ROMERO
MONTEDERAMOS, Petitioner, - versus - TRI-UNION INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATION, Respondent. |
G.R. No.
176700 Present: QUISUMBING, Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES, J., BRION, ABAD, JJ. Promulgated: September
4, 2009 |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Respondent Tri-Union International Corp. (respondent),
which markets and distributes Company B products, hired on July 18, 1997 Romero
Montederamos (petitioner) as a stockman at its outlet at the Metro Ayala Department
Store, Cebu Business Park, Cebu City.
By Memorandum of
By petitioner’s claim, in August 2002,
respondent asked him to sign a contract of employment covering five months[2]
but he refused, knowing that he was already a regular employee; that on June
24, 2003, he informed respondent of his need for a letter of introduction
to Metro Ayala since his Metro Ayala Identification Card (I.D.) was due to
expire on June 30, 2003; that he was
told to return the following day but was unable to do so because he had to
accomplish clearance requirements with Metro Ayala; that on June 26, 2003, he repaired
to respondent’s office but was told that his supervisor was absent and that the
latter’s assistant could not give the letter of introduction by herself; that he
later learned that the assistant could
and actually did sign letters of introduction for and in behalf of the
supervisor;[3] and that as his wait for a letter of
introduction did not come by June 30, 2003, he realized that respondent had no
intention of giving him one and was terminating his employment, hence, his
filing on July 2, 2003 of the Complaint against respondent.
Upon the other hand, respondent claimed as follows:[4]
On April 15, 2003, it sent petitioner a Violation
Memorandum[5]
warning him for habitual tardiness, citing his tardiness on February 18, 2003,
March 4, 2003, March 18, 2003, and April 1, 2003; and that on June 17, 2003, it
sent petitioner a second Violation Memorandum[6]
for habitual tardiness, citing his tardiness on April 22, 2003, May 6, 2003,
May 20, 2003, and June 3, 2003, which Memorandum required him to submit a
written explanation therefor, but that petitioner refused to receive it and
in fact answered back and walked out on his immediate supervisor, prompting the
latter to send him a Memorandum on June 18, 2003 reading:
You were given second memorandum last
June 17, 2003 with a request of explanation in your part of your habitual
tardiness. However, you refuse[d] to
sign the memorandum for the said violation.
Instead, you answered and walked out from the office before your
superior told you to do so.
This memo serves as your warning. Another situation that may arise after this
memorandum will be a ground for your suspension.[7] (Underscoring
supplied)
Again petitioner refused to receive the third Memorandum. And he failed to submit an explanation behind
his habitual tardiness, drawing respondent to send him a June 27, 2003 Memorandum
via registered mail suspending him for
one month effective July 1, 2003, viz:
You are hereby warned to follow all rules
and regulations of our company where you are employed, one of these is to
attend [the] company meeting scheduled every Tuesday of the week. However, there has been no improvement of
your habitual tardiness since our first memorandum last
This memo serves as your last warning.
Another situation that may arise after this memo will be a ground for
your termination.[8] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Hence, petitioner’s filing on
On
This
is to remind you that your suspension ends this
Petitioner
never ever reported for work, however.
Finally, respondent claimed that it had
paid petitioner overtime pay, allowance, and service incentive leave.[10]
By Decision[11] of P3,000.00. Petitioner’s
claim for overtime pay was denied as it was unsubstantiated.
On appeal, the NLRC,[12]
by Decision dated
Noting that “it is to the best interest of
complainant that he should no longer be reinstated to his former position,” the
NLRC granted him backwages and
separation pay covering the period July 1, 2003 to 2004, subject to
recomputation upon finality of the Decision.
Respondent’s Motion
for Reconsideration[13]
having been denied by Resolution[14] of
By Decision[15]
of
Respecting petitioner’s claim that his refusal to
sign the 5-month contract precipitated his suspension, the appellate court
noted that the refusal occurred in August 2002 yet, but the Violation Memoranda
were issued to petitioner much later starting April 2003. It thus held that if indeed respondent wanted
to terminate the services of petitioner on the basis of such refusal, it could
have done so much earlier.
Finally, the appellate court held that respondent’s
offer of reinstatement to
petitioner runs counter to the charge of
illegal dismissal.
His
Motion for Reconsideration[16]
having been denied by Resolution[17] of
The
petition is bereft of merit.
While
the employer bears the burden in illegal dismissal cases to prove that the
termination was for valid or authorized cause, the employee must first
establish by substantial evidence the fact of dismissal from service.[19] This
petitioner failed to discharge. He, in
fact, failed to refute respondent’s claim that it sent him a Violation
Memorandum, which was duly received by him on April 15, 2003, and a subsequent Memorandum
via registered mail,[20] requiring
him to explain his habitual tardiness on the therein indicated dates but that
he failed to comply therewith.
That respondent advised petitioner
on
Constructive
dismissal contemplates, among other things, quitting
because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely,
or a demotion in rank or a diminution of pay.
It clearly exists when an act of clear discrimination,
insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee,
leaving him with no option but to forego his continued employment.[22] Not any
of these circumstances exists to call for a ruling that petitioner was
constructively dismissed.
Respondent’s inability to provide the
letter-introduction for the renewal of petitioner’s Metro Ayala I.D. cannot be
considered an act of discrimination or insensibility to warrant a finding of
constructive dismissal. It bears noting
that petitioner’s Metro Ayala I.D. was yet to expire on
In
another vein, petitioner’s failure to report for work after the expiration of
the period of his suspension notwithstanding, respondent just the same, by its
claim, offered to reinstate him during the mandatory conference and even after
receiving the promulgation of the decision of Labor Arbiter, which claim he
did not refute.[23]
Respecting
petitioner’s claim for service incentive leave, the Court finds well-taken the
Labor Arbiter’s grant thereto. For respondent’s
claim of having settled it bears no documentation.
As for
petitioner’s claim for overtime pay, the same fails, there being no concrete proof
that he had indeed rendered overtime service.
WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the
foregoing discussions, DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
MARIANO C. Associate Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] NLRC records, p. 1.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15] CA rollo, pp. 106-113. Penned by Court of Appeals Associate Justice Pampio A. Abarintos with the concurrence of Associate Justices Marlene Gonzales-Sison and Priscilla Baltazar-Padilla.
[16] CA rollo, pp. 114-120.
[17]
[18] Rollo, pp. 17-38.
[19] Vide
Ledesma, Jr. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 174585,
[20] Vide NLRC records, pp. 18-21.
[21] Go v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 158922,
[22] Norkis Trading vs. Gnilo, 544 SCRA 279.
[23] Vide NLRC records, pp. 67, 95-96.