THIRD
DIVISION
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EDWINO A. TORRES
(deceased), represented and substituted by ALFONSO P. TORRES III and FATIMA
P. TORRES, son and daughter, respectively, of deceased petitioner,
Petitioners, - versus - BALLIGI V. RODELLAS, Respondent. |
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G. R. No. 177836 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, and PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: September
4, 2009 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari,[1] under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court, seeks the review of the 29
November 2006[2]
and 2 May 2007[3] Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 81305, entitled “Edwino A. Torres (deceased) represented and
substituted by Alfonso P. Torres III, Fatima P. Torres, son and daughter of
deceased petitioner,” which, respectively, dismissed the petition assailing the
decision of the Office of the President, and denied the subsequent motion for
reconsideration thereof.
The root of the present controversy is a 111-square meter parcel of alienable
and disposable residential land, described as Lot No. 4, Sgs-04-000316-D,
located at Poblacion,
Respondent Balligi V. Rodellas (Balligi) and her family began occupying
the subject property sometime in 1967. They
built thereon a residential house (the Rodellas’ house), initially made of
light materials, but eventually renovated and replaced using stronger
materials.
In October 1986, Balligi filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application (MSA) for
the subject property with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). Said application was docketed as
MSA No. (IV-18) 3524.
In 1989, Balligi and her family left Occidental Mindoro for
Sometime thereafter, still in 1989, petitioner Edwino A. Torres (Edwino)
and his spouse moved into the house on the subject property, occupying the
portion vacated by Aster Vallejos. Edwino claimed that Balligi already sold him
the subject property and the house built thereon for P60,000.00, as
evidenced by an Affidavit of Relinquishment/Sale
of Right supposedly signed by the parties thereto and notarized on P300.00 from the other occupants of the house.
On the basis of the Affidavit of
Relinquishment/Sale of Right, Edwino filed with the DENR an MSA in his own
name for the subject property, docketed as MSA No. (IV-18) 3780.
After conducting an investigation and ocular inspection, Wilfredo M.
Paguia, Land Investigator, DENR, issued a Report
on 10 June 1991, recommending that Edwino’s MSA be given due course. On
In 1992, respondent Balligi’s son, Eugenio V. Rodellas, Jr. (Eugenio),
returned to Occidental Mindoro. While
there, he came to learn that Edwino claimed ownership of the subject property and
the house thereon by virtue of the Affidavit
of Relinquishment/Sale of Right.
On
On
In an Order[4]
dated
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
Protest as well as the Amended Protest is (sic) hereby as it is ordered
DISMISSED for lack of merit and whatever amount paid on account thereof is
forfeited in favor of the government. The MSA No. (IV-18) 3780 of Edwino A.
Torres is hereby given further due course.
According to DENR-RO No. IV, neither Eugenio nor Inanama had the personality
to represent Balligi. It credited no
value to the Special Power of Attorney
in favor of Eugenio and Inanama,
as the “document itself was highly questionable. Close scrutiny of the same
shows that the authentication was done on the 25th day of January
1993 [even] before the execution of the said document by Balligi Letty V.
Rodellas on
On
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises,
the Motion for Reconsideration dated June 21, 1993 filed by herein [petitioner
Balligi], represented by Eugenio V. Rodellas, Jr. and Inanama V. Gallardo, is
hereby as it is ordered DENIED for lack of merit.
Consequently thereto, the Order dated
Determined, respondent Balligi, who had arrived back in the
On
After an evaluation of the record of the case, DENR-RO No. IV dismissed respondent
Balligi’s Opposition/Protest in an
Order dated
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant “OPPOSITION
AND/OR PROTEST” filed by Balligi V. Rodellas is hereby, as it is ordered,
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Let the MSA No. (IV-18) 3780 of Edwino A. Torres
be now given further due course leading to the issuance of patent therefor.[7]
Citing its
Balligi moved for the reconsideration of the Order dated
Undaunted, Balligi filed an appeal with the Office of the President,
docketed as O.P. Case No. 98-8537.
In a Decision[10]
promulgated on
A careful review of the order of June 4,
1993, which the DENR claims constitutes a bar to subsequent litigation, would
reveal that the same does not comply with the third requisite enumerated above,
that the judgment must be on the merits. It will be recalled that the Regional
Executive Director (RED) refused to rule on the main issue raised in the
protest, which is the alleged forged and spurious Affidavit of Relinquishment/Sale
of Right, claiming that his Office is not in the position to determine and
resolve the genuineness and due execution of the aforesaid document; and
claiming further that “the said protest should not have been entertained in the
first place considering that upon its filing, Eugenio V. Rodellas Jr. has no
personality to represent Balligi V. Rodellas.”
The Office of the President opined that “the DENR should have applied res ipsa loquitur” instead, since:
It should have been very clear that the
alleged Affidavit of Relinquishment/Sale of Right is nothing but a forgery.
[Respondent Balligi] was in the
The Office of the President disposed:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Acting
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources dated September 19, 1997, and
the order dated June 29, 1998, reiterating it, are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources is hereby ordered to
reject the Miscellaneous Sales Application No. (IV-18) 3780 of Edwino A. Torres
and reinstate Miscellaneous Sales Application No. (IV-18) 3524 of Balligi V.
Rodellas, and give due course thereto. All persons occupying the subject
property by virtue of the Miscellaneous Sales Application of Edwino A. Torres,
his heirs and assigns, are hereby ordered to vacate the same.[12]
Atty. Alexander Restor (Atty. Restor), Edwino’s counsel, received a copy
of the
In an Order dated
DISMISSED for being filed out of time and for
lack of personality of the movant.[13]
According to the Office of the President, Ewino’s death extinguished his
agency relationship with Atty. Restor.
Hence, Atty. Restor had no more authority to continue to act on Edwino’s
behalf. In addition, the Motion for
Reconsideration was filed by Atty. Restor beyond the 15-day reglementary period.
On
Subsequently, on 9 December 2003, Atty. Restor filed, on behalf of Edwino,
represented and substituted by the latter’s son and daughter, Alfonso P. Torres
III (Alfonso) and Fatima P. Torres (Fatima), respectively, a Petition for Review
with the Court of Appeals, challenging the 5 August 2003 Decision and 27
October 2003 Order of the Office of the President. Their Petition was docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 81305.
In a Resolution promulgated on
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is
hereby DISMISSED.[15]
The Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of the Office of the President
that the
As expected, Alfonso and Fatima filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
In its Resolution dated
It is true, as [herein petitioners Alfonso
and Fatima] argue, that the Office of the President failed to take into
consideration that the 15th day fell on a Saturday and therefore,
the Motion for Reconsideration, which was filed on the 17th day,
cannot be said to have been filed out of time.[17]
But the appellate court remained steadfast in its resolve that Atty.
Restor lacked the legal personality to file the Motion for Reconsideration of
the
[T]he Letter of Appointment (citation
omitted) appended by the petitioners to the Petition for Review cannot cure
Atty. Restor’s lack of authority in filing the Motion for Reconsideration
before the Office of the President. Not only was said letter not presented
before the latter. It was likewise executed only after the Office of the
President issued the assailed Order. That being the case, Atty. Restor’s lack
of authority cannot be said to have been cured.[18]
In the end, the Court of Appeals concluded that:
Thus, while the petition for review appears
to have been filed on time, the fact is that the decision sought to be reviewed
has already become final and executory. In view of said finality, this Court is
without authority to review said Decision anymore.[19]
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court bringing forth the following
assignment of errors:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
RULING OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT THAT ATTY. RESTOR, PETITIONER’S FORMER
COUNSEL, HAD NO LEGAL PERSONALITY TO FILE THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BEFORE
THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, IN VIEW OF EDWINO’S DEATH, PURSUANT TO SECTION 16,
RULE 3 OF THE RULES OF COURT AND ARTICLE 1919(3) OF THE CIVIL CODE;
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REFUSING TO
RULE ON THE PROPRIETY OF THE DISMISSAL OF PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION BY THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; and
III
THE DECISION OF THE DENR REGIONAL EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR DATED
At the crux of this Petition is the
issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the Petition for Review
of Edwino’s legal heirs in CA-G.R. SP No. 81305 on the ground that the
Alfonso and Fatima maintain that
the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
In defense of the assailed
resolutions of the Court of Appeals, Balligi contends that the arguments of Edwino’s
heirs are untenable as “[p]etitioners’ stand is premised on the assumption that
the proceedings and the judgment had before the Office of the President were
invalid.”[21]
Quite the reverse, Balligi asserts that
“said proceedings stand for even petitioners ADMITTED the non-personality of
Atty. Restor under (sic) their Motion for Reconsideration before the Honorable
Court of Appeals x x x.”[22]
That said, however, Balligi, through a
new counsel, Atty. Amando S. Fabros, digressed from previous arguments. Balligi now claims that “[t]he ruling of the
Office of the President was not so much based on the failure of either Atty.
Alfredo A. Castillo (Atty. Castillo) or Atty. Restor to give advice or information as to the
death of Edwino A. Torres but on the apparent non-withdrawal of Atty. Castillo who was
handling the appeal, and the unceremonious taking over of said appeal by Atty.
Restor without such withdrawal and written authority of petitioners.”[23]
She insists that “what was invalidated
or not given force and effect was the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Atty.
Restor without legal authority or personality.”[24] Balligi submits that “if a party appears in
an action by attorney, he must be heard only through such attorney, who, so
long as he remains the attorney of record, has the exclusive management and
control of the action and of all steps and proceedings taken therein to enforce
the rights and remedies of his client.”[25]
We agree with petitioners that the Office of the President misapplied the
rule on substitution upon the death of a party litigant.
Note that the
rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the President of the
SECTION 9. The
Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory character whenever practicable.
Sec. 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, thus, finds application
herein, in that it covers the situation in case of the death of a party. The rule provides:
Section 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. – Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the
claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to
inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof,
and to give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives.
Failure of counsel to comply with his duty shall be a ground for disciplinary
action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall
forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be
substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within a specified time, to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. (Emphases ours.)
Clear from
the aforequoted provision that a deceased party may be substituted by his
heirs, but it must be emphasized that substitution may only be allowed in
actions that survive the death of a party thereto. In Gonzales
v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,[26]
citing Bonilla v. Barcena,[27]
we declared that the determination of whether an action survives the death of a
party depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. We explicated:
In
the causes of action which survive the wrong complained
of affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries
to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do
not survive the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights
of property affected being incidental x x x.
In the case at bar, both parties
accuse the other of unlawfully depriving them of their respective rights to
acquire the subject property, together with the house built thereon, by means
of an MSA grant from the State. Evidently,
what are primarily and principally affected herein are the property and
property rights of the parties, and any injuries to their persons (i.e., damages) are only incidental. Such property and property rights survived Edwino’s
death and may pass on by succession to his heirs. Therefore, the heirs must be allowed to
continue any litigation to protect said property or property rights and to
substitute themselves for the deceased party in accordance with appropriate
rules.
According to Section 16, Rule 3 of
the Revised Rules of Court, a counsel, within 30 days from his client’s death, is duty-bound to
inform the court of such fact, and to submit the name/s and address/es of the
deceased client’s legal representative/s.
Thereafter, the court shall
order, forthwith, the appearance of and substitution by the deceased party’s
legal representative/s within another period of 30 days from notice.
Nowhere is it
mentioned in the instant case when exactly Edwino died. Atty. Restor just informed the Office of the
President of the fact of Edwino’s death in the Motion for Reconsideration of the
5 August 2003 Decision, which he filed on 15 September 2003 on behalf of his
deceased client. With no exact date of
Edwino’s death, we have no basis for determining whether Atty. Restor was able
to inform the Office of the President of such fact within the requisite period
of 30 days. Nevertheless, even assuming
that Atty. Restor belatedly notified the Office of the President of Edwino’s
death, Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court only provided that, in
case of failure of the counsel to comply with his duty as stated in the first
paragraph thereof, it would be a ground for disciplinary action against said
counsel, not that he/she would already be without personality to appear as
counsel in the proceedings for the benefit of his/her client or the latter’s
heirs.
Instructive
herein is our ruling in Heirs
of F. Nuguid Vda. de Haberer v. Court of Appeals.[28] Florentina Nuguid Vda.
de Haberer (Florentina) was the appellant in the case still
pending before the Court of Appeals when she died. Florentina’s counsel, Attorneys Bausa, Ampil
and Suarez, gave the Court of Appeals notice of their client’s death and
requested the suspension of the running of the period within which to file the
appellant's brief, pending the appointment by the probate court of an executor
of the latter’s estate. The Court of
Appeals denied the motion for extension/suspension of time to file appellant’s
brief and dismissed the appeal.
Florentina’s counsels filed their urgent motion for reconsideration,
explaining that their predicament over the requests for extension/suspension of
period to file a brief was due to the uncertainty of whether their services would
still be retained by the heirs or legal representatives of their deceased client.
Florentina’s counsels still felt
obligated, however, to preserve the right of Florentina’s heirs/successors to
continue the appeal, pursuant to what is now Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules
of Court, pending the settlement of the question of who among such
heirs/successors should be the executor of the deceased's estate. Hence,
Florentina’s counsel presented, for admission, the printed "brief for the
appellant," the printing of which they had deferred "for professional
ethical considerations," pending action by the appellate court on their
request for suspension of the period.
Despite the foregoing explanation by Florentina’s counsel, the Court of
Appeals still refused to reconsider its earlier dismissal of the appeal and to
admit the submitted appellant’s brief.
In addition to invoking the general principle that “litigants have no
right to assume that such extensions will be granted as a matter of course”;
the appellate court also cited the equally established principle that the
relation of attorney and client is terminated by the death of the client. In the absence of a retainer from the heirs
or authorized representatives of his deceased client, the attorney would
thereafter have no further power or authority to appear or take any further action
in the case, save to inform the court of the client's death and take the
necessary steps to safeguard the deceased's rights in the case. Upon appeal to us, we found that the Court of
Appeals gravely erred in not following the Rule and requiring the appearance of
the legal representative of the deceased and instead dismissing the appeal of
the latter who had yet to be substituted in the pending appeal. We held that:
Respondent court therefore erred in ruling that
since upon the demise of the party-appellant, the attorney-client relationship
between her and her counsels "was automatically severed and
terminated," whatever pleadings filed by said counsel with it after the
death of said appellant "are mere scraps of paper." If at all, due to said death on May 25, 1975
and severance of the attorney-client relationship, further proceedings and
specifically the running of the original 45-day period for filing the
appellant's brief should be legally deemed as having been automatically suspended, until the proper substitution of the
deceased appellant by her executor or administrator or her heirs shall have
been effected within the time set by respondent court pursuant to the cited
Rule.
x x x x
Prescinding from the foregoing, justice and
equity dictate under the circumstances of the case at bar that the rules, while
necessary for the speedy and orderly administration of justice, should not be
applied with the rigidity and inflexibility of respondent court's
resolutions. What should guide judicial
action is the principle that a party litigant is to be given the fullest
opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for
him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities. x x x.[29]
(Emphases supplied.)
In this case, Atty. Restor is in much the same
situation as Florentina’s counsels. Though incomplete, the mention by
Atty. Restor of Edwino’s death in the Motion for Reconsideration effectively informed the Office of the
President of the same. Having been
apprised of the fact of Edwino’s death, it was incumbent upon the Office of the
President, even without Atty. Restor’s motion to such effect, to order the
legal representative/s of the deceased party to appear and be substituted; or,
at the very least, to direct the counsel to furnish the court with the names
and addresses of such representative/s.
Since Atty.
Restor filed the Motion for Reconsideration within the reglementary period and
no longer requested for suspension/extension of time to do so, the
Office of the President need not suspend the running of said reglementary
period as in Heirs of F. Nuguid Vda. de Haberer,
but it could have deferred any action on said Motion until a substitution had been
effected and it had ascertained that the substituted heirs chose to retain
Atty. Restor’s services as legal counsel.
Conspicuously, the Office of the President completely failed to act on
the information that Edwino had died so as to effect proper substitution by the
latter’s heirs, as set forth in Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court. The only action the Office of the
President took as regards said information was to deny the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Atty. Restor for his lack of personality, given his
client’s death. This we find totally contrary
to equity and fair play since Edwino’s heirs were, in effect, deprived of their
right to seek reconsideration or appeal of the adverse decision of the Office
of the President which was itself partly responsible for their non-substitution.
We
emphasize that the purpose behind Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
Procedure is the protection of the right
to due process of every party to a litigation who may be affected by the
intervening death. The deceased litigant
is himself or herself protected, as he/she continues to be properly represented
in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of his estate.[30] The spirit behind the general rule requiring
a formal substitution of heirs is “not really because substitution of heirs is
a jurisdictional requirement, but because non-compliance therewith results in
the undeniable violation of the right to due process of those who, though not
duly notified of the proceedings, are substantially affected by the decision
rendered therein.”[31]
It must also be
remembered that, unless properly relieved, the counsel is responsible for the
conduct of the case;[32]
he is obligated by his client and the court to do what the interest of his
client requires until the end of litigation or his representation is terminated
formally and there is a termination of record.[33] And the only way the Office of the President
could have ascertained whether Atty. Restor still had the authority to file the
Motion for Reconsideration on behalf of Edwino’s heirs, or otherwise had been
relieved or his representation terminated, was by having Edwino’s heirs come
forth as the rules required. In fact, in
the Letter of Appointment
dated 16 November 2003, which was presented before the Court of Appeals,
Alfonso and Fatima, as Edwino’s legal representatives and heirs, explicitly retained
the services of Atty. Restor by “[appointing] and [engaging] [his] legal
services x x x in O.P. Case No. 98-8537 before the Office of the President and
to further represent [them] in the event that the afore-mentioned case is
appealed to the Court of Appeals/Supreme Court.”[34] Even though belatedly executed, such Letter
of Appointment demonstrates that if they were just given the opportunity by the
Office of the President, Alfonso and Fatima could have easily confirmed the
authority of Atty. Restor to continue acting as their counsel in the
proceedings and to submit the Motion for Reconsideration of the 5 August 2003
Decision of the Office of the President.
Interestingly, if, as argued by the
Office of the President and the Court of Appeals, Atty. Restor no longer had the
personality to represent Edwino upon the latter’s death, assuming he died prior
to the rendition of the decision of the Office of the President, should it not
also follow that the sending of a copy of the 5 August 2003 Decision of the
Office of the President to Atty. Restor, as counsel of record, could no longer
be deemed a notice to the party, and his receipt of the same could not have caused
the commencement of the period within which to file a motion for reconsideration?
As a consequence, the reglementary period
within which to move for reconsideration of the assailed decision in O.P. Case
No. 98-8537 had really not yet begun to toll.
Given the foregoing, the
This having been said, we address the
recent theory[35]
of Atty. Fabros, Balligi’s new counsel, that Atty. Restor’s lack of personality
to file the Motion for Reconsideration of the 5 August 2003 Decision of the
Office of the President was due to the failure of Atty. Castillo, Edwino’s previous
counsel, to formally withdraw as such, and of Atty. Restor to formally
substitute for Atty. Castillo. A
thorough review of the Order dated 27 October 2003 of the Office of the President
(dismissing the Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated 5 August 2003
filed by Atty. Restor, due to the latter’s lack of personality), and the
Resolutions dated 29 November 2006 and 2 May 2007 of the Court of Appeals
(affirming the dismissal by the Office of the President of said Motion for
Reconsideration) reveal no such pronouncement. The plain reason for the dismissal of the
Motion for Reconsideration was that Atty. Restor had no more personality to
file the same, given that Edwino’s death extinguished the attorney-client
relationship between them.
But even assuming, for the sake of
argument, that the Office of the President and the Court of Appeals did find that
Atty. Restor had no personality to file the Motion for Reconsideration in
question because Atty. Castillo had not withdrawn as Edwino’s counsel and Atty.
Restor had not substituted for Atty. Castillo; such finding would
have likewise been erroneous. A
party may have two or more lawyers working in collaboration in a given litigation,[36] but the fact that a second attorney enters his appearance for the same
party does not necessarily raise the presumption that the authority of the
first attorney has been withdrawn.[37] The second counsel should only be treated as
a collaborating counsel despite his appearance as "the new counsel of
record." A lawyer is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any
cause in which he appears;[38] the second counsel, in this case Atty. Restor,
is presumed to have acted within his authority as collaborating counsel when he
filed the Motion for Reconsideration of the
Finally, we stop
short of resolving the issue of whose MSA should be given due course, because
in order to do so, we must first make findings of fact concerning the authenticity
and validity of the Affidavit of
Relinquishment/Sale of Right dated 9 October 1989, allegedly executed by
Balligi in favor of Edwino. It must be
noted that the DENR and the Office of the President made divergent findings
thereon. We cannot, as of yet, make such
findings given the derth of evidence on record.
To arrive at an ultimate determination, the remand of the case to the
Court of Appeals is in order, so that it can give due course to the Petition for
Review in CA-G.R. SP No. 81305. Time and
again, we have stated that this Court is not a trier of fact or otherwise
structurally capacitated to receive and evaluate evidence de novo, unlike the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals generally has the authority
to review findings of fact, and even hold hearings for further reception of
evidence. Its conclusions as to findings
of fact are generally accorded great respect by this Court. It is a body that is fully capacitated and has
a surfeit of experience in appreciating factual matters, including documentary
evidence.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed twin Resolutions dated 29 November 2006 and 2 May 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81305 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, insofar as they affirmed the declarations
of the Office of the President in the latter’s Order dated 27 October 2003 in O.P.
Case No. 98-8537 that, given the death of his client, Edwino A. Torres, Atty.
Alexander Restor lacked the personality to file the Motion for Reconsideration of
the Decision dated 5 August 2003; and that, since no motion for reconsideration
or appeal had been timely filed, the said Decision dated 5 August 2003 of the
Office of the President had become final and executory.
The case is hereby REMANDED to the Court of Appeals, which is ORDERED to give due course to the Petition for Review filed in CA-G.R. SP No. 81305 and to hold further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURAAssociate Justice |
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DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate
Justice |
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ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
Pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman’s Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
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REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo, pp. 8-33.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan-Castillo with Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Hakim S. Abdulwahid concurring; rollo, pp. 34-36.
[3] Rollo, pp. 37-41.
[4]
[5] DENR Order dated
[6] Rollo, p. 47.
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] CA rollo, p. 52.
[15] Rollo, p. 36.
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26] 473
Phil. 582, 591 (2004).
[27] 163
Phil. 521 (1976).
[28] 192
Phil. 61 (1981).
[29]
[30] Sumaljag v. Literato, G.R. No. 149787, 18 June 2008, 555 SCRA 53, 59-60; citing Napere v. Barbarona, G.R. No. 160426, 31 January 2008, 543 SCRA 376, 382.
[31] Heirs of F. Nuguid Vda. de Haberer v. Court of Appeals, supra note 28.
[32] Tumbagahan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
L-32684,
[33] Orcino v. Gaspar, 344 Phil. 792, 798
(1997).
[34] CA rollo, p. 52.
[35] Rollo, p. 125.
[36] Tan v. Court of Appeals, 341 Phil. 570,
580 (1997).
[37] Elbińa v. Ceniza, G.R. No. 154019,
[38] Fernandez v. Anińon, G.R. No. 138967,