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ROLANDO
PLACIDO and EDGARDO CARAGAY,
Petitioners, - versus - NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION and PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, INCORPORATED, Respondents. |
G.R. No.
180888 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, * CARPIO
MORALES,** J., Acting Chairperson, BRION, ABAD, JJ. Promulgated:
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioners Rolando Placido (Placido) and Edgardo
Caragay (Caragay) had been employed since
It appears that since August 2000, PLDT had been
receiving reports of theft and destruction of its cables.[1] On March 13, 2001, PLDT Duty Inspector
Ricardo Mojica (Mojica) and PLDT Security Guard/Driver Mark Anthony Cruto (Cruto),
responding to a report that cables were being stripped and burned in one of the
residences along Alley 2 Street, Project 6, Quezon City, proceeded to the said area
where they saw petitioners’ service vehicle parked infront of the house at No. 162. They likewise saw petitioners stripping and
burning cables inside the compound of the house which turned out to belong to Caragay’s
mother. With the assistance of police
and barangay officials, PLDT recovered the cables bearing the “PLDT” marking.
The incident spawned the filing, on complaint of
PLDT, of an Information for Qualified Theft against petitioners before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
In a related move, PLDT required petitioners to
explain within 72 hours why no severe disciplinary action should be taken
against them for Serious Misconduct and Dishonesty.[2] After several requests for extension to
submit their explanations, petitioners submitted a joint explanation[3]
on June 11, 2001 denying the charges
against them. By their claim, they were
on their way back from the house of one Jabenz Quezada (Quezada) from whom they
were inquiring about a vehicle when they were detained by Mojica.
On petitioners’ request, a formal hearing was scheduled. Their request for a copy of the Security
Investigation was denied, however, on the ground that they are only entitled to
“be informed of the charges, and they cannot demand for the report as it is
still on the confidential stage.”
During the
Mojica testified during the hearing that when petitioners
saw him as they were stripping and burning the cables, they fled but surfaced thirty
minutes later from Alley 6 Street wearing different clothes; and that according
to Rodolfo R. Anor, PLDT Work Order Supervisor, the cables could be dead cables
that were not recovered by contractors.[6]
Petitioners’ counsel later reiterated the request
for a setting of a hearing and an
audiotape of the
On
By Decision of January 12, 2004, Labor Arbiter Catalino
R. Laderas held that petitioners were illegally dismissed, there being no provision in PLDT’s rules and regulations
that stripping and burning of PLDT cables and wires constitute Serious Misconduct
and Dishonesty; that PLDT’s seeming lack of urgency in taking any disciplinary
action against petitioners negates the charges;[10] and that dismissal is too harsh, given petitioners’
years of service and lack of previous derogatory record.
On appeal,[11]
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), by Decision dated February 28,
2005, reversed the Labor Arbiter’s Decision
and dismissed petitioners’ complaint
for lack of merit,[12]
it holding that they were validly dismissed for just cause ─ “theft of
company property.”[13]
In brushing aside petitioners’ disclaimer of the acts
attributed to them, the NLRC noted that, inter
alia, they failed to present any affidavit of Quezada to prove that they
were indeed at his house inquiring about a vehicle.
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals.
In the meantime or on
By Decision of September 28, 2007, the appellate
court affirmed the NLRC Decision,[15]
it holding that since the cables bore
the “PLDT” marking, they were presumed to be owned by PLDT, hence, the burden of evidence shifted on
petitioners to prove that they were no longer owned by PLDT, but they failed.
Ruling out petitioners’ claim that they were denied
due process, the appellate court held that they were given ample opportunity to
defend themselves during the administrative hearing during which they were
furnished with written invitations for their appearance before the
investigating unit on several dates, but they refused to submit themselves to
the investigation. Petitioners’ motion
for reconsideration having been denied by Resolution[16]
of
Petitioners insist that the presence of the “PLDT” marking
on the cables does not prove that PLDT
owned them at the time. They aver that PLDT
disposes of used and unserviceable materials, including cables and telephone
wires which had been declared junked and classified as scrap --- a substantial
amount of which remains insulated ---,
and once disposed of, these cables, although still bearing the “PLDT” marking,
are no longer its property .
In fine, petitioners contend that PLDT’s ownership
of cables or wires bearing the “PLDT” marking on the insulation cannot be
presumed, hence, a person’s possession thereof does not give rise to the presumption
that he obtained or stole them from PLDT.[18]
Additionally, petitioners aver that
they were denied due process when PLDT refused to furnish them a copy of the
Investigation Report and grant them a formal hearing in which they could be
represented by counsel of their choice.
The petition is bereft of merit.
As did the NLRC and the Court of Appeals,[19]
the Court finds that as the cables bore the “PLDT” marking, the presumption is that
PLDT owned them. The burden of evidence thus
lay on petitioners to prove that they acquired the cables lawfully. This they failed to discharge.
And as also
did the NLRC and the Court of Appeals, the Court finds that petitioners were
not denied due process.
Article 277 of the Labor
Code provides:
x x x x
(b) Subject to the
constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right to be
protected against dismissal except for a just or authorized cause and without
prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article 283 of this Code, the employer shall furnish the workers
whose employment is sought to be terminated a written notice containing a
statement of the causes for termination and shall afford the latter ample
opportunity to be heard and defend himself with the assistance of his
representative if he so desires in accordance with company rules and
regulations promulgated pursuant to the guidelines set by the Department of
Labor and Employment. Any decision taken by the employer shall be without
prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity or legality of his
dismissal by filing a complaint with the regional branch of the National Labor
Relations Commission. The burden of proving that the termination was for a
valid or authorized cause shall rest on the employer. (Emphasis supplied)
And the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code require a hearing and conference during
which the employee concerned is given the opportunity to respond to the charge,
and present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him. Thus Rule I, Section 2(d), provides:
Section 2. Security of Tenure. —
x x x x
(d) In all cases of
termination of employment, the following
standards of due process shall be
substantially observed:
For termination of
employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 of the Labor Code:
(i) A written notice
served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and
giving said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side.
(ii) A hearing or
conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel
if he so desires, is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present his
evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him.
(iii) A written
notice of termination served on the employee, indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been
established to justify his termination. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
The abovequoted provision of Section 2(d) should not be taken to mean, however, that holding an actual hearing or conference is a condition sine qua non for compliance with the due process requirement in case of termination of employment. For the test for the fair procedure guaranteed under the above-quoted Article 277(b) of the Labor Code is not whether there has been a formal pretermination confrontation between the employer and the employee. The “ample opportunity to be heard” standard is neither synonymous nor similar to a formal hearing. To confine the employee’s right to be heard to a solitary form narrows down that right.[20]
The essence
of due process is simply an opportunity to
be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. What the law prohibits
is absolute absence of the
opportunity to be heard, hence, a party cannot feign denial of due process where he had been afforded the opportunity to
present his side. A formal or trial type
hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential to due process, the requirements of which are satisfied where the
parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of
the controversy.[21]
In the present case, petitioners were, among other
things, given several written invitations to submit themselves to PLDT’s
Investigation Unit to explain their side, but they failed to heed them. A
hearing, which petitioners attended along with their union MKP representatives,
was conducted on
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
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CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
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MARIANO C. Associate Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice |
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article
VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice