THIRD
DIVISION
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ALLAN DIZON Y AQUI, Petitioner, - versus - PEOPLE OF THE Respondent. |
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G.R.
No. 170342 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., PERALTA, and Promulgated: September
18, 2009 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In
this Petition for Review on Certiorari[1]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Allan Dizon y Aqui prays for
the reversal of the Decision,[2]
dated 1 September 2005, and Resolution,[3]
dated 7 November 2005, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00615,
which affirmed with modification the Decision,[4] dated 11 March 2002, of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 75, Olongapo City, in Criminal Cases No. 303-97 to No. 305-97,
finding petitioner guilty of one count of simple rape.
The
records of the case generate the following facts:
On
Criminal Case
No. 303-97
The undersigned
accuses Allan Dizon y Aqui of the crime of Rape, upon complaint under oath filed
by AAA[6]
which is attached hereto and made an integral part hereof as Annex “A”
committed as follows:
That in or about
the month of December, 1996, in the City of Olongapo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with lewd design and by means of force, and intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
of AAA, who was seventeen (17) years old, against her will.
Criminal Case
No. 304-97
The undersigned
accuses Allan Dizon y Aqui of the crime of Rape, upon complaint under oath filed
by AAA which is attached hereto and made an integral part hereof as Annex “A”
committed as follows:
That on or about
the twentieth (20th) day of
February, 1997, in the City of
Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with lewd design and by means of force, and intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
of AAA, who was seventeen (17) years old, against her will.
Criminal Case
No. 305-97
The undersigned
accuses Allan Dizon y Aqui of the crime of Rape, upon complaint under oath filed
by AAA which is attached hereto and made an integral part hereof as Annex “A”
committed as follows:
That in or about
the month of October, 1996, in the City of Olongapo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with lewd designs and by means of force, and intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
of AAA, who was seventeen (17) years old, against her will.
Subsequently,
these cases were consolidated. When arraigned on
The
prosecution presented as witnesses AAA, BBB and Brigida Acuna Navarette. Their testimonies, woven together, bear the
following narrative:
AAA,
daughter of BBB (mother) and CCC (father), live with her parents in a
two-storey house located at
Petitioner
and his wife, EEE (niece of CCC), lived in a house also situated at No. 26
Bonifacio Street, Barangay Pag-asa, Olongapo City. Their house was detached from, and positioned
at the back of, the two-storey house of AAA and her parents. The said houses were located within the same
compound and had the same address.[9]
On
Sometime
in April 1997, BBB observed that AAA was physically weak and lonely. She also noticed that her daughter’s stomach was
becoming bigger. BBB asked her if she
was pregnant, but the latter refused to answer. On
Subsequently,
the police requested the Department of Social and Welfare Development (DSWD)
According
to AAA, this was already the second time that petitioner raped her. The first one happened inside her house while
her parents were not around. The third
rape incident took place in petitioner’s house.[13]
The
prosecution also proffered documentary evidence to bolster the testimonies of
its witnesses, to wit: (1) medical certificate of AAA certifying that she was
pregnant (Exhibit A);[14]
(2) birth certificate of AAA showing that she was born on
For
its part, the defense presented the lone testimony of petitioner to refute the
foregoing accusations. No documentary or
object evidence was adduced.
Petitioner
testified that he and his wife, EEE, lived in a house situated at
After
trial, the RTC rendered a Decision on P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. However, it acquitted petitioner in Criminal
Cases No. 303-97 and No. 305-97 because the prosecution had failed
to prove the commission of rapes in said criminal cases.
Petitioner
filed a Notice of Appeal, to which the RTC gave due course in its Order dated
On
P50,000.00, also awarded by
the appellate court were moral damages amounting to P50,000.00 in favor
of AAA. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but this was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution
dated
Hence,
petitioner lodged the instant Petition assigning the following errors:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING
WITH MODIFICATION THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DESPITE LACK OF
EVIDENCE AGAINST PETITIONER;
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE VERNACULAR “GINALAW PO NIYA AKO” IS SYNONYMOUS WITH RAPE; AND
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT USING THE STANDARDS USED FOR ADULTS IN ASSESSING THE
TESTIMONY OF AAA.
In reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided by three principles,
to wit: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to
prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove;
(2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons
are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with
extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on
its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for
the defense.[21]
As a result of these guiding principles, the credibility of the
complainant becomes the single most important issue. If the testimony of the victim is credible,
convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things,
the accused may be convicted solely on the basis thereof.[22]
We have carefully examined AAA’s court testimony and found it to
be credible and trustworthy. Her positive
identification of petitioner as the one who ravished her on 20 February 1997
(Criminal Case No. 304-97), as well
as her direct account of the bestial act, was clear and consistent, to wit:
FISCAL (to
witness)
Q. How many times were you – which you said
“ginalaw” by the accused Allan Dizon?
A. Several times.
x x x x
Q. Now, you said several times, when was
the second time?
x x x x
WITNESS:
During the birthday of Allan.
COURT (to
witness)
Q. How did you know that it was his
birthday?
A. My cousin told me that it was the
birthday of Allan.
FISCAL (to
witness)
Q. And where did this incident happen?
A. Infront of their house.
Q. Is that a lot?
A. Inside our yard.
Q. Was it in the morning or in the evening?
A. Evening.
Q. And what did the accused do in this second
incident?
A. Inside his house. He called me.
Q. And what happened after he called you?
A. He asked me to do something, but he did
not ask anything.
Q. After that, what happened?
A. Ginalaw
po niya ako.
Q. And you still remember what you were wearing
at the time?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What were you wearing at the time?
A. I was wearing a short.
Q. And what happened to your short?
A. He told me to take off my short.
Q. Did you take off your short?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Why?
A. Because he was holding a knife. He threatened me.
Q. After you took off your short, what
happened?
A. Ginalaw
po niya ako.
Q. Did you feel anything when you said “ginalaw po niya ako”?
x x x x
WITNESS:
Yes, sir.
FISCAL (to
witness)
Q. What did you feel?
A. I felt pain.
COURT (to
witness)
Q. In what part of your body did you feel
pain?
A. From waist downward.
FISCAL (to
witness)
Q. Was there anything inserted in your
vagina?
ATTY GUIAO
Objection.
COURT
Sustained.
FISCAL (to
witness)
Q. Why did you feel pain on your lower part
of your body?
A. My vagina sustained a wound.
COURT (to
witness)
Q. How did you know that your vagina
sustained a wound?
A. When I urinated. I felt pain.
Q. Why did you sustain a wound in your
vagina?
A. There was a blood on my vagina.
x x x x
FISCAL (to
witness)
Q. Who caused the wound in your vagina?
x x x x
WITNESS
Allan.
FISCAL (to
witness)
Q. How did he cause the wound?
A. Because of his penis.
Q. And what about his penis?
A. He put cologne on my vagina.
COURT (to
witness)
Q. After putting cologne on your vagina,
what did he do?
A. Ginalaw
po niya ako.
Q. What do you mean by “ginalaw po niya ako”?
A. He threatened me.
COURT
Continue
x x x x
FISCAL (to
witness)
Q. Why did the accused threaten you when you
said “ginalaw po niya ako”?
A. He told me not to report the
matter. He told me that if I report the
matter to my mother, he would fight my father.
COURT (to
witness)
Q. How did [he] threaten you?
A. If I report the matter he would create a
trouble.
x x x x
Q. And when you said “ginalaw po niya ako,” what did the accused do in general?
A. He took off my panty.
Q. And after the accused took off your
panty?
A. “Ginalaw
po niya ako.”
Q. With what did he touch you?
A. My vagina.
COURT (to
witness)
Q. What did he do with your vagina?
A. He inserted his penis on my vagina.
Q. How did you know that he inserted his
penis?
A. I saw it.
Q. What did you feel?
A. I felt pain.
Q. Why?
A. When he brought out his penis, I felt
pain.[23]
Well-entrenched is the rule that when a woman says that she has
been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that the rape was
indeed committed.[24]
It is also significant to note that the RTC gave full credence to
the foregoing testimony of AAA, as she relayed her painful ordeal in a candid
manner. It found her testimony to be credible
and sincere. Jurisprudence instructs that when the credibility of a witness is
of primordial consideration, as in this case, the findings of the trial court,
its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the
probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings
are accorded respect if not conclusive effect. This is because the trial court has had the
unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of a witness and was in the best
position to discern whether they were telling the truth. When the trial court’s findings have been
affirmed by the appellate court, as in the present case, said findings are
generally binding upon this Court.[25]
Further, BBB and Navarette corroborated AAA’s testimony on
material and relevant points.
Petitioner,
however, maintains that there was no rape because when AAA was asked during the
trial what petitioner had done to her on
In
rape cases, the testimony of complainant must be considered and calibrated in
its entirety, and not in its truncated portion or isolated passages thereof.[27] The true meaning of answers to questions
propounded to a witness is to be ascertained with due consideration of all the
questions and answers given thereto. The
whole impression or effect of what has been said or done must be considered,
and not individual words or phrases alone.[28] Facts imperfectly stated in answer to a
question may be supplied or clarified by one’s answer to other questions.[29]
Initially,
AAA made vague explanations of what she meant by “ginalaw po niya ako.” However,
subsequent inquiries clarified her statement “ginalaw po niya ako” to mean that petitioner inserted his penis into
her vagina, viz:
COURT (to
witness)
Q. After putting cologne on your vagina,
what did he do?
A. Ginalaw
po niya ako.
Q. What do you mean by “ginalaw po niya ako”?
A. He threatened me.
x x x x
Q. And when you said “ginalaw po niya ako,” what did the accused do in general?
A. He took off my panty.
Q. And after the accused took off your
panty?
A. “Ginalaw
po niya ako.”
Q. With what did he touch you?
A. My vagina.
COURT (to
witness)
Q. What did he do with your vagina?
A. He
inserted his penis on my vagina.
Q. How did you know that he inserted his
penis?
A. I saw it.
Q. What did you feel?
A. I felt pain.[30]
(Emphasis supplied.)
AAA’s
difficulty in clarifying her statement “ginalaw
po niya ako” cannot undermine her credibility. It should be noted that she was illiterate at
the time she testified on the incident.[31] Hence, her testimony must be treated with the
broadest understanding and consideration of attendant circumstances. At any rate, AAA sufficiently explained her
statement “ginalaw po niya ako” to
mean that petitioner inserted his penis into her vagina. The RTC and the Court of Appeals were,
therefore, correct in concluding that what she meant when she said those words
was that petitioner raped her.
To
rebut the overwhelming evidence for the prosecution, petitioner interposed the defense
of denial and alibi. He denied raping
AAA and claimed that he was celebrating his birthday in his house with
relatives and friends when the alleged incident occurred.
Denial
is inherently a weak defense, as it is negative and self-serving. It cannot prevail over the positive testimonies
of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it
is easy to contrive and difficult to prove. It must be proved by the accused with clear
and convincing evidence. For alibi to
prosper, it is not enough for the accused to prove that he was somewhere else
when the crime was committed. He must
likewise prove that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the
crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of the commission of the
crime.[32]
In
the case at bar, the incident occurred inside petitioner’s house on the evening
of petitioner’s birthday, which was on
Petitioner also averred that the family of AAA had
an ill motive in accusing him of raping her. He explained that when CCC and petitioner’s
brother-in-law were drunk, the two would call him a “sampid.” Also, when
petitioner had arguments or misunderstandings with the two of them, they would
tell him to leave the house and find another residence.
Motives such as family feuds, resentment, hatred or revenge have
never swayed this Court from giving full credence to the testimony of a rape
victim.[33]
Also, ill motives become inconsequential
if there is an affirmative and credible declaration from the rape victim, which
clearly establishes the liability of the accused.[34]
In the present case, AAA categorically
identified petitioner as the one who defiled her. Her account of the incident, as found by the
RTC, the Court of Appeals, and this Court, was sincere and truthful. Hence, petitioner’s uncorroborated and flimsy allegation
of ill motive is immaterial.
As the rape was committed on
Republic
Act No. 7659 states that the crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. However, if the rape was committed with the
use of a deadly weapon, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. Further, the supreme penalty of death shall be
imposed if the rape victim was a minor and
the offender was her parent, ascendant or relative. Under the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure,[36]
which should be given retroactive effect following the rule that statutes governing
court proceedings shall be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage, the information must state the
qualifying and the aggravating circumstances attending the commission of the
crime for them to be considered in the imposition of the penalty.[37]
The
information alleged that AAA was a minor (17 years old) during the incident. Nevertheless, there was no allegation that
petitioner was her parent, ascendant or relative. Further, there was no allegation that he raped
her with the use of a deadly weapon. Hence,
the penalty imposable on petitioner is reclusion
perpetua. The RTC and the Court of
Appeals thus acted accordingly in imposing on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
As
regards the damages awarded and their corresponding amounts, we agree with the
Court of Appeals that AAA is entitled to the amount of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity and another P50,000.00 as moral damages. Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, the
victim in simple rape cases is entitled to an award of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity and another P50,000.00 as moral damages.[38]
In
criminal cases, exemplary damages may be imposed on the offender as part of the
civil liability when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances.[39] Nonetheless, it is required that the
aggravating circumstance/s be alleged in the information and proved during the
trial.[40]
As
earlier stated, the minority of the victim and her relationship with the
offender, as well as the use of a deadly weapon in the commission of rape, is
an aggravating/qualifying circumstance in the crime of rape. Minority and relationship must both be alleged
in the information and proved during the trial in order to be appreciated as an
aggravating/qualifying circumstance.[41]
While the information in the instant
case alleged that AAA was a minor during the incident, there was no allegation
that petitioner was her parent, ascendant or relative. Also, there was no allegation that petitioner
raped AAA with the use of a deadly weapon.
Thus, the award of exemplary damages in the instant case is not
warranted.
WHEREFORE,
the instant Petition is hereby DENIED.
The Decision, dated
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate
Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
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DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice |
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MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate
Justice Chairperson,
Third Division |
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
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REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice |
* Associate
Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo was designated to sit as additional member
replacing Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura per Raffle dated
[1] Rollo, pp. 10-29.
[2] Penned
by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo with Associate Justices Andres B.
Reyes, Jr. and Lucas P. Bersamin (now a member of this Court), concurring; rollo, pp. 32-55.
[3] Rollo, pp. 95-96.
[4]
[5]
[6] Pursuant
to Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the “Anti-Violence Against Women
and Their Children Act of 2004” and its implementing rules, the real name of
the victim, together with the real names of her immediate family members, is
withheld; and fictitious initials instead are used to represent her, both to protect her privacy. People v.
Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693,
[7] Rollo, p. 57.
[8] TSN,
[9]
[10] TSN,
[11] TSN,
[12] TSN,
[13]
[14] Rollo, p. 230.
[15]
[16]
[17] TSN,
[18] Rollo, p. 45.
[19]
[20] G.R.
Nos. 147678-87,
[21] People
v. Mangitngit, G.R. No. 171270,
[22]
[23] TSN,
3 September 1998, pp. 29-45.
[24] People v. Pioquinto, G.R. No. 168326,
[25] People
v. Bejic, G.R. No. 174060,
[26] Rollo, pp. 20-28.
[27] People v. Olarte, 418 Phil. 111, 123 (2001).
[28] People v. Jackson, 451 Phil. 610, 627 (2003).
[29] People v. Bacus, 411 Phil. 632, 645 (2001).
[30] TSN,
[31]
[32] People v. Montesa, G.R. No. 181899, 572
SCRA 317, 340.
[33] People v. Audine, G.R. No. 168649,
[34] People v.
[35] People v. Ortizuela, G.R. No. 135675,
[36] Rule 110, SEC. 8. Designation of offense. – The complaint or information shall
state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or
omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances. x x x.
Rule 110, SEC. 9. Cause of the accusation.
The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise
language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for
the court to pronounce judgment.
[37] People v. Salalima, 415 Phil. 414, 428 (2001).
[38] People v. Biong, 450 Phil. 432, 448 (2003);
People v. Invencion, 446 Phil. 775,
792 (2003); People v. Pagsanjan, 442
Phil. 667, 687 (2002).
[39] Civil
Code, Article 2229.
[40] People v. Tampus, G.R. No. 181084,
[41]