THIRD
DIVISION
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THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL,
Petitioner, - versus
- AYALA LAND INCORPORATED, ROBINSON’S
LAND CORPORATION, SHANGRI-LA PLAZA CORPORATION and SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC., Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 177056 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, and PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: September 18, 2009 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for
Review on Certiorari,[1] under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court, filed by petitioner Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), seeking
the reversal and setting aside of the Decision[2]
dated 25 January 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76298, which
affirmed in toto the Joint Decision[3]
dated 29 May 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 138,
in Civil Cases No. 00-1208 and No. 00-1210; and (2) the Resolution[4]
dated 14 March 2007 of the appellate court in the same case which denied the
Motion for Reconsideration of the OSG.
The RTC adjudged that respondents Ayala Land Incorporated (
The shopping malls operated or leased
out by respondents have parking facilities for all kinds of motor vehicles,
either by way of parking spaces inside
the mall buildings or in separate buildings and/or adjacent lots that are
solely devoted for use as parking spaces.
Respondents expend for the
maintenance and administration of their respective parking facilities. They provide security personnel to protect
the vehicles parked in their parking facilities and maintain order within the
area. In turn, they collect the
following parking fees from the persons making use of their parking facilities,
regardless of whether said persons are mall patrons or not:
|
Respondent |
Parking
Fees |
|
|
On
weekdays, |
|
Robinsons |
|
|
Shangri-la |
Flat
rate of |
|
SM
Prime |
|
The parking tickets or cards issued
by respondents to vehicle owners contain the stipulation that respondents shall
not be responsible for any loss or damage to the vehicles parked in
respondents’ parking facilities.
In 1999, the Senate Committees on
Trade and Commerce and on Justice and Human Rights conducted a joint
investigation for the following purposes: (1) to inquire into the legality of
the prevalent practice of shopping malls of charging parking fees; (2) assuming
arguendo that the collection of
parking fees was legally authorized, to find out the basis and reasonableness
of the parking rates charged by shopping malls; and (3) to determine the
legality of the policy of shopping malls of denying liability in cases of
theft, robbery, or carnapping, by invoking the waiver clause at the back of the
parking tickets. Said Senate Committees
invited the top executives of respondents, who operate the major malls in the
country; the officials from the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI),
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Metro Manila Development Authority
(MMDA), and other local government officials; and the Philippine Motorists
Association (PMA) as representative of the consumers’ group.
After three public hearings held on
30 September, 3 November, and
In view of the foregoing, the Committees find that the
collection of parking fees by shopping malls is contrary to the National
Building Code and is therefor [sic]
illegal. While it is true that the Code
merely requires malls to provide parking spaces, without specifying whether it
is free or not, both Committees believe that the reasonable and logical
interpretation of the Code is that the parking spaces are for free. This interpretation is not only reasonable
and logical but finds support in the actual practice in other countries like
the
Figuratively speaking, the Code has “expropriated” the
land for parking – something similar to the subdivision law which require
developers to devote so much of the land area for parks.
Moreover, Article II of R.A. No. 9734 (Consumer Act of
the
Section 201 of the National Building Code gives the
responsibility for the administration and enforcement of the provisions of the
Code, including the imposition of penalties for administrative violations
thereof to the Secretary of Public Works.
This set up, however, is not being carried out in reality.
In the position paper submitted by the Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority (MMDA), its chairman, Jejomar C. Binay, accurately
pointed out that the Secretary of the DPWH is responsible for the
implementation/enforcement of the National Building Code. After the enactment of the Local Government
Code of 1991, the local government units (LGU’s) were tasked to discharge the
regulatory powers of the DPWH. Hence, in
the local level, the Building Officials enforce all rules/ regulations
formulated by the DPWH relative to all building plans, specifications and
designs including parking space requirements.
There is, however, no single national department or agency directly
tasked to supervise the enforcement of the provisions of the Code on parking,
notwithstanding the national character of the law.[6]
Senate Committee Report No. 225,
thus, contained the following recommendations:
In light of the foregoing, the Committees on Trade and
Commerce and Justice and Human Rights hereby recommend the following:
1. The
Office of the Solicitor General should institute the necessary action to enjoin
the collection of parking fees as well as to enforce the penal sanction
provisions of the National Building Code.
The Office of the Solicitor General should likewise study how refund can
be exacted from mall owners who continue to collect parking fees.
2. The
Department of Trade and Industry pursuant to the provisions of R.A. No. 7394,
otherwise known as the Consumer Act of the
3. Finally,
Congress should amend and update the National Building Code to expressly
prohibit shopping malls from collecting parking fees by at the same time,
prohibit them from invoking the waiver of liability.[7]
Respondent SM Prime thereafter
received information that, pursuant to Senate Committee Report No. 225, the
DPWH Secretary and the local building officials of Manila, Quezon City, and Las
Piñas intended to institute, through the OSG, an action to enjoin respondent SM
Prime and similar establishments from collecting parking fees, and to impose
upon said establishments penal sanctions under Presidential Decree No. 1096,
otherwise known as the National Building Code of the Philippines (National
Building Code), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). With the threatened action against it,
respondent SM Prime filed, on 3 October 2000, a Petition for Declaratory Relief[8]
under Rule 63 of the Revised Rules of Court, against the DPWH Secretary and
local building officials of Manila, Quezon City, and Las Piñas. Said Petition was docketed as Civil Case No.
00-1208 and assigned to the RTC of Makati City, Branch 138, presided over by
Judge Sixto Marella, Jr. (Judge Marella).
In its Petition, respondent SM Prime prayed for judgment:
a) Declaring
Rule XIX of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the National Building
Code as ultra vires, hence, unconstitutional and void;
b) Declaring
[herein respondent SM Prime]’s clear legal right to lease parking spaces
appurtenant to its department stores, malls, shopping centers and other
commercial establishments; and
c) Declaring
the National Building Code of the Philippines Implementing Rules and
Regulations as ineffective, not having been published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation, as prescribed by
Section 211 of Presidential Decree No. 1096.
[Respondent SM Prime] further prays for
such other reliefs as may be deemed just and equitable under the premises.[9]
The very next day,
1. After
summary hearing, a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued restraining respondents from collecting parking fees from
their customers; and
2. After
hearing, judgment be rendered declaring that the practice of respondents in
charging parking fees is violative of the National Building Code and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations and is therefore invalid, and making
permanent any injunctive writ issued in this case.
Other reliefs just and equitable under
the premises are likewise prayed for.[11]
On
As a result of the
pre-trial conference held on the morning of
1. Capacity of the plaintiff [OSG] in Civil Case No. 00-1210 to
institute the present proceedings and relative thereto whether the controversy
in the collection of parking fees by mall owners is a matter of public welfare.
2.
Whether
declaratory relief is proper.
3.
Whether
respondent
4. Entitlement of the parties of [sic] award of damages.[13]
On
The RTC resolved the
first two issues affirmatively. It ruled
that the OSG can initiate Civil Case No. 00-1210 under Presidential Decree No.
478 and the Administrative Code of 1987.[14] It also found that all the requisites for an
action for declaratory relief were present, to wit:
The
requisites for an action for declaratory relief are: (a) there is a justiciable
controversy; (b) the controversy is between persons whose interests are
adverse; (c) the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the
controversy; and (d) the issue involved is ripe for judicial determination.
SM,
the petitioner in Civil Case No. 001-1208 [sic]
is a mall operator who stands to be affected directly by the position taken by
the government officials sued namely the Secretary of Public Highways and the
Building Officials of the local government units where it operates shopping
malls. The OSG on the other hand acts on
a matter of public interest and has taken a position adverse to that of the
mall owners whom it sued. The construction of new and bigger malls has been
announced, a matter which the Court can take judicial notice and the unsettled
issue of whether mall operators should provide parking facilities, free of
charge needs to be resolved.[15]
As to the third and most
contentious issue, the RTC pronounced that:
The Building Code, which is the enabling
law and the Implementing Rules and Regulations do not impose that parking
spaces shall be provided by the mall owners free of charge. Absent such directive[,]
“Obligations derived from law are not presumed. Only those expressly determined in this Code
or in special laws are demandable and shall be regulated by the precepts of the
law which establishes them; and as to what has not been foreseen, by the
provisions of this Book (1090).[”]
x x x x
The provision on ratios of parking slots
to several variables, like shopping floor area or customer area found in Rule
XIX of the Implementing Rules and Regulations cannot be construed as a
directive to provide free parking spaces, because the enabling law, the Building
Code does not so provide. x x x.
To compel
Parking spaces in shopping malls are
privately owned and for their use, the mall operators collect fees. The legal relationship could be either lease
or deposit. In either case[,] the mall
owners have the right to collect money which translates into income. Should parking spaces be made free, this
right of mall owners shall be gone.
This, without just compensation.
Further, loss of effective control over their property will ensue which
is frowned upon by law.
The presence of parking spaces can be
viewed in another light. They can be
looked at as necessary facilities to entice the public to increase patronage of
their malls because without parking spaces, going to their malls will be inconvenient. These are[,] however[,] business
considerations which mall operators will have to decide for themselves. They are not sufficient to justify a legal
conclusion, as the OSG would like the Court to adopt that it is the obligation
of the mall owners to provide parking spaces for free.[16]
The RTC then held that there was no
sufficient evidence to justify any award for damages.
The
RTC finally decreed in its 29 May 2002 Joint Decision in Civil Cases No.
00-1208 and No. 00-1210 that:
FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, the Court
declares that Ayala Land[,] Inc., Robinsons Land Corporation, Shangri-la Plaza
Corporation and SM Prime Holdings[,] Inc. are not obligated to provide parking
spaces in their malls for the use of their patrons or public in general, free
of charge.
All counterclaims in Civil Case No.
00-1210 are dismissed.
No pronouncement as to costs.[17]
CA-G.R.
CV No. 76298 involved the separate appeals of the OSG[18]
and respondent SM Prime[19]
filed with the Court of Appeals. The
sole assignment of error of the OSG in its Appellant’s Brief was:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE NATIONAL
BUILDING CODE DID NOT INTEND MALL PARKING SPACES TO BE FREE OF CHARGE[;][20]
while the four errors assigned by
respondent SM Prime in its Appellant’s Brief were:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DECLARE RULE XIX
OF THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AS HAVING BEEN ENACTED ULTRA VIRES, HENCE, UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DECLARE THE
IMPLEMENTING RULES INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT HAVING BEEN PUBLISHED AS REQUIRED BY
LAW.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISMISS THE OSG’S
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF AND INJUNCTION FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DECLARE THAT THE
OSG HAS NO LEGAL CAPACITY TO SUE AND/OR THAT IT IS NOT A REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST
IN THE INSTANT CASE.[21]
Respondent
Robinsons filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal of the OSG on the ground that the
lone issue raised therein involved a pure question of law, not reviewable by
the Court of Appeals.
The
Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 76298 on
In
its Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the capacity of the OSG to initiate
Civil Case No. 00-1210 before the RTC as the legal representative of the government,[22]
and as the one deputized by the Senate of the Republic of the
The Court of Appeals rejected the
contention of respondent SM Prime that the OSG failed to exhaust administrative
remedies. The appellate court explained
that an administrative review is not a condition precedent to judicial relief
where the question in dispute is purely a legal one, and nothing of an
administrative nature is to be or can be done.
The Court of Appeals likewise refused
to rule on the validity of the IRR of the National Building Code, as such issue
was not among those the parties had agreed to be resolved by the RTC during the
pre-trial conference for Civil Cases No. 00-1208 and No. 00-1210. Issues cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal. Furthermore, the appellate court
found that the controversy could be settled on other grounds, without touching on
the issue of the validity of the IRR. It
referred to the settled rule that courts should refrain from passing upon the
constitutionality of a law or implementing rules, because of the principle that
bars judicial inquiry into a constitutional question, unless the resolution
thereof is indispensable to the determination of the case.
Lastly, the Court of Appeals declared
that Section 803 of the National Building Code and Rule XIX of the IRR were
clear and needed no further construction.
Said provisions were only intended to control the occupancy or congestion
of areas and structures. In the absence
of any express and clear provision of law, respondents could not be obliged and
expected to provide parking slots free of charge.
The fallo of the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeals are DENIED.
Accordingly, appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.[23]
In
its Resolution issued on 14 March 2007, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion
for Reconsideration of the OSG, finding that the grounds relied upon by the
latter had already been carefully considered, evaluated, and passed upon by the
appellate court, and there was no strong and cogent reason to modify much less
reverse the assailed judgment.
The OSG now comes before
this Court, via the instant Petition for Review, with a single assignment of
error:
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
RULING OF THE
The OSG argues that
respondents are mandated to provide free parking by Section 803 of the National
Building Code and Rule XIX of the IRR.
According to Section 803
of the
SECTION
803. Percentage of Site Occupancy
(a)
Maximum site occupancy shall be governed by the use, type of
construction, and height of the building and the use, area, nature, and
location of the site; and subject to the provisions of the local zoning
requirements and in accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by
the Secretary.
In connection therewith,
Rule XIX of the old IRR,[25]
provides:
RULE XIX –
PARKING AND LOADING SPACE REQUIREMENTS
Pursuant to Section 803 of the National
Building Code (PD 1096) providing for maximum site occupancy, the following
provisions on parking and loading space requirements shall be observed:
1.
The parking space ratings
listed below are minimum off-street requirements for specific uses/occupancies
for buildings/structures:
1.1 The
size of an average automobile parking slot shall be computed as 2.4 meters by
5.00 meters for perpendicular or diagonal parking, 2.00 meters by 6.00 meters
for parallel parking. A truck or bus
parking/loading slot shall be computed at a minimum of 3.60 meters by 12.00
meters. The parking slot shall be drawn
to scale and the total number of which shall be indicated on the plans and
specified whether or not parking accommodations, are attendant-managed. (See Section 2 for computation of parking requirements).
x x x x
1.7 Neighborhood
shopping center – 1 slot/100 sq. m. of shopping floor area
The OSG avers that the
aforequoted provisions should be read together with Section 102 of the National
Building Code, which declares:
SECTION
102. Declaration of Policy
It is hereby declared to be the policy
of the State to safeguard life, health, property, and public welfare,
consistent with the principles of sound environmental management and control;
and to this end, make it the purpose of this Code to provide for all buildings
and structures, a framework of minimum standards and requirements to regulate
and control their location, site, design, quality of materials, construction,
use, occupancy, and maintenance.
The requirement of free-of-charge
parking, the OSG argues, greatly contributes to the aim of safeguarding “life,
health, property, and public welfare, consistent with the principles of sound
environmental management and control.”
Adequate parking spaces would contribute greatly to alleviating traffic
congestion when complemented by quick and easy access thereto because of
free-charge parking. Moreover, the power
to regulate and control the use, occupancy, and maintenance of buildings and
structures carries with it the power to impose fees and, conversely, to control
-- partially or, as in this case, absolutely -- the imposition of such fees.
The Court finds no merit
in the present Petition.
The explicit directive of
the afore-quoted statutory and regulatory provisions, garnered from a plain
reading thereof, is that respondents, as operators/lessors of neighborhood
shopping centers, should provide parking and loading spaces, in accordance with
the minimum ratio of one slot per 100 square meters of shopping floor
area. There is nothing therein
pertaining to the collection (or non-collection) of parking fees by
respondents. In fact, the term “parking
fees” cannot even be found at all in the entire National Building Code and its
IRR.
Statutory construction
has it that if a statute is clear and unequivocal, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without any attempt at interpretation.[26] Since Section 803 of the National Building
Code and Rule XIX of its IRR do not mention parking fees, then simply, said
provisions do not regulate the collection of the same. The RTC and the Court of Appeals correctly
applied Article 1158 of the New Civil Code, which states:
Art. 1158. Obligations derived from law are not
presumed. Only those expressly determined in this Code or in
special laws are demandable, and shall be regulated by the precepts of the law
which establishes them; and as to what has not been foreseen, by the provisions
of this Book. (Emphasis ours.)
Hence, in order to bring
the matter of parking fees within the ambit of the National Building Code and
its IRR, the OSG had to resort to specious and feeble argumentation, in which
the Court cannot concur.
The OSG cannot rely on
Section 102 of the National Building Code to expand the coverage of Section 803
of the same Code and Rule XIX of the IRR, so as to include the regulation of
parking fees. The OSG limits its
citation to the first part of Section 102 of the National Building Code
declaring the policy of the State “to safeguard life, health, property, and
public welfare, consistent with the principles of sound environmental
management and control”; but totally ignores the second part of said provision,
which reads, “and to this end, make it the purpose of this Code to provide for
all buildings and structures, a
framework of minimum standards and requirements to regulate and control
their location, site, design, quality of materials, construction, use,
occupancy, and maintenance.” While the
first part of Section 102 of the National Building Code lays down the State
policy, it is the second part thereof that explains how said policy shall be
carried out in the Code. Section 102 of
the National Building Code is not an all-encompassing grant of regulatory power
to the DPWH Secretary and local building officials in the name of life, health,
property, and public welfare. On the
contrary, it limits the regulatory power of said officials to ensuring that the
minimum standards and requirements for all buildings and structures, as set
forth in the National Building Code, are complied with.
Consequently, the OSG
cannot claim that in addition to fixing the minimum requirements for parking
spaces for buildings, Rule XIX of the IRR also mandates that such parking
spaces be provided by building owners free of charge. If Rule XIX is not covered by the enabling
law, then it cannot be added to or included in the implementing rules. The rule-making power of administrative
agencies must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings to
carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to
amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by
the statute. Administrative regulations
must always be in harmony with the provisions of the law because any resulting
discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic law.[27]
From the RTC all the way
to this Court, the OSG repeatedly referred to Republic v. Gonzales[28]
and City of Ozamis v. Lumapas[29]
to support its position that the State has the power to regulate parking spaces
to promote the health, safety, and welfare of the public; and it is by virtue
of said power that respondents may be required to provide free parking
facilities. The OSG, though, failed to
consider the substantial differences in the factual and legal backgrounds of
these two cases from those of the Petition at bar.
In Republic, the
Indiscriminate parking along
The Court, in City of
Republic and City of
Indeed, Republic and City of
Under the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code, parking in designated areas along public streets or highways is
allowed which clearly indicates that provision for parking spaces serves a
useful purpose. In other jurisdictions where traffic is at least as voluminous
as here, the provision by municipal governments of parking space is not limited
to parking along public streets or highways. There has been a marked trend to
build off-street parking facilities with the view to removing parked cars from
the streets. While the provision of off-street parking facilities or carparks
has been commonly undertaken by private enterprise, municipal governments have
been constrained to put up carparks in response to public necessity where
private enterprise had failed to keep up with the growing public demand.
American courts have upheld the right of municipal governments to construct
off-street parking facilities as clearly redounding to the public benefit.[30]
In City of
It is not
sufficient for the OSG to claim that “the power to regulate and control the
use, occupancy, and maintenance of buildings and structures carries with it the
power to impose fees and, conversely, to control, partially or, as in this
case, absolutely, the imposition of such fees.”
Firstly, the fees within the
power of regulatory agencies to impose are regulatory
fees. It has been settled law in
this jurisdiction that this broad and all-compassing governmental competence to
restrict rights of liberty and property carries with it the undeniable power to
collect a regulatory fee. It looks to the enactment of specific measures that
govern the relations not only as between individuals but also as between
private parties and the political society.[31] True, if the regulatory agencies have the
power to impose regulatory fees, then conversely, they also have the power to
remove the same. Even so, it is worthy
to note that the present case does not involve the imposition by the DPWH
Secretary and local building officials of regulatory fees upon respondents; but
the collection by respondents of parking
fees from persons who use the mall parking facilities. Secondly,
assuming arguendo that the DPWH
Secretary and local building officials do have regulatory powers over the
collection of parking fees for the use of privately owned parking facilities,
they cannot allow or prohibit such collection arbitrarily or whimsically. Whether allowing or prohibiting the
collection of such parking fees, the action of the DPWH Secretary and local
building officials must pass the test of classic reasonableness and propriety
of the measures or means in the promotion of the ends sought to be
accomplished.[32]
Keeping in mind the aforementioned
test of reasonableness and propriety of measures or means, the Court notes that
Section 803 of the National Building Code falls under Chapter 8 on Light and Ventilation. Evidently, the Code deems it necessary to
regulate site occupancy to ensure that there is proper lighting and ventilation
in every building. Pursuant thereto,
Rule XIX of the IRR requires that a building, depending on its specific use
and/or floor area, should provide a minimum number of parking spaces. The Court, however, fails to see the
connection between regulating site occupancy to ensure proper light and
ventilation in every building vis-à-vis regulating
the collection by building owners of fees for the use of their parking
spaces. Contrary to the averment of the
OSG, the former does not necessarily include or imply the latter. It totally escapes this Court how lighting
and ventilation conditions at the malls could be affected by the fact that
parking facilities thereat are free or paid for.
The OSG attempts to
provide the missing link by arguing that:
Under Section 803 of the National
Building Code, complimentary parking spaces are required to enhance light and
ventilation, that is, to avoid traffic congestion in areas surrounding the
building, which certainly affects the ventilation within the building itself, which
otherwise, the annexed parking spaces would have served. Free-of-charge parking avoids traffic
congestion by ensuring quick and easy access of legitimate shoppers to
off-street parking spaces annexed to the malls, and thereby removing the
vehicles of these legitimate shoppers off the busy streets near the commercial
establishments.[33]
The Court is
unconvinced. The National Building Code
regulates buildings, by setting the
minimum specifications and requirements for the same. It does not concern itself with traffic congestion in areas surrounding
the building. It is already a stretch to
say that the National Building Code and its IRR also intend to solve the
problem of traffic congestion around the buildings so as to ensure that the said
buildings shall have adequate lighting and ventilation. Moreover, the Court cannot simply assume, as
the OSG has apparently done, that the traffic congestion in areas around the
malls is due to the fact that respondents charge for their parking facilities,
thus, forcing vehicle owners to just park in the streets. The Court notes that despite the fees charged
by respondents, vehicle owners still use the mall parking facilities, which are
even fully occupied on some days.
Vehicle owners may be parking in the streets only because there are not
enough parking spaces in the malls, and not because they are deterred by the
parking fees charged by respondents.
Free parking spaces at the malls may even have the opposite effect from
what the OSG envisioned: more people may be encouraged by the free parking to
bring their own vehicles, instead of taking public transport, to the malls; as
a result, the parking facilities would become full sooner, leaving more
vehicles without parking spaces in the malls and parked in the streets instead,
causing even more traffic congestion.
Without using the term outright, the OSG is actually
invoking police power to justify the regulation by the State, through the DPWH
Secretary and local building officials, of privately owned parking facilities,
including the collection by the owners/operators of such facilities of parking
fees from the public for the use thereof.
The Court finds, however, that in totally prohibiting respondents from
collecting parking fees from the public for the use of the mall parking
facilities, the State would be acting beyond the bounds of police power.
Police power is the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property.
It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment
of the property of the owner. The power
to regulate, however, does not include the power to prohibit. A fortiori,
the power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate. Police power does not involve the taking or
confiscation of property, with the exception of a few cases where there is a
necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose
of protecting peace and order and of promoting the general welfare; for
instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and
firearms. [34]
When there is a taking or
confiscation of private property for public use, the State is no longer
exercising police power, but another of its inherent powers, namely, eminent
domain. Eminent domain enables the State
to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just
compensation to the owner.[35]
Normally, of course, the
power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and
possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the
said power may not be availed of only to impose a burden upon the owner of
condemned property, without loss of title and possession.[36] It is a settled rule that neither acquisition
of title nor total destruction of value is essential to taking. It is usually in cases where title remains
with the private owner that inquiry should be made to determine whether the
impairment of a property is merely regulated or amounts to a compensable
taking. A regulation that deprives any
person of the profitable use of his property constitutes a taking and entitles
him to compensation, unless the invasion of rights is so slight as to permit
the regulation to be justified under the police power. Similarly, a police
regulation that unreasonably restricts the right to use business property for
business purposes amounts to a taking of private property, and the owner may
recover therefor.[37]
Although in
the present case, title to and/or possession of the parking facilities remain/s
with respondents, the prohibition against their collection of parking fees from
the public, for the use of said facilities, is already tantamount to a taking
or confiscation of their properties. The
State is not only requiring that respondents devote a portion of the latter’s
properties for use as parking spaces, but is also mandating that they give the
public access to said parking spaces for free.
Such is already an excessive intrusion into the property rights of
respondents. Not only are they being deprived
of the right to use a portion of their properties as they wish, they are further
prohibited from profiting from its use or even just recovering therefrom the expenses
for the maintenance and operation of the required parking facilities.
The ruling of
this Court in City Government of Quezon
City v. Judge Ericta[38]
is edifying. Therein, the City
Government of Quezon City passed an ordinance obliging private cemeteries
within its jurisdiction to set aside at least six percent of their total area
for charity, that is, for burial grounds of deceased paupers. According to the Court, the ordinance in
question was null and void, for it authorized the taking of private property
without just compensation:
There is no reasonable relation between
the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private
cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of'
health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The
ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a
private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal
corporation. Instead of' building or maintaining a public cemetery for this
purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.
'The expropriation without compensation
of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic
Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to
prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and
to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of
general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government
Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177(q) that a sangguniang
panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in
such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the
city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private
properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law, and practise
in the past. It continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires
payment of just compensation. The
questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of
subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and
other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots.
The necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very clear from
said requirements which are intended to insure the development of communities
with salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the
regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when
individual lots are sold to homeowners.
In
conclusion, the total prohibition against the collection by respondents of
parking fees from persons who use the mall parking facilities has no basis in
the National Building Code or its IRR.
The State also cannot impose the same prohibition by generally invoking
police power, since said prohibition amounts to a taking of respondents’
property without payment of just compensation.
Given
the foregoing, the Court finds no more need to address the issue persistently
raised by respondent SM Prime concerning the unconstitutionality of Rule XIX of
the IRR. In addition, the said issue was
not among those that the parties, during the pre-trial conference for Civil
Cases No. 12-08 and No. 00-1210, agreed to submit for resolution of the
RTC. It is likewise axiomatic that the
constitutionality of a law, a regulation, an ordinance or an act will not be
resolved by courts if the controversy can be, as in this case it has been,
settled on other grounds.[39]
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari
is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated 25 January 2007 and
Resolution dated 14 March 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76298,
affirming in toto the Joint Decision
dated 29 May 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138, in
Civil Cases No. 00-1208 and No. 00-1210 are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 26-43.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan Vidal with Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Jose C. Reyes, concurring; rollo, pp. 45-58.
[3] Penned
by Judge Sixto Marella, Jr.; rollo, pp.
250-260.
[4] Rollo, pp. 59-60.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] Penned
by Judge Sixto Marella, Jr., id., at 61-63.
[13]
[14] Section
1 of Presidential Decree No. 478 and Section 35, Chapter12, Title III of the
Administrative Code of 1987, enumerate the powers and functions of the
OSG.
[15] Rollo, p. 252.
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22] Citing Section 35, Chapter XII, Title III, Book IV of Executive Order
No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, which provide:
SECTION 35.
Powers and Functions. – The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent
the Government of the
x x x x
(3) Appear in any court in any action involving
the validity of any treaty, law, executive order or proclamation, rule or
regulation when in his judgment his intervention is necessary or when requested
by the Court.
x x x x
(11) Act and represent the Republic and/or the
people before any court, tribunal, body or commission in any matter, action or
proceeding which, in his opinion, affects the welfare of the people as the ends
of justice may require; x x x.
[23] Rollo,
p. 57.
[24]
[25] A Revised IRR took effect on
[26] Soria v. Desierto, 490 Phil. 749, 754
(2005).
[27] Land Bank of the
[28] G.R.
No. 45338-39,
[29] 160
Phil. 33 (1975).
[30] Republic v. Gonzales, supra note 28 at 793.
[31] Republic v. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, 143 Phil. 158, 163 (1970).
[32] Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 385 Phil. 956, 969 (2000).
[33] Rollo,
pp. 36-37.
[34]
[35] Acuña v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 79310,
[36] Republic of the
[37] See J. Romero’s Dissenting
Opinion in Telecommunications and
Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections, 352
Phil. 153, 191 (1998). See also People v.
Fajardo, 104 Phil. 443, 447-448 (1958).
[38] Supra note 34 at 656-657.
[39] Ty v. Trampe, G.R. No. 117577,