THIRD DIVISION
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EDGARDO H. CATINDIG, petitioner, - versus - THE PEOPLE OF THE Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 183141 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J., Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, and PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: September 18, 2009 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This case is a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision[1]
dated
Herein petitioner Catindig is an
incumbent member of the Sangguniang Pambayan
of
The factual antecedents of this case are
as follows:
Sometime in 2001, a team of auditors
from the Commission on Audit (COA) conducted a rate audit of CWD, Calamba,
Laguna, covering its operations and financial transactions for calendar year
2001. The audit was made to determine
the reasonableness of the water rate increase granted by the Local Water
Utilities Administration (LWUA) to the water districts to cover Power Cost
Adjustment (PCA) and Foreign Exchange Cost Adjustment (FECA).
During the examination, the COA audit
team found that the Board of Directors of CWD passed several resolutions
granting benefits and allowances to officers, employees and members of its
Board of Directors in the total amount of P15,455,490.14 supposedly without
legal basis and beyond the allowable limit.
The said amount was divided as follows: (1) P4,378,908.58 granted
to the Board of Directors of CWD over and above per diems without legal basis; (2) P10,620,587.68 granted to
CWD officers and employees without legal basis; and (3) P455,993.88
granted to CWD officers and employees in amounts over the authorized limits.
The aforesaid findings of the COA
audit team were embodied in its Report No. 2002-06.[8] The COA audit team explained therein that the
functions of the members of the Board of Directors of the Water Districts were
limited to policy-making, as clearly stated in Section 18[9] of
Presidential Decree No. 198, as amended.
Moreover, even the LWUA, in its Resolution No. 313, Series of 1995,
acknowledged that directors of Water Districts a not organic personnel, and that
their function is limited only to policy-making. Also, Section 13[10]
of Presidential Decree No. 198, as amended, categorically provides that each member
of the Board of Directors of the Water Districts is entitled only to receive per diem, and no director shall receive
other compensation for services to the district. Thus, the COA audit team stated in its audit
report that the compensation, benefits and allowances amounting to P4,378,908.58
received by the Board of Directors of CWD were in clear violation of Section 13
of Presidential Decree No. 198, as amended. From the said amount, only P366,300 was
allowed, representing the per diem
per board meeting. Furthermore, the
allowances granted to the officers and employees of CWD amounting to P10,620,587.68
by a mere board resolution issued by the Board of Directors of CWD were without
basis, as these are not authorized by
law.
Accordingly, the audit team made the
following recommendations: (1) that the CWD make a re-evaluation of the
benefits and allowances granted to its Board of Directors, officers and employees
to ensure that the same were authorized and within the limits allowed under
existing laws and regulations; and (2) that the LWUA should adhere to the law,
particularly Presidential Decree No. 198, as amended, in regulating the grant
of benefits and allowances to the CWD Board of Directors, officials and employees
to ensure that the same are within the authorized limits.
On the basis thereof, petitioner
filed on 7 July 2004 a Complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman for Luzon (Ombudsman)
against private respondent and the other members of the Board of Directors of
CWD for a series of acts of gross violation of Section 3(i)[11]
of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, in conspiracy with one another, and in
relation to their duties as public officers of CWD, with a prayer for immediate
preventive suspension against all of them.
The said Complaint was docketed as OMB-L-C-04-0709-H.
After going over the records, the
Ombudsman was convinced that the findings of fact made by the COA audit team can
sustain charges for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, against private respondent and the other members of the Board of
Directors of CWD. The Ombudsman then issued
a Resolution[12] dated
Thereafter, two Informations, both
dated
The Information docketed as Criminal
Case No. 13850-05-C, the subject of this Petition, reads:
That on or about the period from 1993-2001, or
sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Calamba, Province
of Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, [ATTY.
FANDIÑO], VIVENCIO P. LEUS, SYLVIA V. TANCANGCO, SEVERINO M. ARAMBULO,
public officers, being members of the Board of Directors of [CWD], while in the
performance of their official functions, committing the crime charged in
relation to their office, and taking advantage of the same, through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously allow and grant unto themselves the
total amount of P4,378,908.00
as benefits consisting of director’s
fee, RATA, extra and miscellaneous expense, mid-year productivity incentive,
anniversary incentive, 13th month pay, Christmas incentive, year-end
incentive, uniform allowance, medical and hospitalization, traveling and per diem during official business and
employer’s contribution to [Board of Directors’] share in the welfare/provident
fund when in truth and in fact they are not allowed by law because they are
not organic personnel of the water district whose functions are limited only to
policy making and not in the detailed management of the district, thereby
causing undue injury to the government in the aforestated amount.[17] (Emphases supplied.)
On 12 December 2005, the private
respondent and the other members of the Board of Directors of CWD filed in
Criminal Case No. 13850-05-C an Omnibus Motion for Determination of the
Existence of Probable Cause, Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Probable Cause and
Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest.[18] Then, on
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, let a warrant for the arrest of the [herein private respondent and the other members of the Board of Directors of CWD] be issued.
Likewise, pursuant to Section 13, R.A. [No.] 3019, [as amended], this Court hereby orders the suspension pendente lite of [the private respondent and the other members of the Board of Directors of CWD] from their position as members of the Board of Directors, Calamba Water Districts for a period of sixty (60) days, to take effect immediately upon receipt hereof.
Let a copy of this Order be furnished to the [CWD] for the implementation of the suspension order.
The said [CWD] shall inform this Court of any action taken thereon within ten (10) days from receipt thereof and its authorized official or duly authorized representative shall advise this Court of the date of the actual implementation of the suspension of the [private respondent and his co-accused therein] as well as the expiration of the sixtieth day hereof so that the same may be lifted at the proper time.
Send a copy of this order to the Office of the City Prosecutor and Atty. Brion, Jr.[20] (Emphases supplied.)
The
private respondent and the other members of the Board of Directors of CWD moved
for the reconsideration of the aforesaid Order, but the motion was denied in
the court a quo’s other Order dated
The
private respondent was the only one who elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. He
challenged the aforesaid two Orders of the court a quo for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as the facts on record did not
establish prima facie probable cause;
thus, Criminal Case No. 13850-05-C should have been dismissed.
On
The Court of Appeals stated in its
Decision that the employees and officers, including the Board of Directors of
the CWD, had received the disputed allowances and benefits long before this
Court declared as illegal such payment of additional compensation; thus, it
could be reasonably concluded that private respondent and his co-accused in the
case below received the same in good faith.
The Court of Appeals also elucidated that in prosecuting cases involving
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, the public
officers must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence in performing their legal duties. In the absence of bad faith, private
respondent and his co-accused in the case below cannot be held liable for
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended.
Aggrieved, petitioner moved for a reconsideration
of the aforesaid Decision of the Court of Appeals, but the motion was denied by
the appellate court in its Resolution dated
Hence, this Petition with the
following assignment of errors:
A
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED THE PETITION THEREIN BASED ON FACTUAL ISSUE RATHER THAN ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION OF THE TRIAL COURT, SINCE IT WAS FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, AS AMENDED.
B
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DID NOT OUTRIGHTLY DISMISS THE PETITION
IN QUESTION SINCE THE ISSUES RAISED THEREIN WERE SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME IN CA-G.R.
SP NO. 92474, WHICH IT ALREADY FINALLY DISMISSED OUTRIGHTLY ON [28 DECEMBER
2005] LONG BEFORE THE PETITION IN QUESTION IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 96293 WAS FILED
WITH THIS HONORABLE COURT DATED [
C
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED, IN GRAVE ABUSE OF ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO NOTICE CERTAIN RELEVANT FACTS IN ITS QUESTIONED DECISION AND RESOLUTION WHICH, IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED, WILL JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION THEREOF.
D
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DID NOT UPHOLD THE ASSAILED TWO ORDERS IN QUESTION OF THE TRIAL COURT.
Given
the foregoing, the issues that must be resolved in this Petition are:
I. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in pronouncing that the private respondent and the other members of the Board of Directors of the CWD acted in good faith in receiving the disputed benefits and allowances pursuant to LWUA Resolution No. 313, as amended, in a Petition for Certiorari, which is meant only to correct errors of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion.
II. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not outrightly dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 96293 on the ground of res judicata.
The present Petition is
not impressed with merit.
Petitioner argues that a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, which was used by the private respondent in
challenging the Orders dated 24 May 2006 and 5 July 2006 of the court a quo, is intended only to correct
errors of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction
committed by the trial court. It cannot
be used to correct an error of judgment or simple abuse of discretion. Also, it cannot be legally used for any other
purpose. Petitioner, thus, holds that
the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled not only on the issue of grave abuse
of discretion but also on the merits of the case, that is, by ruling that the
private respondent and the other members of the Board of Directors of CWD acted
in good faith in receiving the disputed benefits and allowances pursuant to
LWUA Resolution No. 313.
At
the outset, the Ombudsman recommended the filing of two Informations with the
RTC of Calamba City against the private respondent and the other members of the
Board of Directors of CWD for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019, as amended. One of the two
Informations was lodged before Branch 35 of the RTC of Calamba City, and is now
the subject of this Petition. After the
Information was filed with the court a
quo, the private respondent and the other members of the Board of Directors
of CWD conversely filed an Omnibus Motion for Determination of the Existence of
Probable Cause, Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Probable Cause and Motion to Hold
in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest.
In resolving the said Omnibus Motion, the trial court issued an Order
dated
It
is a fundamental principle that an order denying a Motion to Dismiss is an
interlocutory order, which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case,
as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally
decided on the merits. As such, the general rule is that the denial of a
Motion to Dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari, which is a remedy designed
to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. Neither can
a denial of a Motion to Dismiss be the subject of an appeal unless and until a
final judgment or order is rendered. In order to justify the grant of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari,
the denial of the Motion to Dismiss must have been tainted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[21]
There
is “grave abuse of discretion” where “a power is exercised in an arbitrary,
capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, so patent and so gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by, or in contemplation of law.”[22]
With
the aforesaid definition, it cannot be said that the trial court gravely abuse
its discretion in finding probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest against the private respondent and the other members of the Board of
Directors of CWD, thus, denying their Omnibus Motion. It bears emphasis that the trial court itself
carefully scrutinized the documents submitted by the parties and personally evaluated
the Resolution of the Ombudsman finding probable cause for the filing of the Information
against the private respondent and the other members of the Board of Directors
of CWD for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. After it was convinced that probable cause
exists to issue a warrant of arrest, it was only then that it directed the
issuance thereof.
The aforesaid general
rule, however, is not absolute. Where special circumstances clearly demonstrate
the inadequacy of an appeal, then the special civil action of certiorari may exceptionally be
allowed. This Court categorically stated
in Salonga v. Cruz Paño[23]
that under certain situations, recourse to the extraordinary legal remedies of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus to
question the denial of a motion to quash is considered proper in the interest
of more enlightened and substantial justice.[24]
After a careful review of
the records, this Court finds that such special circumstance obtains in the
present case. Simply stated, the existing evidence is insufficient to establish
probable cause against the private respondent to prosecute him for violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, vis-à-vis to establish probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest against him.
The Ombudsman, in
arriving at the conclusion that probable cause exists to prosecute the private
respondent and the other members of the Board of Directors of CWD for violation
of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, relied heavily on the
findings of fact of the COA audit team and the ruling of this Court in Baybay Water District v. Commission on Audit.[25] Such finding of probable cause by the
Ombudsman was affirmed by the trial court in its two Orders dated 24 May 2006
and 5 July 2006 resulting in its issuance of a warrant of arrest against the
private respondent and the other members of the Board of Directors of CWD,
The findings of fact of
the COA audit team revealed that the Board of Directors of CWD passed several
resolutions granting benefits and allowances to its officers, employees and
members of its Board of Directors, including the private respondent. The said benefits and allowances granted to
the members of the Board of Directors of CWD amounting to P4,378,908.58,
are as follows: (1) director’s fee; (2) RATA; (3) extra and miscellaneous
expense; (4) mid-year productivity incentive; (5) anniversary incentive; (6) 13th
month pay; (7) Christmas incentive; (8) yearend incentive; (9) uniform
allowance; (10) medical and hospitalization, and traveling and per diem during official business; and
(11) employer’s contribution to the Board of Directors’ share in the
welfare/provident fund. The COA audit
team in its audit report stated that the aforesaid benefits and allowances
granted to the members of the Board of Directors of CWD were without
basis. The COA audit team explained that
the functions of the members of the Board of Directors of Water Districts are
limited only to policy-making as provided for in Section 18, Presidential Decree
No. 198, as amended. Moreover, Section
13 of Presidential Decree No. 198, as amended, explicitly states that the
director of water districts shall receive no other compensation other than the per diem.
In Baybay Water District v. Commission on Audit,[26] this
Court made a categorical pronouncement that Presidential Decree No. 198, as
amended, expressly prohibits the grant of compensation other than the payment
of per diems, to directors of water
districts. The erroneous application and
enforcement of the law by public officers does not estop the Government from making a subsequent correction of such
errors. More specifically, where there
is an express provision of law prohibiting the grant of certain benefits, the
law must be enforced even if it prejudices certain parties due to an error
committed by public officials in granting the benefit. Practice, without more, no matter how long
continued, cannot give rise to any vested right if it is contrary to law.
Despite the foregoing, this
Court strongly holds that there was no probable cause to prosecute the private
respondent and the other members of the Board of Directors of CWD for violation
of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, and to issue warrant of
arrest against them.
Section 3(e) of Republic
Act No. 3019, as amended, provides:
SEC. 3.
Corrupt practices of public officers.
— In addition to acts or omissions
of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to
be unlawful:
x x x x
(e)
Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
From the aforequoted provisions, the elements of
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, are as follows:
(1) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial
or official functions; (2) he must have
acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence;
and (3) his action caused undue injury to any party, including the government,
or gave any private party an unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in
the discharge of his functions.[27]
In the present case, the second
element of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, i.e., that the private respondent and
the other members of the Board of Directors of CWD acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence, is absent.
In Soriano v. Marcelo,[28]
citing Albert v. Sandiganbayan,[29]
this Court discussed the second element, to wit:
There is “manifest
partiality” when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or
predilection to favor one side or person rather than another. “Evident bad faith” connotes not only
bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to
do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill
will. “Evident bad faith” contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating
with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for
ulterior purposes. “Gross inexcusable
negligence” refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the
slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty
to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious
indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. (Emphases
supplied.)
Based on the foregoing
definitions, this Court does not find the act
of the private respondent and the other members of the Board of Directors of
CWD of passing resolutions granting benefits and allowances to have been
committed with manifest impartiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence.
It bears stressing that
in granting those benefits and allowances, the Board of Directors of CWD relied
on Resolution No. 313, Series of 1995, as amended by Resolution No. 39, Series
of 1996, entitled “Policy Guidelines on Compensation and Other Benefits to Water
District Board of Directors,” which was issued by the LWUA itself, the body
that oversees and regulates the operations of the local water districts. The benefits granted by the said LWUA Resolution
No. 313, Series of 1995, to the board of directors of water districts are
the following: rata, travel allowance, extraordinary and miscellaneous
expense, Christmas bonus, cash gift, uniform allowance, rice allowance,
medical/dental benefits and productivity incentive bonus.[30]
More so, at the time that
the private respondent and the other members of the Board of Directors of CWD
passed the resolutions from 1993-2001 granting benefits and allowances, this
Court had not yet decided Baybay Water
District v. Commission on Audit, which was promulgated only in 2002. Also, it was only in De Jesus v. Commission on Audit,[31] applying
Baybay Water District v. Commission on
Audit, that this Court declared that LWUA Resolution No. 313, Series of
1995, which grants compensation and other benefits to the members of the Board
of Directors of Local Water Districts, is not in conformity with Section 13 of
Presidential Decree No. 198, as amended.
Therefore, in relying on LWUA
Resolution No. 313, Series of 1995 in passing several resolutions granting the
disputed benefits and allowances, the private respondent and the other members
of the Board of Director of CWD acted in good faith, as they were of the honest
belief that LWUA Board Resolution No. 313, as amended, was valid.
Bad faith is never
presumed, while good faith is always
presumed; and the chapter on Human Relations of the Civil Code directs
every person, inter alia, to observe
good faith, which springs from the fountain of good conscience.[32]
In the absence of manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable
negligence in passing several resolutions granting benefits and allowances, there can be no probable cause to
prosecute the private respondent and the other members of the Board of
Directors of CWD for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended. Consequently, there was also no
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against them.
Clearly, where the
evidence patently demonstrates the innocence of the accused, as in this case,
this Court finds no reason to continue with his prosecution; otherwise,
persecution amounting to grave and manifest injustice would be the inevitable
result.[33]
In Principio v. Barrientos,[34] petitioner
therein filed a motion with the trial court praying that its motion for
reconsideration filed with the Ombudsman be given due course and thereafter,
rule that no probable cause exists. The
trial court denied the said motion of the petitioner, thus, affirming the
finding of probable cause. Petitioner
filed a Petition for Certiorari with
the Court of Appeals, but it dismissed the petition and affirmed the RTC. On appeal to this Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari,
this Court ratiocinated that:
At the outset, we reiterate the fundamental principle
that an order denying a motion to quash is interlocutory and therefore not
appealable, nor can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari. x x x The proper procedure to be followed is to enter a
plea, go to trial, and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on
appeal from the final judgment. x x x.
However, the general rule is not absolute. Where
special circumstances clearly demonstrate the inadequacy of an appeal, then the
special civil action of certiorari or
prohibition may exceptionally be allowed. x x x.
After a careful review of the records, we find that
such special circumstance obtains in the case at bar. Simply stated, the existing evidence is insufficient to establish
probable cause against the petitioner and therefore, the petition must be
granted.
x x x x
Furthermore, the Ombudsman cannot impute bad faith on
the part of the petitioner on the assumption that he, together with other BSP
officials, was part of a cabal to apply pressure on RBSMI to sell out by
subjecting it to many impositions through the Monetary Board. Bad faith
is never presumed while good faith is always presumed x x x. Therefore, he who claims bad faith must prove
it. x x x The Ombudsman should have first determined the facts indicating
bad faith instead of relying on the tenuous assumption that there was an
orchestrated attempt to force RBSMI to sell out.
As a general
rule, courts do not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine
whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information
with the appropriate courts. There are, however,
well-recognized exceptions to this rule, such as those enumerated in Brocka v. Enrile [G.R. Nos. 69863-65,
a. To
afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused x x x;
b. When
necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions x x x;
c. When
there is a pre-judicial question which is subjudice x x x;
d. When the acts of the officer
are without or in excess of authority x x x;
e. Where the prosecution is
under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation x x x;
f. When
double jeopardy is clearly apparent x x x;
g. Where
the court has no jurisdiction over the offense x x x;
h. Where
it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution x x x ;
i. Where
the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance x x x;
j.
When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied x x x; and
k.
Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the
threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners x x x.
This is not
the first time that we are dismissing a case for want of probable cause. In Cabahug v. People [426 Phil. 490, 510
(2002)], we took exception to the Ombudsman’s determination of probable cause
and accordingly dismissed the case against the accused before the
Sandiganbayan. Therein, we observed:
While it is the function of the Ombudsman
to determine whether or\not the petitioner should be subjected to the expense,
rigors and embarrassment of trial, he cannot do so arbitrarily. This seemingly
exclusive and unilateral authority of the Ombudsman must be tempered by the
Court when powers of prosecution are in danger of being used for
persecution. Dismissing the case against the accused for palpable want of
probable cause not only spares her the expense, rigors and embarrassment of
trial, but also prevents needless waste of the courts’ time and saves the precious
resources of the government. (Emphases supplied.)
Thus, the Court of
Appeals did not err in granting the Petition for Certiorari of the private respondent and in pronouncing that he and
the other members of the Board of Directors of CWD acted in good faith.
Similarly, petitioner contends that
the substantial facts and issues involved in the Petition for Review in CA-G.R.
SP No. 92474 were the same facts and issues raised in the Petition for Certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 96293, the
subject of the present Petition. With
the dismissal of the Petition for Review in CA-G.R. SP No. 92474, which became
final and executory on 29 March 2006, petitioner insists that the Court of
Appeals should have also dismissed outright the private respondent’s Petition
for Certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No.
96293 on the ground of res judicata.
Res judicata exists when the following elements are present: (a) the
former judgment must be final; (b) the court that rendered it had jurisdiction
over the parties and the subject matter; (c) it must be a judgment on the
merits; and (d) there must be -- between the first and the second actions --
identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action.[35]
Emphasis must be given to
the fact that CA-G.R. No. 92474 was dismissed based on pure technicalities and
not on the merits, to wit: (1) therein petitioners’ (now private respondent’s) counsels
failed to indicate their respective Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Official Receipt numbers, in violation of Bar Matter No. 1132; (2) the Petition
did not contain an affidavit of service, as required by Section 13, Rule 13 and
Section 5, Rule 43, of the Rules of Procedure, as proof that copy of the said
Petition had been served on the adverse party; (3) the Petition does not contain
any explanation of why a personal service upon therein private respondent (now
petitioner) was not resorted to pursuant to Section 11, Rule 13; and therein
petitioners failed to furnish the Ombudsman and the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) with a copy of their Petition.
Clearly from the
foregoing, the dismissal of CA-G.R. SP No. 92474 was based on sheer
technicality. Since no judgment on the merits was rendered after consideration
of the evidence or stipulation submitted by the parties at the trial of the
case, it falls short of one of the essential requisites of res judicata, that the judgment should be one on the merits.[36]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
instant Petition for Review on Certiorari
is hereby DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
|
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes with Associate Justices Aurora Santiago Lagman and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 51-65.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes with Associate Justices Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. and Romeo F. Barza, concurring; id. at 93-94.
[3] SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
x x x x
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
[4] Penned by Judge Romeo C. de Leon, rollo, pp. 397-401.
[5] The following are the co-accused of private respondent Atty. Fandiño: (1) Vivencio P. Leus, Vice-Chairman; (2) Sylvia V. Tancangco, Corporate Secretary; and (3) Severino M. Arambulo, Press Relations Officer (P.R.O).
[6] SEC 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
[7] Also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
[8] Rollo, pp. 227-236.
[9] SEC 18. Functions Limited to Policy-Making. - The function of the board shall be to establish policy. The Board shall not engaged in the detailed management of the district.
[10] SEC. 13. Compensation. - Each director shall receive a per diem, to be determined by the board, for each meeting of the board actually attended by him, but no director shall receive per diems in any given month in excess of the equivalent of the total per diems of four meetings in any given month. No director shall receive other compensation for services to the district.
[11] SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
x x x x
(i) Directly or indirectly becoming interested, for personal gain, or having material interest in any transaction or act requiring the approval of a board, panel or group of which he is a member, and which exercise of discretion in such approval, even if he votes against the same or does not participate in the action of the board, committee, panel or group.
Interest for personal gain shall be presumed against those public officers responsible for the approval of manifestly unlawful, inequitable, or irregular transactions or acts by the board, panel or group to which they belong.
[12] Rollo, pp. 329-333.
[13]
[14] Herein private respondent Atty.
Fandiño and the two members of the Board of Directors of CWD, namely, Vivencio
P. Leus and Sylvia V. Tancangco, elevated the Resolution dated 26 August 2005
of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon to the Court of Appeals by way
of a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. The said case was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 92474. On
[15] Rollo, pp. 368-370.
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21] Lu
Ym v. Nabua, G.R. No. 161309,
[22] Bayas v. Sandiganbayan, 440 Phil. 54, 71-72 (2002).
[23] G.R. No. L-59524,
[24] Principio
v. Barrientos, G.R. No. 167025,
[25] 425 Phil. 326 (2002).
[26]
[27] Soriano
v. Marcelo, G.R. No. 160772,
[28]
[29] G.R. No. 164015,
[30] Molen, Jr. v. Commission on Audit, 493 Phil. 874, 883 (2005).
[31] 451 Phil. 812, 822 (2003).
[32] Principio v. Barrientos, supra note 24.
[33]
[34]
[35] Avisado v. Rumbaua, 406 Phil. 704, 716 (2001).
[36] Barranco v. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems, G.R. No. 168990, 16 June 2006, 491 SCRA 222, 230.