SECOND DIVISION
DR. CASTOR C. DE JESUS, Petitioner, - versus
- RAFAEL D. GUERRERO III,
CESARIO R. PAGDILAO, AND FORTUNATA B. AQUINO, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 171491
Present:
Quisumbing, J., Chairperson,
Carpio Morales,
BRION,
ABAD, JJ.
Promulgated:
September 4, 2009 |
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DECISION
QUISUMBING,
J.:
Before us is a petition for review seeking to reverse and set
aside the Decision[1] dated
Culled
from the records are the following facts:
Nilo
A. Bareza, Records Officer III of the Philippine Council for Aquatic and Marine
Research and Development (PCAMRD), made out a check payable to himself and
drawn against the Asean-Canada Project Fund, a foreign-assisted project being
implemented by PCAMRD. To avoid being
caught, Bareza stole Land Bank Check No. 070343 from the trust fund of the
PCAMRD from the desk of Arminda S. Atienza, PCAMRD Cashier III. He filled out the check for the amount of P385,000.00,
forged the signatures of the authorized signatories, made it appear that the
check was endorsed to Atienza, and with him as the endorsee, encashed the check
that was drawn against the PCAMRD Trust Fund.
Then, he deposited part of the money to the Asean-Canada Project Fund
and pocketed the difference.[3]
Atienza
discovered that the check in question was missing on the third week of February
1999 while preparing the Report of Checks Issued and Cancelled for the Trust
Fund for the month of January. Not
finding the check anywhere in her office, Atienza called the bank to look for
the same. She was shocked to learn from
a bank employee that the check had been issued payable in her name. When Atienza went to the bank to examine the
check, she noticed that her signature and the signature of Dir. Rafael D.
Guerrero III (Guerrero), PCAMRD Executive Director, were forged. She also found out that Bareza appeared to be
the person who encashed the check.[4]
Bareza
admitted his wrongdoings when he was confronted by Atienza about the incident,
but begged that he be not reported to the management. Bareza also promised to return the money in a
few days. Against her good judgment,
Atienza acquiesced to Bareza’s request, seeing Bareza’s remorse over his
transgressions. But Atienza also felt
uneasy over her decision to keep silent about the whole thing, so Atienza
persuaded Bareza to inform Fortunata B. Aquino (Aquino), PCAMRD Director of
Finance and Administrative Division, about what he did. Bareza, however, decided to confess to
Carolina T. Bosque, PCAMRD Accountant III, instead.[5]
When
Bareza revealed to Bosque what he had done, he was also advised to report the
matter to Aquino, but, Bareza became hysterical and threatened to commit
suicide if his misdeeds were ever exposed.
Due to his fervent pleading and his promise to repay the amount he took,
Bosque, like Atienza, assented to his plea for her to remain silent.[6]
True
to his word, Bareza deposited back P385,000.00 to the PCAMRD account on
On
A
fact-finding committee was thus created by virtue of PCAMRD Memorandum Circular
No. 30[9]
to investigate the burning incident and forgery of checks by Bareza. After investigation, the fact-finding
committee found sufficient evidence to charge Bareza with dishonesty, grave
misconduct and falsification of official document.[10]
The fact-finding committee likewise
found sufficient evidence to charge Atienza with inefficiency and incompetence
in the performance of official duties[11]
and Bosque with simple neglect of duty.[12]
Concomitant
to the above findings, Guerrero formed an investigation committee to conduct
formal investigations on the charges filed against Bareza, Atienza and Bosque.[13] The investigation committee found Bareza
guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct and recommended his dismissal from
the service. It also found sufficient
basis to uphold the charge filed against Atienza and Bosque, and recommended a
minimum penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day suspension for Atienza, and a
maximum penalty of six (6) months suspension for Bosque.[14]
On
Not
convinced with the results of the investigation and the penalties imposed on
Bareza, Atienza and Bosque, petitioner exerted efforts to obtain a copy of the complete
records of the proceedings had. Upon
reading the same, petitioner was of the opinion that the investigation
conducted by the fact-finding committee and investigation committee was
perfunctorily and superficially done, and made only to whitewash and cover-up
the real issues because the report exonerated other persons
involved in the crimes and omitted other erroneous acts. According to him, these circumstances led to
partiality in deciding the charges.
Hence, petitioner filed with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
In
their Joint Counter-Affidavit and Complaint for Malicious Prosecution[17]
dated
In
his Consolidated Reply and Counter-Affidavit[19]
dated
In
a Decision[21]
dated
Petitioner
moved for reconsideration, but the Ombudsman denied it in an Order[23]
dated
Not
accepting defeat, petitioner elevated the matter by way of a petition for review[25] under Rule 43 before the appellate
court. Petitioner claimed that the
Ombudsman gravely erred when it recommended the dismissal of the charges against the
respondents and denied his motion for reconsideration despite the existence of a
prima facie case against them for incompetence
and gross negligence.
On
Petitioner
moved for the reconsideration of the said Decision but it was denied by the
appellate court in the Resolution dated
Hence,
the present petition raising the following issues for our resolution:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DENIED IN ITS DECISION PETITIONER’S PETITION
AND AFFIRMED THE OMBUDSMAN’S DECISION OF AUGUST 5,
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR AND A GRAVE MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS AND
MISAPPRECIATION OF THE EVIDENCE WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE IS NO PRIMA FACIE OR PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST
RESPONDENTS, [THAT] IF CONSIDERED, WILL ALTER THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENTS ARE NOT
ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE.[27]
Simply put, we are asked to resolve whether the appellate court
erred in affirming the dismissal of the complaint. We hold that it did not.
In
administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of
guilt is substantial evidence, i.e.,
that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.
Further, the complainant has the burden of proving by substantial
evidence the allegations in his complaint.
The basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence and is not
equivalent to proof. Charges based on
mere suspicion and speculation likewise cannot be given credence. Hence, when the complainant relies on mere
conjectures and suppositions, and fails to substantiate his allegations, the
administrative complaint must be dismissed for lack of merit.[28]
Mainly,
petitioner ascribes incompetence and gross negligence to respondents because
according to him, the fraudulent use of PCAMRD funds and arson would not have
happened had they not been remiss in the performance of their duties. Specifically, he averred that Guerrero, being
the head of PCAMRD, should have seen to it that all the resources of the
government are managed and expended in accordance with laws and regulations,
and safeguarded against loss and waste; Pagdilao should have ensured that the
signed blank checks were used for what they were intended; and that anomalies
would have been avoided had Aquino supervised Bareza, Atienza and Bosque, her
subordinates, properly and efficiently.
In sum, petitioner argues that they are accountable because of command
responsibility.[29]
We
agree with the appellate court and the Ombudsman that the complaint against the
respondents should be dismissed. A
perusal of petitioner’s allegations clearly shows that they are mere general statements
or conclusions of law, wanting in evidentiary support and substantiation. It is not enough for petitioner to simply
aver that respondents had been derelict in their duties; he must show the
specific acts or omissions committed by them which amount to incompetence and
gross negligence. This, he failed to
do. Hence, the complaint was correctly
dismissed for lack of merit.
Petitioner’s
allegation that he has specified the acts and omissions of respondents which
show that they are guilty of dishonesty and falsification lacks merit. Aside from the fact that nowhere in the
records does it appear that he has indeed shown the particular acts or
omissions of respondents constituting dishonesty or which amounted to
falsification of whatever nature, it must be emphasized that the case he filed
before the Ombudsman was an administrative complaint for incompetence and gross
negligence. Hence, these are the two
charges he needed to prove by substantial evidence, not any other crime or
administrative infraction. At the very
least, petitioner should have shown how his accusations of dishonesty and
falsification constituted incompetence and gross negligence on the part of the respondents.
To
further persuade us that his complaint was wrongly dismissed, petitioner argues
that he had in his petition established the existence of probable cause to hold
respondents liable for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, or the
Anti-Graft and
Corrupt
Practices Act.[30] He then concludes that “if
there is sufficient basis to indict the respondents of a criminal offense then
with more reason that they should be made accountable administratively
considering the fact that the quantum of evidence required in administrative
proceedings is merely substantial evidence.”[31]
This
argument likewise has no merit. It is
worthy to note that petitioner is merely proceeding from his own belief that
there exists sufficient basis to charge respondents criminally. This is not within his province to
decide. He could not arrogate unto himself
the power that pertains to the proper authorities enjoined by law to determine
the absence or existence of probable cause to indict one of a criminal offense.
More
importantly, an administrative proceeding is different from a criminal case and
may proceed independently thereof.[32] Even if respondents would subsequently be
found guilty of a crime based on the same set of facts obtaining in the present
administrative complaint, the same will not automatically mean that they are
also administratively liable.
As
we have said in Gatchalian Promotions
Talents Pool, Inc. v. Naldoza[33]
and which we have reiterated in a host of cases,[34]
a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a
finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely, respondents’ acquittal will not
necessarily exculpate them administratively.
The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether
different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first
two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa.[35]
It
must be stressed that the basis of administrative liability differs from
criminal liability. The purpose of
administrative proceedings is mainly to protect the public service, based on
the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust. On the other hand, the purpose of criminal
prosecution is the punishment of crime.[36]
To state it simply, petitioner
erroneously equated criminal liability to administrative liability.
Neither
will the allegation of the principle of command responsibility make the
respondents liable. In the absence of
substantial evidence of gross negligence of the respondents, administrative
liability could not be based on the principle of command responsibility.[37] Without proof that the head of office was
negligent, no administrative liability may attach. Indeed, the negligence of subordinates cannot
always be ascribed to their superior in the absence of evidence of the latter’s
own negligence.[38] While it may be true that certain PCAMRD
employees were sanctioned for negligence and some other administrative
infractions, it does not follow that those holding responsible positions, like
the respondents in this case, are likewise negligent, especially so when the
contentions of petitioner remain unsubstantiated.
WHEREFORE, there being no
sufficient showing of grave and reversible error in the assailed decision and
resolution, the petition is DENIED. Said Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
|
WE CONCUR: CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
||
ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
MARIANO C. Associate Justice |
|
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice |
||
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 25-32. Penned by Associate Justice Santiago Javier Ranada, with Associate Justices Mario L. Guariña III and Jose Catral Mendoza concurring.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25] CA rollo, pp. 7-21.
[26] Rollo, p. 31.
[27]
[28] Manalabe v. Cabie, A.M. No. P-05-1984,
[29] Rollo, pp. 218-219.
[30]
[31]
[32] Miralles v. Go, G.R. No. 139943, January
18, 2001, 349 SCRA 596, 609; See also Barillo
v. Gervacio, G.R. No. 155088, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA 561, 572; J. King & Sons Company, Inc. v.
Hontanosas, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-03-1802,
[33] A.C. No. 4017,
[34] Miralles v. Go, supra at 609; Office of the Court Administrator v. Sardido,
A.M. No. MTJ-01-1370, April 25, 2003, 401 SCRA 583, 591; Saludo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121404, May 3, 2006, 489
SCRA 14, 19.
[35] Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v.
Naldoza, supra at 413.
[36]
[37]
[38] Nicolas v. Desierto, G.R. No. 154668,
December 16, 2004, 447 SCRA 154, 167; Soriano
v. Marcelo, G.R. No. 167743, November 22, 2006, 507 SCRA 571, 591-592.