Republic
of the
SUPREME
COURT
THIRD DIVISION
|
ALICE
VITANGCOL and NORBERTO VITANGCOL, Petitioners, -
versus - NEW
VISTA PROPERTIES, INC., MARIA ALIPIT, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CALAMBA, LAGUNA,
and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 176014 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO,
JR., NACHURA,
and PERALTA,
JJ. Promulgated: September
17, 2009 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
In
this Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners Alice
Vitangcol and Norberto Vitangcol (collectively, Vitangcol) assail the August
14, 2006 Decision[1]
and December 19, 2006 Resolution[2]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 84205 which reversed the
December 21, 2004 Order[3]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 35, in Calamba City, Laguna, in Civil
Case No. 3195-2001-C for Quieting of Title entitled New Vista Properties,
Inc. v. Alice E. Vitangcol, Norberto A. Vitangcol, Maria L. Alipit and Register
of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna.
The Facts
Subject
of the instant controversy is
On
June 18, 1989, Maria and Clemente A. Alipit, with the marital consent of the
latter’s wife, executed a Special Power of Attorney[4]
(SPA) constituting Milagros A. De Guzman as their attorney-in-fact to sell
their property described in the SPA as “located at Bo. Latian, Calamba, Laguna
covered by TCT No. (25311) 2538 with
a parcel of land (Lot No. 1702 of
the Calamba Estate, GLRO Rec. No. 8418) situated in the Calamba, Province of
Laguna, x x x containing an area of [250,007 square meters], more or less. x x
x That a portion of the above-described parcel of land was traversed by the
South Expressway such that its original area of [250,007] SQUARE METERS was
reduced to [242,540] SQUARE METERS, which is the subject of the sale.[6]
Following
the sale, New Vista immediately entered the subject lot, fenced it with cement
posts and barbed wires, and posted a security guard to deter trespassers.
We
interpose at this point the observation that the property delivered to and
occupied by New Vista was denominated in the SPA as
The
controversy arose more than a decade later when respondent New Vista learned
that the parcel of land it paid for and occupied, i.e., Lot No. 1702, was being claimed by petitioners Vitangcol
on the strength of a Deed of Absolute Sale for Lot No. 1702 under TCT No.
(25311) 2528 entered into on
Alarmed
by the foregoing turn of events, New Vista lost no time in protecting its
rights by, first, filing a notice of adverse claim over TCT No. T-482731,
followed by commencing a suit for quieting of title before the RTC. Its complaint[7]
was docketed as Civil Case No. 3195-2001-C before the RTC, Branch 92 in
On
December 11, 2001, Vitangcol moved to dismiss[8]
the complaint which New Vista duly opposed.
An exchange of pleadings then ensued.
On
June 27, 2003, or before Maria Alipit and Vitangcol, as defendants a quo, could answer, New Vista filed an
amended complaint,[9]
appending thereto a copy of the 1989 deed of absolute sale De Guzman, as agent
authorized agent of the Alipits, executed in its favor. Thereafter, Vitangcol filed a motion to
dismiss, followed by a similar motion dated
Unlike
in its original complaint, New Vista’s amended complaint did not have, as
attachment, the June 18, 1989 SPA. It, however, averred that Clemente and Maria
Alipit had ratified and validated the sale of
Ruling
of the RTC
The Initial RTC Order
By Order of November 25, 2003, the
trial court denied Vitangcol’s and Maria Alipit’s separate motions to dismiss
the amended complaint. As there held by the RTC, the amended complaint[10]
sufficiently stated a cause of action as shown therein that after the purchase
and compliance with its legal obligations relative thereto, New Vista was
immediately placed in possession of the subject lot, but which Maria Alipit, by
herself, later sold to Vitangcol to New Vista’s prejudice.
The
From the above order, Vitangcol sought
reconsideration,[11]
attaching to the motion a copy of the
In view of the foregoing, the court
hereby set aside its Order dated November 25, 2003 and by virtue of this order,
hereby finds that the Amended Complaint states no cause of action and that the
claim of the plaintiff in the present action is unenforceable under the
provisions of the statue [sic] of frauds, hence, the Amended Complaint is
hereby ordered DISMISSED, pursuant to Rule 16, Section 1, paragraph g and i.
SO ORDERED.[13]
In
reversing itself, the RTC made much of the fact that New Vista did not attach
the SPA to the amended complaint. To the RTC, this omission is fatal to New
Vista’s cause of action for quieting of title, citing in this regard the
pertinent rule when an action is based on a document.[14]
The
RTC also stated the observation that New Vista’s act of not directly mentioning
the SPA and the non-attachment of a copy thereof in the amended complaint
constituted an attempt “to hide the fact that Milagros Alipit-de Guzman is only
authorized to sell a parcel of land denominated as Lot No. 1735 of the Calamba
Estate, and not Lot No. 1702 of the Calamba Estate, which is the subject
matter of the Deed of Absolute Sale (Annex B of the Amended Complaint).”[15] According to the RTC, what the agent (De
Guzman) sold to New Vista was
Aggrieved,
New Vista interposed an appeal before the CA, its recourse docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 84205.
Ruling
of the CA
On
August 14, 2006, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision reversing
the December 21, 2004 RTC Order, reinstating New Vista’s amended complaint for
quieting of title, and directing Vitangcol and Maria Alipit to file their
respective answers thereto. The decretal portion of the CA’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the 21 December 2004 Order of the court a quo is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Amended Complaint is hereby
REINSTATED. The defendants-appellees are
hereby directed to file their respective answers/responsive pleadings within
the time prescribed under the Rules of Court.
SO
ORDERED.[16]
The
CA faulted the RTC for dismissing the amended complaint, observing that it was
absurd for the RTC to require a copy of the SPA which was not even mentioned in
the amended complaint. Pushing this observation further, the CA held that the
amended complaint, filed as it were before responsive pleadings could be filed
by the defendants below, superseded the original complaint. As thus superseded, the original complaint
and all documents appended thereto, such as the SPA, may no longer be taken
cognizance of in determining whether the amended complaint sufficiently states
a cause of action. It, thus, concluded
that the RTC erred in looking beyond the four corners of the amended complaint
in resolving the motion to dismiss on the ground of its failing to state a
cause of action.
And
citing jurisprudence,[17]
the CA ruled that even if the SPA were considered, still the discrepancy
thereof relative to the deed of absolute sale—in terms of lot and title
numbers—is evidentiary in nature and is simply a matter of defense, and not a
ground to dismiss the amended complaint.
Finally,
the CA held that the real question in the case boiled down as to whose title is
genuine or spurious, which is obviously a triable issue of fact which can only
be threshed out in a trial on the merits.
Through the equally assailed December
19, 2006 Resolution, the CA denied Vitangcol’s motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the instant petition.
The
Issue
Petitioners
Vitangcol raise as ground for review the sole assignment of error in that:
THE DECISION AND THE RESOLUTION
OF THE TWELFTH DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS UNDER CHALLENGE ARE CONTRARY TO
LAW[18]
The
Court’s Ruling
The
petition is bereft of merit.
The
sole issue tendered for consideration is whether the Amended Complaint, with
the
Amended Complaint
Sufficiently States a Cause of Action
The
Rules of Court defines “cause of action” as the act or omission by which a
party violates a right of another. It
contains three elements: (1) a right
existing in favor of the plaintiff; (2) a correlative duty on the part of the
defendant to respect that right; and (3) a breach of the defendant’s duty.[19] It is, thus, only upon the occurrence of the
last element that a cause of action arises, giving the plaintiff a right to
file an action in court for recovery of damages or other relief.[20]
Lack
of cause of action is, however, not a ground for a dismissal of the complaint
through a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, for the
determination of a lack of cause of action can only be made during and/or after
trial. What is dismissible via
that mode is failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. Sec. 1(g) of
Rule 16 of the Rules of Court provides that a motion may be made on the ground
“that the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action.”
The
rule is that in a motion to dismiss, a defendant hypothetically admits the
truth of the material allegations of the ultimate facts contained in the
plaintiff’s complaint.[21] When a motion to dismiss is grounded on the
failure to state a cause of action, a ruling thereon should, as rule, be based
only on the facts alleged in the complaint.[22]
However, this principle of hypothetical admission admits of exceptions. Among others, there is no hypothetical
admission of conclusions or interpretations of law which are false; legally
impossible facts; facts inadmissible in evidence; facts which appear by record
or document included in the pleadings to be unfounded;[23]
allegations which the court will take judicial notice are not true;[24]
and where the motion to dismiss was heard with submission of evidence which
discloses facts sufficient to defeat the claim.[25]
New
The
trial court, however, erred in ruling that, taking said SPA into account, the
amended complaint stated no cause of action.
Indeed, upon a consideration of
the amended complaint, its annexes, with the June 18, 1989 SPA thus submitted,
the Court is inclined, in the main, to agree with the appellate court that the
amended complaint sufficiently states a cause of action.
Hypothetical Admission
Supports Statement of Cause of Action
Thus,
the next query is: Assuming hypothetically the veracity of the material
allegations in the amended complaint, but taking into consideration the SPA,
would New Vista still have a cause of action against Vitangcol and Maria Alipit
sufficient to support its claim for relief consisting primarily of quieting of
title?
The
poser should hypothetically be answered in the affirmative.
In
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the focus is on the
sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations.[26] The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in
the complaint constituting a cause of action lies on whether or not the court,
admitting the facts alleged, could render a valid verdict in accordance with
the prayer of the complaint.[27] And to sustain a motion to dismiss for lack
of cause of action, it must be shown that the claim for relief in the complaint
does not exist, rather than that a claim has been defectively stated, or is
ambiguous, indefinite, or uncertain.[28]
Ratification Would Cure
Defect in the SPA
There
can be quibbling about the lot covered by the deed of absolute sale De Guzman
executed in New Vista’s favor being different from that referred to in her
enabling power of attorney to sell in terms of lot number and lot title number.
The flaw stemmed from the faulty preparation of the SPA. Notwithstanding the
variance in lot descriptions, as indicated above, the amended complaint
contained, as it were, a clear statement of New Vista’s cause of action. New Vista, in fact, alleged that the intended
sale of
That on
March 27, 1989, the SELLERS [the Alipits] entered into a Contract to Sell with
the BUYER [New Vista], after they had previously received on February 11, 1989
an earnest money of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00), wherein they (Sellers)
agreed to sell to the BUYER the above-described parcel of land (in the reduced
area of 242,540 square meters) for P60.00 per square meter or for a total price
consideration of FOURTEEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY TWO THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED
PESOS (P14,552,400.00) under the other terms and conditions stipulated therein;
That on
April 4, 1989, the BUYER had advanced the amount of SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED
EIGHTEEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (7,518,600.00) and paid the Philippine
Veterans Bank [PVB] in the same amount by way of redemption of the
above-described property from its mortgage, all in accordance with the
stipulation in the Contract to Sell dated March 27, 1989, making the advances
made by the BUYER to the SELLERS namely: P10,000.00 Earnest Money; P500,000.00
Advances; and P7,518,600.00 Redemption Money; in the total amount of EIGHT
MILLION TWENTY EIGHT THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P8,028,600.00) which per
agreement has formed part of the payment of the purchase price of
P14,550,000.00 thereby leaving a balance of SIX MILLION FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY
THREE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED PESOS (P6,523,800.00);
That in
line with the Resolution dated
“WHEREFORE,
the petitioner Central Bank of the
SO
ORDERED.”
thus, paving the way for the
execution of the foregoing Final Deed of Sale.
NOW,
THEREFORE, in view of the foregoing facts and circumstances, and for and in
consideration of the sum of [P14,552,400.00] of which had been previously paid
by the BUYER to the SELLERS in the manner stated above, and the remaining sum
of x x x (P6,523,800.00), likewise Philippine Currency, to the SELLERS now in
hand paid and receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged and expressed to their
entire satisfaction from the BUYER THEREBY completing payment of the entire
price consideration of this sale, the SELLERS do hereby sell, transfer and
convey, in the manner absolute and irrevocable, unto the BUYER, its successors,
administrators and assigns, the above-described parcel of land in its reduced
area of 242,540 square meters, more or less, free from all liens and
encumbrances.[29]
As
may clearly be noted, the transfer of the lot covered by TCT No. (25311) 2528
or, in fine Lot No. 1702 of the Calamba Estate, in favor of New Vista, came not
as the result of simple, single transaction involving a piece of land with a
clean title where the vendor, for a sum certain received, delivers ownership of
the property upon contract signing. As things stand, the execution of the deed
of absolute sale completed a negotiated contractual package, the culmination of
a series of side but closely interrelated transactions involving several
payments and remittances of what turned out to be the total purchase price for
the lot envisaged to be purchased and sold, to wit: PhP 10,000 earnest money payment on February
11, 1989; an advance of half a million (no date provided); settlement of a
mortgage loan with Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB) of over PhP 7.5 million on
April 4, 1989; and the final payment of the balance of the total purchase price
amounting to over PhP 6.5 million on August 9, 1989—the date of the execution
of the Deed of Absolute Sale. For proper
perspective, it may be mentioned that the Alipits and New Vista executed the
Contract to Sell on March 27, 1989 after the payment of the earnest money and
before the settlement of the mortgage loan with the PVB; and the SPA executed
by Clemente and Maria Alipit on June 18, 1989 or more than a month before the
execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale.
Taking
the foregoing events set forth in the 1989 deed of absolute sale, as
hypothetically admitted, it is fairly evident that the property the Alipits
intended to sell and in fact sold was the lot covered by TCT No. (25311) 2528,
which, doubtless, is
No Showing of Existence
of
As
to how the SPA mentioned a lot, i.e.,
Lot No. 1735 covered by TCT No. (25311) 2538, different from what is stated, i.e., Lot No. 1702, in the 1989 deed
of absolute sale in question, is not sufficiently explained by the
parties. But what can be gathered from
the records is that what were denominated as Lot No. 1735 and Lot No. 1702 have
the same area and location: 242,540 square meters in Calamba. Moreover, if indeed the SPA authorized De
Guzman to sell
Moreover,
the sequence of coinciding events, starting from the payment by New Vista of
the earnest money, to the execution of the final deed of sale and the delivery
of the subject lot to New Vista would readily show the following: that
Clemente and Maria Alipit executed the SPA for de Guzman to sell and to
formalize, in a deed of absolute sale, the sale of the subject lot following
the fulfillment of the terms and conditions envisaged in the Contract to Sell
earlier entered into, and not some lot
they co-owned, if there be any. Maria
Alipit’s utter failure to show in her motion to dismiss that she co-owns with
her brother Clemente a similarly-sized 242,540-square-meter lot, denominated as
Lot No. 1735 of the Calamba Estate and covered by TCT No. (25311) 2538,
strongly suggests that no such separate property exists and that there is contextually
only one property—
Ratification: Delivery and Not Questioning Deed of Absolute
Nonetheless,
even if the SPA, vis-à-vis the deed of absolute in question, described a
different lot and indicated a dissimilar TCT number, still, the hypothetically
admitted allegation of New Vista that lot owners Clemente and Maria Alipit
ratified the sale would cure the defect on New Vista’s claim for relief under
its amended complaint. Stated a bit differently, the ratificatory acts of the
Alipits would work to strengthen New Vista’s cause of action impaired by what
may be taken as typographical errors in the SPA. As deduced from the
stipulations in the deed of absolute, lot owners Clemente and Maria Alipit
doubtless benefited from the transaction.
And most importantly, they turned possession of Lot No. 1702 over to New
Vista in 1989. Since then, New Vista enjoyed undisturbed right of ownership
over the property until the Vitangcol entered the picture.
The
delivery of the subject Lot No. 1702 to New Vista clearly evinces the intent to
sell said lot and is ample proof of receipt of full payment therefor as indicated
in the deed of absolute sale. For a span
of more than 10 years after the execution of the contract of sale, neither
Clemente nor Maria Alipit came forward to assail the conveyance they authorized
De Guzman to effect, if they considered the same as suffering from some
vitiating defect. What is more, if their
intention were indeed to authorize De Guzman to sell a property other than Lot No.
1702, is it not but logical to surrender that “other” property to New
Vista? And if New Vista employed illegal means to gain
possession of subject property, a relatively valuable piece of real estate, why
did Clemente and Maria Alipit, and their successors in interest, not institute
any proceedings to oust or eject New Vista therefrom?
Clemente
and Maria Alipit’s long inaction adverted to argues against the notion that
what they sold to New Vista was a property other than Lot No. 1702 of the
Calamba Estate.
Two Versions of TCT
Covering Subject
Lest
it be overlooked, the purported sale of
It
is worth to mention at this juncture that the deed of absolute sale in favor of
New Vista recited the following event: that the RTC, Branch 39 in Manila issued
on June 30, 1989 in Civil Case No. 85-32311 (in re: liquidation PVB) an Order
to release TCT No. (T-25311) 2528 in the names of Clemente Alipit, married to
Milagros Alipit, and Maria Alipit. If this recital is true and there is no
reason why it is not, then TCT No. (T-25311) 2528 in the name of Maria Alipit
alone must, perforce, be a fake instrument.
Accordingly, the subsequent sale of Lot No. 1702 to Vitangcol on August
14, 2001 by Maria Alipit with a bogus TCT would be ineffective and certainly
fraudulent. Not lost on the Court, as
badge of fraud, is, as New Vista points out, the issuance of a new TCT on
August 15, 2001 or a day after the subject lot was purportedly sold to
Vitangcol.
As
found by the RTC in its initial November 25, 2003 order, virtually all the material allegations in the
amended complaint are triable issues of facts, a reality indicating that it
sufficiently states a cause or causes of action. If the allegations in
the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it can be maintained, it should
not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be presented by the
defendants.[30]
On
July 15, 2009, the parties filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss informing the Court
that they have amicably settled their differences and have filed a Joint Motion
for Judgment Based on Compromise Agreement before the RTC, Branch 35 in
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit. The records of the case are immediately remanded to the RTC,
Branch 35 in
Let the entry of judgment be made. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V.
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M.
PERALTA
Associate Justice
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 29-56. Penned by Associate Justice Arturo G. Tayag and concurred in by Associate Justices Elvi John S. Asuncion and Jose C. Mendoza.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] The Amended Complaint dated June 25, 2003 pertinently alleges:
2.1. Clemente L. Alipit and defendant Maria L. Alipit are siblings who are previous owners of a parcel of land located in Calamba, Laguna with a previous area of approximately two hundred fifty thousand seven square meters (250,007 sq.m.) and previously covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-(25311) 2528 in the names of Clemente L. Alipit married to Milagros David and Maria L. Alipit issued by the Registry of Dees of Laguna, x x x herein referred to as the “Subject Property”. x x x
x x x x
2.2.3 On 04 April 1989, and pursuant to the Contract To Sell dated 27 March 1989, plaintiff paid Philippine Veterans Bank the redemption value of the Subject Property in the amount of Seven Million Five Hundred Eighteen Thousand Six Hundred Pesos (P7,518,600). Thereafter, the annotation on the title of the Subject Property regarding the mortgage was cancelled and the mortgage released.
2.2.4.
On
2.2.4.1. Clemente L. Alipit and
defendant Maria Alipit revalidated, confirmed and ratified the sale of the
Subject Property to plaintiff by accepting and/or retaining the sums paid by
plaintiff, giving the owner’s duplicate of TCT No. T-(25311) 2528 to plaintiff,
and turning over possession of the subject property to plaintiff who has
present control and possession of the property.
2.3. Immediately after the execution of the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated
2.4. x x x
Plaitiff then sought to transfer TCT No. T-(25311) 2528 in its name
twice; first, on
2.5. Sometime middle of October 2001,
plaintiff was conducting a title search of a prospective parcel of land, which
it intended to purchase in Calamba, Laguna.
Plaintiff’s representative was informed by a staff of the Registry of
Deeds of Calamba, Laguna that the Subject Property had already been purchased
by defendant Alice E. Vitangcol.
Furthermore, plaintiff was also informed, much to its surprise, that a
new transfer certificate of title in the name of defendant Alice E. Vitangcol
had already been issued on
x x x x
2.5.2. Plaintiff
noticed that Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-482731 was issued on
2.5.3. Attempting to
find out how Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-482731 came to be issued,
plaintiff was able to secure a copy of an alleged Deed of Absolute Sale dated
2.5.7. Third, the Deed
of Absolute Sale dated
2.5.8. A certified
true copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-(25311) 2528 dated
2.5.9. At the
time of the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
[11] Rollo,
pp. 324-328, dated
[12] Sec. 8. Effect of amended pleadings. – An amended pleading supersedes the pleading it amends. However, admissions in superseded pleadings may be received in evidence against the pleader; claims and defenses alleged therein not incorporated in the amended pleadings shall be deemed waived.
[13] Rollo, p. 68.
[15] Rollo, p. 66.
[16]
[17] World Wide Ins. & Surety Co., Inc. v. Manuel, 98 Phil. 47 (1955).
[18] Rollo, p. 10.
[19] Balanay v. Paderanga, G.R. No. 136963, August 28, 2006, 499 SCRA 670, 675; AC Enterprises, Inc. v. Frabelle Properties Corporation, G.R. No. 166744, 506 SCRA 625, 665-666 (citations omitted).
[20] Fluor Daniel, Inc.-Philippines v. E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd., G.R. No. 159648, July 27, 2007, 528 SCRA 321, 327.
[21] Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. v. Judge, Regional Trial Court, Davao City, Br. 8, G.R. No. 147058, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 272, 284.
[22] Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte Ltd. v. Dakila Trading Corporation, G.R. No. 172242, August 14, 2007, 530 SCRA 170, 196.
[23]
See Tan v. Director of Forestry, No. L-24548,
[24] See Marcopper Corporation v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-55935, July 30, 1986, 143 SCRA 178; U. Bañez Electric Light Company v. Abra Electric Cooperative, Inc., No. L-59480, December 8, 1982, 119 SCRA 90; Mathay v. Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, No. L-23136, August 26, 1974, 58 SCRA 560; Dalandan v. Julio, No. L-19101, February 29, 1964, 10 SCRA 400.
[25] Tan, supra note 23.
[26] Malicdem
v.
[27] Universal Aquarius, Inc. v. Q.C. Human Resources Management Corp., G.R. No. 155990, September 12, 2007, 533 SCRA 38; Fluor Daniel, Inc.-Philippines, supra note 20; Malicdem, id. at 260.
[28] Pioneer Concrete Philippines, Inc. v. Todaro, G.R. No. 154830, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 153, 162 (citations omitted).
[29] Rollo, pp. 62-64.
[30] Jan-Dec Construction Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146818, February 6, 2006, 481 SCRA 556, 567 (citation omitted).