Republic of the
SUPREME COURT
THIRD DIVISION
RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR. G.R. No. 178933
Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,* and
PERALTA,
JJ.
COURT OF APPEALS (Fifth Division) Promulgated:
and NELIA S. SILVERIO-DEE,
Respondents. September 16, 2009
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D E C I
S I O N
VELASCO,
JR., J.:
The
Case
This Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 65 seeks the reversal of the May 4, 2007 Resolution[1]
and July 6, 2007 Decision[2] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 98764, entitled Nelia S. Silverio-Dee and Ricardo C.
Silverio, Sr. (impleaded as necessary party) v. Reinato G. Quilala, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the RTC of Makati, Branch 57, Ricardo S.
Silverio, Jr., Edmundo S. Silverio, represented by Nestor Dela Merced II, and
Sheriff Villamor R. Villegas.
The assailed resolution granted
private respondent’s prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
against public respondent Judge Quilala. On the other hand, the assailed decision
set aside the Writ of Execution dated April 17, 2007 and the Notice to Vacate
dated April 19, 2007 while directing the respondent lower court to give due
course to the appeal of herein private respondent.
The Facts
The instant controversy stemmed from
the settlement of estate of the deceased Beatriz Silverio. After her death, her
surviving spouse, Ricardo Silverio, Sr., filed an intestate proceeding for the
settlement of her estate. The case was docketed as SP. PROC. NO. M-2629
entitled In Re: Estate of the Late
Beatriz D. Silverio, Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. v. Ricardo S. Silverio Jr., et al.
pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
On November 16, 2004, during the
pendency of the case, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a petition to remove Ricardo
C. Silverio, Sr. as the administrator of the subject estate. On November 22,
2004, Edmundo S. Silverio also filed a comment/opposition for the removal of
Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate and for the appointment
of a new administrator.
On January 3, 2005, the RTC issued an
Order granting the petition and removing Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator
of the estate, while appointing Ricardo Silverio, Jr. as the new administrator.
On January 26, 2005, Nelia S.
Silverio-Dee filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated January 3,
2005, as well as all other related orders.
On February 4, 2005, Ricardo Silverio
Jr. filed an Urgent Motion for an Order Prohibiting Any Person to
Occupy/Stay/Use Real Estate Properties Involved in the Intestate Estate of the
Late Beatriz Silverio, Without Authority from this Honorable Court.[3]
Then, on May 31, 2005, the RTC issued
an Omnibus Order[4]
affirming its Order dated January 3, 2005 and denying private respondent’s
motion for reconsideration. In the Omnibus Order, the RTC also authorized
Ricardo Silverio, Jr. to, upon receipt of the order, immediately exercise his
duties as administrator of the subject estate. The Omnibus Order also directed
Nelia S. Silverio-Dee to vacate the property at No. 3, Intsia,
Nelia Silverio-Dee received a copy of
the Omnibus Order dated
On
Notably, the RTC in its Order dated
December 12, 2005[6] also
recalled its previous order granting Ricardo Silverio, Jr. with letters of administration
over the intestate estate of Beatriz Silverio and reinstating Ricardo Silverio,
Sr. as the administrator.
From the Order dated December 12, 2005,
Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by
the RTC in an Order dated
Meanwhile, on January 6, 2006, Nelia
Silverio-Dee filed a Notice of Appeal dated January 5, 2006[8] from
the Order dated December 12, 2005 while the Record on Appeal dated January 20,
2006[9] was
filed on January 23, 2006.
Thereafter, on October 23, 2006,
Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal and for Issuance of a
Writ of Execution[10] against
the appeal of Nelia Silverio-Dee on the ground that the Record on Appeal was
filed ten (10) days beyond the reglementary period pursuant to Section 3, Rule
41 of the Rules of Court.
Thus, on
Consequently, private respondent
filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (With Prayer for TRO and Writ
of Preliminary Injunction) dated
On
Afterwards, on July 6, 2007, the CA
issued the assailed decision granting the petition of private respondent. The
dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant
petition is GRANTED and GIVEN DUE COURSE. Accordingly, the Order, dated
SO
ORDERED.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issues
-A-
The
Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 (Annex G of Annex C) and the Order dated
December 12, 2005 are Interlocutory Orders which are not subject to appeal
under Sec. 1 of Rule 41;
-B-
The
respondent Court seriously erred and/or committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction, in deliberately failing to
decide that the basis of the occupancy of Nelia S. Silverio-Dee are fraudulent
documents, without any authority from the Intestate Court;
-C-
The
respondent Court seriously erred and/or committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing precipitately the
temporary restraining order (TRO) in its Resolution dated May 4, 2007 (Annex
A-1);
-D-
The
respondent Court seriously erred and/or committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction in annulling the Order dated
April 2, 2007, the Writ of Execution dated April 17, 2007, and the Notice to
Vacate dated April 19, 2007 because the respondent Silverio-Dee’s occupancy of
the Intestate property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City
(Annex N of Annex C) will prevent the sale authorized by the Order dated
October 31, 2006 to secure funds for the payment of taxes due which are now
high and rapidly increasing payment of which must not be enjoined.[17]
The Court’s Ruling
This petition is meritorious.
The May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC Is
an Interlocutory Order, Not Subject to
an Appeal
To recapitulate, the relevant facts
to the instant issue are as follows:
On May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus
Order ordering Nelia Silverio-Dee to vacate the premises of the property
located at No. 3,
Thus, in denying due course to the
Notice/Record on Appeal, the RTC, in its Order dated April 2, 2007, ruled:
Verily, the appeal taken by the movant Nelia
Silverio-Dee from the Order of this Court dated December 12, 2005 denying the
Motion for Reconsideration is misplaced as no appeal may be taken from the
order denying the motion for reconsideration (see Section 1, Rule 41 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in relation to Section 1(f), Rule 109 of the
Rules of Court). Furthermore, assuming that what said movant had appealed is
the final Order dated May 31, 2005, still, the appeal cannot be given due
course as the Record on Appeal had been filed beyond the thirty-day period to
appeal (see Section 3 Rule 41 of the Rules of Court)
WHEREFORE, the appeal filed by Nelia Silverio is
hereby DENIED due course.
Let a writ of execution issue to enforce the
Order dated
SO
ORDERED.
Thus, the denial of due course by the
RTC was based on two (2) grounds: (1) that Nelia Silverio-Dee’s appeal was
against an order denying a motion for reconsideration which is disallowed under
Sec. 1(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court; and (2) that Nelia Silverio-Dee’s
Record on Appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period to file an appeal
provided under Sec. 3 of Rule 41.
Sec. 1(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court provides:
RULE 41
APPEAL FROM THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS
SECTION 1. Subject of appeal.—An appeal may
be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case,
or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be
appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
(a) An order denying a motion for new trial
or reconsideration;
x x x x
In all the above instances where the judgment
or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate
special civil action under Rule 65.
Petitioner argues that because
private respondent filed a Notice of Appeal from the Order dated December 12,
2005 which denied her motion for reconsideration of the Omnibus Order dated May
31, 2005, her appeal is of an order denying a motion for reconsideration. Thus,
petitioner alleges that private respondent employed the wrong remedy in filing
a notice of appeal and should have filed a petition for certiorari with the CA
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court instead.
The CA, however, ruled that the
filing of the Notice of Appeal in this case was proper saying that the appeal
pertained to the earlier Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005. The CA, citing Apuyan v.
Haldeman,[18]
argued that an order denying a motion for reconsideration may be appealed as
such order is the “final order” which disposes of the case. In that case, we stated:
In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., We held, thus:
… [T]his Court finds that the proscription
against appealing from an order denying a motion for reconsideration refers to
an interlocutory order, and not to a final order or judgment. That that was the
intention of the above-quoted rules is gathered from Pagtakhan v. CIR, 39 SCRA
455 (1971), cited in above-quoted portion of the decision in Republic, in which
this Court held that an order denying a motion to dismiss an action is
interlocutory, hence, not appealable.
The rationale behind the rule proscribing the
remedy of appeal from an interlocutory order is to prevent undue delay, useless
appeals and undue inconvenience to the appealing party by having to assail
orders as they are promulgated by the court, when they can be contested in a
single appeal. The appropriate remedy is thus for the party to wait for the final
judgment or order and assign such interlocutory order as an error of the court
on appeal.
The
denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a
complaint is not an interlocutory order, however, but a final order as it puts
an end to the particular matter resolved, or settles definitely the matter
therein disposed of, and nothing is left for the trial court to do other than
to execute the order.
Not being an interlocutory order, an order
denying a motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint is
effectively an appeal of the order of dismissal itself.
The reference by petitioner, in his notice of
appeal, to the March 12, 1999 Order denying his Omnibus Motion—Motion for
Reconsideration should thus be deemed to refer to the
If the proscription against appealing an
order denying a motion for reconsideration is applied to any order, then there
would have been no need to specifically mention in both above-quoted sections
of the Rules “final orders or judgments” as subject to appeal. In other words,
from the entire provisions of Rule 39 and 41, there can be no mistaking that
what is proscribed is to appeal from a denial of a motion for reconsideration
of an interlocutory order. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the question posed is whether
the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 is an interlocutory order.
On this aspect, the CA ruled that the
Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 was a final order, to wit:
We note that the Order, dated December 12,
2005, is an offshoot of the Omnibus Order, dated May 31, 2005. In the Omnibus Order, the court a quo ruled
that the petitioner, as an heir of the late Beatriz S. Silverio, had no right
to use and occupy the property in question despite authority given to her by
Ricardo Silverio, Sr. when it said, thus:
x x x In the first place, Nelia S.
Silverio-Dee cannot occupy the property in Intsia,
x x x x
For the property at Intsia,
Moreover, the alleged authority given by SILVERIO,
SR. for Nelia S. Silverio-Dee to occupy the property dated May 4, 2004,
assuming it is not even antedated as alleged by SILVERIO, JR., is null and void
since the possession of estate property can only be given to a purported heir
by virtue of an Order from this Court (see Sec. 1 Rule 90, supra; and Sec. 2
Rule 84, Revised Rules of Court). In fact, the Executor or Administrator shall
have the right to the possession and management of the real as well as the
personal estate of the deceased only when it is necessary for the payment of
the debts and expenses of administration (See Sec. 3 Rule 84, Revised Rules of
Court). With this in mind, it is without an iota of doubt that the possession
by Nelia S. Silverio-Dee of the property in question has absolutely no legal
basis considering that her occupancy cannot pay the debts and expenses of
administration, not to mention the fact that it will also disturb the right of
the new Administrator to possess and manage the property for the purpose of
settling the estate’s legitimate obligations.
In the belated Memorandum of Nelia
Silverio-Dee, she enclosed a statement of the expenses she incurred pertaining
to the house renovation covering the period from May 26, 2004 to February 28, 2005
in the total amount of Php12,434,749.55, which supports this Court’s conclusion
that she is already the final distributee of the property. Repairs of such
magnitude require notice, hearing of the parties and approval of the Court
under the Rules. Without following this process, the acts of Nelia Silverio-Dee
are absolutely without legal sanction.
To
our mind, the court a quo’s ruling clearly constitutes a final determination of
the rights of the petitioner as the appealing party. As such, the Omnibus
Order, dated May 31, 2002 (the predecessor of the Order dated December 12,
2002) is a final order; hence, the same may be appealed, for the said matter is
clearly declared by the rules as appealable and the proscription does not apply.[19]
(Emphasis supplied.)
An interlocutory order, as opposed to
a final order, was defined in Tan v.
Republic:[20]
A
final order is one that disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or
terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done
but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the court, while an interlocutory order is one which does
not dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be decided upon. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Additionally, it is only after a
judgment has been rendered in the case that the ground for the appeal of the
interlocutory order may be included in the appeal of the judgment itself. The
interlocutory order generally cannot be appealed separately from the judgment. It
is only when such interlocutory order was rendered without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion that certiorari under Rule 65 may
be resorted to.[21]
In the instant case, Nelia
Silverio-Dee appealed the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC on the ground that it
ordered her to vacate the premises of the property located at
Art. 1078 of the Civil Code provides that
where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before
partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of the debts
of the deceased. Under a co-ownership, the ownership of an undivided thing or
right belongs to different persons. Each co-owner of property which is held pro
indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy the
same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of
his co-owners. The underlying rationale
is that until a division is made, the respective share of each cannot be
determined and every co-owner exercises, together with his co-participants,
joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and
enjoyment of the same.
Although the right of an heir over the
property of the decedent is inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully
settled and partitioned, the law allows a co-owner to exercise rights of
ownership over such inchoate right. Thus, the Civil Code provides:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full
ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he
may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the
effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners,
shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership.[22] (Emphasis supplied.)
Additionally, the above provision
must be viewed in the context that the subject property is part of an estate
and subject to intestate proceedings before the courts. It is, thus, relevant
to note that in Rule 84, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court, the administrator may only
deliver properties of the estate to the heirs upon order of the Court. Similarly,
under Rule 90, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court, the properties of the estate shall
only be distributed after the payment of the debts, funeral charges, and other
expenses against the estate, except when authorized by the Court.
Verily, once an action for the
settlement of an estate is filed with the court, the properties included
therein are under the control of the intestate court. And not even the
administrator may take possession of any property that is part of the estate
without the prior authority of the Court.
In the instant case, the purported
authority of Nelia Silverio-Dee, which she allegedly secured from Ricardo
Silverio, Sr., was never approved by the probate court. She, therefore, never
had any real interest in the specific property located at
Thus, private respondent employed the
wrong mode of appeal by filing a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. Hence, for
employing the improper mode of appeal, the case should have been dismissed.[23]
The implication of such improper
appeal is that the notice of appeal did not toll the reglementary period for
the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the proper remedy in the
instant case. This means that private respondent has now lost her remedy of
appeal from the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC.
Therefore, there is no longer any
need to consider the other issues raised in the petition.
WHEREFORE, the
May 4, 2007 Resolution and July 6, 2007 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No.
98764 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Thus, the Decision dated April
2, 2007 of the RTC denying due course to the appeal of Nelia Silverio-Dee; the
Writ of Execution dated April 17, 2007; and the Notice to Vacate dated April
19, 2007 are hereby REINSTATED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA
J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T
A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I
C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 59-67. Penned by Associate Justice Arturo G. Tayag and concurred in by Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and Hakim S. Abdulwahid.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
G.R. No. 141524,
[16] G.R. No. 142534, June 27, 2006, 493 SCRA 99.
[17] Rollo, p. 38.
[18] G.R. No. 129980, September 20, 2004, 438 SCRA 402, 418-419.
[19] Rollo, pp. 77-80.
[20] G.R. No. 170740, May 25, 2007, 523 SCRA 203, 210-211.
[21] 1 F. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium 540 (8th revised ed.).
[22] G.R. No. 114151, September 17, 1998, 295 SCRA 536, 548-549.
[23] Rules of Court, Rule 50, Sec. 2.