THIRD
DIVISION
|
BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINE
Petitioner, - versus
- DOMINGO R. DANDO, Respondent. |
|
G.R.
No. 177456 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: September 4, 2009 |
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before
this Court is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed
by petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), assailing (1) the Decision[1] dated 20
November 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 82881, which granted the
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court filed by herein respondent Domingo R. Dando (Dando); and
(2) the Resolution dated 4 April 2007 of the appellate court in the same case denying
the Motion for Reconsideration of BPI. The
Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision, annulled the Orders dated
The
instant Petition stemmed from a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages[2] filed
on P750,000.00 from
Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC), under a Privilege Cheque Credit Line Agreement.[3] The parties agreed that Dando would pay FEBTC
the principal amount of the loan, in lump sum, at the end of 90 days; and
interest thereon every 30 days, the periods reckoned from the time of availment
of the loan. Dando defaulted in the
payment of the principal amount of the loan, as well as the interest and
penalties thereon. Despite repeated
demands, Dando refused and/or failed to pay his just and valid obligation.[4] In 2000, BPI and FEBTC merged, with the
former as the surviving entity,[5] thus,
absorbing the rights and obligations of the latter.[6]
After
Dando filed with the RTC his Answer with Counterclaim,[7] BPI
filed its Motion to Set Case for Pre-Trial.
Acting on the said Motion, the RTC, through Acting Presiding Judge Oscar
B. Pimentel (Judge Pimentel), issued an Order[8] on
When the parties appeared before the
RTC on
On
calling this case for the pre-trial conference, counsel for both parties
appeared and even [respondent] Domingo R. Dando appeared. The attention of the Court was called by the
counsel for the [respondent Dando] that the counsel for the [petitioner BPI] only
filed her Pre-Trial Brief today at
Counsel
for the [respondent Dando] even claims that he has not received a copy of the
pre-trial brief, but then according to the counsel for the [petitioner BPI], a
copy thereof was sent by registered mail to counsel for the [respondent Dando] since
(sic) August 18, 2003, and considering the nature of the motion of the counsel
for the [respondent Dando], it is best that the [respondent Dando’s] counsel
reduce the same in writing within five days from today, furnishing personally a
copy thereof the counsel for the [petitioner BPI] who is hereby given five days
from receipt thereof within which to file her comment and/or opposition
thereto, thereafter, the incident shall be considered submitted for Resolution.
Meanwhile,
no pre-trial conference shall be held until the motion is resolved.[12]
On
In
an Order dated
In
resolving this motion, this Court should be guided by the mandatory character
of Section 6, Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Court which: strictly mandates
the parties to the case to file with the Court and serve on the adverse party
and SHALL ensure their receipt thereof at least three (3) days before the date
of the pre-trial, their respective pre-trial briefs but likewise imposed upon
the parties the mandatory duty to seasonably file and serve on the adverse
party their respective pre-trial briefs.
The aforesaid rule does not merely sanction the non-filing thereof of
the parties’ respective pre-trial briefs but likewise imposed upon the parties
the mandatory duty to seasonably file and serve on the adverse party their
respective pre-trial briefs. Pre-trial
briefs are meant to serve as a device to clarify and narrow down the basic
issues between the parties so that at pre-trial, the proper parties may be able
to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and the facts before
civil trials and this prevent said trials from being carried in the dark.[15]
Consequently, the RTC decreed:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, finding the [herein respondent Dando’s] motion to dismiss
to be impressed with merit the same is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the instant case is hereby
dismissed with prejudice.[16]
BPI
filed a Motion for Reconsideration[17] of the
On
The
Court finds merit in plaintiff’s motion.
Considering
that although reglementary periods under the Rules of Court are to be strictly
observed to prevent needless delays, jurisprudence nevertheless allows the
relaxation of procedural rules. Since
technicalities are not ends in themselves but exist to protect and promote
substantive rights of litigants [Sy vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 127263, April 12,
2000; Adamo vs. IAC, 191 SCRA 195 (1990); Far East Marble (Phils.), Inc. vs.
CA, 225 SCRA 249, 258 (1993)], in the interest of substantial justice, and without
giving premium to technicalities, the motion for reconsideration is hereby
granted.[19]
At the end of its
Wherefore,
the Order dated
Let
this case be set for pre-trial anew on
It
was then Dando’s turn to file a Motion for Reconsideration,[21] which
the RTC addressed in its Order dated
Finding
no new issue raised in defendant’s motion, as to warrant a reconsideration of
the assailed Order dated
The
Pre-trial set on
Dando
sought recourse from the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 82881.[23] Dando averred that RTC Judge Untalan
committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, in issuing its Order dated
In
this case, the BPI stated in its motion for reconsideration of the order
dismissing its action that the delay in the filing of the pre-trial brief was
solely due to the heavy load of paper work of its counsel, not to mention the
daily hearings the latter had to attend.
We find this excuse too flimsy to justify the reversal of an earlier
order dismissing the action. The BPI did
not come forward with the most convincing reason for the relaxation of the
rules, or has not shown any persuasive reason why it should be exempt from
abiding by the rules. We therefore find
the public respondent to have gravely abused his discretion in considering and
granting the BPI’s motion for reconsideration.
The BPI failed to even try to come up with a good reason for its failure
to file its pre-trial brief on time in order to relax the application of the
procedural rules. Heavy work load and
court hearings cannot even be considered an excuse. The trial court cannot just set aside the
rules of procedure and simply rely on the liberal interpretation of the
rules. Clearly, public respondent
ignored the mandatory wordings of Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 18. Under Section 6, the plaintiff’s failure to
file the pre-trial brief at least three days before the pre-trial shall have
the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial. Under Section 5 of the same Rule, failure by
plaintiff to appear at the pre-trial shall be cause for dismissal of the
action. There is grave abuse of
discretion when a lower court or tribunal violates or contravenes the
Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.[24]
The
fallo of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the petition is GRANTED.
The Orders dated
The
Court of Appeals, in a Resolution dated
Hence,
this Petition where BPI raises the following issues:
A. IS THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IN
ISSUING THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION, CORRECT WHEN IT STRICTLY APPLIED THE RULES
OF PROCEDURE.
B. IS THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECT WHEN IT DECLARED THAT THE HONORABLE TRIAL
COURT COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN THE LATTER RECONSIDERED AND
SET ASIDE THE ORDER (ANNEX “H” TO THE PETITION) DISMISSING THE CASE, DESPITE
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT’S DISCRETION OR POWER TO RELAX COMPLIANCE WITH THE
RULES OF PROCEDURE.[27]
Relevant
herein are the following provisions of the Rules of Court on pre-trial:
Rule
18
PRE-TRIAL
SEC. 6. Pre-trial
brief. – The parties shall file with the court and serve on the
adverse party, in such manner as shall ensure their receipt thereof at least three (3) days before the date
of the pre-trial, their respective pre-trial briefs which shall contain, among
others:
x x x x
Failure
to file the pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at
the pre-trial.
SEC. 5. Effect of failure to appear. – The failure of the plaintiff to
appear when so required pursuant to the next preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. A similar failure on the part of the defendant
shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render
judgment on the basis thereof. (Emphases ours.)
It is a
basic legal construction that where words of command such as “shall,” “must,”
or “ought” are employed, they are generally and ordinarily regarded as
mandatory. Thus, where, as in Rule 18,
Sections 5 and 6 of the Rules of Court, the word “shall” is used, a mandatory
duty is imposed, which the courts ought to enforce.[28]
The
Court is fully aware that procedural rules are not to be belittled or simply
disregarded for these prescribed procedures insure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice. However, it
is equally true that litigation is not merely a game of technicalities. Law and jurisprudence grant to courts the
prerogative to relax compliance with procedural rules of even the most
mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to put an
end to litigation speedily and the parties’ right to an opportunity to be
heard.[29]
This is not to say that adherence to the Rules could
be dispensed with. However, exigencies and situations might occasionally demand
flexibility in their application.[30] In not a few
instances, the Court relaxed the rigid application of the rules of procedure to
afford the parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the
merit. This is in line with the
time-honored principle that cases should be decided only after giving all
parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses. Technicality and procedural imperfection
should, thus, not serve as basis of decisions.
In that way, the ends of justice would be better served. For, indeed, the general objective of
procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of
contending parties, bearing always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but
to promote the administration of justice.[31]
In Sanchez v. Court of Appeals,[32] the Court restated the reasons that may provide
justification for a court to suspend a strict adherence to procedural rules,
such as: (a) matters of life, liberty,
honor or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances;
(c) the merits of the case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault
or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought
is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (f) the fact that the other party will
not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.[33]
Herein, BPI instituted Civil Case No. 03-281 before the RTC
to recover the amount it had lent to Dando, plus interest and penalties
thereon, clearly, a matter of property. The
substantive right of BPI to recover a due and demandable obligation cannot be
denied or diminished by a rule of procedure,[34] more so, since
Dando admits that he did avail himself of the credit line extended by FEBTC,
the predecessor-in-interest of BPI, and disputes only the amount of his
outstanding liability to BPI.[35] To dismiss Civil Case No.
03-281 with prejudice and, thus, bar BPI from recovering the amount it had lent
to Dando would be
to unjustly enrich Dando at the expense of BPI.
The counsel of BPI invokes “heavy pressures of work”
to explain his failure to file the Pre-Trial Brief with the RTC and to serve a
copy thereof to Dando at least three days prior to the scheduled Pre-Trial
Conference.[36] True, in Olave v. Mistas,[37] we did not find “heavy pressures of work” as sufficient
justification for the failure of therein respondents’ counsel to timely move
for pre-trial. However, unlike the respondents
in Olave,[38] the failure of BPI to file its Pre-Trial Brief with
the RTC and provide Dando with a copy thereof within the prescribed period
under Section 1, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, was the first and, so far, only
procedural lapse committed by the bank in Civil Case No. 03-281. BPI did
not manifest an evident pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or
a wanton failure to observe a mandatory requirement of the Rules. In fact, BPI, for the most part, exhibited diligence
and reasonable dispatch in prosecuting its claim against Dando by immediately
moving to set Civil Case No. 03-281 for Pre-Trial Conference
after its
receipt of Dando’s Answer to the Complaint; and in instantaneously filing a
Motion for Reconsideration of the 10 October 2003 Order of the RTC dismissing Civil
Case No. 03-281.
Accordingly, the ends of justice and fairness would be
best served if the parties to Civil Case No. 03-281 are given the full opportunity to thresh out
the real issues and litigate their claims in a full-blown trial. Besides, Dando would not be prejudiced should the
RTC proceed with the hearing of Civil Case No. 03-281, as he is not
stripped of any affirmative defenses nor deprived of due process of law.[39]
Wherefore,
premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED.
The Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
|
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
|
|
|
DIOSDADO M. PERALTAAssociate
Justice |
|
|
|
|
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo with Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Hakim S. Abdulwahid, concurring; rollo, pp. 6-13.
[2] Rollo, p. 45.
[3] Id at 59
[4]
[5] http://www.mybpimag.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=279&Itemid=320
[6] Rollo, p. 52.
[7]
[8] Records, p. 36.
[9] Annex I, Rollo, p. 180.
[10] Annex H, id. at 82.
[11]
[12] Records, p. 50.
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23] In view of the petition filed by Dando before the Court of Appeals, Regional Trial Court, Branch 149 issued an Order dated 19 March 2004 (records, p. 162), indefinitely suspending the proceedings in Civil Case No. 03-281 pending resolution before the Court of Appeals of CA-G.R. SP No. 82881.
[24] Rollo, pp. 11-12.
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28] Mirasol v. Court of Appeals, 403 Phil. 760, 772 (2001).
[29] Barranco v. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems, G.R. No. 168990, 16 June 2006, 491 SCRA 222, 232, citing Reyes v. Torres, 429 Phil. 95, 101 (2002).
[30] Polanco
v. Cruz, G.R. No. 182426,
[31] Asian Spirit Airlines (Airline Employees Cooperative) v. Bautista, 491 Phil. 476, 484 (2005).
[32] 452 Phil. 665, 674 (2003); Macasasa v. Sicad, G.R. No. 146547, 20 June 2006, 491 SCRA 368, 383, citing Barnes v. Padilla, 482 Phil. 903, 915 (2004).
[33] Barranco v. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems, supra note 29.
[34] Gosiaco
v. Ching, G.R. No. 173807,
[35] Dando claims in his Answer that he
was not able to avail himself of the indicated full credit line amount of P750,000.00,
and agrees with the allegation in the complaint, specifically paragaraph no. 6
thereof, that he has drawn no more than P375,000.00, but again denies
that he has agreed to pay 19% interest per annum and late payment charges
thereon at the rate of 3% x x x. (Rollo,
p. 67.)
[36] Rollo, p. 84.
[37] G.R. No. 155193,
[38] The respondents in Olave repeatedly failed to comply with the Rules, to wit: (a) the respondents’ failure to implead all the indispensable parties in the original complaint, which impelled the petitioners to move that they (the respondents) be ordered to amend their complaint; and b) while the respondents amended their complaint, they still failed to submit the required special power of attorney evidencing the authority of the respondent Antonina Mistas to execute the required certificate against forum shopping in behalf of her sister, respondent Pacita Mistas.
[39] Zenaida
Polanco v. Carmen Cruz, G.R. No. 182426,