THIRD
DIVISION
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PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented
by Governor Luis Raymund F. Villafuerte, Jr., Petitioner, - versus
- HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS; and CITY
OF NAGA, represented by Mayor Jesse M. Robredo, Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 175064 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: September 18, 2009 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This
Petition for Certiorari[1]
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul and set aside the Decision[2] dated
The property subject of the instant
case is a parcel of land, known as Plaza Rizal, situated within the territory
of herein respondent City of
On
On
The City of
The City of
SEC. 2. Territory
of the City of
On
In an Order[11]
dated
On
As
understood in the Law of Nations, the right of jurisdiction accorded a
sovereign state consists of first, its personal jurisdiction, which in a sense
is its authority over its nationals who are in a foreign country and second,
territorial jurisdiction, which is its authority over persons and properties
within the territorial boundaries x x x.
“The territorial jurisdiction of a
state is based on the right of domain.
The domain of a State includes normally only the expanse of its
territory over which it exercises the full rights of sovereignty.” x x x
“Sovereignty, in turn, refers to the
supreme power of a State to command and enforce obedience; it is the power, to
which, legally speaking all interest[s] are practically subject and all wills
subordinate.” x x x Indeed, from the
point of view of national law, it is in a sense absolute control over a
definite territory. x x x.
In summation therefore from the
above-quoted citations, when territorial jurisdiction is being referred to, it
means the entire territory over which a State (or any local government unit)
can exercise absolute control.
In the instant case, [Camarines Sur]
thru (sic) counsel admitted during the pre-trial conference that indeed, the
property in question, which is Plaza Rizal, is within the territorial
jurisdiction of the [City of Naga].
Thus, applying the above-quoted principles concerning territorial
jurisdiction, [Camarines Sur] is barred by its express admission from claiming
that it is the
[The contention of Camarines Sur]
that [Section 2, Article I] of
[Republic Act No.] 305 merely defines [the] territory of the City of
The unequivocal and specific import
of said provision provides the extent into which the City of
“To safeguard all the lands,
buildings, records, moneys, credits and other property and rights of the city,
and subject to the [provisions] of this Charter, have control of all its
property.”
Considering that the Province [of
Camarines Sur] expressly acknowledged that [Section 2, Article I] of [Republic Act No.] 305 merely defines the
territory of [the City of Naga], then it is safe to assume that it also accept
that the City of Naga as represented by the City Mayor exercises control of all
the properties of the City, for properties as used in the above-quoted
provision refers to lands, buildings, records, moneys[,] credits and other
property and rights of the city. x x x
Since [Section 2, Article I] of [Republic Act No.] 305 defines the territory of [the City of] Naga
and Plaza Rizal is within its territorial jurisdiction, ergo, it is the City
[of Naga] who has the right of administrative control and management of Plaza
Rizal.
The
RTC thus decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
[Section 2, Article I] of
[Republic Act No.] 305 is hereby interpreted and declared in this Court to mean
that the administrative control and management of Plaza Rizal is within the
City of Naga and not with the Province of Camarines Sur.[13]
Camarines
Sur received a copy of the foregoing Decision on
Camarines Sur received a copy of the
RTC Order dated
On
On
In a Resolution[22]
dated 17 November 1999, the Court referred the Petition for Review filed by
Camarines Sur to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action, holding that the
latter had jurisdiction concurrent with that of the former over the case, and
no special and important reason was cited for the Court to take cognizance of
the case in the first instance. Before
the appellate court, the Petition for Review of Camarines Sur was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 56243.
On
We deny the petition.
Where
an appeal would have been an adequate remedy but it was lost through
petitioner’s inexcusable negligence, certiorari is not in order. x x x Certiorari cannot be resorted to as a
substitute for the lost remedy of appeal x x x.
It is notable that Camarines Sur took this recourse of petition for certiorari only after it twice attempted to avail of appeal,
but both of which were DISAPPROVED.
Because it made these attempts to appeal, it goes without saying that
Camarines Sur believed that the errors it claimed were committed by the court a quo were correctible only by appeal
and not by certiorari. Thus, when it
subsequently filed the instant petition, it was availing of it as a disallowed
substitute remedy for a lost appeal.
Time and again it has been ruled that [the] remedies of appeal and
certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive x x x.
But disregarding for the nonce the lost appeal and its
disallowed substitution by certiorari, still the petition would fail because of
the absence of grave abuse of discretion.
The court a quo had declared
that:
The
existence of the
This
finds support in one of the provisions of the old Administrative Code of the
Philippine Islands where it was provided that:
SEC.
2168. Beginning of the corporate
existence of new municipality. – x x x.
When
a township or other local territorial division is converted or fused into a
municipality all property rights vested in the original territorial
organization shall become vested in the government of the municipality. x x x.
When
Naga was converted from a municipality into a city, all properties under its
territorial jurisdiction including Plaza Rizal was vested upon it.[23] (Emphasis ours.)
The fallo of the Court of Appeals decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED.[24]
Camarines
Sur sought a reconsideration[25]
of the aforequoted Decision, but the Court of Appeals denied the same in the
assailed Resolution dated
Camarines Sur, thus, filed the
instant Petition, raising the sole issue of:
WHETHER
OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT TREATED THE [PETITION FOR
REVIEW UNDER RULE 45 FILED BY CAMARINES SUR] AS ONE FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE
65 THEREBY DENYING DUE COURSE AND DISMISSING THE PETITION AND EVEN THE MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION ON THE GROUND THAT THE PETITION WAS AVAILED OF AS A
SUBSTITUTE FOR THE LOST APPEAL AND FOR ABSENCE OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
Camarines Sur argues that the Court
of Appeals went beyond its authority and gravely abused its discretion when it
treated and resolved the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, which must
allege grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC, and which cannot be
made a substitute for a lost appeal. Camarines
Sur insists that what it filed was a Petition under Rule 45, which raised all
reversible errors committed by the RTC and presented all questions of laws.
Moreover, as the Court of Appeals
upheld the Decision dated
First,
Camarines Sur avers that the filing of the Complaint for Declaratory Relief
and/or Quieting of Title was improper as it was hinged on a pretended
controversy. Essentially, the complaint of
the City of
Second,
Camarines Sur contends that since Plaza Rizal is admittedly located within the
territorial jurisdiction of the City of
Petition for Review
v. Petition for Certiorari
At
the outset, the Court holds that the Court of Appeals indeed committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in erroneously
and inexplicably resolving the Petition, which was initially filed by Camarines
Sur before the Court, but later referred to the appellate court, as if the same
were a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This mistake
is evident in the preliminary statement of the case, as found in the first
paragraph of the Decision dated
The petitioner
Province of Camarines Sur (or Camarines Sur for brevity), represented by Gov.
Luis Villafuerte, asks through this Petition
for Certiorari that the Decision
of Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court stationed at Naga City x x x be
reversed and set aside x x x.[26]
(Emphasis ours.)
For
a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to
prosper, the following requisites must be present: (1) the writ is directed
against a tribunal, a board or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.[27]
There is grave abuse of
discretion "when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility,
and it must be so patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law."[28]
On the other hand, Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court pertains to a Petition for Review on Certiorari, whereby
"a party desiring to appeal by certiorari
from a judgment, final order or resolution of the x x x the Regional Trial
Court x x x, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may include an application for a
writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise
only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth."[29]
A perusal of the petition referred to
the Court of Appeals lays bare the fact that the same was undoubtedly a
Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Not
only does the title of the Petition indicate it as such, but a close reading of
the issues and allegations set forth therein also discloses that it involved
pure questions of law. A question of law
arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of
facts. For a question to be one of law,
the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely
on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.[30] The Court of Appeals, thus, could not fault
Camarines Sur for failing to allege, much less prove, grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC when such is
not required for a Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Likewise, the doctrine that certiorari
cannot be resorted to as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal applies
only when a party actually files a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 in lieu of a Petition for Review under
Rule 45, since the latter remedy was already lost through the fault of the petitioning
party. In the instant case, Camarines
Sur actually filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45; the Court of Appeals only
mistook the same for a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65.
Be that as it may, the Court still finds
that the questions of law invoked by Camarines Sur must be resolved against it.
Declaratory Relief
Declaratory relief is defined as an
action by any person interested in a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question of
construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive order or
regulation, or statute; and for a declaration of his rights and duties
thereunder.[31] The only issue that may be raised in such a
petition is the question of construction or validity of provisions in an
instrument or statute.[32]
The requisites of an
action for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy
between persons whose interests are adverse; (2) the party seeking the relief
has a legal interest in the controversy; and (3) the issue is ripe for judicial
determination.[33]
The Court rules that the City of
In the instant case, the controversy
concerns the construction of the provisions of Republic Act No. 305 or the
Charter of the City of
To recall, Section 2, Article I of
Republic Act No. 305 defines the territory of the City of
Clearly,
the interests of the City of
Administrative control and
supervision of Plaza Rizal
Republic
Act No. 305 took effect on
Art. 344.
Property of public use, in provinces and in towns, comprises the
provincial and town roads, the squares, streets, fountains, and public waters,
the promenades, and public works of general service paid for by such towns or
provinces.
All other property possessed by either is
patrimonial and shall be governed by the provisions of this code, unless
otherwise provided by special laws.
Under
the 1950 Civil Code, the properties of local government units are set forth in
Article 424 thereof, which reads:
Art. 424. Property
for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities, consist of the
provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains,
public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said
provinces, cities, or municipalities.
All other property
possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code,
without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.
Manifestly, the definition of what constitutes the
properties for public use and patrimonial properties of local government units
has practically remained unchanged.
As regards properties for public use, the principle
is the same: property for public use can be used by everybody, even by
strangers or aliens, in accordance with its nature; but nobody can exercise
over it the rights of a private owner.[36]
It
is, therefore, vital to the resolution of this case that the exact nature of
Plaza Rizal be ascertained. In this
regard, the description thereof by Camarines Sur is enlightening, viz:
The
land subject of the Action filed by the City of
A
historical marker was erected in the said place which attests to the long
standing ownership, possession and management by the
All
the improvements in said place, such as the construction of monuments and
memorial structures, the concreting of its flooring and the walkways, planting
of trees and ornamental plants, the construction of the skating or skateboard
ring, a public TV facility, an internet café, a gazebo where people from all
walks of life discuss religion, political, social and economic issues, a
portable stage where cultural shows are held, a giant chessboard on the tiled
ground with large pieces for playing, where portable booths are installed for
the trade fairs during fiesta or Christmas season, where year-round lights are
wrapped around the trees, all of which have been constructed, operated and
maintained by the Province of Camarines Sur (not by Naga City) where millions
of pesos had been spent for construction and millions of pesos are budgeted
annually for maintenance, operating expenses and personnel services by the
Province of Camarines Sur.[37]
Unmistakable
from the above description is that, at present, Plaza Rizal partakes of the
nature of a public park or promenade. As
such, Plaza Rizal is classified as a property for public use.
In
Applying
the above pronouncements to the instant case, Camarines Sur had the right to
administer and possess Plaza Rizal prior to the conversion of the then
Municipality of Naga into the independent City of Naga, as the plaza was then
part of the territorial jurisdiction of the said province. Said right of administration by Camarines Sur
was governmental in nature, and its possession was on behalf of and in
representation of the Republic of the
Thereafter,
by virtue of the enactment of Republic Act No. 305 and as specified in Section
2, Article I thereof, the City of
Camarines
Sur cannot claim that Plaza Rizal is part of its patrimonial property. The basis for the claim of ownership of Camarines
Sur, i.e., the tax declaration[39]
covering Plaza Rizal in the name of the province, hardly convinces this Court. Well-settled is the rule that a tax
declaration is not conclusive evidence of ownership
or of the right to possess land, when not supported by any other evidence. The same is merely an indicia of a
claim of ownership.[40]
In
the same manner, the Certification[41]
dated 14 June 1996 issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources–Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO)
in favor of Camarines Sur, merely stating that the parcel of land described
therein, purportedly Plaza Rizal, was being claimed solely by Camarines Sur, hardly
constitutes categorical proof of the alleged ownership of the said property by
the province.
Thus,
being a property for public use within the territorial jurisdiction of the City
of
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court is hereby DISMISSED.
The administrative control and
supervision of Plaza Rizal is hereby vested in the City of
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 10-39.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Roberto A. Barrios with Associate Justices Mariano C. del Castillo (now a member of this Court) and Magdangal M. de Leon, concurring; rollo, pp. 40-47.
[3] Rollo, pp. 48-50.
[4] CA rollo, pp. 12-49.
[5] AN ACT CREATING THE CITY OF
[6] AN ACT TRANSFERRING THE SITE OF THE PROVINCIAL CAPITOL OF THE PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR FROM THE CITY OF NAGA TO THE BARRIO OF PALESTINA, MUNICIPALITY OF PILI IN THE SAME PROVINCE.
[7] Section 1. The site of the
provincial capitol of the
[8] Section 3. Upon approval of
this Act, the capital of the
[9] The parties to the original
complaint were respectively referred to as “CITY
GOVERNMENT OF NAGA, herein represented by its City Mayor, Jesse M. Robredo,
Plaintiff” and “PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT
OF CAMARINES SUR, herein represented by its Provincial Governor, Luis R.
Villafuerte, Defendant.” (Records, pp. 1-4)
Subsequently, on
[10] CA rollo, pp. 54-58.
[11] Records, pp. 25-26.
[12] Rollo, pp. 51-53-A.
[13]
[14] CA rollo, pp. 72-88.
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20] Thereafter, On 16 September 1999,
Camarines Sur filed before the Court a Motion for Extension to file a Petition
for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. (CA rollo,
pp. 3-9.) In a Resolution dated
[21] CA rollo, pp. 12-49.
[22] Rollo, p. 54.
[23]
[24]
[25] CA rollo, pp. 299-325.
[26] Rollo, p. 40.
[27] Tirazona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 169712, 14 March 2008, 548 SCRA 560,
575, citing Manila
Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. v. Panado, G.R. No. 167118, 15 June 2006, 490 SCRA 751, 762.
[28] Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. v. Panado, id. at 762-763.
[29] RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, Sec. 1, as amended by A.M. NO. 07-7-12-SC.
[30] See Velayo-Fong v. Velayo, G.R. No. 155488, 6 December 2006, 510 SCRA 320, 329-330, cited in Binay v. Odeña, G.R. No. 163683, 8 June 2007, 524 SCRA 248, 255-256.
[31] Section
1, Rule 63 (Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies) of the Rules of Court
provides:
Section
1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested under a
deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected
by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an
action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of
construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or
duties, thereunder.
[32] Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 54305, 14 February 1990, 182 SCRA 166, 177, cited in Almeda v. Bathala Marketing Industries, Inc., G.R. No. 150806, 28 January 2008, 542 SCRA 470, 480.
[33] See
Galarosa v.
[34] CJH
Development Corporation v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 172457,
[35] CIVIL CODE (1889), Art. 343.
[36] In
the Matter of Reversion/Recall of Reconstituted Act No. 0-116 Decree No. 388, Heirs
of Palaganas v. Registry of Deeds,
[37] Rollo, pp. 138-139.
[38] 115 Phil. 608 (1962).
[39] Records, pp. 99-100.
[40] Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73246, 2 March 1993, 219 SCRA 339, 347.
[41] Records, pp. 101-102.