plaintiffs have dropped, dismissed and
withdrawn, as they hereby drop, dismiss and withdraw, their complaint in the
above-entitled case, in favor of all the defendants, and they hereby
acknowledge that they have no more claims, demands, complaint, or causes of
action of any kind whatsoever against said defendants, their
successors-in-interest and assigns, arising from or connected with any of the
transaction or transactions that gave rise to plaintiffs' complaint, or
anything else whatsoever.
2. With the dropping, dismissal and
withdrawal of plaintiffs' complaint, plaintiffs have agreed, as they hereby
agree to the lifting, cancellation and dissolution of the Writ of Preliminary
Attachment issued by this Honorable Court dated October 13, 1998 by virtue of
which plaintiffs had levied
on/garnished/ attached FINANCIERA's certain real and personal properties.
2.1 The notices of levy which the plaintiffs
had caused to be annotated on the following real properties of FINANCIERA by
virtue of said Writ shall be, as same hereby, lifted and cancelled, to wit:
a) A parcel of land in
b) A parcel of land in
c) A parcel of land in
d) A parcel of land in
2.2 The notices of garnishment which the
plaintiffs had caused to be annotated/registered, likewise by virtue of said
Writ, on the thirty (30) investment accounts of FINANCIERA with the SCHOLARSHIP
PLAN PHILIPPINES, INC. (SPPI) under Account Nos. A-04-000-324 to A-04-000-330,
Nos. A-04-000-332 to A-04-000-338 and Nos. A-04-000-340 to A-04-000-355, all of
which had already matured with a total cash value of P3,160,000.00 are
likewise canceled and lifted, to be disposed of by FINANCIERA in the following
manner:
a) The investment under Account No. A-04-000-355 with a cash value of P110,000.00
is hereby assigned and conveyed to FINANCIERA in favor of the plaintiffs to
form part of the above-mentioned valuable consideration paid hereunder by
FINANCIERA to the plaintiffs.
b) The rest of the investment accounts with a total cash value of P3,050,000.00
are hereby assigned and conveyed by FINANCIERA in favor of the spouses SIMEON
VALDEZ and LYDIA VALDEZ, as part of the
valuable consideration to be paid to them by FINANCIERA in another civil case,
entitled “The spouses Simeon Valdez and Lydia Valdez, plaintiffs, versus
Financiera Manila, Inc., defendant”, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-40877 of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 90, which civil case the said
spouses have likewise agreed to amicably settle with FINANCIERA simultaneously
with the execution of this Compromise Agreement.
3. Upon the execution of this Compromise
Agreement, plaintiffs shall return and deliver to Financiera the originals of
the following evidence of indebtedness subject matter of the complaint,
consisting of Placement Advice Certificates and checks drawn on the
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) previously issued by Fianciera
to the plaintiffs, x x x
x x x x
4. This Compromise Agreement shall be a full
and final settlement of all the claims and counterclaims filed by or against
the parties in this case, or any of them, and specifically it shall be a full
and complete satisfaction of the judgment rendered by this Honorable Court in
favor of the plaintiffs as modified by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
68286.
5. Plaintiffs hereby agree and bind
themselves to sign, execute and deliver any and all other deeds, papers and
documents, and to do and perform any and all other acts and things, that may be
necessary or required to fully implement this Compromise Agreement,
particularly the discharge and release of the levy/garnishment/attachment on
defendant's aforesaid investments with the Bonifacio Land Corporation and the
payment to the defendant by the latter of the cash value of said investments.
Respondent Financiera
delivered to the plaintiffs therein Certificates of Payments and Passbooks
covering its SPPI Investments under Account Nos. A-04-000324 to A-04-000330, A-04-000332
to A-04-000346, A-04-000347 to
A-04-000354 and A-04-000355. On
A consolidation[14]
of Civil Cases No. Q-98-35546 and Q-00-40877 was eventually made and assigned
to the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 227. The plaintiffs in those cases filed a motion
for the rescission of the Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No. Q-98-35546 on the ground that no
payment was expected from respondent Financiera. The motion was denied by the court in an
Order[15]
dated P3,160,000.00, which Order attained
finality.[16]
Respondent Financiera
filed an Urgent Motion for Execution[17]
dated P4,069,439.90 to the plaintiffs as actual
damages.[19]
Thereafter, respondent
Financiera filed its Motion for Reconsideration,[20]
which was eventually denied,[21]
prompting it to file a petition for certiorari[22]
with the CA on the ground that the RTC had committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Orders dated
The CA, in its Decision[23]
dated March 18, 2008, ruled that the RTC
gravely abused its discretion in varying the terms and conditions of the
Compromise Agreement by ruling that it was the duty and obligation of
respondent Financiera to see to it that plaintiffs were fully paid their claim,
the same not having been expressly undertaken by petitioner under the
Compromise Agreement. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE,
the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated P3,920,313.24
interest of the Sps. Valdez.
SO ORDERED.
In a
Resolution[24] dated
4.1 THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS NO JURISDICTION
OVER THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY RESPONDENT.
4.2 THE QUESTIONED DECISION IS UTTERLY ILLOGICAL
AND INCONCLUSIVE (sic) DONE IN VIOLATION OF SEC. 14, ART. VIII OF THE
CONSTITUTION, AND SEC. 1, RULE 36 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
4.3 RESPONDENT'S ASSIGNMENT OF ITS SPPI
INVESTMENT FAILED TO EXTINGUISH ITS OBLIGATION TO PAY PETITIONER UNDER OUR LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE.
4.4 THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS NO JURISDICTION
TO LIFT THE ATTACHMENTS WHILE PETITIONER'S CLAIMS REMAIN UNPAID.
4.5 THE GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY PETITIONER FOR
THE ALLOWANCE OF THIS PETITION INVOLVE PURELY QUESTIONS OF LAW.
In questioning the jurisdiction of
the CA over the petition for certiorari filed
by respondent Financiera, petitioner Valdez claims the following: (a) as
jurisprudence[26]
dictates, the proper remedy of the same respondent should have been to file an
appeal, because it was the motion for execution of judgment that was denied;
(b) the petition for certiorari was
filed out of time, because respondent Financiera received the RTC Order of June
18, 2007 denying the latter's motion for reconsideration on June 29, 2007, but
instead of filing a notice of appeal within the reglementary period lasting
until July 14, 2007, respondent Financiera belatedly filed a petition for certiorari on August 28, 2007 when the
questioned RTC Orders had already attained finality; (c) the final RTC Orders
should not have been modified because, as ruled by this Court in a number of
cases,[27]
the said Orders are immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in
any respect, even if the modification was meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact and law, and whether it was made by the court that rendered
it or by the highest court of the land;
and (d) the subject matter of the petition for certiorari should not have been expanded, since the only subject
matter elevated by respondent Financiera was that of SPPI Investment Account
No. A-04-000-355 with a cash value of P110,000.00, and not the entire P10,195,833.33
unpaid claim under the Compromise Agreement, contrary to the pronouncement of
this Court in various cases[28]
that the nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction
over it, is determined based on the material allegations contained in the
petition.
Petitioner P149,126.66, the sum
adjudged under the summary judgment.
This statement is clearly in conflict with the compromise judgment that
they are entitled only to the cash value of P110,000.00 of SPPI Account No. A-04-000-355. Petitioner goes on to add that the decision indeed
become topsy-turvy when it declared that the attachment shall be lifted to the
extent of the interest of the Spouses Valdez in the amount of P3,920,313.24,
the original claim upheld under the summary judgment, again in conflict with
the P3,050,000.00 under the Compromise Agreement. The questioned
decision became increasingly damaging by declaring in its fallo that petitioner's interest was in the sum of P3,920,313.24. The general rule is that where there is
conflict between the dispositive portion or the fallo and the body of
the decision, the fallo controls. This rule rests on the theory that the
fallo is the final order, while the opinion in the body is merely a
statement ordering nothing.[31]
In arguing that respondent
Financiera's assignment of its SPPI Investment failed to extinguish its
obligation to pay, petitioner
Finally, in stating that the CA has
no jurisdiction to lift the attachments while the money claims remain unpaid,
petitioner
Respondent Financiera, in its Comment[34]
dated
I.
FINANCIERA CORRECTLY FILED A
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI BEFORE THE
COURT OF APPEALS TO ASSAIL THE ORDERS OF THE COURT A QUO DIRECTING THE EXECUTION OF A COURT DECISION WHICH HAD BEEN
SUPPLANTED AND COMPLETELY SATISFIED BY THE PARTIES THROUGH THE EXECUTION OF A
COURT-APPROVED COMPROMISE AGREEMENT.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY
RULED THAT:
A. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
VARYING THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THE PARTIES' COMPROMISE AGREEMENT;
B. THE PARTIES' COURT-APPROVED
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT IS VALID AND MUST BE ENFORCED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS
THEREOF; AND,
C. FINANCIERA HAD PERFORMED ITS
OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE COURT-APPROVED COMPROMISE AGREEMENT AND IS NOW ENTITLED
TO THE LIFTING OF THE LEVY ON ATTACHMENT ON ITS REAL PROPERTIES, PARTICULARLY
T.C.T. NOS. T-36316 AND T-36317.
According
to respondent Financiera, it filed a petition for certiorari before the CA because the enforcement of the court a
quo's February 26, 2007 and June 18, 2007 Orders rendered nugatory the
force and effect of the parties' court-approved Compromise Agreement. Respondent
adds that the enforcement of the same Orders would cause irreparable injury as
it was directed to pay petitioner P4,069,439.90, when it had already assigned and
transferred to them its SPPI investment accounts pursuant to the parties'
court-approved Compromise Agreement.
In
stating that the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion, respondent Financiera
reasons that the CA was correct in ruling that it was the RTC that committed
grave abuse of its discretion in varying the terms and conditions of the
parties' Compromise Agreement, which was already valid and enforceable in
accordance with the terms thereof, and respondent had already performed its
obligations under the same agreement.
The petition is
meritorious.
One of the issues raised
by petitioner
SECTION
1. Subject
of Appeal. - An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when
declared by these Rules to be appealable.
No appeal
may be taken from:
(a) An
order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;
(b) An
order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from
judgment;
(c) An
interlocutory order;
(d) An
order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;
(e) An
order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or
compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground
vitiating consent;
(f) An
order of execution;
(g) A
judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in
separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints, while
the main case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom; and
(h) An
order dismissing an action without prejudice.
In all the
above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the
aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
In connection therewith,
this Court has ruled[35]
that certiorari is not the proper substitute for a lost appeal. However, it admits of several exceptions,
thus:
Doctrinally entrenched is the
general rule that certiorari is not a
substitute for a lost appeal. However, Justice Florenz D. Regalado lists
several exceptions to this rule, viz.:
“(1) where the appeal does not constitute a speedy and adequate remedy (Salvadades vs. Pajarillo, et al., 78 Phil.
77), as where 33 appeals were involved from orders issued in a single
proceeding which will inevitably result in a proliferation of more appeals (PCIB vs. Escolin, et al., L-27860 and
27896, Mar. 29, 1974); (2) where the
orders were also issued either in excess of or without jurisdiction (Aguilar vs. Tan, L-23600, June 30, 1970, Cf.
Bautista, et al. vs. Sarmiento, et al., L-45137, Sept., 231985); (3) for
certain special consideration, as public welfare or public policy (See Jose vs. Zulueta, et al. L-16598, May 31,
1961 and the cases cited therein); (4) where in criminal actions, the court
rejects rebuttal evidence for the prosecution as, in case of acquittal, there
could be no remedy (People vs. Abalos, L-29039,
Nov. 28, 1968); (5) where the order is a patent nullity (Marcelo vs. De Guzman, et al., L-29077, June
29, 1982); and (6) where the decision in the certiorari case will avoid future litigations (St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc. vs. Campos, et al., L-38280, Mar. 21,
1975).”[36] Even in
a case where the remedy of appeal was lost, the Court has issued the writ of certiorari where the lower court
patently acted in excess of or outside its jurisdiction,[37]
as in the present case.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is appropriate and allowable when the following requisites concur: (1)
the writ is directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[38]
From the above provisions of the
pertinent laws, it is apparent that a denial of a motion for the execution of
judgment is appealable under Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Respondent Financiera justifies the mode of
appeal it resorted to by stating that the enforcement of the court a quo's
Orders dated February 26, 2007 and June 18, 2007, respectively, rendered
nugatory the force and effect of the parties' court-approved Compromise
Agreement; therefore, there was a need to file a petition for certiorari. However, a close reading of the petition
filed by respondent Financiera with the CA clearly shows that what it sought to
be nullified and set aside were the Order of the RTC dated February 26, 2007
denying respondent's motion for the enforcement of the Compromise Agreement
dated December 18, 2002, and granting petitioner Valdez’s motion for execution
of the Decision dated May 22, 2000 as modified by the CA; and the Order of the
RTC dated June 18, 2007 denying respondent's motion for reconsideration of the
earlier mentioned Order. Thus, by reason
of the prayer in the petition for certiorari,
the subject of the same petition was inappropriate, if not inapplicable. Rule 65 of the Rules of Court reads:
SECTION 1. Petition
for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such
tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.
Considering that an appeal was still
available as a remedy for the assailed Orders of the RTC, and that the case did
not fall within the exceptions, the filing of the petition for certiorari
was an attempted substitute for an appeal, after respondent failed to avail
itself of the latter remedy. Necessarily, it must be noted that the
petition for certiorari was filed on
Having ruled on the jurisdiction of
CA, this Court shall now proceed to the merits of the case.
Was the RTC correct in denying
respondent Financiera's motion for the enforcement of the Compromise Agreement
and in granting petitioner
This Court rules in the affirmative.
In a case[39]
decided by this Court, it was held that:
Compromise
agreements are contracts, whereby the parties undertake reciprocal obligations
to resolve their differences,[40]
thus, avoiding litigation,[41]
or put an end to one already commenced.[42]
It is a
cardinal rule in contract interpretation that the ascertainment of the
intention of the contracting parties is to be discharged by looking to the
words they used to project that intention in their contract, that is, all the
words, not just a particular word or two, and words in context, not words
standing alone.[43]
Article 1374 of the Civil Code requires that
the various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together,
attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them
taken jointly.[44]
It is
clear from the above ruling that the substance of a compromise agreement can be
inferred from a careful perusal of all the stipulations in their entirety and
all the words used, as they are connected with
one another.
The
Compromise Agreement entered into by petitioner Valdez and the other plaintiffs
and respondent Financiera was for a valuable consideration paid by the latter
in order for the former to drop, dismiss and withdraw their complaint; and to
acknowledge that they had no more claims, demands, complaints, or causes of
action of any kind whatsoever against said respondent. By dropping, dismissing and withdrawing their
complaint, petitioner Valdez and the other plaintiffs agreed to the lifting,
cancellation and dissolution of the Writ of Preliminary Attachment issued by
the RTC dated October 13, 1998, by virtue of which they had levied on,
garnished and attached certain real and personal properties of respondent
Financiera. The stipulations of the
Compromise Agreement read as follows:
2.1 The notices of levy which the plaintiffs
had caused to be annotated on the following real properties of FINANCIERA by
virtue of said Writ shall be, as same are hereby, lifted and cancelled, to wit:
a) A parcel of land in
b) A parcel of land in
c) A parcel of land in
d) A parcel of land in
2.2 The notices of garnishment which the
plaintiffs had caused to be annotated/registered, likewise by virtue of said
Writ, on the thirty (30) investment accounts of FINANCIERA with the SCHOLARSHIP
PLAN PHILIPPINES, INC. (SPPI) under Account Nos. A-04-000-324 to A-04-000-330,
Nos. A-04-000-332 to A-04-000-338 and Nos. A-04-000-340 to A-04-000-355, all
of which had already matured (emphasis ours) with a total cash value of P3,160,000.00
are likewise canceled and lifted, to be disposed of by FINANCIERA in the
following manner:
a) The investment under Account No. A-04-000-355 with a cash value of P110,000.00
is hereby assigned and conveyed by FINANCIERA in favor of the plaintiffs to
form part of the above-mentioned valuable consideration paid hereunder by
FINANCIERA to the plaintiffs.
b) The rest of the investment, accounts with
a total cash value of P3,050,000.00 are hereby assigned and conveyed by
FINANCIERA in favor of the spouses SIMEON VALDEZ and LYDIA VALDEZ, as part of the valuable consideration to be
paid to them by FINANCIERA in another civil case, entitled “The spouses Simeon
Valdez and Lydia Valdez, plaintiffs, versus Financiera Manila, Inc.,
defendant”, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-40877 of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 90, which civil case the said spouses have likewise
agreed to amicably settle with FINANCIERA simultaneously with the execution of
this Compromise Agreement.
The above
stipulations state in detail the properties whose attachments were sought to be
lifted and canceled. Of particular
importance is the assignment and conveyance of the 30 investment accounts of
respondent Financiera with SPPI with a total cash value, as stated in the
Compromise Agreement, of P3,160,000.00,
because these accounts formed part of the valuable consideration paid by
respondent to petitioner and the other
plaintiffs. There is no dispute that the
said investment accounts with SPPI were eventually assigned by respondent
Financiera. The problem lies in whether there was full compliance with the said
stipulation in the Compromise Agreement.
The stipulation states categorically
that the 30 investment accounts of respondent Financiera with SPPI had already
matured. However, the cash value of the
said investment accounts were never given because SPPI, not being a party to
the Compromise Agreement, could not be compelled to pay respondent Financiera's
unpaid obligation to petitioner
In short, as the stipulations in the
Compromise Agreement remain unfulfilled, respondent Financiera is still
obligated to pay its original indebtedness.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA
V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J.
VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Third
Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the
Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice
Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, with Associate Justices Portia Aliño-
Hormachuelos and Lucas P. Bersamin (now
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court), concurring; rollo, pp. 30-36.
[2] Belen Guevara, Pauline P. Petelo and Teddy Aurelio
[3] Arturo A. Sena; Ricardo S. Castañeda; Hector Y. Uy; Fausto C. Tiu, Financiera's Vice-President and Treasurer; and Mariano C. Tiu, its Vice-President for Money Market Department and Branch Operation, and ex-officio member of its Executive Committee. (CA Decision, CA rollo, p. 210.)
[4] Docketed as Civil Case No. Q-98-35546.
[5]
Resolution dated
[6]
As mentioned in the Order dated
[7]
[8] CA rollo, pp. 46-56.
[9] Civil Case No. Q-00-40877.
[10]
The Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No. Q-98-35546 was approved in
the Order dated
[11] CA rollo, pp. 59-62.
[12] Contained in SPPI's Manifestation
(Re: Motion for Contempt) in Civil Case No. Q-00-40877, as mentioned in CA
Decision dated
[13] As shown in the Certification
dated
[14] As mentioned in petitioner's
Comment dated
[15] CA rollo, pp. 65-66.
[16] Per CA Resolutions dated
[17] CA rollo, pp. 76-82.
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21] Order dated
[22] CA rollo, pp. 2-31.
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26] Syllabus in Socorro v. Ortiz, G.R. No. L-23608, December 24, 1964, 12 SCRA 641; and Shugo Noda & Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107404, March 30, 1994, 231 SCRA 620.
[27] Jacobus Bernhard Hulst v. PR Builders, Inc., G.R. No. 156364, September 3, 2007, 532 SCRA 74, 95, citing Peña v. Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), 502 SCRA 383, 404 (2006); Siy v. National Labor Relations Commission, 468 SCRA 154, 161-162 (2005); Sacdalan v. Court of Appeals, 428 SCRA 586, 599 (2004).
[28] Trans
[29] Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: “No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.”
[30] Sec. 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court requires that “A judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be in writing, personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk of court.”
[31] Mt. Carmel College v. Resuena, G.R. No. 173076, October 10, 2007, 535 SCRA 518, 539, citing Poliand Industrial Limited v. National Development Company, 467 SCRA 500, 550 (2005); Mendoza, Jr. San Miguel, Inc., 458 SCRA 664, 676-677.
[32] G.R. No. 123031,
[33] G.R. No. 149420,
[34] Rollo, pp. 182-203.
[35] Argana v. Republic G.R. No. 147227,
[36] Remedial
Law Compendium, Vol. 1, p. 708 (1997).
[37] Philippine
National Bank v. Florendo, G.R. No.
62082,
[38] Rules
of Court, Rule 65, Sec. 1. Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil
155, 178-179 (1997). See Cochingyan,
Jr. v. Cloribel, G.R. Nos. L-27070-71,
[39] Alonzo v. Sps. Jaime and
Perlita
[40] Regal Films, Inc. v.
[41] Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139495, November 27, 2000, 346 SCRA 126.
[42] Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108947, September 29, 1997, 279 SCRA 647, cited in San Antonio v. Court of Appeals, 371 SCRA 536 (2001).
[43] Limson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 135929, April 20, 2001, 357 SCRA 209; China Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121158, December 5, 1996, 265 SCRA 327.
[44] The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126850, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 79.
[45] Domingo Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126236, January 26, 2007, 513 SCRA 40, 61.
[46]
[47] Inter-Asia Services Corp. (Int’l) v. CA Special Fifteenth Division, 331 Phil. 708, 718-719. (1996).
[48]
Tolentino, Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
[49]
G.R. No. 104133, April 18, 1995, 243 SCRA
531, 535, citing Maceda, Jr. v. Moreman Builders Co., Inc., 203 SCRA 293
(1991).
[50] Supra.